Liddle Hart has baggage here and you should have done some research on him before accepting his version of WW2.
Does not bother me because I am Irish. Now is it possible you could try and answer the questions I put to you earlier. Can you list me the consequences that flowed from 'the failure to take Caen' on June 6 and how this 'failure' impacted the Allied plans? What would happened in Caen was taken on June 6th and how would it have changed the way the war was fought in NWE 1944-45. Or even_what were the Allied plans for the NWE Campaign?
I think 14000 dead French civilians when pulverised from the air, due to the ground forces being unable to take Caen, could be considered a serious consequence. Going off the thread, the topic being did German Generals like Rommel and Von Kluge somehow conspire with Allied command in their belief it would benefit Germany as a whole for the allies to reach Berlin before Russians. It's clear the consensus on here is NO. With Rommel traveling to command posts throughout Normandy asking his compatriot Generals if they would follow his orders, or high commands, this is fact and documented.It may be pure garbage but theirs little pieces of evidence I've mentioned before peaked my interest, it wouldn't be a forum if we all had the same ideas, along with being WW 2 experts because you've watched saving private Ryan.
That would require understanding what happened in real life. Real history is what kiska is trying to subvert with his/her fantasies. So don't hold your breath. Well, for someone who claimed he had no agenda and just a historical theory he/she wished to discuss, you are doing a bang up job of avoiding discussing all the elements which determine whether your theory is lunatic fringe neo-nazi conspiracy or plausible historical insight. I wonder why? Is it because you are here to push an agenda? Do these alleged documents exist and say what you claim they do? Presenting them here would go a long way to increasing your credibility as a historical thinker above that of famed historical combat writer AA Milne.
Incorrect. It made no difference when Caen was 'taken'. It is a detail latched on to by low-information posters but in the overall scheme of things it was of no importance. You cant come up with anything because you simply do not know enough about the Normandy campaign..
Just noticed kiska deleted his avatar, aptly described by another member (who also deleted his comment?) as "a baby wearing a nazi helmet" or something similar. Probably because it was telling too much about the nostalgia or the hidden agenda, or just the level of historical understanding of his poster...
Could we chill out on the new members chaps. It's been mentioned some members are getting a tad aggressive very quickly. Cheers.
No offence taken here. Its just that this forum is about British and Commonwealth forces. Much of the internet is overrun by political content based on misinterpreted history. Those who value the quality of the thinking and research posted here are keen to avoid this forum being over run with off topic material. Seriously, AHF is a good forum to air the views you posted in the original post. I lurk there because the denizens of AHF include people who know really know their stuff on matters axis. Post your question there and be prepared for a robust and informed debate.
AHF has taken a decision to go for clicks and as such the amount of What-Iffery (code word for 'what can we change to make Germany win WW2') has mushroomed so that it is now the bulk of all new content.
After a few weeks of research, regarding my theory on Rommel and Von Kluge conspiring to open up the Western front, to allow the Allies to reach Berlin before the Russians, I've found interesting information regarding the subject. The first is a documentary on YouTube titled ' Erwin Rommel - The Desert Fox ' by TDC World Biography Documentaries, alludes in a part where Kluge confers with Rommel, to open up the Western front. I've also just completed reading ' Field Marshal the life and death of Erwin Rommel by Daniel Allan Butler ' a quote from the book as follows. " I'll tell you this much Rommel said, Field Marshal Von Kluge and I have sent the Fuhrer an ultimatum, telling him the war can't be won" , "what if the Fuhrer refuses," asks Von Kluge, " then I'm going to open up the Western front," replied Rommel without hesitation. The book also quotes Rommel on his thoughts that it would be in Germany's interest for the Western Allies to reach Berlin first and hopefully cut off the Russians advance in the East. So their is some evidence to support my theory, although Rommel might not have grasped the allies unconditional surrender and may have thought at least Churchill might be open to talks, knowing his dislike and untrustworthy view of the Russians, the Americans would never settle for any compromise, however any German officers such as Rommel would facilitate in opening the Western front.
I would be careful quoting Daniel Allen Butler. He has not used German or Italian sources and his work is riddled with errors accordign to this review. Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel Book Reviews It is suspicious how the author quotes from two German officers, neither of whom survived to tell their story. Who recorded this treacherous dialogue that would have been a smoking gun for anyone investigating their links to the July plot? As has been mentioned before, it sounds as if you are looking for evidence to support your theory rather than reading widely and in depth and being prepared to revise your opinions. I suspect it is this which has attracted some of the critical comment on this thread.
1944-1945. Bill Downs Reports From the Western Front 21 August 1944. "You have to move a little faster, the convoys are more crowded, and you spend a lot more time looking at the back end of the truck ahead of you, and you don't spend more than a night or two in the same slit trench—you move forward all the time. You eat a lot of cold rations because you're on the move and when you bump into the enemy rearguard the fighting is just as bitter as it was before. And when you take the Nazi-held position you find that there haven't been many Germans because the enemy has retreated, and there isn't much booty and not many prisoners—yet. But there are mines, hundreds of them. They lie in the roads, and sometimes there is a string of six of them down a road. You set one off and the whole road goes up for ten yards ahead and behind you. And there are plenty of the S mines—the nasty anti-personnel type that jumps into the air before it explodes and then hurls bits of steel and ball bearings to kill or wound anything living within a hundred feet radius. You have to be mighty careful where you step. And then there are the booby-traps. Maybe you see a bottle of wine lying beside a bombed building, but you don't touch it. And maybe there is a tempting apple-tree beside the road—the apples are just getting big enough to eat, but you leave that tree alone too because it might blow up in your face if you pulled a branch down. There are plenty of snipers, but you've learned to pay not much attention to them anymore, for if someone gets it from a sniper a detachment is sent out to clean him out and the advance continues. "This might be the big retreat of the defeated German Seventh Army, but it's still just war to the man with the job of pushing the Nazis back. And the German kills just as effectively when he retreats as when he advances." BILL DOWNS, C.B.S.
Who's Rommel supposed to talk to when he says "I'll tell you this much"? I suspect this "quote" is extrapolated (with much imagination) from Speidel's book Invasion 44 (title of the French version). Mote accurately, Rommel wrote the ultimatum of 15 July to Hitler and sent it via Kluge who Speidel says "associated himself with it". Secondly, Speidel never spells out what exactly Rommel intended to do after, as he expected, Hitler rejected his ultimatum. He just writes: Once the ultimatum had been sent, he [Rommel] exclaimed: "I have now given him his last chance. If he does not want to draw the consequences, we shall act." The whole matter remains rather cloudy throughout the book. Rommel is quoted to have said to Keitel (on 29 June) (my highlights): The situation is rapidly deteriorating; a total victory, about which Hitler talked this very day, is absurd; on the contrary, a total defeat is to be expected. Consequently and by any means, renouncing all acquired advantages and all dreams, let us immediatly bring an end to the war in the West and let us hold the Eastern front. It is about preserving Germany from chaos, and before everything from total destruction from air war. The solution contemplated seems to have been the conclusion of an armistice with the Western Allies, not "opening up" the front in the sense of letting the Allies in without prior agreement. Another quote from Speidel's book: Erwin Rommel realised perfectly the ultimate consequences of his resolution to act alone; he no longer had any illusion about the hard peace conditions that were to be expected. He however hoped, up to a point, in the psychological caution and constructive foresight of the Allies. But he could not count on their pity, nor on their emotion. He nevertheless trusted the cold reason of the major powers. Those were the ideas expressed by Rommel in the late evening of 15 July in front of Vice-Admiral Ruge and myself. So, unless Butler actually got Speidel to tell him more then he (Speidel) wrote in his book, simply "opening up" the front and just letting the Allies in was not contemplated by Rommel, at least as a first step, and even less so by Kluge. The facts are that Kluge did not act when he could, right after the attempt on Hitler's life, and continued to obey his orders until relieved. When ordered to counter-attack the Avranches breakout, he immediately protested this order which, according to him, would surely result in the collapse of the Normandy front from the Orne to the south of Saint-Lô and hasten the catatrophy even more. (...). Once again he proposed strategic measures, i.e. the withdrawal and defence behind the Seine, the abandon of southern and central France. If his real aim was to "open up the Normandy Front" as per your OP, then why would he have protested against orders which he himself thought would do precisely that? Why would he then propose measures that would have allowed prolonged German resistance in the West? Your theory was not that Rommel and Kluge conspired to seek out an armistice/peace in the West (which we all know they did contemplate), but that Kluge "sought out the allied command" and "allowed the US Breakout towards Avranches". The terms "opening up" may be interpreted in two very different ways, one in a limited sense (letting the Allies in by opposing no or only token resistance in one specific place, as per your OP), the other in a general sense (concluding an armistice/peace treaty): I think the consensus by everybody save you in this thread is clearly that your belief is not based on any fact, and that, on the contrary, facts contradict it. In summary: Kluge at some given moment before 20 July 1944 declaring himself willing to negociate an armistice/separate peace on the Western front: yes (but never had the guts to actually start the process). Kluge purposefully letting the US win in the Avranches breakout: preposterous!
Still from Speidel's book (directly from the English edition this time - much better translation than mine!). I have highlighted the part that directly responds to the highlighted parts in the OP above: Pages 121-122: General Blumentritt and Colonel Finckh telephoned the Chief of Staff of Army Group B at 5:00 p.m. on July 20 and informed him: “Hitler is dead.” But when Kluge returned an hour or two later the radio already announced that the attempt on the life of the Führer had failed. This was confirmed by telephone calls from Hitler’s headquarters, which gave details of what had happened. Field Marshall Sperrle, General von Stülpnagel and General Blumentritt arrived at La Roche Guyon between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. Stülpnagel and Lieutenant Colonel Dr von Hofacker pleaded with Marshall von Kluge to take part in these momentous events. Although the attempt on the life of Hitler had failed, the Army Headquarters in Berlin was still in the hands of the rebels, under control of the military head of the conspiracy, General Beck. They urged that only by immediately ending the war, even if it meant capitulation, thereby presenting a fait accompli, would it be possible to give the otherwise abortive uprising a chance of success. General von Stülpnagel, on leaving Paris, had ordered the commander of the city, Baron von Boineburg, to arrest the senior SS chief and police chief of France, Chief Group Leader Oberg, together with his staff and the entire Secret Police, some 1,200 officials. Security units of the army under the command of Colonel von Kraewel carried out these arrests without a shot being fired. It was explained to the troops that Hitler had been killed by SS units and that there was a danger that the SS might assume tyrannical power. Field Marshal von Kluge telephoned personally to Colonel Generals Beck, Fromm, and Höppner, and to Generals Warlimont and Stieff, but he could not decide to assume leadership of an uprising on the western front. Kluge did not believe that isolated action could be taken in the west if the revolt in Berlin and the plot in the Führer’s headquarters had failed. Above all he was not sure that he could rely on his officers and troops in this new situation. Kluge telephoned again to the Führer’s headquarters and to the Army Headquarters in Berlin. Then he ordered the Millitary Governor of France to release the imprisoned Secret Police. The fate of General von Stülpnagel was thus sealed. Stülpnagel passed on these orders by telephone to his Chief of Staff, Colonel von Linstow, at his headquarters, where Admiral Krancke, naval commander in the west, Ambassador Abetz, and others, full of alarm, had already arrived. To make it short, Hitler's surviving the assassination attempt squashed any thoughts Kluge might have nurtured to take action. To be fair to Kluge, he had reportedly declared, as early as 1943, that he was "ready to participate in the destruction of the nazi tyranny" on the condition that Hitler was dead. Rommel had stated that he was ready to act even if Kluge was not, so it is possible that he would have "opened up" the western front, even by capitulating if necessary. Unfortunately, he was seriously wounded on 17 July and out of the scene until his forced suicide, so we'll never know.
