Monty on Tanks

As a student and apprentice engineer within the aircraft industry of the 1960s. The thinking of the older designers - especially lecturers was not as romantic and misty eyed about Spitfires.Tempests and other piston fighters as the public were. Whilst it is true designers tried to keep up with or better enemy aircraft performance it was from the designers and engineers point of view expending resources on obsolete technology. It is right to say that in the mind of the production engineers they could promise to provide an acceptable product at the requested batch numbers using present tooling to produce Spitfires etc. This stifled the use of new and known technology. A Supermarine man and later lecturer would say had we as designers managed to convince the powers that be to stage closure of factories and re-tooled to produce jet fighters earlier we could have provided more squadrons and we would have been on the design modifications and advancing the technology more quickly. Easy to say when commanders are asking for more and not quite so easy to convince them to move on. Many pilots who flew the new jets understood and said so. It may be - I do not know, if this was the case with armour, the need to turn out a proven acceptable design rather than re-tool for a future better tank. The designer and to an extent the engineer will admire a great design but will put romanticism aside -failing to do that would end new and better designs.

 

Wills - hindsight of course is way ahead - but Tank men were asking for a bigger gun in early 1941 - we saw 4 of the new 17 pounders at Medenine -end of '42 - then a whole battery of them in Sicily- July '43 - then a further 100 of them in October '44- and as I recall the war ended for us on May 3rd '45

It wasn't a case of retooling for a whole new tank - which took long enough but just the gun which from our point of view should not have taken five long Tank crew losing years

Cheers

 

It wasn't a case of retooling for a whole new tank

It was when the tanks had been designed around a 2 pdr. 'Overdesigned' might not be too strong a word as considerable effort went into keeping tanks as small as possible for a variety of reasons: rail loading gauge, smaller armoured volume means lower weight (or thicker armour for a given weight), smaller target, Treasury thought it was cheaper etc.

The only British tanks that were upgunned were the Churchill, Crusader and, amazingly, the tiddler that was the Valentine (I don't think I missed any out?)

 

Hi VP, an interesting thread. Just to add another opinion, I think the fact that the 17 pdr was first in-service in 1942, and that it was only "shoe-horned" into a small proportion of tanks in mid-1944, shows that it could not have been considered a priority.

Given that Germany had a head-start, the allied producers still managed to gear up rather impressively in a rather short time, and it isn't as if the Germans didn't also lumber into a few mistakes and dead ends, despite what many Panzer-fans may fail to concede..
With specific regard to tank armament, I'm not sure that they did have a head-start did they? At the out-break of war their tank armament was broadly in line with Britain and France. Russia, if anyone, I would say were slightly ahead of the game. But what the Germans certainly did do was quickly learn from the early campaigns and tried to keep ahead of the curve in up-gunning their tanks, the main impetus being keeping up / ahead of the Russians.
I know we don't do What-ifs, but by 1944/5 the Allied designs were beginning to seriously challenge the German. Quite an achievement given the timescale, the starting point, and the exigencies of mass warfare. My money is on Comet, JSIII, Pershing & Centurion over any of the increasingly desperate routes Germany was beginning to consider.
Poor show! By 1944/5 the Allied designs were beginning to challenge... Well given that German industry was quite effectively being bombed into rubble, we should have done better and overtaken them in my opinion, but again I think its a matter of priorities on the Allies part. Quantity was more important than quality for the Allies. I would argue, to an extent, that the opposite was true for the Germans in 1944/5. Also, don't you think you give too much credence to the "paper panzers" when you mention "increasingly desperate routes"? The vast majority of German tank production and effort, in 1944/5 went into the bread and butter, proven designs; PZ IV (and variants, SPGs) and Panthers. All the lunatic fringe stuff amounted to very little.

 

As MK has mentioned before, no practical level of armour would stop much more than a glancing blow from an 88 or 17pdr. One of the reasons the operational research units did the statistical studies was to 'calculate' a sensible level of protection for future vehicles: if the 'cost' of stopping main gun rounds is prohibitive, is there a reasonable chance of stopping panzerfaust/RPG rounds, or do you settle for something merely bullet- and splinter-proof. It’s worth bearing in mind that while protection improved dramatically on post-war British and US tanks, the German Leopard I went the other way and sacrificed protection for mobility. Everyone agreed on the need for a big gun, though.

British and US guns certainly lagged the German ones, though for different reasons.

The British developed a decent series of anti-tank guns in quite short order: 2 pdr c1936, 6 pdr c1939 and 17 pdr c1942. Unfortunately, their deployment was affected by other issues. Although consideration was given to their mounting in tanks, first and foremost the guns were artillery pieces specified for and developed by the Royal Artillery. They were dedicated hole-punchers, which suited both the Gunners (who had plenty of other guns to chuck HE about the battlefield if it was needed) and the tankers (who had no interest in HE until it was a bit too late).

Once there was a requirement for HE, there was another issue to overcome: the high muzzle velocities required a robust shell which left little room for a decent HE charge. The solution – reducing the propellant charge of HE rounds to lower the muzzle velocity, allowing a thinner shell with more filling – came along quite late in the day. (Out of curiosity, anyone know who first thought of this?)

US doctrine was to set tank destroyers against enemy tanks; the job of the ‘armor’ was to exploit. Thus the Sherman was destined to get a medium velocity 75mm with respectable HE capability and merely adequate – at the outset – AP performance. I believe the field artillery branch had a lot of input on the choice of gun. Unfortunately, the arsenal of democracy never developed a decent anti-tank gun; the 3”, 76mm and 90mm guns were pretty poor compared to British or German guns of similar calibre. Remember that the US used the towed 6 pdr through most of the war.

So the British tankers had good AT guns but struggled to find tanks that would take them and the HE shell was an afterthought. The US had a more upgunnable tank and HE capability, but lacked AT power. The answer wasn't just a bigger gun, it was a proper dual-purpose weapon.


The solution so nearly within reach was to use the biggest British gun that would fit a given tank and make some HE ammo for it. Surely a 6 pdr with an HE round ought to have been a better all-rounder than the 75mm? A cutaway view of the AA 6 pdr HE shell suggests it was well filled, and that was a comparable high velocity round. I would like to see some figures on the HE charge weights – the filling, not the shell – for the 6 pdr, 17 pdr and 75mm to satisfy my curiosity.

 

Idler -
you forgot the Covenanter a few of which made into service - and just as quickly taken out of service

Adam/Mollusc
our main arguement was the undergunning of British Tanks -while it is a fact that already in the Spanish Civil war 1936/39 - the Germans were already experimenting with the 88mm AA gun as an A/T gun - and the Russians had already converted our ex 3 inch AA gun into an A/T gun- while we were piddling around building tanks around a 2 pounder- even the Churchill wasn't fully equipped with the 6 pounder until early '43....and the 17 pounder not at all....they can make all the excuses for ever but the fact it that someone just didn't bother -

same with the conversion of the 3.7AA gun "oh it stood too high off the ground" was the favourite- about the same as the 88mm then !
Cheers

 

Ironic isn't it that the Germans took on Hobart's ideas and ran with them, we didn't and floundered about in the 30's. I think we can agree that because the Germans were geared up for war (and the R&D and industry that that entailed was in place and funded on a war footing) that even though I don't consider their tanks to have been more advanced (in terms of armament) they were much better placed to react and develop more quickly in the coming arms race. Their (VK65?) "Tiger" concept of the mid 30's was a bit of joke really.... transported in two halfs and joined by a mobile crane! I'm not a Panzer fan-boy, but it is clear that even the early war stuff was very well engineered... we can get sucked into the over-engineered or not vortex here if not careful...I'll skirt around the edges by saying that in some areas "highly" engineered is better than not (eg I'd take Zeiss optics as a perfect example), in other areas it doesn't matter a jot. Case in point, T34. Badgers arse, but got the job done (given the numbers produced!), but at high human cost. Germans did not know when to not "highly" engineer and that ultimately helped the allies war-effort by reducing German manufacturing output. I think that because German industry suffered the allied bombing in the latter half of the war and the fact that they were largely on the defensive, with constantly reducing numbers of experienced tank crews, that by-and-large they did get the balance right in putting effort into the heavier models - and by that I mean mostly Panther and Tiger II.

 

Hindsight - well maybe! However, British designers were talking of piston engined obsolescence at the height of piston fighter production - not after. My comments on the tank stand, up gunning may sound easy, when designed other related components will have been designed to withstand recoil forces for that gun. The Hawker Hurricane for instance when the calibre of guns increased a new wing (non fighter wing) for ground attack had to be designed to withstand the recoil forces and low level flying. Post war the Conqueror tank (design by committee)had problems one being the weight of gun and turret on a tank that was not capable - it led to a series of problems and withdrawal. Wartime constraints - yes but I did mention that and fully understand the reasons why the ideal designs were not forthcoming to the production engineers, the designs were certainly on paper.

 

Idler -
you forgot the Covenanter a few of which made into service - and just as quickly taken out of service
Didn't! It's a list of British tanks that we managed to upgun, basically those that had 2pdr and 6pdr /75mm marks. I'd be inclined to argue that 6 pdr - 75mm is more of a case of differently-gunned, not upgunned. The list of British tanks that couldn't be upgunned is considerably longer.

they can make all the excuses for ever but the fact it that someone just didn't bother
That's it in a nutshell. And the more I look at it, that someone was the RTC which takes a bit of the shine off the Hobart generation.

same with the conversion of the 3.7AA gun "oh it stood too high off the ground" was the favourite- about the same as the 88mm then !
And twice the weight and no optical sights (this reared it's head quite recently; can't quite recall the detail of the sight issue). The 3.7" was almost Teutonic in its fitness for purpose. The original 88 was a fairly low-tech beast. Later the Germans played catch-up and development split into more specialised PAK and Flak versions. The RA chose to go up the 17 pdr rather than down from the 3.7", and the 17 pdr was a big enough beast.

 

Idler -
The shine came off the Hobart generation pre war when the winners were the donkey wallopers - who still preferred their horses to Tanks- this was the big problem in the desert with Lumsden and his Balaclava attitude - and while Monty could replace Norrie - Godwin-Austin and Gott he couldn't replace Lumsden with anyone as McCreery and "PIP" Roberts were still in training and Gatehouse was not of Corps
Commander stuff.
Cheers

 

Tom,
I'd have to disagree with that one. The rot had set in before the bulk of the cavalry converted. I don't doubt the donkey wallopers still had a softspot for horseflesh, but they knew which way the wind was blowing. They still had a job to do irrespective of whether horsed or tinned; or thought they did until the job was redefined by the RAC: look at the Div Cav Regts in the BEF - hordes of light tanks and carriers - who were in the process of being brigaded as 'armour' just before the balloon went up.

 

Sorry to drag up an old thread but I find this a very interesting subject as ex armoured crew (RAEME - Peacetime only) and one I have studied for many years. There have been many fantastic points raised and one that is critical to the debate only lightly touched upon. The Germans had a huge advantadge as they had prepared for war and had sound upgradeable standard designs (Pz III & IV) in 1939 which served well against the woefully obsolete British designs of the early years which despite having the excellent 6 pdr available for production could not due to the fact that the Brtish Army lost most of its main materiel in France/Belgium and the need t rearm quickly. This prolonged the life of obsolete weapons and delayed the introduction of better designs due to an overtaxed industrial base. Industry took till late 44 to catchup for tanks and tank guns. I am not going to try and defend this but the subject of the U Boat War and Airwar were raised and how they caught up quicker (1943). I'd put that down to the perilous nature of the threat (Blockade and devestation by Air power) which dirtectly thretened the population.
The British Government must also take a lot of the blame for dithering direction and a total lack of understanding of the problem.
Even if the British had had the Comet or even the Centurian in Normandy I really doubt the result would have been much differnt. The inadequate Allied tanks proved when defending with Infantry, AT and Arty they could easily destroy the attacking forces of superior armour (Panthers at Ruaray, Tigers during totalise etc).
Even if the British had had Tigers and Panthers instead of Cromwells and Shermans during Goodwood the depth and quality of the defences plus the constraint of the battlefield would have doomed them as well.
Al

 

From September 1943 no tank would be allowed to enter service in the British Armoured Divisions unless it could achieve an overhaul life of 3000 miles i.e. 3000 miles before any major assembly required replacement. The Cromwell, A30 Challenger and Comet all met this standard. The Centaur didn't.

This was a pass/fail standard, and would not have been waived just because a tank had a big gun or looked sexy. As such, I'm fairly sure that not one of the late-war German tanks would have been considered acceptable for service in the British Army. Especially not an automotive shit heap like the Panther. The Germans were overjoyed when this managed to achieve an engine life of 700-1000 km.

One of the big problems with British tank guns in the early war period was the ammunition. 2 pounder APCBC and HE rounds were requested in Dec 41 and didn't arrive until the middle of 1943. The HE for the 6 pounder arrived about Feb/Mar 1943, and the APCBC didn't arrive until June/July 1943. If APCBC had been available from the 6 pounder's combat debut, it would have been the dominant tank gun on the battlefield.

Much better use could have been made of all the British tanks, but their potentials too often went unrealised, except when foreign armies got hold of them and managed to extract more value from them than the British generally did. There's a general tendency by the technically illiterate to blame the "design" of British tanks, but the problem really was the whole system of British tank deployment. Even if the British had had the Sherman in 1940, they would still have thrown it together in a rush, given it the wrong ammo, shipped it across the world in a foot of seawater, provided the wrong spare parts, overhauled it with untrained native fitters, staffed it with crews who had been trained to operate an entirely different tank etc. etc.

The tendency of the British Army, War Office and Ministry of Supply to blame the pre-war tank design and development organisation, and the tank manufacturers, was basically a (successful) attempt on their part to distract their critics from realising that these organisations took a very long time to get their act together.

 

So in other words, "guns belong to the Royal Artillery and therefore the R.A.C. can't have any we've got all we want". Interesting mentality, but precisely what has been exposed in regard to the 3.7AA gun for ground use.

It's an interesting stretch to say that "British tankers had good AT guns". It seems they only got them a few years after they needed them.

Christie: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRlqF11c7r0

(turn the volume off it's just "music")

Trailing-arm suspension, large road wheels, the ability to run without tracks, steeply sloped armour, cast mantlets around gun barrels, amphibious 75mm gun, low-profile SPG, airborne tanks...not much left for anyone else to invent. The front glacis angle on some of his designs wouldn't be equalled until the Swedish S "tank".

No one listened but the Soviets, who bought two of his cruiser tanks in the early 1930s and never looked back. Failure in Stalin's Russia of course usually meant a trip to the Lubyanka, which must have focussed designer's minds wonderfully.

No one on our side can say they didn't know. They just didn't bother. The only limitation was motivation (except for the size of railway trucks and tunnels) Unfortunately peace time economics have only confirmed that our problem was and remains, a cultural one.

Monty's patter is embarrassing to read.

Unfortunately it seems Churchill had enough on his plate in the 1930s that he couldn't keep up to date with tank design. If he had he might have been able to push in the right places, as he did in WWI.

Leese and his comment about having a thousand tanks to lose is beneath contempt.

As Deputy CoS BEF, I wonder if he sent his kit home from France on the 19th of May 1940 as Lord Gort did.

 

There's a generally incorrect perception on this thread that British vs. German tank design was a kind of firepower arms race, with the Germans always keeping their noses in front.

The fact is that the lower firepower of British tanks was often the result of deliberate design decisions - to have a better balanced turret to improve traverse characteristics, to increase stowage and improve crew ergonomics, to reduce weight and enhance reliability, to fit into a military system with set rail gauges and Bailey bridge capacities etc.

For example, the severely out of balance turret that the Germans accepted on the later Panzer IV's, especially the IVJ which dispensed with power traverse entirely, would have been totally unacceptable to the British General Staff.

Whether this policy was wise or not is subject to debate of course, but generally I think British tanks were better designs (and certainly much better engineered) than their German equivalents.

 

The claim Christie's designs were the precursor of the T-34 is just absurd.
The panther turret had difficulty rotating on sloping ground.
German tanks were not groundbreaking in the 1930s and did not earn their (unjustified) reputation until late war.

 

That's an interesting assertion; what lies behind it? Is the T34 not a derivation of the BT7 which was a derivation of the BT2, which appears to have been almost a direct copy of Christies M31, which the Soviets bought two samples of?

I see that after watching the Soviet maneouvres of 1936 featuring the BT tanks, Martel persuaded the War Office to buy the third Christie chassis; and from this came the Nuffield "cruiser" family. Supposedly "extensively redesigned" by Nuffield, but as the tank was not reliable, whatever they changed doesn't seem to have been much of an improvement. Engineering egos at play?

 

The A13 Cruiser Mk.III/IV was fairly reliable by the standards of the day. It was redesigned collectively by Nuffields, The Mechanization Board, and the Superintendent of Design at Woolwich. The redesign was very extensive - even the suspension, the only original component worth keeping, was modified.

Its performance would have improved if the British Army had not insisted on continually sending it into action past its engine overhaul life, but there you go.

You have an enormous amount of attitude for somebody who doesn't know very much, it has to be said.

 

Appearances can be deceiving old chap. It does rather infuriate one, or it should, to think of thousands upon thousands of men being kiiled or having their lives ruined, to say nothing of those of their dependants, by the stupidity or laziness of those who were not only supposed to know better, but were paid good money to know better. I suppose one is expected to view it all with airy detachment now, but I can't help thinking that their lives were worth as much as ours, indeed many were worth a very great deal more, so if I sound a little "bitter", that should tell you why. We're living with the results of those losses today. Their names are not the only thing that liveth for evermore.

As for how much I know, I can only say that I'm still learning, and hopefully always will be. Like yourself I'm sure.

In regard to your post 76, which is interesting for the assertion that British tanks were "better engineered", I'm left wondering what these people thought they were doing: what good is a "balanced turret" if the gun it mounts is practically useless against enemy tanks? Or if it takes years to get into service what should have been done in months? Operationally and financially a good SPG would have been far more useful, and could have been got to the front far more quickly.

Just one example, the Churchill, which the Germans reportedly thought was an obsolete design being used sacrificially when they saw them at Dunkirk (it would be funny if it wasn't so sad), had no external gun mantlet: shell fragements, small calibre projectiles to say nothing of larger ones, could all jam the gun elevation, if not penetrate. Why? Christie had a sort of saukopf mantlet in 1931! We won't even get into why they didn't have ramps or fascines to climb the seawall, perhaps Percy Hobart was still commanding the Home Guard in Chipping Camden at that time?

The Germans seem to have managed to fight their tanks perfectly well from an ergonomic point of view. Being comfortable won't help much if your armour and gun are inferior to that of your enemy, and conversely who the H cares about being uncomfortable if can hit your enemy long before he can hit you? The sort of thing people complain of in peacetime, not when wars are being fought.

The Panther may have been an "automotive shit heap", but the kill ratios rather speak for themselves.

If the British tanks were so much better engineered and gunned than we've been led to believe, as you say, then where does the blame for the operational failures lie? You seem to have answered that in the last para of post #74. I would assert that the tank designs showed exactly the same cultural failures as you describe there.

"There's a generally incorrect perception on this thread that British vs. German tank design was a kind of firepower arms race, with the Germans always keeping their noses in front. The fact is that the lower firepower of British tanks was often the result of deliberate design decisions...."

Doesn't the second sentence contradict the first?