Montgomery Controversy

Canuck

I am curious, who was confirmed as to "blame" for Market-Garden?

 

That was the main reason and catalyst for Monty's decision to get rid of Lumdsen and Gatehouse (cmdr of 10th Armored Division) Their delay and inability to pass through Axis minefields besides bellyaching and Lumdsen's actually proposing to abandon whole Lightfoot operation on 24-25 October was final straw. Lumsden being a cavalyman he was insisted losing vehicles in minefields was not proper use of tanks. Monty annoyed by his questioning of authority probably cut ties with him then. For Monty it was an absolute breach of confidence. He had to wait the end of battle to get rid of them though. Once actual engagement was started it is hard to sack commanders unless absolutely necessary. He was not fighting a cavalryman battle anyway his was "killing match" type of attritional battle destroying enemy piece by piece with bite and hold tactics from Great War and limited casaulties , using massive firepower and repulsing immediete and inevitable enemy counter attacks. He was using armored divisions to that purpose supporting infantry artillery and to drive back panzer counter attacks not releasing them to do the cavalry thing and getting mauled up by Axis anti tank screens again.

 

That was the main reason and catalyst for Monty's decision to get rid of Lumdsen and Gatehouse (cmdr of 10th Armored Division) Their delay and inability to pass through Axis minefields besides bellyaching and Lumdsen's actually proposing to abandon whole Lightfoot operation on 24-25 October was final straw. Lumsden being a cavalyman he was insisted losing vehicles in minefields was not proper use of tanks. Monty annoyed by his questioning of authority probably cut ties with him then. For Monty it was an absolute breach of confidence. He had to wait the end of battle to get rid of them though. Once actual engagement was started it is hard to sack commanders unless absolutely necessary. He was not fighting a cavalryman battle anyway his was "killing match" type of attritional battle destroying enemy piece by piece with bite and hold tactics from Great War and limited casaulties , using massive firepower and repulsing immediete and inevitable enemy counter attacks. He was using armored divisions to that purpose supporting infantry artillery and to drive back panzer counter attacks not releasing them to do the cavalry thing and getting mauled up by Axis anti tank screens again.



But do not Lumsden and Gatehouse have something of a point here?

The primary value of armor is its mobility and speed, and conventional wisdom is not to use them to assault prepared positions or clear minefields. Indeed the only way they can is by running over one for the loss of a valuable piece of equipment and a trained crew of as many as four men.

 

Not every Allied nationalty Commonwealth unit was hostile to Monty. Sure Canadians were bitter during his 8th Army command in 1943 at Southern Italy especially constant drive push back of enemy from front in mountainous terrain and worsening winter weather. Crossing of river Senio and Moro and Battle of Ortona were tough affairs resulted heavy casaulties and might have caused questioning of Monty from Canadians. And as I explained in my previous post his inability to close Scheldt on time and letting 15th German Army escape in 1944 NW Europe Campaign was also a blunder paid with Canadian casaulties in next months. Though none of Canadian generals (except maybe General Guy Simonds whom Montgomery hold a very high regard , a tough and innovative commander) was as experienced as him. Some Canadian commanders like Foulkes were sometimes regarded incompatent even by other British and American commanders.

At the other hand ANZAC troops and officers thought highly of Monty. So did Montgomery about them. He bluntly said "We couldn't win Alamein without Australian Division" 9th Australian Division also suffered heavy casaulties in 2nd Battle of Alamein but never grumbled. 2nd New Zealand Division and their legandary cmdr Bernard Freyberg (Churchill's Salamender) had a very good working relationship with him too and Kiwis performed admirably under his command during Alamein and Mareth Line battles. And also South African Division also received a full praise from Monty after El Alamein. Their commander General Piennar received a full praise "South Africans did very good" after Alamein battles. They did not complain about him much either. So maybe disliking Montgomery was a transatlantic US / Canadian thing.

 

Admiral Bertram Ramsay issued a number of increasingly strong warnings to both Montgomery and Eisenhower of the urgent priority in seizing both sides of the Scheldt estuary and was ignored. General von Zangen certainly saw the danger and his actions delayed the opening of the port by some 85 days.

 

It is a cheap shot because it infers that he was not 'manly'. You can deny it but that is the motivation behind it all the homosexual claims As such it a despicable insinuation and I say anyone repeating it is grasping at staws given his WW1 record.

I have heard the same about nearly every other General in WW2. What is it that forces people to single Monty out for such complaints.?

I dispute such a claim. All I saw from the press reports shows he was well liked by the US public before Bradley and the rest turned on him over his command of US forces during the Bulge.
Indeed you can find complaints from senior US figures who thought they should raise their generals profil in order to counter this unwelcome fact.


I go further. I say he was picked as a scapegoat and has been pursued by the equivalent of a pack of baying dogs for some 60 years for no other reason than his successes. That and petty minded nationalists determined to blame others for their own failings.

 

I really would like to know what drives the Monty Bashers to such heights of frenzy. If the restricted their complaints to normal every day failings I could understand them but they are driven to ever more bizzare ways of blaming Monty for every reverse in WW2.

A sample US based reviewer on Amazon perfectly illustrates the delusion.
Every time you read his Western Front reviews you find him having a go at Montgomery.


http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/AXFQ4OGQ8MFOS?sort_by=MostRecentComment&display=public&x=12&y=11





This review is from: The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment (Twentieth-Century Ba) (Hardcover) Mr Adams is a business man and amateur historian that has written another superlative book on WWII. His earlier book dealt with the operational appraisal of the Pacific War. The keystone to the author's books is that they're highly researched and thought out and include many primary examples to back up his comments. Included in the narrative are written orders, communiques, diary entries, referencing important comments from key people. The extensive Bibliography of primary and secondary sources will support this contention of thoroughness. A creditable Notes section is also provided.

The author's emphasis is on the operational details with special attention for the logistical and command and control problems facing the Allies in the fall of 1944. It will be shown that the logistical problems of supplying the front line had a monumental affect on the prosecution of the war and the impact it had on the command decisions made, especially Montgomery's. It will also be shown the differences in war doctrine (narrow front - wide front, single prong - dual prong) between Eisenhower and Montgomery will have a major disruptive influence on the battlefield as well as between Allies. Montgomery will constantly badger, humilitate and try to wear down Eisenhower into following his game plan for the capture of Berlin by the northern route. Just like Operations Comet and Market Garden were failures, Montgomery's plan for 21st AG to attack in the north while most of the US forces played supporting roles would have also been a failure but on a scale that could've eclisped the casualties of the "Bulge". Montgomery had grossly underestimated German strength and with Model in charge the results would have been terrible for the British / Canadians and the attached Americans as their flanks grew.

There are many books covering the controversy between commanders and to a lesser extent the supply problems of getting fuel, ammo and supplies to the front line which by September was approaching the Rhine River but this is the best account that I've read on the subject.
The author has meticulously researched and assembled information from primary and secondary sources, using hundreds of orders, communiques, diary entries, quotes from key personnel, and data from biographies to fortify his narrative as to the causes and reasons why the Western Allies hit a brick wall in September after a momentous August.
Nightly reports sent to Brooke from Montgomery, the letters Eisenhower sent Marshall, the field orders Eisenhower sent to his "Lieutenants" are important and given ample attention. The author will show the orders that were intended for Montgomery were being altered by British sympathers on SHAEF giving Montgomery greater latitude than Eisenhower wanted to give the Field Marshall. It will also be shown the many times Montgomery tried to discredit Eisenhower to Brooke and Churchill in order to have Eisenhower removed as Supreme Commander. It will also be shown Montgomery's obsession in his narrow front, single phase advance on Berlin and that once Montgomery secured enough ports to fulfill his supply needs for 21st Army Group, he had no desire to capture Antwerp, or the Sheldt which were to be used for Bradley's 12th Army Group.

It was shown that had 21st AG tackled Antwerp and the Sheldt in the opening days of September when the Germans were ill prepared that the objectives would have been quickly secured and the Allies could have started using the port almost immediately. Instead Montgomery was negligent, maybe worse, and Antwerp would not be used until November.
By September the 1st and 3rd Armies were hamstrung by lack of supplies and were forced to slow their advance. This condition was exacerbated by Montgomery's risky plan, Operation Market-Garden which Eisenhower agreed to without thought or consultation with his planners. The supply pirority was raised for Montgomery for this operation at the expense of Patton which had been making the greatest gains. A chapter is devoted to each of the following: Operation Market-Garden, First Army's repeated attempts at Aachen, the West Wall, Roer River / Hurtgen Forest campaigns, Patton's Lorraine. The landings of Seventh Army on southern France and its drive north is also covered but to a lesser extent. The book opens with a brief summary of the Cobra breakout and moves on to the Falaise Gap and the race to the Seine by the end of August. This sets the scene for the remainder of the narrative. The whole second chapter discusses the logistics of war and shows how a successful army is amply supplied.

Much time is spent on building personal profiles on Eisenhower and Montgomery but Smith and other Eisenhower's deputies, Bradley, Patton, Dempsey, Simonds are also discussed but to a lesser degree. Eisenhower's command style is shown; his desire to lead from the rear, allowing his deputies, especially Smith run the day to day stuff. Its also shown that Eisenhower was constantly concern of offending the British or charged with discrimination and would go out of his way to accomodate them. To me, this was Eisenhower's weakness and the British, especially Montgomery, took advantage of it. If Eisenhower had taken a stronger hand at Falaise, the Sheldt, refused the dangerous Operation Market-Garden, curtailed the British in SHAEF that were changing Eisenhower's orders for Montgomery's benefit, had not given priority to Monty so many times over Bradley and Patton the Allies would have crossed the Rhine much sooner. The author clearly shows the antics Montgomery pulled degraded the overall Allied effort. Montgomery is also shown as the embittered Field Marshall who wanted and thought deserved Ike's job and would follow his own agenda as much as possible.

There are also 20 maps which were very good. Most showing actual deployments and axes of attack while couple maps showed diffeneces in plans between US and British planners.
The author provides analysis of key events and their impact on the future running of the war. In some instances he provides alternative scenarios that could have been more successful. Securing Antwerp in the opening days of September and using the port sooner or not running Operation Market-Garden are two examples.
If you want a clear picture of the hardships facing the front line due to shortages and the inside story of the machinations of Eisenhower and Montgomery then this will be a must read.
Even if you've read D'Este, Blumenson, Weigley, Breuer and others, you should still seriously consider adding this book to your collection. There will be new information to be gained by most of us and its highly recommended.


Read all his WF books and you find the same cheap shots.

I think the time has come to stop being polite to such thinkers. Frankly they have been given the benefit of the doubt for too long and the time has come to let them know they are deluded.

 

That was the main reason and catalyst for Monty's decision to get rid of Lumdsen and Gatehouse (cmdr of 10th Armored Division) Their delay and inability to pass through Axis minefields besides bellyaching and Lumdsen's actually proposing to abandon whole Lightfoot operation on 24-25 October was final straw. Lumsden being a cavalyman he was insisted losing vehicles in minefields was not proper use of tanks. Monty annoyed by his questioning of authority probably cut ties with him then. For Monty it was an absolute breach of confidence. He had to wait the end of battle to get rid of them though. Once actual engagement was started it is hard to sack commanders unless absolutely necessary. He was not fighting a cavalryman battle anyway his was "killing match" type of attritional battle destroying enemy piece by piece with bite and hold tactics from Great War and limited casaulties , using massive firepower and repulsing immediete and inevitable enemy counter attacks. He was using armored divisions to that purpose supporting infantry artillery and to drive back panzer counter attacks not releasing them to do the cavalry thing and getting mauled up by Axis anti tank screens again.



But do not Lumsden and Gatehouse have something of a point here?

The primary value of armor is its mobility and speed, and conventional wisdom is not to use them to assault prepared positions or clear minefields. Indeed the only way they can is by running over one for the loss of a valuable piece of equipment and a trained crew of as many as four men.


from cavalryman mobile battlefield tactics perspective yes it must have been agonizing to watch losing tanks in Rommel Devil's Gardens during Operation Lightfoot the opening stage of offensive. But as I said Montgomery was not fighting a cavalryman battle. His was an attritional WW1 style infantryman battle with massive artillery and RAF air firepoewer advantage and tanks would be used to support infantry and to cover artillery not to go on merry chase as they did countless times in 1941-42 battles in Western Desert only to be ambushed and mauled by German 88 mm antitank gun screens. In 1942 summer relations between infantry and armour arms in 8th Army was getting worse. (Lidell Hart in his Second World War work covered this ) British Commonwealth infantrymen and their commanders (I think rightly) were pissed to armoured units and their commanders and lost their confidence to to them complately because they were not working in harmony supporting each other and infantry usually left alone unprotected vulnerable against immediate German panzer counterattacks. Every piecemental assault of 8th Army in June July 1942 period failed and heavy casaulties were suffered because of this. Lesson was simple : Armour or infantry couldn't be let uncovered unprotected by other arms or left loose unless enemy was disorganized routed and in full retreat. They have to cover each other and commanded from a central single commander. Vehicles were expandeble in Alamein (Montgomery had 1180 tanks in his disposal at the beginning of 2nd Battle of Alamein. Mines generally damaged tanks armor or their tracks , repairable damage , not complately destroy them ) Infantrymen who crossed minefields in darkness of 23/24/25 October and entrached their positions at other side of minefield waiting for tank support were not. They were vulnerable against a coming panzer counterattack , in need of tank support and if supporting them would cost a few more repairable vehicles so was it. It was more important to gain their confidence.

Tactic was improvised as battle progressed but Bite and Hold Tactic which was originated in WWI was simple : get a hold of enemy enhanchment trenches prepare your defenses and repulse inevitable enemy counter attack. By repreating this tactical outlook 8th Army actually wore enemy to the bone in Alamein before enemy was sufficiently weakened distributed for final breakthrough. They had to go on prepared Axis defence positions head on ( maneuvering from open desert from south was impossible due to Quattara Deppresion . Northern flank of Alamein line faced to sea. Mobile battle was impossible ) As described by Montgomery "a killing match"....It required teamwork from all arms. Not one arm like armor or infantry getting all glory.

 

Admiral Bertram Ramsay issued a number of increasingly strong warnings to both Montgomery and Eisenhower of the urgent priority in seizing both sides of the Scheldt estuary and was ignored. General von Zangen certainly saw the danger and his actions delayed the opening of the port by some 85 days.
There is no doubt mistakes were made in 1944. However I take issue with the mindless moronic blaming of Monty for everything. There are many works that address this failing and for every one that blames Monty for it you can find another that lays out the complex situation that gave rise to these errors. However the monty-bashers confine their reading to the pap that reinforces their feeble minded reasoning.

I have no doubt many will find my replies on the strong side but given the disgraceful way the anti Monty crowd have been behaving I make no apology. Get used to being treated the same way you treat Monty and if you don't like the heat get out of the kitchen...............

 

A tank is a consumable in war. It is meant to be used. I thing you fall into the trap of the post war German excuse making machine that re-wrote the definition of victory to include having less tank losses than your enemy.
Far too much time is wasted bean-counting tank losses in order to salvage the reputation of failed German Generals. I despair at those still falling into this trap.
It is of no great import if side A losses 1000 tanks and side B only 100 if side B is beaten and A has 1000 replacements.

 

I am fully aware that battle consumes lives and equipment and that it is a necessary part of the equation for victory.

But yes it does matter if A losses 10 times as much for victory over B, because even if you win this war, it very likely will be the last one you win. The key is make sure that which is consumed is worth the victory. merdiolu makes a good point about combined operations, but the X Corps was created by Montgomery to act as a Corps de Chasse and not as assault force for prepared positions.

Why did the assault infantry not have organic armor support to allow them to hold against German counterattacks? Who failed to anticipate this need?

The expenditure of X Corps played a huge part in preventing an effective pursuit

By the way, Infantry/mounted rivalry is as old as battle. Union Infantry swore they never saw a dead cavalryman on any battlefield during the entire ACW.

 

Indeed. During Battle of Prokhorovka during Operation Zitadelle in 12th July 1943 , 5th Guards Tank Army lost almost 700 tanks compared to 100-200 destroyed German tanks belonging to 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Yet Russians justifiably can claim they won that battle because they could replace their losses but meanwhile crushed last German panzer reserves and checked German advance once and for all. Initiative passed Red Army. During Battle of Bulge US Army lost a total of 733 tanks and tank destroyers compared to 610 German panzers destroyed yet it was an American victory since US Army could replace their losses easily meanwhile in Bulge they crushed last German panzer and manpower reserves. In Alamein it was same story. 8th Army lost 500 tanks at 2nd Battle of Alamein but 350 of them were recovered and repaired in a few days plus they still had 680 more tanks. Panzer Army Africa at the other hand lost 440 tanks (almost all of their tank strength , Rommel retreated Tripoli with only 16 panzers ) and they left all of them even recoverable ones on battlefield which 8th Army captured.

 

Yes but in 19th Century Civil War tactics cavalry infantry cooperation support was not as mandatory as 20th Century modern battle conditions either. Firepower plus mechanized motorized tactics advanced somewhat since then.

30th Corps during Operation Lightfoot had organic tank brigades. Two corridors would be carved behind initial infantry assault according to Operational Lightfoot plan. From those corridors 10th Corps would pass engage and destroy Axis armor. That was Monty's initial plan. At the beginning of battle 9th Australian Division in northern sector had passed its tanks from northern corridor more or less and fought excellently in Point 28 - Kidney Ridge repulsing Axis counter attacks for next two three days advancing against tough opposition. (Rommel's replacement General Georg Stumme was killed here ) The problem was in southern corridor in Kidney Mytecina ridges sector where mine clearence was not done properly and incomplate so corridor was not ready. Tanks and other vehicles were stuck at other side of minefields creating a bottleneck and an open target against Axis artilley and air raids. Monty when informed of this intervaned and ordered mines to be cleared at once and ordered 10th Armored to go ahead to cover infantry until daylight even corridor was not cleared. Protecting New Zealand and Highland infantry at other side of Mytecina ridge was more important than losing recoverable vehicles which were no use waiting in open desert under Axis air raids and artillery anyway.

When timetable schedule went overboard Montgomery improvised (which he never admitted in his Memoirs though , constantly saying it was according to his plan which lowered his reputation in post war ) and returned to bite and hold tactics by provoking Afrikakorps constantly to counter attack against captured and better prepared Commonwealth positions wearing Panzer Army Africa down before kill. Final breakthrough and head on armored clash which Monty wished actually happened on 2nd November 1942 on Tel-el Aquaqir ridge 10th day of battle in Operation Supercharge. After a devastatingly effective artillery and air bombardment 2nd New Zealand Division and its organic tank unit 9th Armored Brigade fought excellently together and 9th Armored Brigade actually sacrificed itself to open up a gap on enemy gunline , to hold it and to protect British New Zealand infantry. Remaining 10th Corps passed through this gap engaged remaining German Italian armor and destroyed them with help of crushing RAF air support and artillery barrage. This battle was known as "Hammering of Panzers" if I recall correctly. British tank losses compared to Axis was heavier initially (190 British tanks was knocked out compared to 100 Axis tanks plus 49 Axis anti tank and artillery guns destroyed and almost 3.000 Axis POWs captured) but Montgomery wiped out Rommel's remaining armored strength , his remaining reserves as Monty wished in this battle plus 8th Army carved up Axis defense considerably in Operation Supercharge. Montgomery could recover knocked out tanks and go on attacking next day. His infantry losses were much lower which was the key and he still had considerable reserves plus firepower. Germans or Italians couldn't recover their knocked out armoured vehicles once they retreated and they have run out of everything. Their defensive front collapsed two days later anyway due to Hitler's crazy "Hold or Die" order sent on night of 2nd November. Most of Italians were deserted by Germans without motorized transport and captured because of that order.

So timetable was maybe off scedule though Montgomery predicted the whole offensive might go for 10-12 days. Things turned like he predicted generally (I do not understand why Churchill got excited while battle was going on. Probably due suffering so much defeat disappointments before after initial promising starts ) but more slower. The decisive battle and commitment of 10th Corps tank formations happened in last stage of battle between 2-4 November. After stalling of Operation Lightfoot and getting though Axis Devil Gardens (minefields) on 25th October Montgomery improvised and returned to standart infantry/firepower attrition tactics before choosing the location and time of breakthrough. His reluctance to admit improvisation and flexibility in his Memoirs causes confusion. I mentioned this before : Personality problems he maybe had but his battlefield achievements are something else.

 

it should be noted that attacking a strongly fortified position usually required a numerical 4 to 1 advantage. The 8th army overcame the 'devil's gardens' of Rommel's army with only a 2 to 1 advantage. And inflicted 30% casualties on the Afrika Corps, which were fatal, irreplaceable losses

 

Manoeuvre is a key part to exploitation of victory, you are ignoring what i pointed out eariler that the terrain of the entire El Alamein campaign did not allow large scale manoeuvre for either side, it was fought in a bottle.

 

I wouldn't refer to it as bashing. More like introducing some balance into the discussion. Monty's contribution to winning the war cannot be ignored and he had his successes. I'm not trying to denigrate that contribution but he was fallible in many ways and at least had a significant role in many failures. I give him his due but stop well short of calling him a military genius or the best of Allied commanders. If Canadian soldiers, tired of being cannon fodder, perceived Monty in a negative light then that is legitimate, not moronic. There are enough headstones around Europe adorned with the Maple Leaf to have earned them the right to a dissenting opinion.

 

Controversy about Montgomery was and is inevitable. He was a contentious, opinionated man who invited controversy all his life. Nor was criticism of him confined only to Americans. I must point out that many of his harshest critics were (and are) British. Monty was not a typical British officer, and he was never a sociable or 'clubbable' man. He rose by sheer ability, and scarcely bothered to conceal his contempt for less talented fellow officers. This made him a lot of enemies and probably slowed down his career; indeed, if he had not had Brooke on his side I doubt that he would ever have risen as high as he did.

Among Monty's British enemies, one must number Auchinleck, Lumsden, Ramsden, and Gatehouse, all of whom Montgomery had relieved or replaced. One may call that sheer sour grapes, but 8th Army had learned a great deal before Monty arrived (as Niall Barr points out) and it was scarcely fair of him to claim all the credit for success when it came. Auchinleck et al were not Monty's only critics within 8th Army, either. Francis Tuker was a superb division commander, but I have read his comments on the Tunisian campaign and he had very little good to say about 8th Army's leadership. At different times, even some of Montgomery's favorites like Horrocks and DeGuingand took him to task or told him he was wrong--no easy thing to do with Monty. Churchill himself criticized Montgomery during the Normandy campaign and Mrs. Churchill didn't like him at all, finding him bumptious and rude (which he often was). Pug Ismay was astonished and appalled by Montgomery's egocenticity and his appetite for publicity, which he likened to 'a disease, like taking drugs.' From Correlli Barnett onwards, many British military historians have criticized Montgomery.

Montgomery was not a likable man. Moreover, he did not care if we was liked; he knew how good he was, and was not shy about saying so. As a student, he had been a noted bully. He did not socialize outside of a very small circle of intimates, mostly younger officers. His family history was unhappy and he had little home life after the death of his wife. Though normally an acute judge of military talent, personal feelings could warp his judgment of men. He played favorites, and could cut people dead after years of intimacy. Montgomery was very good at the kind of showmanship that sways crowds and troops, but his rudeness and eccentricity harmed his closer relationships, both personally and professionally.

It is true that many American officers got along badly with Montgomery. It is also true that Anglophobia was distressingly common among the WWII American officer corps. But before people start (innacurately) blaming all anti-Montgomery feeling on Americans, they should at least look at the specific criticisms levelled at him by American generals. These men, too, were professionals, and they had professional reasons for their complaints. For the most part, these were precisely the same as the criticisms made of Montgomery by British officers--namely that he was too slow and cautious, incapable of exploiting a breakthrough, greedy for the fame of success to the detriment of the work of others, and unwilling to admit a mistake or accept responsibility when things went wrong. Eisenhower had less Anglophobia than any other American general, but even he finally found Montgomery almost impossible to deal with.

While Anglophobia was common among American officers, Yankophobia was also found in the British high command. Alexander was careful to conceal his true feelings, but he did not rate the US Army highly at all. Neither did K.A.N. Anderson, who cooly proposed to leave US II Corps (more than a third of his army) out of the line of battle for VULCAN. Montgomery shared such views. He was an Echter Englander, and his attitude towards other foreign armies was in tune with this. He liked the Canadian troops but had little regard for any of their commanders except Guy Simonds. He got on very well with Leslie Morshead, but patronized Freyberg. He was disdainful of the Free French, and after the failure of MARKET-GARDEN he and Horrocks attempted to make Sosabowski's Polish brigade the scapegoat. Montgomery's insularity made him marginal as the commander of an Allied force, and the Americans were not the only people who had trouble with him.

Montgomery's operations were and are open to criticism. Alamein did not develop entirely as he had hoped and planned, and his lack of experience handling armor was evident there. The pursuit was a failure. Mareth did not go according to plan either, and Montgomery failed to bag 1st Italian Army before it could retreat. Montomery was slow to see opportunity at Falaise, a fault he shared with everybody else in the Allied command. MARKET-GARDEN was a mess, and uncharacteristically sloppy for a Montgomery operation. The Rhine Crossing could have been made earlier, and the pursuit across Northern Germany was too deliberate.

When all this is said, Montgomery was still one of the two finest British generals of WWII. He was a lot like Churchill, another undiplomatic nonconformist. With all their flaws, both were exactly the right men at the right moment. Monty had the kind of ruthless, driving energy that wins wars. He was a zealous professional who believed in planning and training, and he refused to accept inefficiency or excuses of any kind. He had never forgotten the lessons in combined arms he had learned in WWI, and he understood the viewpoint of the troops.The British Army needed someone like that, and Montgomery and Brooke transformed that army. He promoted younger men, and cast the dead wood aside. He won most of his battles, after a long period in which British victories had been few and far between. He led the army at a dificult time, when manpower was running low. This was a major limitation on his operations, but he got more out of Britain's small field army in Northwest Europe than almost anybody else could have done. He was an ideal commander for D-Day, perhaps the most important battle in modern history. Normandy did not go according to plan (a fact which Monty tried to evade), but he handled the campaign very well nonetheless and Falaise was a victory too. I think he was one of the best men Britain had, and the dismissive attitude towards him that I find in some American circles makes me groan. He was not infallible anymore than Churchill was, though, so he will remain controversial.

 

I have never seen a thread anywhere where it is proposed that Montgomery was the best/Christ/won WW2 or anything like that. 90% of threads about him are critical. It is a common retort of those holding these extreme views that they are just adding balance. I say that is invention.
Prove me wrong by linking a thread where I can see posts promoting him that you want to 'balance'.

 

That is not correct. The criticism of Montgomery is mainly US based and is so extreme that at times I fear for the sanity of some of the bashers.
I have never seen the depth of hatred I read from US posters repeated by a UK critic-never.

Take this for example

http://efour4ever.com/44thdivision/generals.htm

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount of Alamein, almost self-destructs in one of the great public demonstrations of the truth behind the Proverb “pride commeth before the fall.” On January 7, 1945, to a group of reporters, Monty plays loose with facts and truth, and in essence, claims credit for saving the Allies in the Bulge. Montgomery pronounces to the press that his leadership combined with battlefield support from quick acting British troops make the difference. Monty on Monty: “I was thinking ahead” and took the steps to insure the German advance was stopped. And the battle was to Monty one of the most “interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled.” Montgomery then insults the American generals maintaining American troops were great fighting men if provided suitable leadership.

"I am fed up with being treated like a moron by the British. There is no national honor nor prestige left to us. Ike must go. He is a typical case of a beggar on horseback; he could not stand the prosperity." General Patton 1945

Montgomery directly plays to Hitler's plan to split the Allies. He almost succeeds. In all, America’s role in the fight is underplayed and he, as the leader, and the British troops, are the heroes. Montgomery is already disrespected and disliked by his American counterparts because of his cautiousness in the field, his egotism, and never-ending willingness to disparage his American Allies. Field Marshal Montgomery is disdainful of the American Army from start of the war, saying that the American Army did not know how to fight and never will. Yet, Montgomery fails in Normandy to close the noose at Falaise, allowing many trapped Germans to avoid capture. Monty stopped Patton's drive into Germany. His pet and ill-advised, Market-Garden campaign, the battle behind the book "A Bridge too Far" diverts gas and supplies from Patton's army and a wide open advance into the Reich. At Antwerp, Montgomery (as well as Eisenhower) is accountable for the Sheldt fiasco which delays the use of the port for supply. American contempt for Monty includes the conviction that his incompetence extends the war. And now this latest pronouncement burns American officers with a deeper hatred of Monty. Galling are the facts that Americans alone, not the British, stop the German advance. Infuriating is the knowledge that once Montgomery has temporary command, true to form, he gets in the way and botches American counter-attacks through his meddling and overly cautious set-piece style

 

it should be noted that attacking a strongly fortified position usually required a numerical 4 to 1 advantage. The 8th army overcame the 'devil's gardens' of Rommel's army with only a 2 to 1 advantage. And inflicted 30% casualties on the Afrika Corps, which were fatal, irreplaceable losses


I read somewhere (don't know its verification ) that losses of Panzer Army and subsequent pursuit follow up was much higher , more than half of Panzer Army Africa was destroyed by the time Tobruk was recaptured by advancing 8th Army in November 1942. Total Axis losses reached more than 59.000 (30.600 German rest Italian ) between 23 October - 13 November 1942. I think in Martin Gilberts Second World War.