Monty on Tanks

VP it definetly is the same tank, the place is full of of military surplus, mostly planes, An F104 and a pair of G91Y are the other "stable" residents but I sometimes catch a glimpse of other stuff. Unfortunatly the location ended up in the middle of an busy exit to the 3 lane ring and I've never been able to find how to stop close to it safely.
Firsrt time I saw it was in 2000 still with the paint in the first pic, as most other hardware there is of Italian origin my suspicion is that it halso did serve in the Esercito Italiano post war though I haven't found confirmation.

 

Infantry go in to battle completely unprotected. Any weapon can kill them

Aircrew are very thinly protected. A hit over 20mm is certain to down them.

The smallest puncture can do in a whole submarine crew.

The majority of Naval vessels are thinly armoured.

Yet the claim is tank crews need an invulnerable vehicle or somehow they are being sent to certain death.

Not so. The most vulnerable fighting man was, is and always will be an Infantry soldier.

Actual tank crew casualties averaged out at 1 death and 1 wounded per penetrated tank. Not being flippant here but this was not a second 'Charge Of The Light Brigade'.
It is also a fact that around half of all tank crew deaths occured outside the tank.

I fear this whole business has been given legs by the post war love-in with German tanks in WW2.
Facts:
A 30 ton Sherman was always going to be at a disaadvatage when facing 50 ton opponents.
The penetrating power of all the main weapons of 1945-45 made it impossible to out-armour an AT hit. The best you could hope for was to stop some frontal penetrations by having all your armour on the front.
However only a third of hits were frontal.

The calculations are well known in the aircraft industry.
Say it costs 100 million to iron out a known failing in a current airframe They set the price of modifications against the claims that could result from a fatal crashes.
If compensation claims are expected to be around 40 million then they take that hit rather than spend 100 million.

The same with tanks.
Making the front of any tank near invulnerable will not stop penetrations.
the 66% going in from the side will still get in.
You save at most a fraction of the 33% that hit the front.

It may be that Allied crews only seeing their own casualties imagined the Germans were not troubled in the same way. They were and the mountain of smoking Panthers and Tigers in 1944-45 show that if the didn't feel the same way the were deluded.

I noticed another mention of the '500 burning Sherman during Goodwood' earlier in the thread.
I urge all those who believe such a claim to note the following:

Tank strength of Guards, 7th and 11th AD on 18/7/44 = 845 tanks

The report that gives the 493 figure says 493 casualties from a total of 1369 tanks.
That is some 500 tanks more than the combined strength of the 3 Division!

The same report also states total tank losses on 18/19 July were 156 tanks.
Note the wording. a tank casualty is not a tank loss.

 

M Kenny -
Most Tank crews of my experience all knew all that - but the argument here is that the British Tanks were always at a dis advantage to the German who - in the main and most of the wartime battles had bigger guns than both the British and Americans Tanks - and face it - better tactics as it took a long time to realise that the "Charge of the Light Bde" tactics employed for some time in the desert- until at least El Hamma in Southern Tunisia in early '43.

The very facts you use about MOST Tank crew casualties i.e killed and wounded- outside of their Tanks are very true which showed the common sense of a Tank crew - including myself at the time in evacuating a burning Tank - as many of them had had the experience of trying to get a friend and comrade out of the furnace of their Vehicle - knowing the identity of a friend burned beyond all recognition only by his position in the burnt out vehicle- is not something I would wish on anyone - and that is a real loss not a casualty to be recovered by REME.

All most Tank crews - again in my experience- wanted really was to gain some parity with the enemy as it was MOST disconcerting to see you best shot bounce off even the side of his Tank while his turret was turning towards yourself - simply because you were out of range by ten yards or so- while he could sit back at 2000 yards and take his time to knock you out to become yet another casualty....

Incidently the skingrafts applied to many Tank crew members took just as long to heal as any other skin graft - but I suspect that you already know all that....

The Tank "casualties" by three divisions at Goodwood - it seems to me to be an error by an inexperienced young officer in his first witnessing the effect of Battle and you will no doubt also appreciate that two of those divisions were sadly lacking also in fighting Battles.

NO one appreciated the dangers inherent to the PBI than ALL OF US TANK MEN who were alongside most of the way into battle- till it started to rain at least.....

Cheers

 

".....the 21st and 25th Tank bdes landed some months later with Churchills again with 2 pounder guns - the 6 pounders came out later and were fitted"


Being right up to the proverbial ears with NIH stuff I have been a lurker for some months, looking but not commenting. Couldn't let your statement stand Tom on this. 25th Tank Brigade was re-equpped with Mark IIIs mounting 6-pdrs in July, 1942. The Churchill 2-pdr inventory was six per regiment/battalion.

Imagine knocking out a Tiger at 600 yards and putting another out of action at nearly 1000 with a popgun.

Cheers, Gerry

 

I noticed another mention of the '500 burning Sherman during Goodwood' earlier in the thread.
I urge all those who believe such a claim to note the following:

Tank strength of Guards, 7th and 11th AD on 18/7/44 = 845 tanks

The report that gives the 493 figure says 493 casualties from a total of 1,369 tanks.
That is some 500 tanks more than the combined strength of the 3 Division!



The Guards Division, the 11th Armoured Division and the Desert Rats had lost 469 tanks (VIII Corps lost 131 tanks on the 19th and another 68 on the 20th), and to these numbers should be added the losses of the British I and Canadian II Corps (due to lack of statistics, these numbers will remain unknown.) For a two day operation, those losses are exceptionally high.

It is also a fact that around half of all tank crew deaths occured outside the tank.

As Tom has noted, the proclivity of Shermans to burn would be a highly motivating factor for tank crews to exit a penetrated vehicle and thus be exposed to mortar/small arms fire. In fact, German guns were noted for continuing to hit disable tanks to ensure they burned (less recovery). 'Ronson' and 'Tommy Cooker' were well deserved nicknames.

 

Gerry
good to hear from you again and you are probably right that your Brigade of 25th most likely were supplied with the six pounder in July of 1942 - as this was the main reason that both Brigades were "Volunteered" for the North African do as the six pounder was coming on stream in numbers BUT many for 21st Bde were late arriving and were installed in North Africa ...

As you are aware it was a lucky shot by 4th troop 48th RTR which jammed the turret of the Tiger and made the crew evacuate and now takes pride of place at Bovington - the only way you could take him on at 600 yards - and live !

Cheers - Tom !

 

Hi Tim,

Here's an Easy Eight suspension:

Dave

Ty

 

The Guards Division, the 11th Armoured Division and the Desert Rats had lost 469 tanks (VIII Corps lost 131 tanks on the 19th and another 68 on the 20th), and to these numbers should be added the losses of the British I and Canadian II Corps (due to lack of statistics, these numbers will remain unknown.) For a two day operation, those losses are exceptionally high.

Is that a quote from another site/document?
7th AD losses were very small and other than a claim Guards lost 60 tanks on 18th I have nothing concrete on their losses. I did notice the War Diary for Irish Guards posted here recently states they had 10 casualties on 18/7/44 and of them only 4 or 5 were destroyed. This from a Unit that ran straight into the retreating Tiger II's of sPz Abt 503.
The 469 from the 3 Division just does not stack up.
I knew about the 2 flanking Corps and their losses also appear to have been light.
It appears that someone added up the total of every single tank in the area as a starting point and then used a figure of every single tank that needed a repair for any reason and used that as the total of tanks lost by Gds/7th/11th.
In short the 490 figure just does not stack up.



As Tom has noted, the proclivity of Shermans to burn..................'Ronson' and 'Tommy Cooker' were well deserved nicknames.

The same OR people who reached that conclusion also looked at how well German tanks burned.
The Sherman had an 80% rate.
The Panther just over 60%.
The Panzer IV and the Tiger clocked in at....................80%!
It took more hits to penetrate a Panther and Tiger but once a shot got in there really was not that much in it.


The Germans had a nickname for the Pz IV 'Rotbart der hauchdünne' the gist is red-beard (i.e rusty) and thin skinned.

 

M Kenny-
Not about to argue over Tank losses in NWE as I have not studied that campaign in any depth but would agree-generally with your figures of both Sherman and PzlV at around 80% - if not even higher- as a result of 75mm and 88mm penetration and 75mm for PzlV....any figures for a six pounder ..?

The figures you quote for both Panther and Tiger are really suspect - not that I am a lover of the German Tank as these numbers MUST be owing to the penetration of the 17 pounder activity which was in volume in that campaign but relatively unknown in the Italian - despite claims that they were available in Italy after Oct '44 - they are certainly not the figures of the 6 pounder penetrations - even at 600 yards...
Cheers

 

The figures for the 'burn rates' apply to penetrated tanks only.
It is not a claim that 80% of every Sherman/Tiger tank burned.
That is once penetrated the chances of a fire were pretty much the same for everyone.
The thing about the surveys is the low number of tanks actualy surveyed. The '80% of Sherman caught fire' was a review of 45 tanks (and again it was a review of tanks pentrated not a claim that 80% of all Sherman caught fire) and the Panther survey was around 35 tanks. However everyone seems to use the Sherman survey so it is just as valid to use the Tiger/Panther surveys, like v like!

 

I think the figures are 'chance of burning if penetrated', so they're independent of the chance of penetration i.e. the size of the shot.

I had a look at Daglish's Over the Battleground - Operation GOODWOOD in the hope that there would be a nice table of losses. No such luck, but there were figures for tank losses for two of the three armd regts in 29 Armd Bde, 11 Armd Div:

3 R Tks: 41
2 FF Yeo: 43

The 23 H history states that 29 Armd Bde lost 106 tanks on 18 July. The Hussars' personnel losses were 2 officers and 23 ORs killed, 5 and 27 wounded - very close to the average 1 and 1 per tank mentioned above (not that I'm keen on turning bloke's lives into statistics)

 

Tom, I said they were available in limited numbers

About 100 of those are now in the theatre and issues have been made to 2nd and 7th Armd Bdes as well as 5th Can and 4th N.Z. Armd Bdes.

2nd Canadian Armoured Regiment received its first 4 Firefly in October 1944. There are also photos of South African and Polish Firefly in Italy so they also used them.

Sherman Register - Sherman Firefly

And from Osprey "Firefly"

Italy was another theatre where the firepower of the Firefly would be welcome, but its demands could not be met until those of 21st Army Group had been satisfied. The demands became more urgent and the calls for them more strident as time went on. As the Allied armies moved north, encounters with heavier German tanks became more common, but it was October 1944 before Fireflies could be spared for that theatre. By the time these had been shared out between British, Canadian, New Zealand, Polish and South African regiments, one per troop was the best that could be hoped for and the most they ever managed.

Perhaps for this reason, regiments in the Italian theatre treasured their Fireflies all the more. They certainly went to far greater lengths to camouflage them than did their counterparts in northern Europe who relied on disruptive painting and a trick of the light to confuse the enemy. It was the gun, of course, that was the problem. Some senior officers had already criticized it for the way it stuck out in front of the tank, entirely missing the point that it was the length of the barrel, more than anything else, that ensured the high velocity and hitting power of the weapon.

 

Idler-
You must agree that those figures quoted for the 29th Armoured bde for just ONE day's action is very high at approx 59% with the 3rd Tanks at 69% and Fifes at 70% and we can safely assume that these casualties were caused by the actions of both 75mm specials and 88mm's - and that the casulties in crews for 23rd Hussars is very low at approx 11% - but 32% of those being potentially recoverable apart from the maimed - all I can say is that once out of their Tanks - they must have been fast runners !

Sol -

I did recognise that you mentioned the "limited" aspect of your claim and I would put flesh on that "limited" as it was claimed by Lt.Gen. Leese just before Diadem which was the fourth and last battle of Cassino and the thrust through the Liri valley that " he has 2000 Tanks - and could afford to lose 50% of them"

Which as you can imagine cheered all Tank crews no end and that some 10,000 men were at risk - mind you - he did his best as for the Gothic Line we only had 1200 to start with and I don't know the loss figures for that 28 days of battles but the 21st Tank bde lost 30 Churchill Tanks in that time- also involved were the 5th Cdns - 25th bde - Kiwi's - Polish - 7th-2nd-26th and SA armoured bdes of which the 2nd from 1st Armoured had to be broken up in the Oct/Nov of '44 owing to lack of reinforcments so I wonder who had their Firefly's.....

so you can see that 100 Firefly's was a very limited supply at less than one per troop-with NONE to the Churchill Bdes as they couldn;t fit them in thus the rate went up to 12.5 per battalion but having said that - obviously the amount of Panthers and Tigers which were left at that time was also very limited.Knowing how slowly the RACTD worked it is doubtful if the 100 were in service by New Years....ready for the last spring push...
Cheers

 

The same OR people who reached that conclusion also looked at how well German tanks burned.
The Sherman had an 80% rate.
The Panther just over 60%.
The Panzer IV and the Tiger clocked in at....................80%!
It took more hits to penetrate a Panther and Tiger but once a shot got in there really was not that much in it.

I'm sure these statistics are quite valid.
Just am I am sure that 80% of the time, I could knock out Evander Holyfield with one well placed punch to the jaw. But, as with the Shermans in Normandy, getting close enough to deliver that shot is where it gets a little dicey.
Entire troops were decimated while trying to close that dangerous 2 km gap before they were in effective range. Firing from prepared, concealed positions gave the Germans the additional edge. It's helpful to know that 80% of Tigers would burn but that didn't seem to inspire much confidence in Allied tankers who couldn't get close enough to test the theory.

With all due respect, the armoured regiments who were suffering grevious losses, were not much interested in the statistics. Blackburn and others who were there to witness and experience it, just aren't buying the argument. They are adamant about being totally outclassed and that no amount of heroism could offset the technical disadvantage.

 

With all due respect, the armoured regiments who were suffering grevious losses, were not much interested in the statistics.

You would have to first show that Allied losses were 'grievous'.
Get side by side numbers of Allied/German crew/tank losses and compare.
No one has done that and any claim that Allied losses were grievous is a simple opinion.
I have a different opinion.
There was a bombing raid on the 'unhorsed' crew concentration area on the night of Goodwood. Many men were killed and it is noted that these losses were about the same as the crews lost in the days action.

The number of tanks written off in Goodwood are given as < 150

What I am saying is you have to know what 'normal' casualties were before you can judge one sides to be greater.

Tank total losses in Normandy, 4000 Allied v 2000 German.

 

M Kenny

I am surprised that the "unhorsed" Tank crews actually hung around to be bombed later as all instuctions were to get out of your disabled Tank and run like hell back to your lines for further placement in other vehicles.

Your figures of 1 killed and 1 wounded also bothers me as this is very low in my experience and so I would assume that this is taken from a full Tank battalion/ Regiment of approx 650 men ignoring the fact that many of that strength never actually fought at any time- and if they were casualties then it was by sheer accident.

Fact is that a tank battalion was made up of -usually - five troops of three men in three squadrons who actually did the fighting or some 225 men of which in taking 23rd Hussars losses of 25 killed and 32 wounded in ONE day tend to show that this figure is closer to 26% rather than the 11% originally quoted-or your 1 killed and 1 wounded per tank - and that to my mind is a grievious loss for any one day's fighting as these men were out of battle for the next day -being replaced by the spare crew allocation and the fit ones....

So where did the other 425 disappear to ? - this question always haunted Churchill when he questioned why the 8th Army at El Alamein managed to parade 160K men for pay and rations but only 100K for fighting !

To start with there were four HQ;s some with no guns but wooden poles to accomodate another wireless set with around 70 odd men - REME for perhaps a dozen or so - Signals with another dozen - Medics staff- doctor- male nurses - stretcher bearers - 1 Padre and drivers - "A" and "B" echelons with many vehicles manned by two and three men each -to bring up supplies on a daily basis from bde - Div and sometimes corps - spare crews of around 50 men....it soon added up to a lot of NON fighting men which hardly accounted for casualties...

Cheers

 

M Kenny

I am surprised that the "unhorsed" Tank crews actually hung around to be bombed later as all instuctions were to get out of your disabled Tank and run like hell back to your lines for further placement in other vehicles.

It was a blind bombing raid that hit 11th AD main HQ and was some distance from the front lines.

 

I would assume that this is taken from a full Tank battalion/ Regiment of approx 650 men ignoring the fact that many of that strength never actually fought at any time- and if they were casualties then it was by sheer accident.

It considers crews in tanks that were hit and nothing else.
As with all averages you can find tanks were all the crew died and others were all survived.
What struck me when checking the KIA numbers for the Armoured Regiments is how 'low' they are.
Not to say they were triffling but the fact that if you believed the tales of say '500 burning Shermans' were the norm then losses would have been huge.
The Goodwood crew KIA numbers are very low for the (claimd) loss of 500 tanks

 

M Kenny
So the "unhorsed" Tank crews were not Tank crews bit mainly admin staff - not fighting Tank crews.....


Just semantics really but I did make the point of Fighting crews as opposed to NON fighting personnel in a battalion in my explanation of Tank Crew losses which on the evidence of the 29th AB - were grievious - but not perhaps in the same range as Bomber crews on an average basis...

although you might perhaps have more success with my Tank Commanders widow and her three year old son..
Cheers

 

Idler-
You must agree that those figures quoted for the 29th Armoured bde for just ONE day's action is very high at approx 59% with the 3rd Tanks at 69% and Fifes at 70% and we can safely assume that these casualties were caused by the actions of both 75mm specials and 88mm's - and that the casulties in crews for 23rd Hussars is very low at approx 11% - but 32% of those being potentially recoverable apart from the maimed - all I can say is that once out of their Tanks - they must have been fast runners !

Tom,
I'd certainly agree that the tank casualties were high and, given the inferiority of our tanks, the crew casualties were mercifully low, but the deeper I dig, the more they look 'typical'.

Sellars' The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry 1919-1956 summarises their score for the day (18 July):
2nd Fife and Forfar, which had sustained a tremendous battering, were relieved by the 23rd Hussars and moved back, joining Captain J. D. Hutchison's two troops which had had their own losses while guarding the left flank. It was now possible to assess the day's damage and discover it to be very high indeed. At least thirty-seven tanks were put out of action. On the other side of the balance sheet the Yeomanry had destroyed six Panthers, two Mark IVs, five self-propelling guns and three 88-mm.s. Losses in personnel were proportionately heavy. Captain R. H. M. Trehearne and fifteen other ranks were killed. Missing and presumed to have been killed in action were Major C. Nicholls and eighteen other ranks. Among the wounded were Lieutenants D. A. Reid , P. R. Noakes, S. H. Millar and twenty-eight other ranks.
That's 35 dead and 31 wounded from 37 tanks. That's 66 too many, but a point that I don't think has been made here yet is that an infantry battalion sustaining this level of casualties in an attack might think they were having a rather good day. The bottom line was that throwing 9-12 armoured regiments at the Germans was a lot cheaper than using 9-12 battalions. There were fields of replacement tanks, even whole armoured regiments in reserve (e.g. the Skins that joined 7 Armd Div after 3 & 4 CLY were amalgamated); infantryman were much easier to lose in quantity and much harder to replace.

Regarding the bombing of the echelons, 2 FF Yeo lost 2 officers and 4 ORs killed, 3 officers and 40 other ranks wounded. It also finished off some tanks that were being repaired. 23 H admit to losing some fitters and some of the unhorsed crewmen, and note that 2 FF Yeo were very unlucky.

Perry Moore's Operation Goodwood: July 1944: A Corridor of Death states 18 July's tank casualties as 126 from 11 Armd and ~60 from Gds Armd. Any higher figures out there are probably all A vehicles, not just tanks.