Extract from Second Canadian Armoured Brigade, Operation Overlord: The Assault on the Beaches of Normandy, 6-11 June 1944, Sequence of Events and Lessons Arising Therefrom. Lessons Arising from the Operation Intercommunication 1. The 38 and 18 set not for tank-infantry intercommunication did not prove successful. This may be attributed in part to confusion in the initial stages. 2. In future tank-cum-infantry operations it is desirable that an infantry officer should ride in the squadron leader’s tank with the spare 19 set on the infantry battalion frequency. In any case this set should always be so netted when operating with infantry. 3. The installation of a phone for infantry on the outside of the tank is essential. Until this is done the only substitute is a hand-set passed out through the pistol port. 4. Crew commanders must NOT lean out of tanks to speak to personnel on the ground. The target so presented is ideal for snipers. 19 Set in Sherman VC Tanks. 5. It has been found that the 19 set in Sherman VC’s has a tendency to drift off net when the 17-pounder gun is fired. This should be investigated with a view to finding some remedy. Enemy Direction Finding on Netting Calls 6. Instances have been reported of enemy shellfire coming down on tanks immediately following a group netting call. This may be coincidence, but the possibility of enemy Direction Finding should not be discounted. Passage of Information 7. Passage of information both from rear to forward and from forward to rear was not good. What little that passed was slow and often very inaccurate. Information on immediate flanking formations was either too late to be of use or completely lacking. This contributed largely to the failure of the attack through le Mesnil-Patry on 11 June. 8. Information regarding our own minefields was sketchy in the extreme and several tanks were disabled on minefields laid by infantry with whom they were working at the time. 9. Our tanks shelled our own infantry in a forward locality on D+5. One company had been in that locality since D-Day but tanks had not been informed. 10. Too much stress cannot be laid on close personal liaison between all arms. This must never stop. It must continue at rest, training, planning and right through the actual operation. If information is not forthcoming through normal channels then “aggressive inquisitiveness” will root it out. Co-operation Between Different Arms 11. Despite early training, there was evidence of lack of appreciation of the other fellow’s role and his difficulties. This leads to misconceptions and unsound employment of forces. 12. From a tank commander’s point of view, there seemed to be a general impression in the infantry that the main anti-tank weapon is the tank and moreover that a tank should be employed to destroy enemy anti-tank weapons. On several occasions tanks were asked to lead in attacks on manned anti-tank defences. This they did, in order to maintain the momentum of the assault, and suffered unduly high casualties in consequence. They were expected to remain on a captured objective for several days when they should have been withdrawn to rally and their place taken by artillery and infantry anti-tank guns. Whenever tanks threatened a defended locality our infantry often called for tanks to come forward instead of meeting the attack with properly-sited anti-tank guns. It is realized of course that conditions of war were by no means normal. It is felt, however, that these incidents should be brought to light so that acts dictated by exceptional conditions do not become a habit in more normal times. 13. It is the policy of this brigade to give all possible assistance to the infantry whenever and wherever it can. Tanks will be in support and not under command of infantry below a divisional level. Tank commanders on all levels will co-operate with infantry to the full. At the same time it is their duty to advise on the proper employment of tanks. It will be rarely if ever that an infantry commander will try to insist on the misuse of tanks. Should he do so, however, the tank’s commander will be in duty bound to refer the matter to his next higher commander. 14. The fullest co-operation can only be achieved by complete understanding of the equipment and functions of other arms. Each and every opportunity should be taken for tank and infantry personnel to train and live together. Wherever possible, simple tank-cum-infantry exercises should be laid on, based on operational experiences. This should be done after every action as the turnover of personnel, particularly infantry, will be continual. In rest areas squadrons and companies should harbour close to each other and all ranks be encouraged to mix and learn what they can of each other’s habits, equipment and point of view generally. Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) 15. Armoured regiments have still much to learn regarding the employment of FOOs. Visits of two or three days to armoured regiments by FOOs would benefit both. FOOs would learn the type of targets that armour will ask them to engage and armoured personnel would learn how to ask for fire and what the artillery is capable of giving them. Intercommmunication between FOOs and tanks is not satisfactory and a sound working system must be tied up. Mines and Booby Traps 16. Here again armoured regiments are lacking in knowledge and experience. Close liaison with Royal Canadian Engineer personnel must be maintained and demonstrations of laying and lifting mines and booby traps arranged. Village Fighting 17. Tanks are not best suited for town or village fighting. Their field of manouevre is nil and they are an easy prey to sticky bombs, grenades and snipers. They will however be called upon at times to support infantry into built-up areas. This is normally done by support fire from a commanding position outside the town or village. If it is necessary to go right in, infantry must definitely lead. Not more than one troop should be employed in each thrust. Tanks should be inter-supporting and one tank in each troop should be detailed to cover upper story windows and house tops. The rear tanks gun should cover the rear. Tanks should move close enough together to give each other support around bends in the road. 18. Tanks and infantry commanders should travel together and maintain the closest liaison. 19. All ranks, in particular crew commanders, will avoid exposing themselves unnecessarily as snipers are usually prevalent. 20. Types of Tanks best suited for village fighting. (a) S h e rman VC - unwieldy within a village. It might be employed from a commanding position to destroy concrete and other masonry strong points. (b) Sherman 75 mm – most suitable for assaulting a defended village. (c) Stuart – too light and vulnerable for this type of work. 21. It should be remembered that artillery concentrations have little killing effect on builtup areas where observed tank fire may destroy located enemy positions. Control 22. When putting tanks into a large built-up area, control will be assisted by the use of a largescale map and plans. Sectors should be picked out in planning with a view to clearing them up piecemeal in detail. Speculative Shooting 23. Crew commanders must be impressed with the value of controlled speculative shooting when searching ground. A few rounds of high explosives on likely positions will often flush antitank and machine gun crews. It may be advisable to detail one tank per troop to search trees and upper storeys, also using speculative rounds. Target Indication 24. Verey Lights - Targets may be indicated effectively by infantry shooting in their direction with verey lights. Organization of Regiment and Employment of Sherman VC 25. As a result of experience gained in this campaign it has been decided to organize squadrons on a four tank troop basis. Each troop will have three 75 mm and one 17-pounder. The position of the troop leader will be left for units to decide. It has been suggested that the troop leader should ride in the 17-pounder tank, whose normal position would be back of the other three tanks. It is probably better, however, for the troop leader to lead in a 75 mm tank leaving his troop sergeant to cover the troop in the Sherman Vc. This tank should be so placed as to give the maximum support if the troop bumped into heavy armour. 26. It is felt that heavy tanks may be encountered at any time and anywhere. If our hard hitting 17-pounders are consolidated in one group it is unlikely that they would be immediately available when most wanted. 27. Whilst we gave at least as good as we took in the first six days of this operation, the vital necessity of seizing ground at all costs resulted in heavy tank casualties. All units are therefore down well below estimates and it will be some time before they can be built up again and a healthy reserve accumulated. In the meantime, regiments will be based on a strength of 49 Shermans as follows: Regimental Headquarters (RHQ) – (4 tanks) and three squadrons, each having a squadron headquarters (3 tanks) and three troops of 4 tanks each. Enemy Equipment and Methods 28. The 88 mm still appears to be the enemy’s most formidable anti-tank weapon. It is most effective against Shermans at ranges up to 3,000 yards. All his anti-tank guns are very well sited and full use is made of dummy guns as decoys. Snipers have been found dug in well forward of anti-tank gun positions. These force crew commanders to close down and limit their field of vision. 29. Tanks encountered so far have been Marks III and IV and Panthers. Tigers have also been reported but not confirmed. Mark IVs have been captured dressed up with light spaced armour to resemble the Tiger. The deception is hard to detect. It can be stated definitely that we are outgunned both by the long 75 mm and the 88 mm. 30. It has been noted that the Panther travels with the gun at 12 o’clock. It is not traversed until the tank halts. One killing was made well up in our forward lines of 4 Panthers with guns actually strapped down. 31. The enemy appears to move in line ahead waiting until he bumps into opposition before deploying. Once deployed however he makes the best use of ground and natural cover such as hedges and bushes. 32. Snipers have been a constant menace taking a heavy toll of crew commanders. Own Equipment and Methods 33. Sherman VC – has proved a very effective anti-tank weapon and in view of the fact that we are outgunned, it is strongly urged that the proportion of those tanks in the squadron be increased as early as possible. 34. .50 Browning on Tanks – Differences of opinion have been expressed as to the value of this weapon mounted on tanks. Commanding officers may retain it or discard it at their discretion. The use of this gun on B Echelon vehicles should be explored before it is turned back to ordinance. 35. 2-inch Bomb – it has been suggested that the infantry 2-inch bomb projected from the tank bomb thrower would be effective against infantry in slit trenches and enclosed places such as orchards and farm yards. This possibility will be explored. 36. It is possible that so far smoke has not been used to the best advantage. It is suggested that squadron leaders may have been moving too close to their forward troops to be in a position to use it. Reports from Italy indicate that the 75 mm smoke shell is not reliable as it is impossible to control its bounce. Smoke grenades and the 2-inch smoke bomb were apparently found more effective. 37. Three important uses of smoke should be borne in mind: (a) Defilading observed fire from the flank. (b) Blinding weapons which high explosives cannot neutralize. (c) Cover for local withdrawal. Use of Ground 38. Proper use has not been made of ground in many cases. Tanks and squadrons must move tactically deployed when in enemy territory. The minimum number of tanks must be exposed to enemy fire and tanks must always be mutually supporting. Careful planning, good use of ground with mutual support means more kills for less casualties. Use of Artillery 39. Artillery properly employed is a factor contributing to the success of most operations. A pre-arranged fire plan is essential and commanders must consider and advise the gunners of the priority rating of suspected targets. When fire has been called for through FOOs, tanks must remember to wait for it to come down before advancing into the target area. Infantry on Tanks 40. Carrying infantry on tanks can be overdone. It is an excellent means of moving them quickly to a pre-arranged assembly area from the rear when the enemy is not likely to be encountered. In future infantry will NOT be carried on tanks in forward areas. AFV Recognition 41. The present situation is NOT satisfactory. It is difficult in this close country to recognize friend from foe at long but vulnerable ranges. Several instances of engagements between our own tanks have already come to light. A white star on the sides of tanks is an obvious aiming mark and will NOT be used by units in this brigade. The use of standard tank flags discloses our positions to the enemy and has proved more assistance to him than to us. Firing verey lights has been suggested as a possible solution and it is proposed to try this out in this brigade. It is hoped that some practicable system, common to all formations, will be laid down by higher authority. http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1353&context=cmh&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.ca%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%2520canadian%2520infantry%2520actions%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D8%26sqi%3D2%26ved%3D0CFkQFjAH%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fscholars.wlu.ca%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1353%2526context%253Dcmh%26ei%3D3wU0UcSDGqi20gGYg4GoBw%26usg%3DAFQjCNFaG-Yra54uKEtC8rdYEHdpxfZQ-Q#search=%22canadian%20infantry%20actions%22
Very enlightening. Thanks for posting it, Canuck. Do you have a date on it, though? From the phrase "the present situation is not satisfactory," I would imagine that it was written while the bocage fighting was still going on.
Tim All that was learned in both North Africa by the British Armour and in Sicily by the 1st AB - why then was the 2nd AB NOT trained in much of this advice BEFORE the invasion - same with 5th Cdn AD - they learned the hard way also in Italy...very sloppy ! Cheers
Very enlightening. Thanks for posting it, Canuck. Do you have a date on it, though? From the phrase "the present situation is not satisfactory," I would imagine that it was written while the bocage fighting was still going on. The source says: "... as given to Historical Officer, 21 June 1944"
Was this not predicted by some generals and certainly by some battalion and other unit commanders? Was it not a case that some thought it ill advised to use armour that had fought in open areas of the desert and were then sent to East Anglia - flat and often featureless to train for the assault which for many would be in close country. Was it said 'they came here (armour in general) full of the we know it all we have done it when in reality they had to learn on the close country battlefield what they should have learned in training'. 'They should have been sent to the depths of the English countryside to train' - Horrocks.
Was this not predicted by some generals and certainly by some battalion and other unit commanders? Was it not a case that some thought it ill advised to use armour that had fought in open areas of the desert and were then sent to East Anglia - flat and often featureless to train for the assault which for many would be in close country. Was it said 'they came here (armour in general) full of the we know it all we have done it when in reality they had to learn on the close country battlefield what they should have learned in training'. 'They should have been sent to the depths of the English countryside to train' - Horrocks. Perhaps this applied to formations that had fought with 8th Army (7th Armd, 4th and 8th Armd Bdes), but 2nd Canadian Armoured Bde had not fought in the desert. It had spent a great deal of time training in the UK.
Yes as I indicated (general armour) point. I do not do history prefer documentary on tactics, strategy and training.
TTH- 7th AD had dumped both 7th and 4th AB's in Italy and went home with 23rd AB- who were experienced Desert warriors as was the V111 AB - BUT they did not perform too well in the opening stages as the bocage was a fright for them also- apart from a few regiments in 11th AD - they did better as they were led by "PIP" Roberts who had been a true desert man BUT had experience in leading 26th AB in Algeria and Tunisia with 6th AD - the Guards AD were new to the game also
Was this not predicted by some generals and certainly by some battalion and other unit commanders? Was it not a case that some thought it ill advised to use armour that had fought in open areas of the desert and were then sent to East Anglia - flat and often featureless to train for the assault which for many would be in close country. Was it said 'they came here (armour in general) full of the we know it all we have done it when in reality they had to learn on the close country battlefield what they should have learned in training'. 'They should have been sent to the depths of the English countryside to train' - Horrocks. Wills, Good insight. The effect of the terrain in East Anglia would have been compounded by the fact that many of those desert armoured veterans were also conducting the training. In 1940, it could be said that we trained for the last war and in 1944, that we trained for the last battle. As noted in a previous thread, Radley-Walters (Sherbrookes) was highly critical of the training they received. Much of it was irrelevant or worse, deadly, when applied to the conditions he faced in Normandy.
Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfils the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things. Winston Churchill Criticism - it makes my heart sink when something that was and I am sure still is a normal and accepted fact within the forces, is described as having a go at a favourite general. From the time we join up when we start at the lower end, we work our way up to the next level by learning,experience, encouragement and criticism. We find ourselves promoted and start at the lower level of the next stage in our career and this is repeated. You find yourself back in the classroom with a Chief Instructor ripping you apart officers are expected to be able to take it without comment - because the exercise you have been tasked to write up has left things out - when he is in full flow it goes on forever, until he drops the write up in front of you and says overall good effort well done! Then he sets about another poor soul. Later he will stand you a drink in the mess and chat about anything but the days work - not done to talk of work. Along with many career soldiers I took my fair share of criticism it is not about belittling effort it is done to teach to improve. If someone is placed on a pedestal and is beyond criticism he must be high up on the celestial ladder - a true 'star'. One Colonel of the Light Infantry on a course took me aside and said - you do know that as an ex regular I expect more of you - which is soldier speak for - look out! Thinking about the workplace today it would appear criticism is now known as harassment. Perhaps that is why we have people who do not realize that with authority comes responsibility.
Very well put, Wills. One thing I did notice looking at 5 years' worth of war diaries for 50th Division was the increasing willingness to analyze and criticize, which implies that a very healthy spirit was developing in the British Army. The trend is even more noticeable in the Australian war diaries I saw (9th Division). I didn't have the time to dig as deeply into the Normandy records of 8th Armd Bde as I would have liked, but looking at my notes again it seems to me that the experiences of the 8th and the Canadian 2nd were pretty similar in many respects. The difficulties of cooperating and communicating with the infantry were the same, as was the sniper problem. That is especially interesting because of 8th Armd Bde's mixed composition. Brigade HQ and the Sherwood Rangers were desert veterans, the 4th/7th DG had not fought since 1940, and the 24th Lancers were entirely new to action.
One thing I did notice looking at 5 years' worth of war diaries for 50th Division was the increasing willingness to analyze and criticize, which implies that a very healthy spirit was developing in the British Army. The trend is even more noticeable in the Australian war diaries I saw (9th Division). I have no military background but that assessment, in the business world, implies strong and inspired leadership. The organizational cultures that fully support critical analysis and recommendations for positive change are usually free from autocrats and towering egos.
Gents, a little context wouldn’t go astray here. The time frame of the 2CAB report covers the notorious 7 June engagement between the Sherbrooke Fusiliers/North Novas and 12SS Pz, the Bretteville L’Orgeilleuse defence by First Hussars/Regina Rifles against Hitlerjugend’s bungled attack and the First Hussars/Queens Own Rifles battlegroup disaster at Le Mesnil Patry. The last engagement was by far the Hussars’ worst day of the war, but at Bretteville an element of the same unit pulverized a Hitlerjugend Panther company, so the significant pattern is that attacking armour got hammered no matter what nationality. The root cause of the Le Mesnil Patry disaster was not that the sharp-enders were badly trained but that they were ordered to attack off line of march, without arty preparation, towards an absurdly distant objective. I Corps issued orders for the attack at 0400 on 11 June for 12 June, then advanced the timetable to make the attack happen on 11 June afternoon. The units involved obeyed, against their better judgment, because they believed they wouldn't have been asked to do it if it wasn't important. Here is Prof Terry Copp’s analysis of the action. A Well-Entrenched Enemy: Army, Part 92 | Legion Magazine After re-reading this and ticking off the directly relevant points it seems to me the 2CAB summary is a ‘push back’ reminder to higher authority not to f around. There were 3 Canadian Div or I Corps people who should have had the experience, savvy and guts to say no, this attack is not on. Another point to make is the terrain 2 CAB fought over is not bocage. It is open farmland – grain country. Google Street View is a really useful tool. The other night I had a look round Norrey en Bessin at the approach the Hussars took to attack Le Mesnil Patry. Between the two villages I could see no visual obstructions of any note. German A/T guns and tanks could see the attackers coming and wait for the right moment to open concerted fire at optimum range. I figure that was the uniquely terrifying problem Commonwealth armour faced in Normandy. The Caen sector was a battlefield where whole squadrons of Shermans could be brewed up in minutes.
Good post Larry As Radley-Walters so succinctly described, the challenge for Allied armour was to learn the use of terrain, Artie support, smoke and tactics in order to survive long enough to get within effective range of the enemy.
Larry "I figure that was the uniquely terrifying problem Commonwealth armour faced in Normandy " NO - it wasn't as we had that every day in Italy BUT we learned to minimize the effect - all except the Bays at Gemmano who were new to the game - as I pointed out - we had learned those lessons and they should have been passed on - obviously not and they were sucker punched... Cheers
Canuck Thanks for posting this. I have a copy request for this report in with Lac-Bac but they cannot find this report and have sent me wrong document (again!). Do you have full reference for this report in archives? Cheers
