Montgomery Controversy

You are on to something here. I gain the impression that much decision making by senior US commanders had more to do with positioning themselves against possible competitors post war than in "winning the War" per ce. After all the war would be over in months and a career is a lifetime. Alanbrooke's diary contains comments from Lumsden (the LO to the US in the Pacific) about how no one wanted to cross Macarthur because he was thought a potential Republican presidential contender. If you take a cynical management decision making approach to WW2 it is possible to deduce some career and political motivations the decisions.

The Battle of the Bulge and the furor caused by Montgomery's press conference is a good example. At the time the German attack was seen widely as the US Army caught with its pants down. With a bit longer view, the allies were right to thin out their troops in unimportant sectors of the line. They did not have many more soldiers than the Germans, just more resources. In order to attack they needed to concentrate on the points that mattered. Concentration of force is a principle of war, and weakly occupying the Ardennes was a calculated risk. It also payed off. The odds were heavily stacked against the Germans and the decision to gamble on defeating the Allies in the West failed spectacularly costings the Germans their carefully husbanded reserve armies. In military terms the Ardennes could be portrayed as a great Allied success. The line was deliberately left weak. The Germans fell into a trap of attacking and wiped themselves out against a welll conducted defence. Alem Halfa (2nd El Alamein ) on a massive scale.

But that message was neither promulgated not accepted in 1944-5. The highest levels of strategy were not conducted by professional soldiers, but in the media of democratic countries. The simple story of the Bulge was US troops overconfident, caught unawares by sneaky Gwermans dressed as Americans and accompanied by shameful surrenders and retreat. The AB troops rush to the rescue and a few good men hold Bastogne like a frontier Fort then Patton comes to the rescue and the US Cavalry save the day. Then some sneaky limey claims the credit. The plot of the Battle of the Bulge Film captures the essence of the popular narrative. Some Americans were sufficinetly concerned by thisd portrayal that Bruce C Calrke commissioned the battle of St Vith flim to draw attention to the role of the US Armour on the Northern flank.

Much of the American determination and haste to recapture the territory lost seems to derive from both a sense of shame and the value placed by the media on territorial objectives. Monty did not get this at all. To him, the aim was to defeat the Germans in the most economic way. His tidy battlefield was to make sure that he was controlling the rate at which soldiers lives were lost, and to ensure that they were on operatiosn that he thought might work and not in chance encounters. This was fine for British troops whose fathers had taken part in many ill planned operations on the Western Frotn in WW1. For an American public willing to shed blood to redeem, honour this was not so.

Stephen Ambrose demonstrated both his weakness as a historian and predjudices as a writer in "Band of Brothers". he spends ha;lf a page criticising Montgomery for hanging back and not wanting to attack the sides of the Bulge. Yet in the same chapter describes the heavy casualties suffered by the elite Easy Company as it tried to capture the village of Foy, and castigates this as a pointless operation. Yet he never puts two and two together.

 

13 million people living in Istanbul so yeah good luck finding me I live in Asia Minor that reduces odds to 6 million. I wouldn't mind company though but warning it is quite cold in this time of year.

As for controversy it sounds more like popularity rivalry , national jignoism contest and misunderstanding more than anything else. Some operations Monty involved commanded might have been unsucessful or less than a sucess but his victories in battlefield are much more and he had troops confidence no matter what.

Well you started a debate and thats a good thing

regards
Clive

 

Think about this! What would have happened, if Patton had taken part in the closing of the neck of the Falaise pocket.... instead of romping around the country side, capturing parts of France devoid of any enemy, In fact a EGO trip. Even then, he ran out of fuel, and was grounded and useless.

One thing not mentioned here, is that Monty was utterly ruthless. When he beat the enemy, he did it with no holds barred. Any one in doubt of that should have been with me as we pushed at the back of the Falaise pocket. The sights were to say the least, were Horrific. The stench of death, the heaps of bodies both men and horses, with the feet in the air, the utter slaughter that Monty exacted on the fleeing enemy had to be seen to be believed.

What is also forgotten, is that Monty was just as ruthless with his officer class. He expected the very highest performance from his staff, Not up to the job OUT! and had the reputation of "Bowler hatting" more officers than any before

 

Sheldrake

You are having a laugh - right…?

Cheers

 

Another plug for Professor John Buckley's "Monty's Men". All discussed there, in measure and with reason.

 

Wasn't he was gay or had homosexual tendencies?

 

There was a later post-hoc argument (started by SHAEF G-2 General Stron) that the thinning out of the forces in the Ardennes was a "calculated risk" - the only problem being there is no evidence of any "calculation" - i.e. no plans for moving reserves into place to counter any German attack. There has been a vast historical attempt to display the Ardennes as a great Allied success, unfortunately, of course, it wasn't - it was a great cock-up. We made plenty as well obviously, so shouldn't be too critical.

I have just started reading the new book by Huw Davies about Wellington in which he describes him as a "flawed genius" - personally I have come to think of Montgomery in similar terms; flawed, both in terms of his personality, his historical writing and in his generalship. BUT he made the right call more than enough times to outweigh any flaws he had or mistakes he made, and IMHO deserves huge credit for Allied battlefield success in NW Europe (as well as North Africa, Sicily and Southern Italy). Great but not perfect is, therefore, my hugely superficial summary.

Regards

Tom

 

Staffsyeoman,

Just finished "Monty's Men" and overall agree that it is a good book, although it left me curiously disappointed. I'm not sure why; I'm going to read it again to try and put my finger on it. Perhaps after his book on British Armour in Normandy I was expecting a similarly challenging read, whereas "Monty's Men" seems less radical. I'm also saturated by reading about 21 Army Group in terms only of Montgomery (both positive and negative)and then personal frontline accounts - what about the Army, Corps, Divisional, Brigade commanders and staff officers, etc.

Regards

Tom

 

Andy just because he lived in a caravan not sure you can draw that conclusion. However whilst it may have been an issue at that time all that really matters is he was a bloody good leader and given the backing of the man I hold above all others, my Dad, he gets my vote any day of the week.

Cheers Brian

(PS thanks for the PM will do)

 

Tom,

With respect I have read all the posts within this thread, but sadly my duties on our sister forum, ww2f.com, force me to be more an observer on this fine website rather than as active as I might wish.

I do infact agree with your basic premiss in post #9, though I find your examples cited as proof anecdotal and less than enlightening. That being said they do posses a germ of truth despite the seeming appearence to be designed to cut Montgomery's rivals off at the knees in a misguided effort to elevate the Feild Marshall's reputation at their expence.

It is my opinion that American tactical doctrine, as compared to that of Britain, emphasized a greater reliance upon both manuver and speed of movement as a more or less equal component to the application of firepower. In simplistic terms the act of dislocating the enemy though rapid movement could be as effective in destroying a enemy position as would a well planned and organized direct assault.

In this American doctrine was closer to that employed by Germany in the same time period, though far from an exact repoduction of the "blitzkreig" in its classic sense.

Each of the examples cited, Tunis, Scicily and Falaise can illustrate this premiss.

The march of II Corps to Bizerte was one made under the command of British 1st Army as a component of the overall strategy to cut off German forces in North Africa from support and the supply needed for further resistance. This along with 8th Army seizing Tunis, effected the conditions that forced a capitulation equal to that of Stalingrad.

Sicily is another example of using movement and speed to achieve the desired goal. US 7th Army's mandate was to secure the flank of UK's 8th Army, with Montgomery prefering that Patton hew close to his left flank, keeping all forces close together. Patton felt that moving aggressively outward to engage any enemy force positioned to strike the 8th Army's left flank achieved the same goal while making maximum use of allied land and maritime mobility to destabilize the Axis position and prevent any counterstroke from being developed.

At Falaise, Patton was ordered off by Bradley to exploit the hole in German defences and not a case of a out of control general romping off on his own. The encirclement at Falaise, along with the exploitation of 3rd Army prevented Germany from erecting any cohesive front until nearly the German frontier, and that they did then had as much or more to do with the difficulty in the Anglo-Americans bringing up supplies to the front.

A big element obscuring the debate is that Montgomery was by training a Infantry and Staff officer and Patton a Cavalry officer. As such each represented the extreme positions of each nations battle doctrine, Montgomery prudent and cautious, Patton bold and aggressive. In battle there is a place for each of these trait's and Eisenhower was able to harness the best of each to bring victory.

On balance, Montomery was a effective and competent battlefeild commander, extremely well suited both to the troops he commanded and the national goals desired by his government. The same can be said of Patton also. Both possesed character traits that could be abrassive and ofputting to outside observers, but these did not invalidate their merit as commanders. They do however offer much kindling to stoke the fires of controversy and debate.

 

That would make him a gypsy rather than gay I think.

Anyway I only mentioned it as it was a controversial thread and someone posted on here a couple of years ago IIRC that he engaged in sexual acts with other boys at his private school. Not sure if this was a school boy fad or if it was much more than that.

 

Yep sorry Andy just my lateral thinking and strange sense of humour sat here avoiding Coronation Street. One of the reasons for this site I suppose is the fact that not all (in fact very little) information was readily available or reported on at time.

Cheers Brian

 

Belasar

As I had explained in my posting # 9 - the main difference was in Philosphy - there was no intention to cut off Monty's rivals to enhance his status - Patton did that all by himself - the stroll down

the highway to Bizerta was not a 1st Army Idea but the exhortation of both Patton and his deputy Bradley - and it was agreed owing to the restructuring of 2nd Corps after both Kasserine and Gabes

plus 78th Div was already looking after the left flank- so no problem ... anecdotal I guess so as one HAD to be there and the attack from Medjez to Tunis / Cap Bon was a joint operation with 1st and

8th Army - on the suggestion of Monty to Alex as Alex had made a bit of a pigs ear of his Vulcan attack….so Monty sent up Horrocks - 4th Indian - 7th Armoured - 22 Guards bde to join 4th British -

6th Armoured -21st and 25th Tank bdes for a joint attack...

Patton was asked especially by Monty to close up to his left flank for the battle of Catania - Patton then went off to see Alex in Malta for permission to capture Palermo - which NO ONE needed - the

desired goal was not to capture Messina first BUT to kill Germans

Dempsey called off the Falaise battle as Patton was boasting that he would carry on and force the British into the sea for another Dunkirk ….Dempsey was a corps commander in Sicily and knew

Patton..and thought Patton would try it on...

When Patton did his left wheel to relieve Bastogne - the German 7th Inf Army took no notice of him and advanced without bothering…..so much for the fabled Cavalry man

But you are right - this debate will go on long after I have gone…..but I would ask both you and Sheldrake to read Nigel hamilton's "Monty - The Field Marshal ' NOT the whole book but Part three

Chap 6 - The Maasstricht Conference then on to part four Chap 1 - The price of drift - which starts off…" The Battle of the Ardennes was to be America's greatest defeat since Pearl harbour -

Kasserine writ large "….then I shall discuss this further...

Cheers

 

So was Alexander the Great and Charles XII of Sweden to name but a few superb warriors - don't forget the Spartans!

 

But the Germans: they don't like it up 'em!

Isn't investigating the homosexual tendencies of historical figures a bit of a fashion these days? The queer thing is that it seems to be done for conflicting reasons, sometimes promoting the 'victims' (e.g. Turing), sometimes chipping away at the more traditional heroes (e.g. Baden-Powell). There was a documentary on B-P a few years ago and I was left the feeling that, in the absence of any, er, hard evidence, he might just have been uninterested in sex of any persuasion, rather than a repressed gay.

As for Monty, I understand that he took the early death of his wife very badly which suggests that his marriage wasn't just a smokescreen.

 

Tom,

One of the knocks on Montgomery was his extended preparation and highly methodical execution of his El Alamein battle, which some detractors found excessively cautious to the point that an oppertunity to bag the Africa Korps in Egypt was squandered. merdiolu, our original poster on this thread, makes a spirited and cogent rebuttle on ww2f.com that this was vital to counter the impression after so many defeats suffered by Western Desert Force/8th Army at the hands of Rommel that German troops were "invincable".

I believe the same logic holds true for US troops after Kasserine. Without El Guettar and Bizerte, as demonstrations to the ability to operate effectively against German arms without having their hand held by the British, were vital as within a year they would provide half of all allied troops engaging German forces and during the last year of the war, the majority. That the capture of Bizerte offered a chance to force an early capitulation of Axis forces (as did 8th Army's capture of Tunis) is simply a bonus.

As for Sicily, The original plan for its capture was highly diffused, but Palermo (and other ports) were a high priority in the original plan. The intent of the operation was to seize the island to ease shipping concerns and to destabilized Mussolini's government. While "killing Germans" was a major goal, the greater goal was to defeat them, by any means possible. Atrittion has its place, but an exessive reliance upon it when other means were available are just plain wasteful of blood and treasure.

The fact is that Alexander did order Patton to take Palermo and to continue his eastward drive along the the north coast with the full knowledge that in effect a 'race' for Messina was in the offing by his two headstrong commanders (Patton & Montgomery). This would not be the first or last time a CinC used proffessional rivalry to spur his troops along. There were I think still some doubts in Alexander's mind about US troops at the beginning of Operation Husky, but during Patton's drive on Palermo these began to be dimminshed and he started to shed his "our Italians" attitude towards American troops.

How an expierenced combat leader like Dempsey could believe that any American general could attack his forces with deliberation and so be influenced by that perception is beyond my understanding. More so since Patton was moving in a different direction in any event. Is there any documentation for this comment or is it what American's called scuttlebut?

Exactly how the Ardennes and Patton's counterattack relates to a debate on the Montgomery contraversy eludes me, but your facts are skewered. The German 7th Army consisted of the weakest element in the Axis attack (4 divisions AFAIK) and possesed little to no armor and they did try to stop Patton's troops, but since his tankers did reach Bastone and Houffalize (through the 7th Army), his movement can hardly be considered a failure or irelevant (though the Paratroopers still insist they didn't need saving ).

 

IIRC the criticism towards Montgomery was in the aftermath of El Alamein not before, most recognise his decision to build overwelming superiority was not only necessary but common sense. As the German's own attacks on Alam Halfa ridge had been beaten back very badly; the battlefield had been turned into a bottleneck for both sides by the Qattara depression, which left little room for manoeuvre either way. The criticism most historians direct towards Montgomery is in his decision to not quickly exploit it in the aftermath, however this is decision was based on the fact that 88 ambushes had mauled British armour in pursuit in the previous offensives, Montgomery did not want to waste brtiish armour against them again

 

Close study of that battle might reveal that it was not Montgomery who baulked at the pursuit but his subordinates. There was nothing overcautious about Montgomery's orders for D Day which called for armour and armoured cars to press on to Villers Bocage and the Caen Falaise highway.

The issue is why did Montgomery tolerate the failure of his subordinates to follow his orders, in a way which would have led to dismissal if Bradley, Clark or Patton had been similarly crossed. This is not a foible of Montgomery, but a difference between the British and American military culture. US Commanders were ruthless with subordinates who did not press attacks with full vigour. Bradley, Clark and Patton all took a dim view of subordinates who were not seen to do their utmost. John Ellis's Monte Cassino includes a transcript of the signals log of communications within 34 US Infantry division which illustrates the pressure on battalion and regimental commanders ot press on regardless of the difficulties - or faced being replaced by someone more ruthless. There was a huge turnover of US Diviisonal commanders in Normandy, compared to the British Army's whose professional head was aware of the limitations of his commanders, but did not think that they could be replaced with better.

The US Army is more formal and at every point there is a clear hierarchy with rank and seniority established between any two officers. The British style is more collegiate and orders can sometimes be a basis for negotiation. Many of the WW2 British Commanders had served as junior officers in the WW1 BEF commanded by Douglas Haig' had seen for themselves the practical effects of a culture of pressing on regardless of difficulties. Of course it is vital that subordinate commanders must have the mental toughness make soldiers carry out acts which on reflection they would prefer not to. However, no amount of pressure from above can make a line of infantry cross uncut wire or cross open ground covered by flanking machine guns. That experience more than anything else is probably the brake on the aggressiveness of the British line infantry and armour, and the practical lesson that the over-eager and in cautious could get a bloody nose from the Germans. Noticably, one of the British Divisional commander with the most agressive reputations for pressing on earned the nickname "Butcher" or "Von" Thomas, the GOC of 43 Wessex Division.

One of Montgomery's acts as Commander 8th Army was to crack down on what he called "bellyaching" , the tendency of subordinates to complain and object to orders with which they disagreed. The army he had taken over was riven by disagreements and the habit of ignoring disagreeable orders. I suspect that any leader in any organisation has to read their own orgaisation well enough to know how much of their own way they can get away with compared to the mass indifference or resistance.

If armies are a reflection of their societies, Montgomery's army group was that of unionised Britain and not the USA, far less Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.

 

not sure I agree with that, Montgomery sacked alot of officers particuarly in Normandy, the 7th armoured for example he culled 100 officers and their GOC

 

To my knowledge, the only critic of note before the launch of the offensive, was Churchill who chafed at any delay. Then again as critics go he would be one difficult to ignore by any commander of that era.

The preparation or build up on balance seem to be justified by Montgomery. The risk in a vigorous pursuit I believe was also justified despite previous Axis performance, for the DAK had never suffered as complete a defeat before 2nd El Alamein and was but a shadow its previous self. Eliminating the DAK within Egypt would have greatly altered the Axis position in North Africa.

By any measure Mongomery's 8th Army won a great victory at El Alamein, but the oppertunity to win a complete victory (in my opiion) was not realized.