Omaha Beach questions.

On D Day LCT(6) 603 was indeed Army Serial 55 as planned, because of the Jeep marked "1-32-?? HQ-6" seen disembarking from it:


The only unit with "32" in its designation in any of the eight LCT(6)(DD) in CT 16 Landing Table is "Det 32d FA Bn", which had two Jeeps (with one driver each) pre-loaded on board LCT Army Serial 55. The 32nd Field Artillery Battalion was part of the US 1st Infantry Division, hence the marking 1-32-F. Strict compliance with the official US vehicle marking regulations, nicely explained here:
WWII Unit Identification Markings for U.S. Military Vehicles, Jeep and Truck Bumper Markings (LoneSentry.com)
would have called for 1-32F-HQ-6, but the displacement of the hyphen is but a slight deviation from the rule.

However, things apparently did not totally go according to plan for LCT 603, because its planned load after it had launched its DD tanks did not include any Cub Plane...

Michel

 

Splendid clips.

There is a lot of detail on the small modifications made for carrying DD tanks. Chains to hold the ramp at the correct height and angle for DD launching. White lines to mark the centre and track positions. small track guides welded on the deck.

Some clips are very atmospheric as well as informative.

The small observation aircraft were given a lot of thought. They were obviously useful in their primary role of spotting enemy artillery and troops. Reconnaissance aircraft from the UK were not so good at this. The British considered using an old aircraft carrier (Argus?) to carry Austers across the Channel but changed their mind at the last moment. The Auster was somewhat sturdier than the Piper and it was thought that they could fly across the Channel. On the day the weather defeated them.

The normal method of moving both Auster and Piper was on a truck. The US Army used a standard 2 1/2 ton 6 X 6 and the British a Bedford or Austin 6 pdr AT portee. With the wings removed of course.

As far as I can tell none were flown on D Day.

I am still digesting the information posted two weeks ago.

Mike

 

I find that it was indeed planned to fly Piper Cub aircraft off the beach on D Day. A simple strip was to have been marked out on Charley beach, at the right/west end of Omaha. Since the cliffs overlooking this beach were not cleared on D Day the plan was not put into operation.

Some of the LCT(6) which had launched/landed DD tanks are later listed as carrying barrage balloons and a four man crew for them.
Balloons were not allowed to be flown on the early waves of craft since they could be spotted visually and by radar.
The navy did not permit uninflated balloons and gas cylinders to be carried.
So where did the balloons come from? Were they carried on the APAs?

Mike.

 

This looks like an unsolvable puzzle: why would the four man barrage balloon crew have to be already on board together with the DD tanks (as per the LCT Assignment Table here http://ww2lct.org/history/actionreports/O14.jpg) if their balloon was not with them?
I can think of at least two reasons why the balloon would indeed have been pre-loaded on some LCT(6) carrying DD tanks in spite of the valid objections you raised:
- the balloons were not to be flown but kept on the bridge so as to reduce their visibility
- the LCT(6) carrying DD tanks were not supposed to beach with the first waves but to launch their tanks 6,000 yars offshore

Following are a few sources about barrage balloons.
About the US 320th Bar Bln Bn:
Forgotten

FM 4-117 ( Barrage Balloon - Operation of Matériel and Employment of Personnel ):
http://www.easy39th.com/files/FM_4-...Materiel_and_Employment_of_Personnel_1942.pdf

Barrage Balloon Manual by 2064968 LACW Margaret Lindsey (make sure to explore the first link - Site Directory - as well):
New Page 1

17 Balloon Centre - RAF Sutton on Hull

Michel

 

Typically rail loading was used for the first load of troops dispatched, before the LCVPs had been lowered into the water. Once the LCVPs returned from their first run, they were typically net loaded for follow-on waves. This is because it took too much time to snag the LCVPs and haul them back up to rail level. LCMs, of course, were never rail loaded that I have seen.

The picture above showing troops rail loading from the Chase is an interesting exception. The Chase's Action Report states that the last rail loaded LCVPs were in the water by 0601 hours, and after that they were net loaded for subsequent waves. The craft in your picture is an interesting historical oddity and there's a story behind why this LCVP was hoisted back up as an exception to normal practice. I hope to have an article posted on line concerning this story and some related aspects in a week or two. If you don't mind, I don't want to give it away now, but will wait till it gets posted.

Bin

 

Bin,

Welcome to the forum. I look forward to reading your article.

Mike

 

Thanks to all those who have provided information, material or pointers as to where to look I now have a vast archive relating to Omaha Beach. Work is progressing well on three fronts: the naval effort, the D Day landings and the Beach Maintenance Area. However progressing well is not the same as progressing rapidly and it will be some time, months, before I can start posting. I do of course have questions and these will appear from time to time.

Mike

 

Sorry for the belated follow-up.

LCVP 26-26 had a brief brush with semi-fame. WWII combat photographer Robert Capa landed on Easy Red Sector of Omaha Beach, and after a very brief stay sought refuge on an LCI(L) that had beached nearby. Shortly thereafter the LCI was hit and the crew suffered several casualties. Somewhere en route back to the Transport Area, the LCI hailed LCVP 26-26 to transfer some of its casualties to the attack transport USS Chase. Capa boarded LCVP 26-26 with the casualties, and was taken back to the Chase with them.

As I noted in my earlier post, LCVPs were normally rail-loaded for the first trip of the day, and then net-loaded for subsequent trips. However, there are two separate photos showing LCVP 26-26 being rail-loaded for a second trip to the beach. One was taken by Capa, the second is credited to the US Coast Guard. So the 26-26 was an exception to the normal procedures. I suspect this was due to the casualties that were aboard, and they decided it would be easier to transfer them to the Chase if they simply hauled the LCVP back up to rail level. The Chase's deck log said the last rail-loaded LCVP was lowered by 0601 hours, but that entry was made as the last of those craft were lowered at that time. It was already entered into the log long before 26-26 came back and they made an exception.

If you are interested in more detail concerning Capa ad his retreat from the beach, you can find my article at:
Part I: http://www.nearbycafe.com/artandpho...est-post-24-charles-herrick-on-capas-d-day-e/
and
Part II: Guest Post 24: Charles Herrick on Capa’s D-Day (f) « Photocritic International

Bin

 

Bin,

I must apologise. I read this post with interest when you posted it. I am sure that I wrote a reply but I am quite capable of pressing the wrong button, or forgetting to press any button at all.

I am just looking at the APAs and APs used on Omaha. These have been my favourite warships since I read about them in the 1950s and then saw the film 'Away all Boats'. They seem to have been neglected as a separate topic despite their great importance in amphibious operations. I can think of three models which have been produced over the years but all are of the late VC2 types.

Anyway a belated thank you for your post and links.

Mike
(Hope I have pressed the Post Reply button).

 

Appreciate your comments. My focus has always been on the ground side of things, and where I've dabbled in the amphib side I have tended to concentrate on the Southwest Pacific side of things, where attack transports were few and far between and LSTs generally had to fill the gap (except in the latter stages), so my knowledge of them is very thin. I've only found myself researching the Chase due to the Capa connection.

I remember Away All Boats very well. A great example of a class of war movies you seldom see today.

 

I may have missed something regarding the loading of jeeps on the LCTs that carried DD tanks in the first wave (I wasn't able to open some of the links), so I hope this isn't re-plowing the same ground. It appears the loads landed at H+220 were only loaded onto the LCTs after the first wave had been discharged. At least that is what the marginal notes in the landing tables indicate.

I'm attaching two pages from Annex 3, to Field Order #5, the 16th RCT's plan for the invasion. That annex is the landing table for the 16th RCT. The first picture is page 1 from the RCT's landing table and shows the load-out for Wave 1, the DD Tanks (and part of Wave 2); it shows the 4 DD tanks and the 20 personnel who made up their crew. Since LCT 55 is listed at the top of this form, and it's been discussed earlier in this thread, we'll track it to the next pic.


The second picture is page 30 of the landing tables, showing LCT 55's load for its scheduled H+220 beaching. Note the far right column. It states: "LCT 55 report to Henrico after releasing DD tks at sea, to pick up vehicles." There are similar comments for the other DD tank LCTs, though some direct the LCTs back to the Chase.


This third picture is a page 38 from the 116th RCT's landing table showing the second load for LCT 95 (H+215), which earlier carried in DD tanks of Wave 1. In this case the notation is at the bottom of the page rather than the right hand column, but the message is the same: "Personnel and vehicles from APA #3 are loaded in the Transport Area on LCT(6) 95 after it has returned from disgorging DD tanks at L/D." (The comment above it looks like it is a typo, as the asterisk references LCT 97, not 94 as stated in the footnote.)


Hope this helps clear things up. I had some info on the landing of the barrage balloons that I dug up for a book I provided research for a couple years ago. I don't want to rely on memory, so I'll hold off until/if I can find the actual data. My filing system - such as it is - is not what one could wish it were . . .

 

The Barrage Balloons.

The Western Naval Task Force OPLAN 02-44, specified:

"4. During the initial crossings, the following rules shall be followed for balloons:
a. Ships and craft that are to arrive in the transport area prior to H minus 15 minutes shall not fly balloons.
b. Those arriving after that time which will beach on the first tide will not fly their balloons at more than 100 feet."

But this refers to the balloons that were part of the ships' equipment. Army balloons were handled differently. Army balloons would be inflated in the UK by RAF/RN personnel and then be tethered to selected landing craft to be ferried across the channel. These balloons were merely along for the ride, and not acting as part of the convoy air defense system; they were on short 100 foot tethers. Once the landing craft reached the invasion beach, the Army men of the 320th Barrage Balloon Battalion (Very Low Altitude) would come aboard, take the balloon, and install it in the shore barrage.

The Navy OPLAN also specifically prohibited the ships from carrying uninflated Army balloons or hydrogen supplies. In fact, the Navy was very leery of shipping hydrogen, and the unit did not receive any hydrogen resupply, relying entirely on balloons originally filled in the UK. BY D+15, the battalion had amassed 141 balloons over Omaha and Utah beaches.

The Western Naval Task Force authorized the Army to bring one tethered balloon on every LST in Forces O, U and B (again, those arriving in the transport area after H-15 and beaching H+225 or later). These were in addition to the Navy ships' balloons and were tethered to the aft rail of the LST on a 100 foot leash. LCT3s and LCT4s in Force B were also authorized to take on inflated Army balloons. The Army was responsible for all aspects of handling these balloons in Forces O, U and B. Thereafter, the balloons could be ferried unattended by Army troops.

So, what does that mean when talking about the Force O landing craft and our barrage balloons crews?
- The Force O LCTs did not fly Army balloons, so all those teams from the 3230th Barrage Balloon Battalion that came in with Force O consisted just of the men and their equipment - but no balloons. [Though the 16th RCT landing tables shows one balloon - specified as a balloon in the equipment/vehicle column - scheduled to come in on LCT 84 at H+220 on Fox Green. Probably an error. The 116th RCTs landing tables also show a few balloons coming in via LCT beginning H+330, but again this seems to be an error since the Navy order had forbidden it.]
- Force O LSTs did not beach on Omaha that day, so ferrying balloons ashore posed something of a problem. I have seen nothing that verifies any of these balloons made it ashore until very late on D-Day.
- The first balloons coming in via LCT would not have arrived until Force B's LCTs began beaching later in the afternoon. Force B was supposed to land on the 2d and 3d tides. (2d low tide was at about 1800 hours and 2d high tide at about 2300 hours).

While the Navy OPLAN authorized tethered balloons to be brought in on D-Day (after H+225) it is doubtful any came ashore for at least another 8 hours (1800-1830 hours).
- The Assault Group O-2 commander said that the bulk of his LCTs (none of which towed balloons) did not begin to land until 1625 hours due to beach congestion, so Force B's LCTs (some of which did tow balloons) would have been delayed until O-2 had cleared out a couple hours later.
- The 320th Barrage Balloon Battalion history says balloons and crews did come in, but it also said that its barrage did not fly till D+1.
- An article in the 1994 Air Defense Artillery Yearbook stated the first balloon at Utah Beach came ashore at 2315 hours on D-Day, and the first balloons began flying over Omaha Beach at virtually the same time (2300 hours).

So essentially no Army balloons were over Omaha Beach on D-Day until an hour before midnight.

Hope this helps clarify things.

 

Hello Bin,

Regarding your post #31 above on the loading of jeeps and other vehicles on the LCT(DD), you are partly correct in that some of the vehs were loaded after the first wave. However, some jeeps and trailers were "pre-loaded" in the LCT in the UK before the DD tanks were themselves embarked.

On D Day, after the DD tanks were launched (the pre-loaded jeeps remaining on board), the LCT went to their alloted APA to complete their load with vehicles carried on board the APA. Only then did they beach to disembark both pre-loaded and APA-loaded vehicles and personnel.

The Landing Table you kindly posted tells us precisely this:

On page 1, the "Embarkation Sector or Port" is given as "Portland Hard 3" (Column (k)):


On page 30, LTIN 2182 (inside the Green rectangle on the attachment below) planned to land at H+220 is actually made up of two loads:
- a first one (Blue rectangle), already on LCT(55), composed of 2 jeeps of 32d FA Bn and 4 jeeps of 18th Inf which have been embarked at Portland Hard 3 (same as the DD tanks)
- a second one (Yellow rectangle), embarked on APA 2 (HENRICO) at Portland Hard 1, and consisting in 3 Jeeps & their trailers from 81st Cml Wpns Bn.

Note that the asterisk ahead of the Remark "LCT 55 report to Henrico after releasing DD tks at sea, to pick up vehs" which you mention refers to the second part of the load only.


As a quite unrelated remark, one notices that no LTIN is alloted to the DD wave, probably because the LCT were not intended to beach then, as noted in the last "Remarks" column (o) (inside the blue square in the first attachment (page 1) above). This however is rather strange, since the LTIN does not represent a craft but a load. This is in contrast with the Eastern Task Force Landing Tables which allocate an LTIN to each of the DD loads, although the LCT which carried them were not supposed to land with the first wave either. The difference of approach is all the more bizarre as in the ETF it was decided that LTINs and Craft serials were to be one and the same... But this is another subject!

Michel

 

Michael,

Thank you very much. I see your point and it makes perfect sense. Don't know why I didn't pick it up when I read the thread; I'll just blame it on advanced age! Appreciate it.

Chuck

 

Chuck,

I imagine you will have the same references for balloons as I have. There is indeed little mention of them actually being landed. It is difficult to imagine that anyone would struggle up a beach under fire while flying a balloon, even a small one. The only hard fact seems to be that some at least were flown at 2315 hours at Exit E3. They were taken down again as it got light next morning.

I am not sure that it was the intention that personnel of 320 Company should land without balloons but that was most likely the case in the event. When it is said that the balloons were to be accompanied by army personnel I have assumed that army balloon personnel would be accompanied by balloons but that may not be the case.

On British beaches the balloon personnel landed carrying the balloon winch with balloon attached.

Mike

 

Trux,

Aside from the Western Naval Task Force OPLAN and the First US Army OPLAN there really isn't a whole lot. I have a copy of the unit history. It's only about 15 pages and about half of those are cover letters and endorsements. Unfortunately it consists of a series of non-used friendly .jpg files rather than a text document or Adobe Rader file. If you don't have it and want it let men know and I'll post it somewhere convenient. If you have any other sources I'd love to take a peek at them,

Linda Hervieux published a book on this unit, 'Forgotten: The Untold Story of D-Day's Black Heroes, at Home and at War'. Much of the focus is on the social aspects, and the memories of the participants was often clouded by the 70 years separation from the D-Day landings, but there is some interesting background detail.

I have never quit understood the intent of sending in the crews in the manner they did. According to the unit history the battalion was broken down and its pieces sent over in more than 150 separate landing craft. That's got to be a record for dispersion! I assume (with all the dangers that entails) that the purpose of sending the ground teams in several hours before the balloons were to arrive was to ensure the winches and anchors were in place before the balloons came ashore. Still, fragmenting them over so many craft seems excessive in hindsight.