What amazes me, is the assumption that there was only one side fighting in the Market Garden operation. We should have pushed on here, and been in another place earlier, It just goes to show how little the folk that write here, really understand about war. The constant arguing that the troops should have done much better. How little you know. And indeed, how little you understand. I do. having taken part in the drive North across Holland. Not only that, you do the men that died in that operation, a terrible injustice. I sometimes wonder how many of you would fare against a determined SS rearguard, intent on defending to the last man as we did. My guess is not very well.... Again I know what it is like, having crossed ths first of the seven bridges to Arnhem in a fiercely fought direct assault action at one in the morning. Crossing under a hail of fire. An action that left many good friends behind. Sapper
danny, more substance than one short 'what if' statement is needed before waiving a 'magic wand' over a major battle where, as is usually the case, significant influencing factors were numerous. As you've focussed on the armoured approach, I suggest you familiarise yourself with the events of Horatius some 2500 years before. http://www.dl.ket.org/latin1/historia/people/horatius01.htm The lesson does not lay in 'how to defend a bridge', far from it, but in constraints of bringing forces to bear. Though there was no bridge involved, the lesson of Horatius was the geographical feature which cost the French so dearly at Agincourt 1900 years later, and, on which the British pinned their land defence of Gibraltar with inferior numbers in the event of a German invasion during W.W.II. No.9
Nicely put No.9. So long as we don't get on to Vercingetorix. I'd like to back up Sapper on this one. And i know some of you will probably jump on me for not looking at the wider picture here, but here goes... It was a bloody battlefield! It took time to get men and artillery through to help the boys at Arnhem. Because of this the German defenders had chance to regroup and get their armour there faster. Operation Market Garden was a success, with only the one failure at Arnhem. Yes, it would have been good if the XXX Corps had got there faster, but shifting tanks and artillery on single roads is a bit difficult when you are under attack from straffers and anything esle that can be thrown at you. Battles do not run according to the clock. If they did WW2 would have lasted about three weeks. The push from Normandy to Berlin was meant to take about six months and it would all be over by Christmas. It wasn't. These things took time, with backtracking to get around abostacles and all of the usual things that come from chaos. You are dealing with humans not machines, and humans make mistakes. Arnhem was one of them. And as to holding the line? I think I could. I have been shot at when alone and in a secluded area. I panicked, but i got myself together enough to find a safe place and call for help. If my friends lives were on the line i would fight back. And i know others who would be the same. And i know some who are out and out cowards who think only of their own skins. But that is not something to discuss on this forum. I understand it has been covered in another, so I'll leave it there. But Arnhem was just that bidge too far where the plans couldn't stretch far enough to come together. The weather delayed a drop, there weren't enough gliders/planes to get the troops in fast enough, so three waves had to be dropped. It all adds up in the end.
I was reading this the other day and it is quite an interesting version from another perspective of a fighter pilot in the MG operation.. From: http://samilitaryhistory.org/4/d04aprne.html (South African Military History) The main talk of the evening, My Role as a Fighter Pilot at Arnhem, was given by General Albie Gotze and was one of our series of "I was there" talks. This provided for a remarkable evening, as our speaker not only went into considerable detail on the battle itself, but also added the personal touch at relevant points, as he explained his role as one of the fighter pilot escorts to the ground troops. To start we heard how events evolved from the break through at Falaise; the use of Eisenhower's broad front and the related support problems, the lack of a decisive supreme commander, the impact of British failure to take the Beveland Peninsular, the thrusting and conflicting demands of Montgomery and Patton and much more - all of which led to acceptance of Montgomery's plan for an airborne attack to secure a gateway into Germany and the Ruhr, codenamed Market Garden. The ever careful Montgomery shook his colleagues by suggesting that his plan, resulting in The Battle of Arnhem, should take place "immediately" but the briefing to his senior colleagues led to one of the most famous comments of the war when Lt. Gen Browning pointed to Arnhem bridge on the map and said "I think we might be going a bridge too far". It proved to be a correct judgement. The plan was monumental with just 7 days to launch the first ever fully equipped airborne force to drop deep behind enemy lines in daylight, in joint operation with ground troops, and using 1187 troop carriers, 478 gliders, 5000 aircraft of all types to deploy a total of 35, 000 men. The aim was to take all identified bridges and to hold open a 64-mile wide corridor for the army advance through Germany. How this was all planned was given in detail, including specific targets by unit, air support operations, weather, security, the choice of landing and drop zones and most controversial of all - the use (and non-use) of available intelligence. Most fascinating of all was the role of our speaker; after a tour on Hurricanes he volunteered for ops on Typhoons and joined 137 Squadron on 28 August 1944. His role and those of his pilot colleagues both before and during the 9 days of the battle (when 35 pilots were killed) made his description of the battle even more fascinating than usual. The battle started before dawn on 17 September 1944, when 1400 bombers supported by over 1500 fighter escorts, bombed German positions in preparation for the airborne armada to arrive at their drop zones around 1100 hours. That was a sight our speaker saw from the air and he said about it "my feelings at the time were of awe and wonder, I will never forget it". But misfortune followed, with the recent arrival of the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions in the area, the operational plans for Market Garden being found on the body of a USA officer - plans that were passed immediately to the German high command - and most of the 1st British Airborne Division radio equipment being lost. This last misfortune was the reason for the almost total loss of communication between this unit and the approaching ground troops. With the airborne drop underway, XXX Corps started their ground attack into Holland, with Albie Gotze and his co-pilots giving close air support, but despite making initial progress they were clearly behind schedule by the end of day 2. The 1st Airborne were also losing their initiative, a problem compounded by their CO - General Urquhart - losing contact with his HQ for 36 hours at a time when the Dutch underground were reporting that the Germans were winning the battle at Arnhem Bridge. With the Germans having full knowledge of their plans, the signs were already ominous for the main attacking forces. Several sorties being repulsed and although the north end of the bridge was secured by 0600 on 18 September, all the troops in the action were surrounded. This put the emphasis on the bridge at Nijmegan, where the Germans were waiting, after the bridge at Zon was blown up be the Germans. From that confused start to the battle, Albie Gotze then took us through the detail of the battle as it unfolded on a day-by-day basis, giving equal emphasis to the 4 main airborne units - 1st British, 82nd American, 101st American and 1st Polish - and the ground troops of the 2nd Army - VII, XXX, and XII Corps. He added to this with the roles played by air support, including the way that B24 Liberators flew in supplies through heavy flak, and how the Typhoons, flying at anything from 500 to 50 feet attempted to neutralise that flak - all explained with personal knowledge. The success or otherwise of taking the target bridges was described, together with the determined attempt by German forces to stop the advance of the ground troops and the capture of the bridges by the airborne troops. The battle ran from 17 - 26 September, 9 days of fierce fighting and heavy casualties that did not achieve the anticipated objectives, and eventually the airborne troops, who never did receive the timely help from ground forces, had to withdraw and this they did. Our speaker then summarised the reasons for failure, including: airborne troops landing too far from their objectives, the bad luck of the late arrival of Panzer troops, the speed of German response aided by knowledge of the allies plans, the impact of the worsening weather, the communications failure, the inability of the ground forces to advance within the planned time and Eisenhower's reluctance to channel all his resources to this hugely important operation. Although it was a failure, it was an epic and heroic battle for all the men who fought at Arnhem on both sides. As General Albie Gotze stated, "It was a victory for the human spirit, it has a special quality, a flavour almost of mystique". The talk we received more than matched the quality of the battle itself.
Thank you mos, however, I can't see where we could go with Vercingetorix v Caesar? Guerrilla ambush was not devised or really developed by him and it had nothing to do with the decisive factors of his final battle at Alesia - which he lost? Re Market Garden, as a matter of interest, in his 1958 memoirs, Monty lists the following reasons for not achieving total success, abridged by me to save typing: 1. "The operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters as the spearhead of a major Allied movement.......... There is no doubt in my mind that Eisenhower always wanted to give priority to the northern thrust and to scale down the southern one. He ordered this to be done, and he thought that it was being done. It was not being done. We now know from Bradley's book - A Soldier's Story - page 412, that in the middle of September, there was a parity of logistic resources between the First and Third American Armies in 12 Army Group. Eisenhower is a thoroughly genuine person; he is the very incarnation of sincerity and he trusts others to do as he asks. But in this instance his intentions were not carried out." Text from war correspondent/author Chester Wilmot also sited. 2. "The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective - the bridge. .................... I take the blame for this mistake." 3. "The weather." 4. "The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation." No.9
As ever No. 9, you are right. But i think there is also one other thing we have all overlooked about Arnhem. The German's knew what was coming, and where and when. Some dozy plonker of an officer in the gliders had written everything down and had it in his pocket. he was killed on landing and when the Geman's searched hid body they found the whole sodding battle plan! If other probelms hadn't occured, and the weather hadn't held up the second wave, then i think Arnhem could have been retrieved. However, in the end the Fates played the German dice and we got hammered. As to Vercingetorix. I believe he made a valiant last stand and brought the Gall tribes together as no-one had managed before. It was too late. he ended up being handed over by his own people to the Romans who took him back to Rome and paraded him through the streets before cutting his throat, i think. Or he could have been hanged. Don't quote me on this, as it is about ten years since i read any Celtic history. And as to referencing Vercingetorix, i was merely saying that to try and divert you brainy people away from ancient history to something we lesser mortals (ie. Me) could follow.
I amazed at the lack of thought when folk discuss former battles. As one that took part in Market Garden, let me put it this way. You have just beaten the living daylights out of the enemy. He is running headlong for his very life. You are chasing after him, helter skelter, no holds barred. You chase him hundresd of miles across Western Europe. On the way you inflicted terrible damage on the reteating enemy. Now according to the readers on here, we should have stopped... I know not where? Why? Well from what I read Market Garden should not have been tried. That is utter rubbish...When you have beaten an enemy, and he is in full flight, you chase him until he stops you. That stop was at Arnhem.....The way I read what some of you think, is that market Garden, because it was not a total success should not have been attempted. Absolute rubbish...When you have a beaten enemy on the run, you chase him to the utter limit. The alternative is to say "We have done well lets have a rest now" That may be your way of fighting a war...It is not the British way. You only stop when all is exhausted... then you can still try for another mile. For that is the mile you may have great difficulty capturing at a later date. So all you critics of the Market Garden. Think about it..... Sapper. Market Garden Association member.
People always think about the allied losses during MG, they seem to forget the casualties the Germans had as well, which were heavy. The Dutch people suffered terribly after MG in those areas that were still held by the Germans, ask them if they think it was worth it, im pretty sure I know what the reply will be, and that is after they suffered such hardships. Visit the place in September and see all the British and Dutch flags that are out, all the host families that have veterans staying with them, the crowds that gather to see the old soldiers come back. Then say it was not worth it, probably easy to do if you come from a country that was not occupied or bombed during the war. Nijmegen was a great springboard to launch later offensives Andy
(sapper @ Jan 30 2006, 09:07 AM) [post=45057]You chase him hundresd of miles across Western Europe. On the way you inflicted terrible damage on the reteating enemy. Now according to the readers on here, we should have stopped... I know not where? Why? Well from what I read Market Garden should not have been tried. That is utter rubbish...When you have beaten an enemy, and he is in full flight, you chase him until he stops you. That stop was at Arnhem.....The way I read what some of you think, is that market Garden, because it was not a total success should not have been attempted. Absolute rubbish...When you have a beaten enemy on the run, you chase him to the utter limit. The alternative is to say "We have done well lets have a rest now" That may be your way of fighting a war...It is not the British way. You only stop when all is exhausted... then you can still try for another mile. For that is the mile you may have great difficulty capturing at a later date. So all you critics of the Market Garden. Think about it..... Sapper. Market Garden Association member. [/b] Isn't that the very argument that Patton and Bradley had against doing Market Garden in the first place? They had chased the Germans for hundreds of miles across France ready to chase them across the border, into Germany and on to Berlin when the decision to execute a high risk campaign of Market Garden shut them down and gave the Germans the much needed rest from Patton's pursuit? You sound like an opponent of Market Garden. You seem to agree with Patton, attack, attack, attack, don’t stop to try something high risk where the enemy is not fleeing in the first place, keep after him while he is on the run and highly vulnerable. Which side of this issue are you on?
(Reverend Bob @ Jan 30 2006, 05:46 PM) [post=45090]Attack!! Attack!! Attack!! [/b] That's what I am talking about! Imagine the looks on the P-47 pilots faces when they would see German tanks flushed out of cover heading up the road. You get to beat German armor like it was a red-headed-retarded-stepchild and still be home at the base in the rear for a nice hot meal and a shower withing an hour. And to think they paid you to fly those things! (spidge @ Jan 17 2006, 05:08 AM) [post=44458]I was reading this the other day and it is quite an interesting version from another perspective of a fighter pilot in the MG operation.. From: http://samilitaryhistory.org/4/d04aprne.html (South African Military History) [/b] Wow Geoff, that's quite a spin on things. If the Germans knew, then it was doomed from the outset. But either way, that Browning looks like a prophet. Interesting post.
Err.....thank you again mos, flattery will get you anywhere. Seriously though, I was not dismissing Vercingetorix, just asking a question - or attempting to. Getorix was an outstanding individual. Militarily, as you say he unified numerous chieftains and got co-operation in putting forward strategies quite radical for people who mostly only knew assault by 'human wave'. (Hermann Arminius did the same some 50 years later with the Germans.) Getorix withdrew to Alesia which was his last stand, but I see the great curio about this final episode was the way Caesar laid siege. He built an extensive and elaborate encirclement, and then, knowing of or in anticipation of an attack by relief forces, built a second elaborate encirclement placing the Romans between the two. I can't think of a similar occurrence anywhere else, but would love to hear of any. No.9
Kind of caught between a rock and hard place, you could say. Sorry, considering when that happened it shoudl probably be caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Spelt those wrong, didn't I? Sapper, to answer your question, I don't think we are saying that Market Garden shouldn't have taken place. I know I'm not. I think we are just questioning the planning that went into it, and whether Arnhem should have been hit as well as the other two towns, whose names I cannot spell just now... Like I said, without the other unforeseen factors coming into the equation Arnhem could have been recovered. But it was not to be, and maybe they should have stuck to two targets instead of three when there was a lack of transport/bomber aircraft to tow in the gliders. Just a thought. And as to taking a rest? I don't chuffing think so! If they're running away shoot them in the arse! P.S. No. 9, your time is up! Sorry, it had to be said.
It seems to me very confusing to have two almost identical threads running on Market Garden, both of which are tending to drift off topic quite a lot. Do you think this one should be closed?
(angie999 @ Jan 31 2006, 08:34 AM) [post=45115]It seems to me very confusing to have two almost identical threads running on Market Garden, both of which are tending to drift off topic quite a lot. Do you think this one should be closed? [/b] Yes it is confusing. I say close this one myself.
