My kingdom for a nightfighter

Not really sure. You might be crossing the ideas here with the ones on the Finally! Vindicated! thread. They do seem to have converged.
Which is why i thought this thread was longer.
The intent of this thread was to point out something I didn't know which was not only stated by the post war retrospective but emphasized one the biggest problem. That is relative the inability to not do night time interdiction of German supply lines and movement because of the severe shortage of Night Fighters, according to Weyland, specifically the P-61.
So what are the exact numbers of nightfighters in say June 44? Did they increase from previous numbers, stay static or did they decrease as equipment was moved to day fighters? Did NF numbers continue to grow after this date?

Obiviously that was a fact that was not only obscure to me but also others as well as ironically it met with the typical "pshawing" and the "Jimboism" rhetoric. Never knew it was so shameful to quote generals in post war military self-analysis. Hey, but every skeet range needs a target right? Glad I can accomodate so many.
English translation = Clay Pigeon shooting.
Glad you are happy being the target Jimbo, nice to have a moving one once in a while.
Kitty

 

So what are the exact numbers of nightfighters in say June 44? Did they increase from previous numbers, stay static or did they decrease as equipment was moved to day fighters? Did NF numbers continue to grow after this date?

I am not sure the totals. There were only 700 P-61s built at a time. Weyland XIX TAC only had a single sqadron of them (12-16). He was particulary needing the P-61s, maybe because of their ground radar or their speed and armament. He had plenty of A20s but they were not the same for night intradiction. He knew this was a problem during the war but before the war he never dreamed he would have such air superiority that would decimate by day and therefore force movement by night. Driving at night with your lights off is very precarious. It certainly slowed the German supply greatly. But even as the Allies marched across Germany at flank speed, the fact that the supplies could not be cut off completely kept the battlefield from being completely isolated, else, divisions would fall in days rather than weeks. The concept of air supremacy and dominance was new in WWII. They never forsaw its potentials and reacted too late. You can't just scale up production with say six months to go in the war at the point you really need night fighters. Had they have realized the potential, they might have been better prepared and WWII might have turned into a much smaller war. That was their opinion. As Napoleon said, an army marches on its belly. No supply, no resistance, a fast end to combat.

 

Could someone maybe give us approximate figures for US/Commonwealth/German nightfighter numbers at D-Day? And if they rose or fell afterwards and before? It would help this discussion a lot.
Kitty

 

I'm not sure nightfighter numbers would help.

The proposition is that the Germans were moving supplies by night and the allies did not have the weapons to stop this happening.

Allied attacks on supply movements at night used some aircraft to drop flares illuminating targets, for other aircraft to attack. This tactic was used as far back as Alam Halfa.

To me, nightfighters are aircraft equipped with air to air radar for finding other aircraft at night and so have little specific advantage for supply interdiction at night.