The discussion about proportion of British born European troops in the British forces of WW2 misses a slightly bigger point directly related to the controversy over Montgomery. In WW2 Britain was not a nation of C50m, but the home nation of an Empire and commonwealth of over 300m subjects. It wasn't quite as monolithic as the Roman or Soviet empires. The self governing Dominions of Australia, Canada New Zealand and the Union of South Africa decided what contribution they would make to the war effort. The imperial possessions in Africa and India were under British control and used as the British wished, subject to opposition from native population, which in India was a constraint on Indian mobilization. One of the controversial aspects of Montgomery's generalship has been the perception that he was overcautious, and as a result the US to undertake more of the fighting and suffer disproportionate casualties. This was a case made in the American press during the war, and has continued to his day. (It is rather depressing that the "making tea in front of Caen" accusations made by an ill informed wartime press have been repeated unquestioned for the last 70 years) As has been pointed out on several occasions the British Army between 1942-45 was acutely short of infantry, which forced British commanders to be risk averse. Britain had sustained heavy losses during the first half of the war and the Army was in competition for manpower with the RAF and Navy. By 1944 the British Army were forced to break up several formations because they did not have the infantrymen to replace losses. In the key battles from Sep 1944 on the decisive NW European front the British contribution was getting smaller rather than bigger. But given that the British Empire had a population of 300m it seems odd that the shortage of 50,000 infantrymen was not made up by replacing, one or two battalions in each brigade with Indian or African troops. There were difficulties in integrating what were known at the time as "native troops", but the British were quite good at this. It is clear from the Alanbrooke diaries hat Churchill's policy was not the single minded defeat of Germany but on the maintenance of the British Empire. As a consequence the British army in NW Europe had to make do with a finite reinforcement pool despite hundreds of thousands of troops across the globe. It surprises me that American criticism of the British contribution in 1944-45 has not picked up this point. The results of British imperial policy were to impose constraints omn the risks and the number of casualties that Montgomery's armies could sustain. Montgomery has unfairly been criticised for policies dictated by Churchill and the overall management of the British Empire. The US equivalent is not the Brazilian Expeditionary force, the army of an ally, but the 92nd Division formed with black troops in a combat role. The US 5th Army had a low priority fort US troops. US strategy was to concentrate on the main theatre - the ETO. After the break out from Normandy and the invasion of southern France there was even less point in US eyes to try to attack through the Apennines. The "US 5th Army" had lots of British troops including a brigade if AA gunners less guns. One nit pick: The 442 RCT were transferred to France in September 1944.They were excellent soldiers and were transferred, like the FEC to where they were needed.