Monty on Tanks

Those were minor issues.

They mainly suffered from extremely poor design, inadequate development testing, and premature introduction into production.

 

Delete.

 

Be interesting to know what the 'extremely poor design' was and if it was the result of limitations outside the control of the designers. It has to be assumed that the damage to German facilities caused by Allied bombing had some significant effect on their ability to build exactly what they wanted how they wanted it.

As for my 'minor issues', the ability to do modifications and improvements was something readily available to the Allies eg Crusader tank modifications mentioned in a previous post. Given the aerial pounding and desperate situations being forced on Germany in field support had to suffer. A well known example of this concerns the Pershing -v- Panther meeting engagement in Cologne which was filmed. As confirmed by a survivor we see that the Panther's turret does not move, it's jammed which it had done before several times. This is exactly the sort of problem which for an Allied tank would have seen it withdrawn from combat for repair or modification.

In other words for an Allied tank there would be no problem and so nothing to criticise it for.

 

Well for most of the 41/42 period in North Africa Monty was nowhere to be seen. I would also posit that, given the extremely good performance of the infantry tanks in both COMPASS and CRUSADER, the absence of 2-pdr HE, while consistently remarked upon, may not have been such an issue for infantry-tank co-operation.

All the best

Andreas

 

Monty = El Alamein where the biggest battle of all was fought and where the infantry were tasked to play the major role until the AFV's could break out. So the infantry should have been supported in their bloody task using the best available. Which certainly was not the Valentine by any measure. Given Monty's ability to absorb lessons it seems fair to observe that he would have noted that. How responsible he was for promoting the Churchill in the support role I do not know, what went on at those decision levels would be of interest, I have a few books on order that may help.

 

Look, you said 41/42. He arrived in August 42. Hence my comment. There were many infantry/I-tank battles before then, and at least in CRUSADER these were critical to defeating the Axis outside Tobruk, since the cruiser tanks buggered it up.

All the best

Andreas

 

Be interesting to know what the 'extremely poor design' was and if it was the result of limitations outside the control of the designers. It has to be assumed that the damage to German facilities caused by Allied bombing had some significant effect on their ability to build exactly what they wanted how they wanted it.

As for my 'minor issues', the ability to do modifications and improvements was something readily available to the Allies eg Crusader tank modifications mentioned in a previous post. Given the aerial pounding and desperate situations being forced on Germany in field support had to suffer. A well known example of this concerns the Pershing -v- Panther meeting engagement in Cologne which was filmed. As confirmed by a survivor we see that the Panther's turret does not move, it's jammed which it had done before several times. This is exactly the sort of problem which for an Allied tank would have seen it withdrawn from combat for repair or modification.

In other words for an Allied tank there would be no problem and so nothing to criticise it for.

In fairness, "extremely poor design" is probably overdoing it, in that I've no doubt that the German designers were fully aware of the weaknesses of the tanks that were appearing under their names, and that they were also fully aware of the weaknesses that they were having to sign off.

The "extremely poor design" I was referring to as regards the Panther was the well-known problem of the final drives which manifested on even the very last Panthers. My own research has tended to indicate that another well-known problem with this tank, the tendency for the engine to catch fire, persisted to the end of the war, and you will see this in the British report I linked to earlier.

I probably come across as more critical of German equipment than, objectively, I really am. That's purely because I think that the weaknesses of Allied equipment are over-emphasized, and the corresponding weaknesses of German equipment are under-emphasized.

Personally, I think that it is obvious that every protagonist in WWII was floundering to a certain extent, and was incompetent to a certain extent, and I am suspicious of any narrative that attempts to posit any kind of "superiority" on behalf of any belligerent.

 

Been around too long to get worked up about this stuff, there is always something to learn or consider from someone else if the discussion is kept civil

Getting a bit off topic but on the subject of design the Merritt-Brown transmission was the best of all of them.

 

This must be as close to voice of the WO/Whitehall as we can get from this distance of time, so it' enjoyable for that alone IMO. Unfortunately kingdoms can be lost while the design committees engineer a better horseshoe nail from Monday to Friday, nine to five with an hour off for lunch. Not that they ever came up with one in this case.

Tanks need what to be effective? Hitting power, armour protection, reliability, and the optics to see what's around them and aim their weapons effectively. The rest is luxury, icing on the cake. Whoever gets the best combination of those qualities into the field first, will win many battles and perhaps a war. Loving craftsmanship and purported mechanical refinements (and if anyone had them it wasn't our side) won't make the difference. Too much complacency, stubborn adherence to outmoded methods and technology, too many poorly motivated and careless workers, and too much incompetent management. And now, to top it all off, a bunch of revisionist "feel good" twaddle.

So the Panther had a poorly designed straight gear final drive and you had to pull all kinds of stuff out of the way to get at it and the slave labourers liked to sabotage them if they could? If you'd asked the Germans if they'd like to trade their poor, unreliable Panthers for some Shermans or Churchills, what would they have said? If you'd asked our crews which they would like, what would they have said?

I'll bet our guys would have said, "#*%&$^@, we'll treat the gears like glass, just give us a gun that will hit hard and long and a good thick sloped glacis and we'll live with the rest!"

Did the French change all the final drive gears in their Panthers post-WWII?

Tell you this, I'll bet the panzer maintenance crews had pulling those drives out down to a fine art and they probably didn't waste a lot of time pissing and moaning, but got them in and out PDQ.

 

Panzer lehr Division 1944-45


http://www.helion.co.uk/published-by...ies-vol-1.html

page 82

The Panther tanks all got stuck. I had been told that the terrain near St Lo was better suited for tank operations than that around Caen. Although I could have taken either the Mark IV or Mark V (Panther), I relied on what I had been told and took the latter. Actually the Mark IV would have been more suitable; the Mark V has too long a barrel and is not maneuverable. It was too wide and had too low a slope to negotiate the hedged dikes; it had to stick to the roads. ...................

............................. We could only knock out enemy tanks at a maximum range of 200 yards, as the hedges concealed everything farther away. The German tanks are built for long range firing in the desert and on the Russian front. We could not use the Mark V cross-country in Normandy. The British Cromwell tank had a sharper angle of approach and, therefore, could scale the hedgerow dikes. We believed it had been specially built for use in Normandy, where the terrain is similar to that in southern England.


Bayerlein again :

While the PzKpfw IV could still be used
to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved
ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman
because of its maneuverability and height was
good . . . [the Panther was] poorly suited for
hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long
gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneu-
verability in village and forest fighting. It is
very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears
out the front final drives, made of low-grade
steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-
train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side
armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-
bombers. Fuel-lines of porous material that
allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank
causing a grave fire Hazard. Absence of vision
slits make defense against close attacks impossible

 

Jentz, Panzertruppen 2 page 150-151

The preferences of the crew for lighter, more maneuverable Panzers was recorded in a report written on 1 November 1944 by Albert Speer on his trip to Italy during 19 to 25 October 1944:
On the Southwest Front, opinions are in favor of the Sherman tank and its cross-country ability The Sherman tank climbs mountains that our Panzer crews consider impassable. This is accomplished by the especially powerful engine in the Sherman in comparison to its weight. Also, according to reports from the 26.Panzer-Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers. The Sherman tanks drive freely cross· country while our Panzers must remain on trails and narrow roads and therefore are very restricted in their ability to fight.
All Panzer crews want to receive lighter Panzers, which are more maneuverable, possess increased ability to cross terrain, and guarantee the necessary combat power just with a superior gun. This desire by the troops corresponds with conditions that will develop in the future as a result of the drop in production capacity and of the fact that, because of a shortage of chrome, sufficient armor plate can’t be produced to meet the increased production plans. Therefore, either the number of Panzers produced must be reduced or it will be necessary to reduce the thickness of the armor plate. ln that case, the troops will unequivocally ask for a reduction of the armor thickness in order to increase the total number of Panzers produced

 

Spielberger. Panther & Its Variants page 257

Date 23 January 1945.


Meeting of the Panzer Commision


there continues to be serious complaints regarding final drive breakdowns in all vehicle types...................General Thomale explained that in such circumstances an orderly utilisation of tanks is simply impossible...........
200 breakdowns with the 38(t).........
Prior to the 1945 eastern offensive there have been 500 defective drives on the Pz IV, from the Panther 370 and from the Tiger roughly 100............the troops lose their confidence and in some situations abandon the whole vehicle just because of this problem

 

I dunno. While I have a lot of time for the Panzer III in particular, and the Panzer IV and Tiger to some extent, the Panther was clearly a piss-poor design. Any tank that weighed in at 45 tonnes but remained vulnerable over the sides and rear to the enemy's main AT weapon (the 76.2mm gun) when it appeared, that was the size of an average aircraft hangar, and came with a weight/power ratio three times less than that of a 34HP VW Kaefer was clearly not fit for purpose. End of.

Yeah yeah, I know, the 75L70 was so good, the only thing it couldn't do was win the war, but a tank happens to be the sum of its parts, and not just a gun.

All the best

Andreas

 

I sometimes have a thought experiment which posits whether mounting the KwK 75/L70 on a cart pulled by a dozen oxen was a better option than the Panther.

 

It should be kept in mind for the big picture that a more compact tank than say the Panther was more suitable in close going outside Europe too, basically horses for courses. Out of all the tanks available including the Sherman and Churchill the little old Matilda was the Australian tank of choice for jungle use right to the end of the war.

 

If those tanks had straight cut gears in the final drives then there is the problem right there. Obviously the Germans did not have any available capacity to cut helical gears, which have a higher load bearing capacity than straight cut gears, for a start. Note too that the 38(t) was not a German designed and manufactured tank. The availability of heavy gear cutting tooling was crucial for the manufacture of transmissions strong enough for big tanks which is one reason why American and British tanks generally had reliable transmissions.

 

I don't think that is likely unless the transaxel busted well behind the battle area AND there was a recovery vehicle powerful enough to tow it to a maintenance area. Towing it with another Panther would probably break its tranny too. And the maintenance area better have a big hoist and a spare transmission available. Huge job.

Here is a picture from a terrific thread Von Poop started a couple of years ago.

http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/52068-recovery-repair-vehicle-pictures/?p=610592

 

Ah but you are forgetting that the German Ubersoldiers could do anything (except win the war, but let's not get stuck on details), and that better, faster, and in a more stylish way than the Allies. So if someone comes with annoying little technical issues, we can just assume that the Ubersoldier could deal with them, to make them go away, and continue our Panzerworship uninterrupted.

Recovery was a huge issue with the outsize German tanks, and as you rightly point out, it appears to have been verboten to hook a broken down Tiger or Panther onto another one:

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bergepanther

All the best

Andreas

 

Somewhere I do have a picture to go with that...

All the best

Andreas