In all available sources on Montgomery's plans for Overlord, from his notes to army commanders of 20 March 1944 to the final St Pauls School briefing of 15 May 1944, he stressed the need to capture the Caen-Falaise Plain in the immediate aftermath of D-day. In Dempsey's Operational Order no 1 of 21 April 1944, Caen is a D-day objective, with Villers-Bocage to be captured on D+3-4, while I Corps pivots on Caen prior to securing the high ground by D+7-8. Montgomery emphasised the need for speed, because he foresaw the German reinforcements arriving from D+2, including up to five panzer divisions, with a full scale counter-attack underway by D+5-6. It was not so much Caen as a city which made it important, but as the best place to secure a crossing of the Orne as a means of access to the Caen-Falaise plain beyond. The alternatives to Caen were north of Caen and then drive south between Caen and Troarn (as in Operation Goodwood) and south of Caen via the Odon and Orne crossings (as in Operation Epsom), but if Caen was controlled by the Germans, other two were effectively blocked, as proved to be the case. In my opinion, the expectation of the arrival of German reinforcements from D+2, meant that there was a margin for slippage from D-day itself to D+1, but no more. As we know, 12 SS Panzer were actually in action on 21 Panzer's left from D+1 and Caen was not taken until weeks later. Later - but not until July 1944, after the failure of Epsom and as Goodwood was stalling, I believe - the strategy of pinning the German reserves onthe British front with Caen as the hinge emerged and this was the Monty line henceforth in all his writings. He would have us believe that everything went according to plan. Well of course, inherent military probability always made it likely that the German reserves would be drawn to the British front. The British position constituted the main threat axis to the Germans and the bulk, but not all, of German reinforcements would approach in the direction of the British. Thus it was and thus it had been planned for, but with a British line beyond Falaise by D+17. That Caen was a D-day objective is beyond doubt. The question is: 1. Why did the British fail to take it? 2. Could it have been taken on D-day or D+1, or was Montgomery's strategy flawed? In this introduction, I have concentrated on the plans as they were developed and put forward before the invasion. I have not given an account of the day's operations as they unfolded. This is because I have not had time to write this up today, but lets get started and I will come back with this later if nobody else does. In particular, it would be interesting to have information on plans and orders as they were issued at corps, divisional and brigade level for D-day, as I would expect there to be issues of interpretation of higher orders.
Before this topic develops, can you clear up one point. I have a book fron 30 Corps HQ dated 1945 called A Short History of 30 Corps. Page 11 states "On 7 June....By nightfall, forward troops had crossed the Bayeux - Caen road and all the "D Day objectives"had been secured" My question is, are you sure the D Day objective was Caen completely or was the objective the Bayeux - Caen road and the airfields to the south east of Caen? View attachment 852
Originally posted by handtohand22@Jul 6 2005, 07:46 AM Before this topic develops, can you clear up one point. I have a book fron 30 Corps HQ dated 1945 called A Short History of 30 Corps. Page 11 states "On 7 June....By nightfall, forward troops had crossed the Bayeux - Caen road and all the "D Day objectives"had been secured" My question is, are you sure the D Day objective was Caen completely or was the objective the Bayeux - Caen road and the airfields to the south east of Caen? View attachment 852 [post=36161]Quoted post[/post] Caen, the key British strategic objective, was the objective of 3rd Infantry Division, which came under I Corps, with armoured support. They landed at Sword Beach. The Canadians who landed at Juno Beach also came under I Corps at this stage, but had different objectives. At Gold Beach, 50th Infantry Division, under XXX Corps, landed on D-day and this is what the passage you quote refers to. Their objectives included: 1. Cutting the Caen-Bayeux-Carentan lateral, the N13, which you refer to. 2. Securing the Arromanches area for the construction of the British Mulberry Harbour. 3. Developing the right flank of the beachhead to link up with the Americans from Omaha Beach and the capture of Port-en-Bessin. Caen was not a XXX Corps objective. Please note that the three infantry divisions landed by sea on D-day on the British and Canadian beaches were supported by commando units, independent armoured brigade groups and specialised armoured and engineer units, in addition to 6th Airborne, which had the objective of securing the left flank between the Orne and the Dives. Elements of Canadian 3rd Infantry Division claim to be the only seaborne units to reach their final D-day objectives on D-day and in fact 50th Division did not begin to reach its final D-day objectives until the following day. British 3rd Infantry were facing the toughest opposition of all. Even on D-day, they faced elements of 21 Panzer Division and, with the arrival of 12 SS Panzer Division from D+1, opposition was stiffening on their front and on the Canadian front as well. In comparison, the opposition encountered by 50th Division and by the American divisions was much lighter, but these things are relative and it was not a walkover anywhere. The later attempt at a "right hook" encirclement of Caen by 7th Armoured Division which ended at Villers-Bocage could only be attempted because up to that point the XXX Corps sector had not drawn the bulk of the German reinforcements, but even as they arrived at Villers-Bocage, this was changing fast.
Source: L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West: Volume I: The Battle of Normandy (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1962), pages 183 to 213. "It is impossible to say when the first beach exits were open. People were too busy to keep looking at their watches and some exits, opened fairly quickly, were later blocked by knocked-out vehicles or traffic jams. It had been foreseen that the rate of landing would be governed by the availability of exits and it had been planned to open twenty-eight in the first hour [on the British and Canada beaches]. The 3rd Division and the 50th [on Gold beach] appear to have had their first exits opened not much later but not nearly all that were needed; two hours or more elapsed before the first was opened on the Canadian beaches. The delay in each case had slowed the landings of the reserve brigades and this inevitability had far-reaching effects on the day's progress...." The 185th Brigade Group had landed nearly up to time and the infantry were assembled in woods half a mile inland by about eleven o'clock. The brigade was to be the spearhead of the division's attack inland; it was to advance with all speed and if possible capture Caen and the ground immediately south of it that day. The advance was to be led by a mobile column of the 2nd King's Shropshire Light Infantry, riding on tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry and supported by the 7th Field Regiment, R.A.; but at noon the infantry's heavy weapons and vehicles were still not clear of the congestion on the shore and the tanks that had succeeded in getting through were being held up by a minefield." Another reason for things not going to plan Norman Scarfe Assualt division "This is from Assualt division by Norman Scarfe page 274 Appendix C Justice and truth seem not to have been near the forefront of David Belchem's mind in 1980 when his book "victory in Normandy" appeared. While the late Eric Lummis was at work on an account of the 1st Suffolk's undaunted D-day assualt on Hillman, I was able to show him the correspondance I had had with Carlo D'Este when he was writing " Decision in Normandy, the first serious description of the whole Normandy campaign which revealed a true understanding of the 3rd div's actions on that day. We agreed that none of the neighbouring assualt divisions was confronted by a headquarters bunker so formidably strong and well sited as Hillman, which the Suffolks had overcome by the end of that day. Nor did the other assualt divs meet a panzer attack as threatening as 21st Panzer divs, which Bill Eadies Staffirdshire yeomanry and the other 3 div support units so decisively drove off. Then, when we examined the speed of advance on the 3rd Canadian div and 50 div fronts, we found their performance closely comparable with ours. So Lord Lovat's sneer at 8 brigades achievment in his complacent account of his own ( with its revealing title, March past 1978,p311) was ill informed and ill judged. The official verdict ( Victory in the west1962 p213) was properly appreciative of the two British and one Canadian seabourne assualts on that stormy sea shore, to have swept away all but a few isolated fragments of Hitlers atlantic wall and to have fought their way an average depth of four to six miles on most of a twenty four miles front was surely a notable feat of arms. Michael Howard has persuasively suggested that 3 div's D-day plan to capture Caen, nine miles inland and with vital river crossings, was in the nature of things "aspirational". This was demonstrated about an hour after midday when 9 brigade, our reserve brigade, lost its commander, intelligence officer and other staff, soon after coming ashore, all seriously injured, and one killed, by one mortar bomb. At once, the corps commander, Lt Gen Crocker, changed 9 brigades plan, and with it the whole divisions. Instead of heading boldly for Carpiquet airfield alongside 3 Can div, 9 brigade was switched to shield our left flank along the Orne and Caen canal. That was the end of any hope of taking Caen on D-day. It had nothing to do with slow advances that afternoon alleged by Wilmot, Belchem, et al. Clearly, the corps commander was not determined to take Caen at all costs on D-day, and was anxious about the active presence of 21st panzer div. As the days passed, there was a curious silence in the national press about the presence of 3 div in Normandy. Divisions that had led the assualt were not pleased to see those that had made their name in North Africa and put up understandably stale performances in Normandy continuing to get "star" treatment in the newspapers. Our own men naturally felt indignant and wondered what their families would be thinking. Ill informed journalists followed Wilmots lead and hinted at our infantrys slowness on D-day, and at their brigadiers and their commanders lack of driving power, for not being in Caen that night. If this book has done nothing else, it will I hope have nailed that journalism as unpardonable calumny." The book does in my view This is from the I Corps Operation Order No.1 this dates from April/May 1944 "20. 3 British Division a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place. b ) The enemy may develop his counter-attack-- i) Through CAEN ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN. iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal iv) Any combination of the above In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he suceeds in forestalling us there. c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established. i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings. ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division. Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business." Just to elaborate a bit more, on some reasons why 3rd Div did not reach or take Caen on D-day. Despite some claims, 3rd div had a pretty rough landing, 29 out of 38 assualt landing craft were lost. The landing was more strongly opposed than they had expected. Underwater and shore obstacles were more numerous than the 1943 photos taken of the beach defenses. These factors caused considerable congestion on the beaches which derailed the carefully planned time table for the landings. This had a knock on effect and slowed the thrust inland. Although by 11am 3 infantry batt's were ashore and ready to move inland (KSLI, Norfolks, Warwicks) the armour on which the KSLI were to hitch a ride and have as cover were still back on the beach. Which by mid morning was chaotic at times. One of the reasons being was that as the tide came in, it was estimated that 30 yards of sand would be left exposed to continue landing vehicles and supplies, but as the tide came in it was only 10 yards of sand, and very soft sand at that. The only way the LC's could beach and unload thier cargos were to land exactly opposite the beach exits. This was not easy as the beach was by now full of debris, burt out DD tanks, hit LC's, RE armoured vehicles and so on. To make things even worse the German coastal batteries were now ranging in on the beaches, which was made easier as they used the AA barrage ballons anchored off shore to do this. So the KSLI were awaitng the Staff's yoemanry but they were stuck nose to tail getting off the beach. It got so bad at one point that landing was halted for half an hour to clear the exits. It was the KSLI that were to lead the assualt on Caen and the Norfolks and Warwicks (although some Warwicks went to reinforce the airborne bridghead) moping up the gains as they captured them. On the way 185 brigade encountered the 2nd battalion of the 192 PZ grens on Periers ridge who were supported by SP guns. Also on the rear slope there were 6 Russian 12.2cm howitzers firing for all they were worth, these should have been knocked out on H hour by fighter bombers or by the heavies. Beuville and Bieville were reached with the latter around 4pm. Y company KSLI and a troop of Staffs yeo were immediately sent on to Lebisey wood, recce units soon saw 24 (more like around 40) German tanks advancing fast from the direction of Caen. The order was given to dig in and defensive posisitions were taken up. D+1 and the 3rd div formed a kind of wedge shape pointing towards Caen which lay around 3 miles away. Another set of problems now faced 3rd div, there was a 2 mile wide gap between them and the Canadian 3rd div. This gap was used the evening before by the 21st PZ divs attack (the only one which the allies faced on D-day) between this gap were some German strongpoints still holding out. Also on the Eastern flank 6th airborne were being frequently attacked and being a lightly armed div this caused great concern for Crocker. Crocker either put the bulk of 3rd div into an all out assualt on Caen, or he could pause and consolidate, as he did not have the strength to do both. He decided to consolidate and closed the gap between both Brit and Canadian 3rd divs and so linking all the British beachheads. Andy
I think that ham and jam's post sets out pretty well why the drive on Caen was fatally delayed on D-day and highlights three things in particular: 1. Beach congestion problems, which of course were made much worse by the marginal weather conditions. I wonder how well beach management had been covered in training. 2. The failure of the bombers on the morning of D-day and the absence of tactical air cover, again due to the weather. 3. What I regard as an underestimation of the strength of Hillman and the effect this would have on the speed of advance from the beach. As set out in the plan, to get to Caen, 3rd Divison and the Armoured Brigade would have needed limited opposition at the beach and immediately inland and perfect beach conditions. It would have needed to be a simple dash to take Caen "on the bounce", as Montgomery was given to say, in the brief interval of confusion before German mobile forces could react. I thin that Caen was a strategic objective in the full sense of the term and that Montgomery and Dempsey had something like the Villers Bocage operation in their mind all along in case they needed it. Villers Bocage nearly came off and probably would have done if it had taken place only a day or two earlier, or the Germans had reacted just a bit more slowly. And the failure to take Caen made the development of the British lodgement and buildup pretty problematic due to the confined space. In addition, the Germans were able to defend on much more favourable terrain than would have been the case.
Originally posted by angie999@Aug 14 2005, 01:33 PM I think that ham and jam's post sets out pretty well why the drive on Caen was fatally delayed on D-day and highlights three things in particular: 1. Beach congestion problems, which of course were made much worse by the marginal weather conditions. I wonder how well beach management had been covered in training. 2. The failure of the bombers on the morning of D-day and the absence of tactical air cover, again due to the weather. 3. What I regard as an underestimation of the strength of Hillman and the effect this would have on the speed of advance from the beach. As set out in the plan, to get to Caen, 3rd Divison and the Armoured Brigade would have needed limited opposition at the beach and immediately inland and perfect beach conditions. It would have needed to be a simple dash to take Caen "on the bounce", as Montgomery was given to say, in the brief interval of confusion before German mobile forces could react. I thin that Caen was a strategic objective in the full sense of the term and that Montgomery and Dempsey had something like the Villers Bocage operation in their mind all along in case they needed it. Villers Bocage nearly came off and probably would have done if it had taken place only a day or two earlier, or the Germans had reacted just a bit more slowly. And the failure to take Caen made the development of the British lodgement and buildup pretty problematic due to the confined space. In addition, the Germans were able to defend on much more favourable terrain than would have been the case. [post=37732]Quoted post[/post] it just goes to show the truth in the old adage: "The best plans are only good until the first contact" or as Burns himself said, "The best laid plans of mice and men a' gang awry". But many who landed on D-day, though that they were going up against a beaten and demoralized foe.
Originally posted by morse1001+Aug 14 2005, 02:13 PM-->(morse1001 @ Aug 14 2005, 02:13 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'> it just goes to show the truth in the old adage: "The best plans are only good until the first contact" or as Burns himself said, "The best laid plans of mice and men a' gang awry". [post=37734]Quoted post[/post] [/b] Moltke the Elder: "The plan never survives the first contact with the enemy". <!--QuoteBegin-morse1001@Aug 14 2005, 02:13 PM But many who landed on D-day, though that they were going up against a beaten and demoralized foe. [post=37734]Quoted post[/post] Do you really think so? As far as I understand it, this is not what they had been told in their training and I think most troops who landed on D-day were expecting a hard battle, not a pushover.
Do you really think so? As far as I understand it, this is not what they had been told in their training and I think most troops who landed on D-day were expecting a hard battle, not a pushover. The heavy aerial bombardment which preceed the actual landings where supossed to to have demoralised the germans. Also, intelligence identified that some units were "reserve" units.
From everything I have read on Sword beach there was certainly no problem with 'beach management', if anything, under the circumstances they did a grand job. The wind was blowing the tide higher up the beach than expected, there were more beach obstacles than had been estimated, some sappers were even trying to defuse some beneath the water. I cant even begin to imagine what that must have been like and the bravery needed to do so. Plus the defenses were more stronger than had been thought. Moltke the Elder: "The plan never survives the first contact with the enemy". Spot on I just never understand why so much fuss is made over Caen not falling on D-day, and what had been said by Monty, I imagine most of this stems from across the Atlantic. What I do disagree with is the idea and what was said about advancing and getting into open tank country. I dont think there was such a thing as far as allied armour is concerned. Goodwood proved how woeful the armour was against 88's and German armour in open country. I hate what 'if's' but if 3rd div had forged ahead and into Caen on D-day, I think Monty's critics would have had a field day, as 21st PZ div would have been able to enlarge the wedge between sword and juno. I think Crocker was correct in putting the linking of Sword and Juno as his main priority. By the end of the 7th from omaha to sword all the beaches had been linked. A war of attrition that we won, and ahead of plan, forget phaze lines, wars are won by defeating the enemy not over running open countryside. Phaze lines are really just to give an idea of where you might be and to make sure you have the logistics and build up of men available at that time. I think these figures pretty much say what was achieved by 2nd army. Keep the bulk of the Germans around Caen using it as a hinge, the door swings open in the West and the Americans breakout. Check out German strength around Operation Cobra time. Of course the Germans fully expected that the breakout would be from Caen. With them falling for Fortitude, and expecting "First US army group" to be between the Seine and pas de Calais, it would have been much easier and expected for 2nd army to cross the Orne, and thrust across to Paris. Rommel even stated this on the 17th July in his army group B report. Estimated German forces on British 2nd army front June 15th - Panzer divs, 4. Tanks 520. Infantry batt, 43. 25 June - Panzer divs, 5. Tanks 530. inf batt, 49 30th June - PD, 7:5. Tanks 725. Inf batt, 64 5th July - PD, 7:5. tanks 69. Inf batt, 64 10th July - PD, 6. Tanks 610. Inf batt, 65 15th July - PD, 6. Tanks 630. Inf batt, 68 20th July - PD, 5. Tanks 560. Inf batt, 92 25th July - PD, 6. Tanks 645. Inf batt, 92 Estimated Forces on the US army front 15th June - Panzer divs 0, Tanks 70.inf batt, 63 25th June - PD, 1. Tanks 190. Inf batt, 87 30th June - PD, 0:5. Tanks 140. Inf batt, 63 5th July - PD, 0:5. Tanks 215. Inf batt, 63 10th July - PD, 2. Tanks 190. Inf batt, 72 15th July - PD, 2. Tanks 190. Inf batt, 78 20th july - PD, 3. Tanks, 190, infa batt, 82 25th July - PD, 2. tanks 190, inf batt 85
Originally posted by angie999@Aug 14 2005, 10:22 AM Moltke the Elder: "The plan never survives the first contact with the enemy". Don't forget Moltke the Younger: "Hey, let's mess with the Schlieffen Plan!" Seriously, fascinating thread. I'm enjoying it.
Reply to ham and jam (post 10). I do appreciate that as it worked out, the majority of German forces were drawn onto the British front. However, the countryside beyond Caen that it was planned to take was much more suited to a combined arms battle in the full sense and the British would have had much more space to deploy free of the bocage. The result of fighting within the confined bridgehead was a much higher, unsustainable rate of infantry casualties than the British army could sustain. The consequences were felt right up to May 1945, as they could not be fully replaced (Carlo D'Este argues that they could from infantry units in Britain, which were not made available to 2nd Army). I think that Goodwood has a number of important lessons. One of them is that armour cannot survive against well planned defences without adequate infantry support. In fact, they had very little indeed, because it was hoped to win a victory without infantry casualties. Finally, Caen was never a hinge as things turned out, on which the whole allied front could turn as planned. It was first the anchor of the German position and then an anvil, but never a hinge.
I think that Goodwood has a number of important lessons. One of them is that armour cannot survive against well planned defences without adequate infantry support. In fact, they had very little indeed, because it was hoped to win a victory without infantry casualties. Michael Reynolds in his book "Steel inferno" quotes a SS Sgt talking about the initial attack of the allies during goodwood. He spoke about infantry walking behind the tanks with their rifles slung over their shoulders, of infantry walking along chatting to each other as if it were an exercise. He also commented on the the fact that Tank commanders were sitting on top of the turrets. As the Sgt also said, they were trained to let the attack roll over them and then attack from the rear.
I quite like the door analogy myself, to quote Chris Dunphie who is a former senior army officer and a very experienced Normandy battlefield guide and whos father is a Normandy vet. "The whole allied beachhead could be seen as a door, hinged at the Eastern British end. At the vital moment it would spring open in the West, releasing the Americans against weakened German resistance. For this strategy to be effective 'the hinge' a phraze frequently used by Montgomery, must be maintained by constant pressure, therby ensuring that the defending Germans were forced to keep the bulk of their forces, and in particular their panzer divs in the East." Michael Reynolds in his book "Steel inferno" quotes a SS Sgt talking about the initial attack of the allies during goodwood. He spoke about infantry walking behind the tanks with their rifles slung over their shoulders, of infantry walking along chatting to each other as if it were an exercise. He also commented on the the fact that Tank commanders were sitting on top of the turrets. Strange, as the armour to lead the 11th had as infantry support the 8th rifle brigade a motor battalion who were not sent into battle on foot. This div by the time of Goodwood had been involved in the fighting around Hill 112 seems strange how after this sort of fighting they would act like green soldiers. As the Sgt also said, they were trained to let the attack roll over them and then attack from the rear. This they certainly did during Goodwood Andy
Strange, as the armour to lead the 11th had as infantry support the 8th rifle brigade a motor battalion who were not sent into battle on foot. This div by the time of Goodwood had been involved in the fighting around Hill 112 seems strange how after this sort of fighting they would act like green soldiers. Not strange really, as we do not the actual tactical situation in that particular area.
Which area was it, or did the SS sgt not sayin the book? then perhaps we might be able to find out what the 'tactical' situation was as there are plenty of books on the subject. Do we know if the sgt is talking about the main armoured thrust in the middle, the Canadians on the right or the the British 3rd div on the left? I dont find it strange actually that tank commanders would be sitting on top of their turrets, as they are advancing in the frontline, I find it ludicrous. Surely tank commanders give orders and instructions to the crew below when a tank is on the move, surely that would not be easy if he is sitting on top of the turret? As far as infantry with rifles slung over their shoulders, maybe if they were the reserve following up the 'initial thrust' then maybe this could have happened. Major Becker's 200th assualt gun batt, with his tactical HQ North of Cagny, had 1 battery in Demouville and it had been badly hit by the bombing and was about to be over run by the 159th brigade (probably brewing tea as they advanced) the battery commander Capt Eichhorn gave Becker a running commentary on the British advance. He reported a vast armada of tanks but he could see no infantry. He got it wrong as the infantry were travelling along with this armoured formation, in half tracks, which he missed.
Surely tank commanders give orders and instructions to the crew below when a tank is on the move, surely that would not be easy if he is sitting on top of the turret? the tanks did have intercom. Tank Commanders often did ride in the turret especially when they were on the move and needed a better view. As far as infantry with rifles slung over their shoulders, maybe if they were the reserve following up the 'initial thrust' then maybe this could have happened. They would still entering into a fire zone and therefore should have been on the lookout for any surviving germans. Kurt Meyer in his book Grenadiers describes one situation he faced, An enemy tank is pushing through the orchards of St Contest! Now it stops. The commander opens the hatch and examines the terrain. is he blind? Has he not yet realised that he is only 200m from the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and that the barrels of our anti-tank guns are aimed at him? Obviously not. He calmly lights a cigarette and blinks at the smoke Admittedly this incident took place on 7th june (probably brewing tea as they advanced) I will treat that remark with the contempt it deserves. In addition, I have to say that since it appears that you do not wish to engage in serious discussion then I feel that there is no point continuing this dialogue. He got it wrong as the infantry were travelling along with this armoured formation, in half tracks, which he missed. Michael Reynolds also notes in his book the the Corp had only three mechanized Infantry battalions.
Morse, I think you took that the wrong way in regards to the tea drinking bit. I said it, as its what usually the Americans think our boys did when fighting battles, I did not for one minute mean that they were. In the post you first made about the tank commanders, you said that they were sitting "on top" of the turret, which I took as sitting outside of the tank itself, not as in the usual commanders place with his head poking out. Im very well aware of the radio link. By the way have you heard of Ken Tout? well as I thought you said tank commanders sitting outside of the turret I emailed him to see how likely that was, rubbish says he. Head and shoulders yes as most commanders do when not under direct fire. They would still entering into a fire zone and therefore should have been on the lookout for any surviving germans. I agree they should have, and I personally think they were not that lax and the German was wrong. I always like to engage in serious discussions, and I also like to think I have a sense of humour, some of the posters on here seem very lacking in that regard. By the way Angie im sure you will reply in regards to the "Hinge", another author, Henry Maule who wrote Caen 1944 also describes it and the Eastern bridgehead as a hinge. Perhaps its just these so called unbiased American authors who dont see it that way Anvil yea, Alexander McKee's book is quite good. But yea I know he is not D'Este. Andy
From what I experienced in Normandy, the real war was fought North of Caen. Where we took on the main of the Panzer strength, and decimated it, By a hard fought slogging match...... For all the talk and chatter that is it! Monty? A great tactical expert. A man that took Normandy ten days ahead of schedule. He was blamed for the Arnhem failure, just as though we had been defeated. When in fact we took the a huge area of Holland in one go. Just imagine the spoils to us, if Monty's long shot had succeeded at Arnhem? The whole of North Germany lay open.We would have been in Berlin before Stalin, there would have been no Cold war! Monty in fron of Caen? absolutely superb in his tactical know how, and in his execution of the war in Normandy. Sapper
A war of attrition that we won Brian, and as you say ahead of schedule. In regards to the comments on more infantry killed due to the small bridgehead and not being out in open "combined arms" country. Maybe if Bradley had not of been so 'cautious' and had attacked when he said he would, the British and Canadians who were doing the hard work at the hinge, might not have had so many casualties? I would also suggest that the ships stationed off shore played a huge part in destroying many attacks and counter attacks by the Germans, something which would not have happened had 2nd armies front line been way South of Caen. Maybe im not being serious enough? Andy
