Jimbo I would like to bring up your assertion that the 352nd Division was a crack division in and refer you to the memoirs of Lt. Col Fritz Ziegalman who was the Chief of Staff of the 352nd and he recounts thus: ""Having had served as a senior General Staff Officer, on the 5th of December 1943, I now reported to the staff, in St. Lo, of the just-forming 352nd Infantry Division (Infantriedivison 352 , abv. 352.ID). By then, the Division's headquarters had already been activated, (5th November), and by the 14th of November, the 914th and 916th Infantry Regiments (Grenadierregiment) were set up. " "By the 29th of January 1944, the 352nd Infantry Division (352ID) only had four infantry battalions and four artillery batteries combat-ready." To fill out the Division's ranks, new recruits were drafted from Wehrkreiss X(?-XI), which was the ' 10th (?11?) Defense Home-District' within Salzwedel-Dessau-Goettingen Hameln-Celle. In geographical Terms it included Lueneburger Heide, Magdeburger Boerde and the Harz Mountains. -SB "As for the eventual date of deployment after completing the formation of the 352ID (to the Eastern Front, Italian Front, the Balkans or remain in the West?), there were no clear orders. It was generally assumed that we could count on being sent to the Eastern Front after the 1st of March1944. So training for the 352ID focused on Eastern Front combat operations. The building process itself went very slowly, especially procurement. Since I had been, from October 1942 to March 1943, Chief Quartermaster for the Army High Command and at this time intimate with procurement issues; it fell to me to providing equipment to outfit the now forming 352ID. For example, live-fire training school was not possible until the end of February, because the delivery of gun sights and sight mounting-plates was not possible before mid-February. By March, each soldier had thrown just two hand-grenades and had only three live-fire training exercises. The training of auxiliary drivers (French civilian truck drivers) was not possible until the 1st of May, because of fuel shortages. During training, we also had our manpower problems. Our 14 infantry companies were not set up until February, and then they were trained for the Russian Front as anti-tank companies. The replacements, mostly teenagers, were physically unfit for all but limited military duty, because of food shortages in Germany. As of May 1st, 50% of the officer corps was inexperienced and 30% of the noncommissioned officer positions went unfilled, because of the lack of competent sergeants. The total manpower of our 'Type 44' infantry division amounted to around 12,000 men of which 6,800 were combat troops, including around 1,500 'Hiwis' (Russian Volunteers). By the fall of 1944, after five years of war, Germany had exhausted its manpower base while still being pressed to provide fresh Divisions to the war-fronts. Their solution was to reduce the manpower size of their Division structure while beefing up their firepower to maintain comparable combat strength levels. This new Division structure model is known as the 'Type 44 Division.' The 'Old' German Division model included three infantry regiments (3,250 men each) having three battalions in each regiment; with a Division manpower total of 17,200 men. The new 'Type 44 Division model consist of three regiments (2,008 men each) organized in two battalions. This, along with other cut-backs, cap at a Division strength of 12,352 men. The 352ID was constituted using the 'Type 44' model. -SB During this initial organizing period, the Division was ordered to have ready, by January 1st., a special combat team, on 'stand-by' for possible emergency deployment in Holland, Belgium and France. This team consisted of a infantry regiment, an artillery and an engineer battalion with elements of signal, supply and divisional staffs. The mobilization and deployment of this force was possible, by foot and rail, with 12 hours notice. From the 1st of May 1944, the same readiness measures were applied to the entire Division. By the 1st of March 1944, the 352ID reached adequate strength and was fully equipped. But, because of diversions of men and material to the Russian Front, the slow arrival of new men, ammunition and weapons during the previous three months, delayed proper training until now. Company and battery level training was probably satisfactory, if not judged too harshly, however battalion and regiment level training did not take place." Source: http://www.omaha-beach.org/US-Version/352/352US.html I think you are confusing "well-organised" with "crack". The German Infantry Forces stationed in Normandy up to May 1944 were by no means Crack Troops. The Eastern Front always got the "Pick of the Crop" up until the Beginning of 1944 until Hitler could no longer ignore the warnings coming from the West. The officer further goes on to say that of the 333 officers, 50% were without Combat Experience, a 30% shortfall in the number of NCO's, and the 9,650 men were mostly 17 year old recruits, hardly crack troops. This was no Hitlerjugend, where the NCO's and Officers were battle-hardened veterans of the Eastern Front having served in the LAH. Gotthard, I am sure I have read them as "crack" in most places but that is just a specific term, it really just means "experienced". They are called experienced because the core of them had fought in the Russian front. Here is the link: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/100-11/ch2.htm#Pre-Assault BTW: These were not "stationed" at Normandy. They were assigned there as an anti-invasion force. The 716th was there as the static forces. Here is a link where they are called crack: http://www.lssport.com/birdtours/sub_ddaybeaches.htm So I don't know if it is the term "crack" that gives you heartburn or if it is the fact that the core units were exprienced from fighting on the Eastern Front.