Montgomery Controversy

No one maybe remembers (certainly not from stateside) but Monty also pulled another sucessful retreat defensive maneuver during Battle of Bulge in December 1944. After St. Vith fallen an entire 7th US Armored Div. combat group , 9th US Armored Div. combat group , plus remaining regiments of 106th and 28th Infantry Div.s were isolated inside a dangerously vulnerable salient around Vielsam. (they called it "Fortified Goose Egg") Despite objections of Ridgway , Gavin or Hodges (they assumed it would be a valuable counter attack platform) Montgomery ordered evacuation of salient due to insistence of field commanders like 7th US Armored cmdr Bob Hasbrouck and Bruce Clarke. "They fought with honor" he said. "Time to extract them" This operation under constant enemy pressure , bad winter weather without air cover and poor road network plus short December daylight accomplished successfully and almost 25.000 US troops were pulled out safely behind Allied lines by 25th December.

 

In his heyday, Monty achieved almost a mystical reputation for being the greatest of Generals..

I still remember my first LIAP leave in the UK, when my dad took me to a local whist drive and introduced me as "One of Monty's men"

People actually lined up to shake my hand

Ron

 

This story is more complicated and reveals a lot about US intra-service politics. Ridgway was obsessed with holding ground. As an airborne man, being surrounded was a normal state of affairs. There was also a popular American sentiment that once ground has been sanctified by the shedding of American blood it was sacrilege to give it up. The command of the defence of St Vith was a little odd. Hasebrouck, who had been a 7AD CC commander replaced Sylvester in Nov 1944. Clarke, the star CC commander from 4AD and victor at Arracourt was posted in to strengthen the 7AD leadership and had taken over as a CC Commander. Clarke, junior but the star armoured commander took charge at St Vith as a CC Commander while Hasebrouck commands the Division from Vielsam at the base of the "duck egg". The fighting is under the command of Clarke whose CC includes a CC from 7ADS, a CC from 9 AD, whose commander (Hoge) is his senior), and the remains of the 106 Infantry Division, mainly the 424 Infantry RCT under the divisional commander, (Jones), nominally a divisions worth of troops.

The issue was whether to believe the commanders when they claimed that the situation was as bad as they claimed. The Americans tolerated "bellyaching" far less than even Montgomery and Ridgway was far from impressed with intransigence by led by Clarke. My understanding is that Ridgway had to hear from Hoge, an old classmate how bad the situation was, before he believed Hasebrouchk and Clarke. Later in the battle Ridgway fell out with Clarke at Manhay over giving up ground and threatened to sack him. Clarke's claimed response was "Go ahead. Patton will have me back".

Neither Ridgway nor Clarke's careers seem to have been harmed. Ridgway emerges from WW2 as a real star and Clarke is SACEUR in the 1960s. The US Airborne forces win the propaganda war and the defence of Bastogne is the main thing the public remember from the Bulge (apart from Peiper). Clarke commissions the self congratulatory , but otherwise excellent documentary and training film and battlefield study about Armour in the Ardennes, which rehabilitates the role of armour and the 87th AD.

The American obsession with holding ground and recapturing it whatever the cost deserves more critical censure. The UIS XVIII Airborne corps was an elite force, made up of highly trained airborne soldiers all of whom who might have been NCOs in some other formation. They were the best of the US Arm,y's infantry, which in tended to receive the lower quality soldiers and did not have a great reputation as assault troops. But this great force of paratroops, who might have been needed as the spearhead into the Reich was burned up fighting for some pretty pointless terrain in the Ardennes.

I am not sure Monty saw himself as intervening in a debate, merely that under his concept of a battle he though that the St Vith duck egg was no longer to the allies benefit, and by tidying up the battlefield he would . He was very well informed through his network of LOs which provided a parallel reporting chain giving assessments by low level commanders and staffs directly to the Army Group commander unfiltered by intervening HQs. One consequence of Monty taking control of 1st Army was that odd groups of inquisitive Brits found themselves being interrogated about American culture and sports - including David Niven, OC of a Phantom Squadron

 

I created this thread because of a similar title in ww2f.com "Rommel or Montgomery". Please bear in mind insulting or degrading Field Marshall Montgomery or his memory was not my intention at all. If anyone offended with anything that was unintentional and accept my apology. Just you know. I am aware that he was a very good commander probably most compatent and proffesional type to head army or army groups in Western military effort against Germany/Italy. And I am more than aware that there is an unjust downplaying against him especially among US military writings. It is somekind of latest trend actually. I think nationalistic jignoism plays a lot in that too.


In my opinion as an armchair strategist who read a lot (again might be true or false , one's perspective according to resources might change for events and personalities before my birth ) Monty was a better army group/theater commander and army comander than Rommel. Most amateur historians and armchair strategists like me bedazzeled with Rommel's definite and tactically decisive victories in field with meager resources or much lesser logististics than his counterparts. I think this is deceptive. While Rommel was a supreme tactician and much more superior in mobile warfare and maneuvers than his British counterparts his were usually tactical operational sucesses not strategic. Again most readers impressed with Rommel's fast maneuvers in desert , his ability to comprehend mobile warfare and his accomplishments of gaining ground and destroying enemy forces which were numerically superior. This is a generation whose military shaped with NATO's mission oriented approach which borrowed this concept from Wehrmacht after the war. US and NATO allies were very impressed with how Germans got along in field with much less resources and could match even sometimes best Alled forces in field and implemented this tactical thinking concept to their own armies especially how NATO would be isolated in Europe with lesser resources and its most valuable ally isolated at other side of Atlantic in case of a conflict with Soviet Union during Cold War. Churchill's praise for Rommel after fall of Tobruk in June 1942 in parliment to cover bad performance of British generals in desert plus to save his own political future did not help either. Also Rommel created a "Knight in Desert" with daring but gentelmanly warfare image both in 8th Army and among British public and any victory against him was seen as unjust or due to numerical superiorty , failure of Hitler and Axis High Command to support him etc. Especially if this victory was won by personally unlikable , slow and deliberate Monty.


Montgomery had different problems than his Axis counterparts though they were as serious as theirs. He was not commanding a homogenous force. Both in desert and than in Normandy/NW Europe the forces he commanded made of different nationalities with different concepts , thinking , outlook and cultures. In 1942-43 period he commanded British , ANZAC (Aussie/New Zealand) , Indian , South African , Free French , Free Greek troops then in 1944 he added Canadians , Poles , Dutch , Belgians to list etc. Despite his undiplomacy he was able to work with them not to mention with RAF chiefs who had egos as big as his own and whose support he needed. RAF was a seperate arm and their military culture was different and much more independent than army. More over the commanders he had to work with (not just Americans but also British Commonwealth) were mixed bag not always clear and as committed as him. He had to find right men as his subordinates (I think he struck gold on this one in case of DeGuingand as Chief of Staff who had to restain him occasionally , Brian Horrocks who was the best corps commander he had , Bill Williams as his intelligence chief etc ) He was commanding basicly an army of "Citizens in Uniforms" mainly draftees conscripts who wished to finish the job , get out of uniform and go home as soon as possible. They were not as motivated as say fanatical blindly zeolot SS troops nor drilled like Germans who were trained since 1935 in effective battle methods and never lost core NCO concept of army. Because of that Allied soldiers morale could decrease and lose confidence against authority easily Monty had always had to keep in his mind that while victories were good and of course had to be won on field they also had to be won effectively with a safety margin. One defeat and he would sacrifice not only precious manpower material resources but also carefully accumulated credits in minds of troops so far. (it almost happened in Operation Market Garden fiasco)


This was the army he had to take result and this was the reality he was in. So as a sensible commander of course he had to gather and utilize every advantage he had because other side no matter how chivalrous it was had his own aces (which were impossible to duplicate. That is jarring to Monty critics as if Allies would always had to fight Germans in equal and ther own terms ! to justify sucess ) So Monty began to use every quantity and quality advantage he had. Too many troops , tanks material advantage. Of course he was usually attacking an enemy with better quality weapons like anti tank guns or light infantry weapons plus settled on pre prepared positions head on. He needed and least 3x4 times manpower , vehicles and much more firepower advantage. ULTRA intelligence Monty had. Yes and Rommel advanced all the way Alamein because he was blind in intel !!!??? He was decrypting wireless messages of US military atteche in Cairo not to mention radio communication of 8th Army division brigade HQs until July 1942. Besides ULTRA was providing intelligence for 8th Army since 1941 but neither Auckinleck nor his subordinates like Cunningham or Ritchie used it efficiently. 8th Army had air superiorty. So Rommel shouldn't advance to Egypt blindly , outstrip his aircover and argue then fallout with Kesselring then. Monty had abundent supplies and Rommel had none. That is again "genius Rommel"s fault. He should have thought this before driving Panzer Army Africa all the way to Alamein and stranded there behind a 2.000 km supply line and leaving Malta intact and ready to cut sea lanes between Italy and Libya.


Most importantly a lot of critics especially mostly from USA thought Monty was too slow , unable to stop defeated Panzer Army remants retreating from Egypt at the end of 2nd Battle of Alamein in November 1942. This is I think due to both his inexperience in tank mobile pursuit operations and his unwillingness to make a disorganized pursuit where it would be easy to distrupt and destroy advance units by retreating Axis forces no matter how deplated they were. Remember they did it several times previously in Western Desert between 1941-2 and Monty had to take care of morale of men and his newly gained reputation. A slower and more ordered pursuit in his own terms would bag enemy he assumed eventually especially Torch landings on Northwest Africa considered. He might have became a little media obssesed but as I said lots of capable military leaders done that previously for an effective PR campaign and gain more resources and political support. Rommel was a cover of German propaganda magazine SIGNAL constantly. Patton , Clark , Halsey and MacArthur had an army of reporters and newpaperman with their headquarters etc. They were not feeding only these mens egos which would inflate later to improper levels. Total War is also about information , public morale , propaganda and confidence , trust , support , awareness of conflict.


And remember inflated propaganda and over esimating one's abilities can bite you back later especially if everyone including yourself believed your own myth. This was what happened Rommel in El Alamein. After his initial counter attacks in October 1942 in Alamein battle failed he had seeked permission to retreat. That was the only logical move which should have been done weeks ago actuallty. Both Rome and Berlin instead sent him congrulationary messages constantly and confidence to him that battle would end favorably. When he was spent Hitler actually forbade him retreating basicly ordered him to "Stand or Die" after 8th Army gutted Axis defence on 2nd November. Later Rommel lamented ruefully on his diary that getting a great deal of public fame and recognition was harmful sometimes because then your superiors ask him to do impossible , achieve deeds that were beyond his approach no matter what. This was a phonemon that would visit Montgomery later too on Battle of Caen and Operation Market Garden in 1944. It seems to a casual reader that it was impossible that Allies stall or fail in tactical battles of these operations because of their immense numerical and logistical superiorty unless they were incompetent , inferior to superior warrior race Germans. That is because they ignore other problems that plague Allies and their armies I mention somewhat above.....


In my next post I will try to look Montgomery and 8th Army's Tunisian Campaign and compare him with Patton and Bradley.

 

Merdiolu,

I have some minor quibbles with your assessment, but on balance a good and fair appraisement of Montgomery and his legasy.

My quibbles are as such.

1. Without question Montgomery had to incorporate troops from many different nations into both 8th Army and 21 Army Group , a facility that British generals seem to do as well or better than anyone, but I think you dismiss too lightly the similar challenges faced by Rommel in the desert. True he had only one other ally in Italy, but the disparity in training, quality, equipment and morale was profound between the DAK and the Italian Army. The qualitative superiority that Germany had in equipment and tactical doctrine over Commonwealth troops was at least equal to if not exceeded by that of Commonwealth forces over that of Italian.

Rommel had to contend with reliance almost entirely on Italian Sea power and air support divided between the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronuatica. Montgomery on the other hand had the luxury of coordinating with the RAF or RN predominately(and their Commonwealth equivalents who used much the same equipment and doctrine).

Most of Montgomery's troops, sailors and airmen spoke English as at least a second language and the vast majority of his were equipped, organized and trained in some form of British battle doctrine, but of course this was different for Rommel in the desert. In NorthWest Europe it must be admitted that here Germany gained the advantage except for some Osttruppes.

2. Certainly Rommel was the darling of the German press, and as far as he was able, he used that notoriety to promote his position, but there were rather significant differences in Rommel's position and that of Montgomery, or Patton for that matter. Every word and image of Rommel transmitted by print, radio or film first had to pass though the scrutiny of Goebbels Propaganda Ministry, where as Allied commanders had to deal with a mostly free press whose only restraint was in publishing secret material or knowledge. "Color" commentary was allowed and even promoted for morale purposes, but one has to wonder if not Eisenhower might on occasion wish he had a Goebbels on hand to curb some of the more "colorful' comments from some of his senior commanders.

Ok, maybe they weren't quite so minor, but otherwise I (mostly) agree with you!

 

I am looking forward with great interest to the comparison between Monty and the Patton / Bradley duo in Tunisia - as in my view there was NO comparison….but different folks etc...

Cheers

 

Having read several books on Rommel it is most evident that some of Rommels Senior Commanders were sometimes less than impressed with
Rommels tactics.

Several battles could have been lost had it not been for their intervention.

I am not taking anything away from Rommels abilities, but all Commanders make mistakes.

The best Generals making the least!

Regards
Tom

 

TCS-
You can say that again as there was one particular move by a junior general who didn't bother in telling Kesselring at the Gothic Line but he filled a gap in the defence of Croce /Gemmano with his mountain brigade and brought the

46th and 56th Divisions to a screeching halt for more than ten days- we then had to haul in 1st AD and 4th Indian to get past his lot who were giving us endless casualties of 145 KIA and 600 WIA on a daily basis - forgotten his name but you

can google for that " Battle of Gemmano "

Cheers

 

Here I have to agree. Patton as a Corps commander and Bradly as his Deputy/Cheif of Staff cannot compare with Montgomery in command of 8th Army. But to be fair you have to compare operations of UK 8th Army vs. US 3rd Army or 21 Army Group against !2 Army Group where commad experience and duties are more or less equal.

In Tunisia, Patton essentially went from peacetime command to wartime command much like Montgomery did during France 1940 and the evacuation. A better comparison might be UK 3rd Division in 1940 and US II Corps in 1942.

 

Agreed. it isn't really possible to make a direct Top Trumps style comparison. The TV show "Deadly Warriors" illustrates the purility of this approach.

I am not sure it is that easy to compare two armies operating side by side. WW2 was not a sporting competition between two allied armies to determine the "best general" or "Toughest troops" by merasurign which army chad captured the most ground. . The British and US were allies in a common purpose to free the world from Axis tyranny. . Nor could any evaluation be said to be fair or balanced.. The Germans had a big say in what happened and how far different armies advanced. .

Claims about how much territory was captured or who liberated what town first miss that point.

One of the most sobering statistics about the Normandy campaign is that 21 AG and 12 AG each lost a comparable proportion of the total troops landed. Just over 10% of troops became casualties and just under 2% died. That is the big statistic that should be remembered when there is a temptation to state a claim that one allied army or commander was better than another.

 

belasar

You do not seem to be aware of a few things when you ask to compare the British 3rd Div in1940 with US 2nd Corps in 1942…..as when Monty was on his way home from India as Brigadier on the promise of 3rd Div Command - he was

seriously ill and put on the unemployed list but he haggled his way back and by the time the BEF landed in France they were a 1st class fighting unit - and proved that when the idiotic move to Belgium put them face to face with what the

Germans could throw at them and retired to the UK in good order….

The first time that the US 2nd corps met up with Rommel was at Kasserine - and they got the shock of their lives - 4000 were KIA - 6000 became POW's and the balance of 72,000 ran pell mell through my brigade trying to get back to

Morocco…..Alexander was called from Cairo to sort it all out and it was there that he formed his opinion of the American leadership - not the Gi's but the leadership - which didn't leave him for a long time as he was stuck with the Patton

/ Bradley duo at Tunisia - then again at Sicily then the even worse Clark in Italy where he had to suffer his presence at Salerno - Anzio and Rome..and I would think that he quietly rejoiced that Monty was given the NWE job

and Clark in Italy

 

Tom,

Both Montgomery and Patton moved heaven and earth to get combat commands, this is to both officers credit.

Patton's first command was the Western Task Force landing at Casablanca (33,000 men, basically a small Corps sized unit). He preformed with distinction in both combat operations against Vichey forces (granted they were Vichey troops, but then these GI's were in their first battle ever) and in the negotiations with the French command of this area.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass occured on Febuary 19th to 24th, 1943 where "they ran pell mell though your brigade trying to get back to Morocco".

On March 6th, 1943 Patton took command of II Corps, some two weeks after "they ran pell mell though your brigade trying to get back to Lorocco".

On March 23rd, two weeks after taking command of II Corps and four weeks after "they ran pell mell though your brigade trying to get back to Morocco" they fought 10th Panzer at El Guettar where they not once, but twice threw back a German panzer led attack.

In four weeks a broken and demoralized unit was turned into an effective force that at a minimum could hold their own in direct combat with German troops.

How much more could Alexander ask of US leadership?

 

Belezar,

What you write is of course correct. This is usually told, by Americans, in the context of a tale told of British high-handedness and prejudice. . There is more than grain of truth in this.

The British had low expectations of the US Army. Until March 1943 it's war had been a sorry story of being humiliated by the Japanese in the Philippines, America's principal overseas possession. Many senior officers had served in WW1 and seen the US Army's early days in battle. They had interpreted Pershing's refusal to allow American formations to operate under allied higher commands as arrogance, which cpondemned the yanks to excessive casualties relearning the lessons of 1914. The US Corps which served under the BEF as part of the Australian Corps were sufficiently under trained that at Bellicourt Monash attached Australian military advisers to each unit in the 27th and 30 Divisions, in the same way the US did with unreliable allies. During the First World war the British developed a process to introduce new formations into battle. Formations would start off ina quiet sector of the line, then be assigned some minor attack, before they would be trusted in a key task. Its the same way that a sports team might like to play a friendly match and some easy match before playing for a major tournament.

The British had seen the US Army undertake a massive expansion with officers with minimal experience catapulted into Corps and Army commands. They could see dramatic personnel changes as men, like Fredenthall , with a good reputation as a peace time soldier demonstrate incompetence and cowardice. There was an lack of trust in US Commanders by their own superiors who sent spies such as Harmon and Bradley. Not the marks of a well oiled war machine

However,the US Army record in Tunis was at patchy. It is only with hind sight, and some rose tinted spectacles that it is possible to see El Guettar as a point in a steadily upward curve. With hindsight we can see that after Kasserine pass, two outstanding US commanders, Patton and Bradley, and a brilliant armoured commander Harmon were given the opportunity tio turn things around. But the capabilities of those men weren't that well known then., It is quite possible that the men sent to turn II Corps around were Clark, Dawley and Lucas. Even after Tunis there were questions about the performance of US Troops, e.g. the 45th Division in the Husky landings and 36th Division at Salerno. Husky was a close run thing. It is easy to imagine a disaster had the assault force at Gela been the 36th and 45th Divisions. Almost every military operation conducted in 1943 seemed to start with a mass sacking of RCT commanders after a couple of days.. .

What annoys the American military and writers is the unwillingness of the British commanders to trust the US Army with the lead role that the US public expected as the larger economy. However, with the information Alexander had before him, he had no reason to believe that the Americans would miraculously turn their army around. Alexander was one of the great fighting soldiers of the C.20th. He had commanded and or fought alongside the British, Belgians, French, Indians, Latvians and Germans. It would have been a massive risk, if not criminally negligent to have taken US protestations that the Americans would get it right on the night. At the time Alex was diplomatic to Eisenhower, but it is clear from the private correspondence that he was very pessimistic. From a British point of view it was a reasonable concern.

 

Good points all, but rose colored glasses weren't an American invention either or are we forgetting Greece, Crete, North Africa though out 1940 and 41, Malaya and Singapore? The latter of which occurred at the same time as the Philippines.

Certainly Americans then and now expected more respect than they had proven fully in March 1943, but I think it is fair to say that they had no reason to be ashamed of their learning curve which does seem to have been a wee bit faster than her ally.

 

I have said it right from the start. The (imagined)'problem' with Monty was his refusal to take second place to anyone. He could get away with it by being called a big-head by fellow britains but his lack of deference to American expectations earned him half a century of unjustified slander and falsehood.
Kissing arse was not high on his 'to do' list and that rankled. It seems it still does with many.

 

Belasar

The British can NOT forget Greece - Crete etc but what you forget - and I have thumped this point ad nauseum - that those disasters were caused by W.S. Churchill in his role as chief

strategist - who thought that he knew everything as he had been involved in the Boer War and as Colonel in WW1 and as Prime Minster and Defence chief became a bit of a bully - to be exact -

until the time to your Pearl Harbour Dec '41 - when he realized that he wasn't the greatest and had Alanbrooke appointed to be C.I.G.S. and became Chairman of the Chief of Staff's Committee

who then set out a strategy to WIN the war despite the dreams of both Marshall and Knox...

It has to be admitted that the learning curve of the Americans was faster than the British AT THAT TIME…and I trust that you will accept MY thinking that to EDUCATE is much faster than to RE-

EDUCATE - as this is what faced Alanbrooke as he sat at his desk for the first time just before Christmas '41….and his thinking was demonstrated by Monty less than nine months later at a small

place called Alem El Halfa - weeks before El Alamein - when Rommel got the shock of his life - and the war began to be won at that point...

While the American Gi learned fast - the same cannot be said for their leaders - and I do mean their junior Officers as a base of their Regiment and Divisional leaders...

Cheers

 

Valid points all.
You are absolutely right. It had taken three years for the British to find a commander and tactics to reverse the Blitzkrieg. However, Britain had seen all her other allies succumb before they had a chance to learn much. The Soviet learning curve had been steep and extraordinarily costly. In March 1943 the pattern seemed to be for the Soviets to lose more in the summer than what they gained in the winter.

In this context the American assumption that their inexperienced army should be given pride of place, and be able to learn on the job does seem a little chauvinistic if not a tad arrogant. The American contingent in Tunisia was merely the advance guard of a mighty citizen's army which expected to make mistakes and. The British did not have the depth of reserves to risk losing battles to blood their allies.

(The problem of "respect" in Tunisia is a minor compared to the preposterous arguments put forwards at the time, and subsequently that the Allies should have invaded France in 1942 or 43.

I don't want to score points, merely ask for some understanding of the thinking that led British commanders in Africa to be err skeptics of the septics...

 

in all these operations which were originated from Churchill by the way , both Prime Minister imaginative and energatic he was and Imperial COS were not aware of their forces actual capabilities and their local logistical tactical conditions. Like sending just four divisions to Greece. That was was nothing in quantity against a massed German invasion except provoking it in first place. Holding Crete which was out of air cover another. British Mediterranean Fleet sacrificed a lot to save the army in Crete though Germans did not get Crete free , their own casaulties were also heavy in Crete invasion and twisted their future logistical thinking. (delay of Barbarossa , throwing out airborne war concept in future , holding Crete with a large and isolated garrison etc ) And actual offensives like Brevity - Battleaxe to relieve Tobruk in 1941 we initiated prematurely.

 

Before anyone gets too overeager to criticise Churchill, may I tentatively suggest that you invest in the Churchill War Papers edition for 1941. Once you have waded through all 1300-odd pages, you get a much greater overview of the information and pressures that were bearing down on Churchill from all sides when he was trying to make strategic decisions. That is not to deny that he had a tendency to browbeat his advisors ("Nag, worry and pester" as he put it IIRC) and that he made some mistakes.

I just wish that the War Papers continued on into 1942 and beyond.

Regards

Tom

 

When Operation Torch was initiated in November 1942 it was due to momentum and insistence of Churchill , Imperial COS and Roosevelt's over Marshal and US War Dept. (Admiral King as CiC of US Navy was also won though later by British planners when he saw shipping tonnage capacity advantages Operation Torch would bring ) Roosevelt was right that US Army should engage with Germans somewhere in 1942. That place was obviously not Europe since both US Armed forces capabilities and logistical capacity was weak for that kind of undertaking in 1942 so North Africa in Med. Theater was chosen wisely.

Wisely because US Army which would be carrying the main burden of Western military effort was not ready yet in 1942. Due to Marshal's reluctance it committed Torch half heartedly though he sent a very good pontential theater commander-organizer (Eisenhower) he built bridges between combined Allied military arms. In Torch landing crushing Vichy France resistance in four days with immense advatages despite obvious problems in landings etc caused many US commanders including Fredenhall thiniking it would be this easy to beat Germans as well. One GI slogan after Algiers fallen was "Bring on the Panzers !" They learned this was not the case in battle of Faid Pass (January 1943-Harry Hopkins's son was also witnessed this) , Kasserine Pass ( February 1943) , and El Guettar (defensive victory but offensive failure for 2nd US Corps)

The thing was US Army was suddenly grown out of no where as a conscript army. In 1940 it totalled barely 100.000 men and badly equipped (not even enough vehicles for an armored division) though it had a great pragmatic staff capability. I read Thomas Ricks "The Generals" and he makes clear that in upper echalons Marshal always put men whom he knew personally , proven itself and most importantly who got tangible results either in planning , administration , field command etc. Despite this with Compulsive Service Act in 1940-41 Army suddenly grew out of proportion with less equipment and training but more men in uniform. This gave US Army even more civilian outlook than British Commonwealth forces. This had both advantage and disadvantages. Disadvantage was obvious : US Army was green , untested more importantly independent of its Allies sometimes unwiling to listen. So defeat in Kasserine Pass was not surprising and actually was a healthy thing for development of US Army. It was a small scale tactical operational screw up in Kasserine and subsequent battles nothing strategic. And important lessons were drawn out.

Advatage was by being new and civilian (though British not aware of some segments of Anglophobia isolanism in US public were obviously grumbled "they were late again") they were fresh , free to experiment in everything including combined arms and US Army was quicker to learn being led by pragmatic and result oriented commanders. Eisenhower , Bradley , Patton etc learned in time that relieving commanders who were not getting anywhere was necessary (it took British to learn that three years until Monty came to 8th Army in 1942 and began to cull ruthlessly old school "nice chaps" who knew each other pre war and were not energatic a lot ) Their combat group formations became much more balanced in 1943 and much more independent initiative taking thinking. They had more flamboyant leaders than their allies but as I said some or a lot Public Relations work was necessary for Total War. Actually while American commanders drawn good and vital lesson from Kasserine Pass defeat , Germans drawn the wrong ones. The reports about American troops in Tunsian Campaign and their combat capacity which were written according to Hitler's mind set (since it was what he wanted to hear) were deceiving as hell full of catch phases like "cowardly , likely to run from battlefield , badly led , too hesistant etc" For rest of the war both Hitler and German High Command would create their image of US Army according to first engagements in Tunisia.

In Tebourba battles , Faid Pass and Kasserine Pass American army first saw the need of good combat leadewrship and personalities to lead. Fredenhall's relief was obviously necessary. He threw not only a bad impression on British (Alexander who assumed the command of entire Tunisian land campaign and armies as 18th Army Group remarked Eisenhower "I am sure you have men better than that" politely after the battle. Unfortunetely this somewhat justified prejudice of Alexander would be dominant in his thinking until Italian Campaign. Once he saw Patton's fast march to Palermo in Sicily he began to change his mind) Actually once front stabilized in Kasserine Pass in Thala and Tebessa in February 1943 US forces did not hurry to pursue , intercept and harass retreating Germans either. I do not see any US commentors criticizing this. It is obvious that once you got a severe beating in field you bound to be hesistant or cautious even if you are victorious. In that sense both British and American forces reacted in same way.

After Patton assumed command things began to improve rapidly of course in general areas. He was although maybe a little bit mentally unbalanced was energatic , motivated and quick. Battle of El Guettar was a good and obvioud morale raiser victory (like Alam el Halfa in August 1942 ) much needed by US Army. But weak points of US Arms were still evident even in March 1943 battles. Although 2nd US Corps went to El Guettar and repulsed all attacks of 10th Panzer Div. it failed to advance , dislodge the enemy and breakout to east towards Gabes and sea for two weeks. Only defending force holding 2nd US Corps in El Guettar for two weeks was a improvised Italian-German battle group. If 2nd Corps overcame that it could cut 1st Italian Army defending Mareth Line-Wadi Akarit position behind. Patton was quite infurited with this. He was not complately Anglophobic. In February 1943v Patton flew 8th Army HQ in Tripoli and met with Montgomery first time and remarked about him "This is the only man who knows his stuff and aware of what he is doing"

I think his perspective on his Allies changed he write his diary on 7 March (when Rommel launched his final attack , his last operation on Medenine against 8th Army and defeated by Montgomery ) "Rommel attacking on British. I hope British get a good drubbing from him" and lamented Monty's arrogance and Ike's taking sides with British (which was not the case) I think his disappointment on US advance at El Guettar compared to 8th Army's caused these unfortunete entries. For the rest of the war Patton struggled hard to race with British and Monty (who became a press public hero) a little bit childishly in his own mind maybe.