Montgomery Controversy

Montgomery put up with Bucknall (30 Corps), Bullen Smith (51 HD) and Erskine (7 Armd Div) for far longer than US commanders would have tolerated the perceived failings of their formations. The US 90th division went through three divisional commanders during the same time.

Regarding the hundred officers sacked. I dontl think Montgomery did that himself. Lord Carver, a 26 year old brigade commander in 1944 used to talk about "relationships with subordinates, in a talk entitled "commanding an armoured Brigade in battle". The gist of this was knowing when to relieve someone when they had had enough. On taking command of 4th Armoured Brigade after David Currie had been killed Carver relieved all three of his commanding officers, and tried but failed to relieve the CO of the DS artillery regiment. . In the case of 7th AD the CRA resigned in sympathy.

 

I am not going to dwell too heavily of what if's etc but must answer some inconsistencies - or those who have read even one British account of Monty's career then they will know that on the way to take over 8th Army he had already asked

for the existing Corps commanders to be replaced as Godwin-Austin had resigned - Gott had been killed - Norrie was beyond his sell by date and Lumsden - the Cavalryman who was fighting Balaclava all over again

and so Leese - Horrocks and Kirkman were sent out with Norries divisions being co-opted into Lumsdens X corps - who could not be replaced as we were short of experienced Officers at that level as neither McCreery nor Pip Roberts were

ready for Corps Command…Mc Creery did a great job commanding 8th Army and Pip Roberts did a fantastic job with 11th Armoured


So it was the action of X corps after El Alamein 2 - of Oct 23rd - Nov 4th which halted the destruction of the Africa Korps at Fuka - or rather the lack of action in becoming disorientated - running out of fuel - getting rained on etc and NOT

Monty's orders for the pursuit…Monty finally fired Lumsden at Medenine co-incidently with setting up the BRITISH "Blitzkreig" with Harry Broadhurst after Tedder had left to Algiers- which did so well at the left hook at El Hamma - Tunis and

the big swan to Antwerp later in the NWE… not too many Tank battles were lost after that...



It was our view at the time when it was all happening that Alex never lost his suspicions of the American's as he said after he was informed of Clark dis-obedience at Valmontone of "what can I do " knowing full well that the Americans were

slowly building up to a majority in manpower and he was losing too many …he did NOT order Patton to go to Palermo - but he did allow him to go and leave Monty with the tougher task of fighting German paras at Catania


Regarding Dempsey's alleged withdrawal at Faliase- I cannot find the reference for that statement but I would refer you to - again 'Monty - Master of the Battlefield " - Chapter 15…page 795 -Patton - "Start Attack" -….Gen Gay " what is

meant by "hence on "..Patton " another Dunkirk - do you understand ? " Gay -" yes Sir !" it was apparently Bradley who stopped him for another reason .. but Dempsey was suspicious..and he was not alone ...

Cheers

 

Belasar,

"By any measure Mongomery's 8th Army won a great victory at El Alamein, but the oppertunity to win a complete victory (in my opiion) was not realized."

Is it just your opinion that such an opportunity existed, or is it based on in-depth research into the balance of forces, of supply, of terrain, of weather, etc and, very importantly, of what the commanders knew of both their own forces and the enemy's?

If the latter, it would be great if you would share it with us, as that would be a really valuable debate rather than just going back over the "I think...you think..." ground again.

Regards

Tom

 

First of all at the end of Battle of 2nd Alamein 8th Army although victorious was less prepared for a rigorous pursuit both mentally and logistically. Main British pursuit force 10th Corps (main armored divisions ) was commited earlier than intended to achieve a breakthough at last stages of battle. It was bled and disorganized. Any pursuit of fastly retreating remants of Panzer Army would be a disorganized tardy affair with regiment brigade sized battlegroup formations. If we look in past we can see that ever since 1941 Germans were vastly much better in this kind of even regimental sized engagements. Victory in Alamein came mainly World War One style attritional warfare tactics on regular fronts. To return into fluid open mobile warfare where Monty would have less control on cavalry minded tankers would be a huge risk. His sucess was more about (not always of course ) fighting on ordered regular front warfare where lessons of Great War could be applied. He probably did not trust his subordinates to go that independent on open desert. And weakness of Africa Panzer Army or Monty's awareness of this fact (hence the arguement he should have pursued retreating Rommel faster , outmaneuver him etc ) is meaningless. Wavell was getting reliable ULTRA intelligence through Imperial COS that Rommel and Afrikakorps was too weak to attack and would be on defensive in March 1941. It did not prevent Rommel's advance from El Ageihla to all the way Egypt border in April 1941. In November 1941 ULTRA predicted Panzer Group Africa was too weak and unaware of coming CRUSADER offensive. It did not prevent British commanders in field screwing things up and barely saving the situation. ULTRA did not predict Rommel's coming attack on January 1942 on Benghazi either. Montgomery couldn't just work according to ULTRA or air recon intelligence about enemy intentions and his own reactions. Afrikakorps units when they were cornered fought desperately and better at punishing enemy's mistakes exploiting its weaknesses. It happened at the end of victorious Operation Crusader when British advance units pursuing retreating Panzer Group Africa ambushed at Buerat close to El Ageihla in December 1941. Montgomery had to consider these past events while planning his next moves. Monty couldn't afford another morale shattering defeat even at local scale like that at the end of Crusader , couldn't afford another "Benghazi - Tobruk gallop" which was going on since 1941. His goal was total victory. If enemy stopped and fought with deplated forces according to his own rules on a straight unbroken front good he could have brought all of his firepower , numbers , air superiorty advantages in time and overwhelm them just like he did in Alamein. He was confident with these tactics when faced an unpredictable adversary. If enemy continued to retreat to east throughout November and December 1942 (which he did ) that was also OK for Allied strategy since Operation Torch put 1st Army at east of Tunisia and soon retreating Panzer Army would be destroyed in a pincer from east and west-which happened actually.

So I would claim that Montgomery's caution after breakthough at Alamein and pursuit of enemy was justified and correct decision. It was not dashing riot inducing cavalry raid like Patton or Rommel ( Monty was precisely prevented that since it was German way of warmaking. That was probably one of the reasons why not enough fuel provided to British armored formations to start pursuit immedietely on 5th November because it did not occur any British commander or field officer why they would return to mobile warfare since they won at 2nd Battle of Alamein by using old fashioned Great War attrition tactics) beloved on propaganda headlines and press editors but it worked...Oh another thing after breaking through Alamein the front was quite chaotic. Most minefields were not cleaned , collecting surrendering Axis troops and rearguards sending them to POW cages took time and retreating Axis units were deploying lots of mines and traps behind. Not to mention on 5th November a serious rain torrent started turned desert sand to bog and slowed advance of 8th Army. Panzer Army confiscating every vehicle it lay upon acted much faster and escaped. After that it was just a straight Monty pushing Rommel to east affair.

So I would claim Montgomery's decision to advance with caution was the right strategy. Caution and not gambling sometimes work just like daring. Important thing is to know when to apply them.

 

I claim no special knowledge, just common sense.

No battle is perfect or unfolds exactly as predicted, hence there is almost always some manner in which it can be improved. Whatever limitations the 8th Army operated on, they were an order of magnitude greater for the Axis forces before him. Certainly Mongomery's post battle communications seemed to imply he shattered Panzer Armee Arfica.

I agree with merdiolu that Rommel (or any of Germany's Panzer commanders) would have bit the bullet and thown caution to the wind in the pursuit. Montgomery made a judgement call, by no means a bad or fatal decision, but one that would have been different by other notable commanders of the period.

In my opinion.

 

Astonishing……Monty decreed " we will hit him for 6 out of Africa " but Lumsden failed in his task as Corps de chasse and allowed his three armoured divisions to come to a screeching halt near Fuka - thus end of chase..but it was raining

hard …and Monty couldn't wait to fire Lumsden - who then complained in his London Club that there wasn't room in the desert for two S***'s

Cheers

 

Monty chose to be daring with Market Garden.

 

to be quite honest most commanders of the huge lots of troops during wwII, irrespective of nationality, have left legacies of controvercy.of course monty and patton being the two biggest prima donnas,but others like mark clark,macarthur,rommel,zhukov were almost as controvercial.

 

Given the exceptionally high casualty rates of the British - Canadian formations near Caen, relative to the American rates for the same period, one wonders what the effect would have been had those commanders actaully met Monty's standard for aggressiveness.

 

"My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success." Bernhard, The Prince of The Netherlands

For whatever credit Monty gets for El Alamein he must also wear the debacle of Arnhem and the strategic blunder in failing to secure Antwerp and Scheldt Estuary in early September 1944. Falaise was a missed opportunity as well so how Monty receives this degree of reverance is a mystery to me and ignores many gross failures. Ego and self promotion have served him well.

Most Canadian vets I have spoken to were never much enamoured with Monty. Many for the reasons listed in the piece below and a significant proportion simply found him to be effeminate and condescending to Canadians.


http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1491&context=cmh

 

Well considering no one has yet paid Monty any ' degree of reverance' I put you firmly in the group for whom he can do nothing right. This is a very blinkered view and totally at odds with reality.
Your linked article by Copp I presume is an attempt to say Montgomery used up Canadian lives to protect his British soldiers but Copp shows that the casualties are linked to combat conditions and nothing else.
Your 'effeminate' jibe is simply childish.

 

Canuck

Can only agree with m kenny as I served in support of the Canadian 1st Division for nearly eight months in Italy so recognized that they were a great bunch of men to serve with but they did tend to be careless at times which added to their

casualty rate such as hanging on to the Tank instead of jumping off when the first shots were fired - going in a bit half cocked at times without support etc. acting as if killing a Panther was their job- like Smokey Smith winning his V.C. - many

did likewise - without the medals...

Monty - Browning and Urghuart had to take the blame for Ahrnem but really the blame lay elsewhere as history has confirmed...

Cheers

 

At the risk of being considered a Dodo, I am loth to write about matters on which I have no personal experience and so I shall confine myself to writing about how I, who served in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, viewed General Montgomery as the person responsible for clearing the enemy from the areas in which I served.

I saw Monty but twice.

Once in a dusty field near Sousse in Tunisia when he stood on a jeep and told us about our forthcoming trip to Sicily and once in Sicily itself where I had to stop my 15cwt Bedford truck to allow him and his entourage passageway through a narrow village road junction.

At the time in question, I and many thousands of my fellow servicemen considered, without reservation, that he was the right man for the job of defeating the enemy and the passing years have given me no reason to think otherwise.

Petty sniping will not detract from his stature and I remain honoured to have served under him.

Ron

 

Decision to leave Falaise Gap open on August 1944 was Omar Bradley's decision. He admitted this in his memoirs "A Soldiers Story". I just love how it was twisted and looked like it was Montgomery's because well we need a scapegoat for US/Canada public perception for extending war and Montgomery fills the bill since he was asocial and unlikable. In both Operation Tractable , and later Trun Chambois battles between 14-21 August 1st Canadian Army was fighting against what remained of Panzer Group West (later 5th Panzer Army ) In south route for Haislips 15th US Corps was open to head north , hit 12th SS Panzer Div and 2nd SS Panzer Corps from south , join up Canadians and close the gap. Bradley chose not to despite Patton's insistance for creating another Dunkirk for British (mocking the situation of course) and in "A Soldiers Story" he takes full responsibility arguing entering British Canadian sector would cause friendly fire incidents and moreover mentions that even it sealed the gap it would be weak and a German breakthrough would overhelm Allied blocking force (extended 15th US Corps) and multiply Allied casaulties for sake of a dubious encirclement maneuver while Allied armies were still adapting fighting in German tactics and operational thinking. This is his summary of Falaise Gap in his memoirs : "I preffered a solid shoulder in Argentan than a broken neck in Falaise"

I think that was also a correct decision from Bradley. If a commander do not trust his forces or preparations for an operation he should not engage it at all.

 

Monty proposed to be daring with Market Garden. He wasn't i/c land forces at that time, but had dropped back to being a mere army group commander like Bradley.

Eisenhower took the top job back at the beginning of September (my slightly cynical view is that there was a negligible risk of the invasion failing at that point, so a potential scapegoat was no longer required). It was unfortunate timing as the routed Germans managed to get a grip before he did.

 

I do not have any explanations about Market Garden or failure to close Scheldt aside maybe victory disease as Japanese later called spread all the way from SHEAF 21st and 12th Army Group HQs to individual army commands down to hierarchy. After astonishing advance through Northern France and Low Countries in 1944 summer everybody probably assumed the victorious end to war was at hand , it was a hope everyone wanted to hold : one more push to Rhine and Ruhr and war ends ! Everyone including Monty was looking east to Rhine , gaining ground and getting a bridgehead not destruction of encircled cornered substantial enemy forces like 15th German Army in west and holding strategic areas like Scheldt and Antwerp approaches which were considered finished. (reminds me Hitler's "Halt" order before Dunkirk in May 1940) V-2 assault from Netherlands on London had started in September and manpower resources of UK was melting away so Monty was also under pressure from Whitehall to head north , overrun V-2 sites in Netherlands get Ruhr and finish the war quickly. Under the shades of these mistakes Canadians paid the price and struggled seven months to clear Netherlands later so their anger or British paras anger towards Monty is understandable.

Priority in Allied Strategic thinking from Eisenhower to Montgomery , Bradley , Patton , Hodges should have been like : "maybe enemy is reorganizing faster than we can pursue so maybe war would extend to a longer winter campaign so we need some good deep harbours." Not "end of war is at hand , one more push regardless of logistics and it will be over !" however hopeful and wishful it was.

But of course I am talking after 70 years of hindsight with all available information I have in open to public not classified , unlike these generals who had to act with minimum info.

 

Given the exceptionally high casualty rates of the British - Canadian formations near Caen, relative to the American rates for the same period, one wonders what the effect would have been had those commanders actaully met Monty's standard for aggressiveness.



It is misleading to compare casualties between formations and nationalities. The casualties depend on the strength and nature of the opposition, terrain, tactics and a lot of other stuff. Here are the official history figures
CASUALTIES TO END AUGUST

KIA WOUNDED MISSING TOTAL TROOPS LANDED % KIA % WOUNDED % MISSING % TOTAL
21 AG 16138 58594 9093 83825 829640 1.95% 7.06% 1.10% 10.10%
12 US 20838 94881 10128 125847 1222659 1.70% 7.76% 0.83% 10.29%
Ellis Victory in the West Vol 1
AGp B 23000 67000 198616 335519 640000 3.59% 10.47% 31.03% 52.42%
Zetterling Normandy 1944
Over the duration of the Normandy campaign the Americans suffered more casualties and fatalities, but landed more troops. An allied serviceman had a 10,22% chance of becoming a casualty and a 1.85% chance of being killed. A US soldier was 0.2% more likely to become a casualties, while a British or Canadian soldier was 0.25% more likely to be a fatality. . On the basis of the statistics, it is difficult to argue that the the British, Canadians or US fought "harder" on the basis of the casualties suffered.

it is sobering to note that the vast ,majority of the 10% of casualties and 2% of fatalities were suffered by the 10% of land forces in the rifle companies of the infantry and those others in immediate contact with the enemy - say 5000 in each of the 35 allied divisions landed by the end of August - say 200k. For an infantryman or FOO party landed in June the odds of becoming a casualty must have been >>50%..

It is also worth noting that the Germans more in absolute terms and proportionately far more. . Monty, and Bradley and Dempsey and their armies must have been doing something right.

 

Wasn't Lumsden sacked for alleged "cowardice and lack of spirit" for his actions on 24-25 October, well before Fuka?

 

canuck,

I was going to make a humorous comment on your "condescending to Canadians" observation that not to worry, he was that way to most people, not just Canadians!

Everything I have read or seen however, is that to British/UK troops his manner and deportment was well received and comforting by a wide margin. There does seem to be something to the idea that this manner rubbed both American and Canadian troops and officers the wrong way. Perhaps he could not fully grasp the North American psyche, and this disconnect has a major impact on fueling the controversy revolving about him.

I am not entirely sure how much credence we should give the views expressed by Canadian troops serving in Italy under Montgomery as being a "butcher" or indifferent to the value of their lives. Do not get me wrong I can believe they felt this way, but I am not sure this attitude is unique to Montgomery in Italy. I have never focused on that theater as heavily as that of NW Europe, but a common refrain from American troops were that they too were badly used by their commanders, and there is some credence to feel that all the troops who served in that frustrating campaign felt similarly.