Monty on Tanks

Not really, the first paragraph concerns operations carried out directly under Montgomery and of course their planning would have to take into account the capability and strength of the units involved. Supporting infantry attacks with modestly armoured AFV's without any HE capability obviously has a negative effect to say the least.

The second paragraph is a comment on some poster's previous remarks on tank performance and casualties.

 

Concerning the OP, Montgomery in December 1944 commented that the capital tank must have a really good dual purpose gun and be able to operate efficiently in the roles of infantry support and as a mobile strike force. It's weight must not exceed 45 tons and it must carry the best possible gun at the required speed. It should be armoured to the maximum weight allowed.

Sounds like a Panther to me, certainly not a Sherman.

 

The tools Monty was given to do the job were hardly his fault. He gets enough flak for 'taking his time' to build up forces, yet you seem to be suggesting that operations should have been cancelled until supertanks had replaced everything else?

The infantry (British as well as Dominion) were not wholly reliant on imperfect I-tanks. Monty ensured that significant artillery support was provided for deliberate operations. Of course, that would still have been provided if he'd had nothing but 75mm-gunned Churchills. As you say, it was a team effort - I-tanks were an addition, not an alternative, to artillery. Whether or not the artillery fireplans were effective is another argument.

 

No criticism of Monty from me, he had to work with what he had and final Alamein was never going to be easy or the result a forgone conclusion.

As it was though Shermans were way more suitable for infantry support than Valentines which could have been used as minefield fodder instead, which was about all they were good for. Someone made those sorts of decisions, the infantry really did get the rough end of the stick there.

Alternatively, at the production level, it may have been a better alternative in the circumstances for the British to concentrate on producing something simpler and less demanding like a StuG III or IV, they certainly did the job for the German infantry.

 

Nonsense? I would say that claiming "British" tanks were "better engineered" is nonsense.

Can you tell us why the Valentine and the Churchill (among others) did not have an exterior gun mantlet for example? I believe the average schoolboy could understand why one is advantageous. Just one example of many of course: engines, running gear, optics, pop guns, a separate calibre for tank MGs...couldn't even build a proper &#%$# fuel can. Same old shite chum: half-hearted half measures.

Why no APC until the Kangaroo or the American halftrack? "Most highly mechanized army" and all that!?

Stil waiting for the statistics which demonstrate that the tank on tank kill ratio after D-Day was not the 1:5 generally recognized at the time, and later.

Cavalwy "swanning about" in the desert getting cut to ribbons because they still think they're beau sabreurs who don't need to cooperate with AT guns and use terrain defensively.

And when a barely armoured SPG finally did arrive in late 44 as the Archer, it was issued to Royal Artillery only; "can't have those grubby infantrymen getting their hands on our guns, now can we old chap?" "Not a proper tank old boy, so the RAC won't have it".

 

Strapping a large chunk of armour on the barrel of your shoulder-laid 2 pr might have adversely affected aiming even if it could have been balanced. RTC got what RTC wanted...

Mechanised =/= armoured. Even if there was a requirement for an APC, it would have been way down the priority list, I would imagine. A poor tank would have been more important than an APC.

Umm... the cruiser tank concept was not a cavalry concept, it was the RTC getting what the RTC wanted - again. The worst thing you can accuse the cavalry of is uncritically implementing RTC/RAC doctrine.

Why wouldn't the RA man a specifically-developed AT system? They had a job to do and chased the kit to do it. Yes, the infantry tended to get the gunners' cast-offs, but surely that was a sensible approach? Read up on Medenine - one reason for the success was that the RA insisted on coordinating the whole AT defence, including the infantry's guns.

 

Perhaps you do not know all SP guns were RA and not RAC? Or that the Archer was an AT gun on tracks and not a tank?

 

You have yet to produce any evidences there was a 'generally recognized'5:1 kill ratio and I know for a certain fact you will not be able to find a single referenced source that shows anything like that figure.
To put it bluntly you are talking out of your arse.

 

Wasn't the 5:1 thing from a US source? Anyway, there is a referenced source that states US tank losses were 4:1 compared with the other Western allies tank losses, the info I have is a bit vague though so I'm trying to track it down to clarify it.

Back to the PBI. The Matilda was certainly a better support tank than the Valentine, the 3" howitzer CS version particularly. It was used extensively as the tank of choice against the Japanese right up to the end of the war. A flamethrower version proved particularly useful against bunkers, it used an internal tank which for mobility was a better arrangement than the Crocodile with it's towed container.

It seems pretty clear to me that those in charge from the top down did not prioritise performance above all other factors, something which the Germans tended to do and which translated to better battlefield performance.

 

I have been loathe to comment on this thread as it always comes down to a bit of wall-bashing.

5:1 has been stated as a mis-representation of data. Since a US Tank Platoon is 5 tanks, it is the smallest tactical unit sent to engage enemy armour thus if one tank is spotted by necessity, 5 Shermans will be sent to engage. Much as a Tank Brigade would send 3 or 4 depending on time period.

'And when a barely armoured SPG finally did arrive in late 44 as the Archer, it was issued to Royal Artillery only; "can't have those grubby infantrymen getting their hands on our guns, now can we old chap?" "Not a proper tank old boy, so the RAC won't have it".'

A substantial point of clarification, the 'Archer' was not called 'Archer' it was Valentine 17 Pdr SP (a few official variations) much as the 'Achilles' was recorded as 'M10 17 Pdr' often enough. A names appear postwar when all Anti-Tank is named as such in the early 1950s. It is also worth stating suggesting that tank destroyers (to use the US term) were... rather lacklustre in the armoured role, as seen by US operational experience.

Better battlefield performance is fundamentally subjective, due to different classifications of destruction. Furthermore stating technology trumps doctrine/operational learning and tactical employment is... a woeful simplification of the matter. Its rather more complex than simply: A + B +C = Great Tank.

There is a wealth of reading and study to be done on this subject matter, most of it is rather affordable, and I recommend reading up on British/German/American recent studies regarding NWE to offer a firm grounding. Statistical analysis and ORS can be useful, but also open to misinterpretation (and sheer bloodymindedness by some!)

 

I have never understood the difference between a main battle tank and a tank destroyer.
Was the difference the armament or the role?
Was the TD a bigger tank or a SP?

 

A TD (US) or self-propelled anti-tank gun (Brit) usually had a larger gun than contemporary tanks. The compromise was usually far lighter armour, or a limited traverse arrangement. For example, US TDs superficially resembled tanks but had thinly-armoured, open-topped turrets.

The MBT evolved from a convergence of cruiser and infantry tanks, and the largely post-war realisation that tanks had to have effective AT guns. The upshot was that the MBTs became the primary AT platforms and displaced the TD/ATSPs and conventional towed AT guns. That sort of brings us back to the beginning with Monty's desire to treat armoured and tank units as interchangeable 'capital' tanks - he wasn't wrong!

 

So would a Sexton with a 25 pounder be used in this role?

 

If there is one pertinent criticism of the Allies, it is that they over-concentrated on tank performance (in terms of reliability, durability etc.) at the expense of firepower. The Panther would never have been acceptable to the British Army because there was no way it would have passed the standard 3000 mile reliability trial. In fact, it wouldn't even have got through the first 1000 miles, and if the tests the British undertook on the Panther themselves are any guide (http://tankandafvnews.com/2015/11/13/from-the-vault-post-war-british-report-on-panther-reliability/), maybe not even the first 300 miles.

I think there's a reasonable argument that says that the Allies could have gone for something more automotively crude but brutal for breakout battles, and such a design would have been feasible - for example by doubling the armour on the A30 and halving its overhaul life - but this would have mitigated against their general philosophy of quality.

 

Strictly speaking, only in self-defence, not by choice.

One case that springs to mind is the first battery of 5 RHA that deployed outside Villers-Bocage. They picked a reverse slope in anticipation of Tigers making it through the town. In the event, they didn't have any trouble from that direction.

 

That could simply be down to them having used four times as many tanks as the rest of the western allies put together.

 

If I recall correctly, this lecture goes on to discuss German Vs Allied engineering and designs.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=QlKOdT0SEOY

I post it purely in the hope that it may be of interest; I'm entirely unqualified to judge how credible it is.

 

#113
Idler
I asked the Question because my Father who was with 5 RHA says they knocked out a German tank ( I think Operation Goodwood) with their Sexton.
He retrieved an Swastika air identification panel from it.This panel is now in 7RHA ( Of which Mercers Troop is now part) museum.

 

On the subject of tank destroyers/self propelled guns/assault guns, the advantage of not having a turret meant that for the same overall weight a bigger gun like the 17 or 25 pdr could be used and if the vehicle was designed to have a low profile then it could carry considerable armour. Like the German StuG AFV's mentioned previously did.

Nice one by your Dad redtop

 

My post was a bit ambiguous, by 'battlefield performance' I meant battlefield effectiveness, not reliability, speed or anything else. However the apparent British concentration on reliability did not always work anyway, a prime example is the Crusader tank, at one stage 200 odd new ones were sitting in theatre workshops waiting for engine fan modification and cooling parts.

On German tank reliability, given the vast distances involved with the East Front they didn't do too badly there, particularly in the early days. But no doubt later in the war they suffered from the unavailability of preferred steel etc in their manufacture, poor maintenance facilities and a lack of rail/road transportation to avoid excessive track and drivetrain wear. Constant Allied air attacks did take their toll concerning everything involved in reliability.