Maleme

Was the Commonwealth effort in the battle for Maleme airfield a tactical blunder, or were the New Zealanders that outnumbered, outgunned, outsupported and outsupplied?

 

This seemed to be the error that allowed the Germans to take the Airfield.

"In the fierce battle of Maleme, the allied side made one critical mistake which greatly helped the Germans at the most critical time. The commander of the allied force which held the hill that covered the Maleme airport with fire, was under continuous pressure by Ramcke's paratroopers. The allied commander and his superiors failed to understand the key importance of preventing the Germans from using the airfield to bring in their reinforcements, so instead of receiving available reinforcements and hold this hill, the allied commander was permitted to abandon it, and it was just before the German Junkers planes began landing in Maleme with reinforcements.

It was a classic example of the importance of holding the higher ground position, which in modern fighting often translates to achieving air superiority, and there, in Maleme, abandoning the higher ground cost The Allies the battle, the island of Crete, and heavy losses which they suffered in the rest of the battle."

 

I would strongly recommend reading Anthony Beevors 'Crete' which deals with this battle and blunder in some detail. The conclusions you can draw yourself but it would certainly appear to me that the only ones outgunned and beaten were the German paratroops who couldn't believe their luck as the allies abandoned their positions.

Steve

 

The Fallschirmjager REALLY took a beating in the first days of the battle, but, wasn´t the whole affair in Crete doomed from the moment the troops evacuated from the Attica took with them only their personal weapons (even less in some cases), and Middle East Command had to provide air (almighty) support to several simultaneous campaigns with only a handful of outdated short range fighters and a few light bombers? Did the retreat from Maleme and the failure to counterattack it with enough punch, only hasten the defeat?

 

They should never have given up the hill. Fighting would have been fierce however allowing the aircraft to land lost them the battle. This was knife edge stuff and the allied commander(s) flinched first.

Lost his nerve was one account I have read.

 

I believe a volunteer crew of a Ju52 knowing how bad things were on the ground attempted to land fully expecting to be hit. Because of the withdrawal from the Hill, I believe called Hill 131 which was not under pressure but the commander, out of touch with his troops and thus believing them to have been wiped out ordered the retreat of those he was in contact with. From their new positions most of the airfield could not be brought under direct fire and so the first supplies were landed and then a mountain brigade and the tide turned in favour of the Germans.

Add to this the big coastal guns that could've been turned to shell the airfield and possibly tip the scales the other way were ordered under no account do so as a misread ULTRA intercept had led Freyburg, the Commander on Crete (and only one authorised to directly read ULTRA messages) to believe a seaborne invasion was imminent and the parachute drop only the forerunner, when in fact the complete opposite was true.

It is perhaps ironic that spot on intelligence helped make someone make the completely wrong decision and if no intelligence had been available perhaps he would have allowed the coastal guns to be turned in land? All in all a question of what ifs but even the kias, nearly 4,000 Germans, almost half on the first day, compared to around 1500 total allied point to the fact that without an air bridge the remaining paratroops were all but doomed.

Steve

 

something to do with ultra .it would be a bit fishyif freyberg had hundeds of soldiers waiting on all the jerries lz,s.crete was not strategic anyway.

 

It is true that the airlift kept the german drive alive, but, what if they tried to send in seaborne reinforcements under the Lufwaffe umbrella, by day? The Royal Navy would have been massacred trying to stop them. I ask again: Wasn´t the island doomed from the start, with the mainland in Axis hands, and the defeat just a matter of time, made shorter by the retreat from Maleme airfield?

 

Also, I believe Crete did have strategic importance, as the key to the Eastern Mediterranean; if the Axis failed to capitalize on it, was because Barbarossa started soon after, all heads in Berlin turning East, and due to the fact that the Regia Marina just wasn´t up to the task of keeping the "Mare Nostrum" an italian lake. However, the Luftwaffe did play its role to perfection (as during the battle itself), turning every mediterranean convoy from then until 43 into one hell of a a ride.

 

The reverse is true of a naval invasion in what actually happened, although a daylight landing raises other questions but also brings the coastal defence big guns into the equation.

The Germans and Italians did try and support the paratroop landings as was known from ULTRA but rather than being the main force (as Freyburg believed) it was purely a supporting role/reinforcement. The German seabourne troops were caught by the Royal Navy who in turn sunk and generally massacred the poorly armed sloops and transport ships and dispatched the escorts as well. THe RN was well aware that by daybreak they needed to be out of range of the Luftwaffe based in Greece, hence their success in this night action.

I think its true to say that if the Germans had thrown everything at the island and had really wanted to smash the defenders they could've done so. Hitler wasn't interested in it as an adventure and believed the airborne invasion a risky business, It's therefore fair to say that with the resources actually made available and used the island was not doomed to fall and for better preperations, communications and use of reserves (mainly the Welsh) the allies having inflicted such losses on the invading force who were already low on supplies and ammunition could've mopped them up within days.

Its interesting that one of the senior paratroops recorded just that in his diary, that they 'awaited daybreak and capture'. Equally Hitler was unimpressed with the whole event and chose not to use paratroops for wholescale invasion again, as he saw them as a tactical weapon of surprise and little else. By irony the German commander whose idea it had all been ended up commanding German forces at Arnhem where once again the limits of paratroops was tested and where he was keenly aware that at no point could an easy drop or landing zone be gifted to the allies or he knew they would succeed, such are the narrow margins of war.

Steve

 

The defeat of the invasion would have been a good tactical victory, a "time-buyer" one to maybe allow for a not under fire evacuation, but strategically, taking into consideration the scarce resources Middle East Command had at the time, the island was bound to become untenable very soon. Wavell had to send into the cauldron troops that were sorely needed somewhere else, or who weren´t the most adequate for the task ahead (Layforce, for example), and let´s remember that the main numbers of the defenders were made up by evacuees from Greece, either infantry without its heavy stuff or service troops with nothing but a lot of guts.

 

It would not have been possible, politically to abandon Crete.

Churchill had promised that so as not to provoke the Germans, initially troops wouldn't be sent to the Greek mainland but that 'they would take care of Crete'. This allowed the 5 Cretan Division to be sent first against the Italians and later to be used against the Germans, if the allies had of abandoned Crete the fall out and the accusation of Germany that the British always abandoned their allies would have seemed to been proven true.

Also whilst many of the troops were evacuated to Crete most were quickly moved on to North Africa and the numbers and units remaining were largely those there pre the evacuation from Greece. Some of these units such as the Black Watch and Welsh were well trained, well armed and fresh.

Also where you say 'the defeat of the invasion WOULD have been a good victory' it actually happened and thus WAS a good victory and should have been the nail in the assaults coffin. With no seabourne help, and if no airbridge could've been gained victory would have been assured for the Allies. It comes back to the loss of Hill 131 as to the single biggest tactical error that led to a chain of events that made the military position impossible.

As I said before if the Germans launched an all out fully resourced invasion they would almost certainly have succeeded but with no landing craft and resources going off east this was never likely. I also don't believe the island would necessarily have become untenable, you only need to look at Malta to realise that whilst things can be desperate they can still be held. I think if the airborne landings had failed Hitler would not have authorised another larger attempt as he was no fan of it in the first place and thought the island of little strategic use, unlike Malta which was seen as important but even so a full scale invasion was never launched and an airborne one seen as far to risky after Crete.

Its a terrific question of what ifs that go into the post war world such as the Greek civil war that may all have taken a different course if it had been held and thus a great discussion point. That however the allies could've resisted the airborne attack with a bit more luck, planning and tactical nouse is perhaps one question that has very little 'ifs' in it, what would've happened from there though is where the question marks appear!!

Steve

 

The fact that the battle proved the paratroopers to be nothing more than a surprise resource, not destined to win an attrition battle by themselves (as Arnhem and many other instances were to confirm), points out the importance - not taken into consideration during planning - of the seaborne reinforcements; all the really heavy hardware (tanks and artillery) got to the island by ship, and it was that kind of stuff which really won the battle for the Axis.

I agree with you in the fact that Jerry, specially Adolf, saw the whole enterprise as a sideshow, most likely undertaken because it was the logical step after conquering mainland Greece and with the Wops in the Dodecanese since long before, but hadn´t Barbarossa ocurred so soon after, the whole weight of the Hun would have fallen upon a brave, resourceful but sadly under-everything garrison, and Middle East Command, so poor in resources, would not have able to do the minimum necessary to help.

The whole issue was an strategical one; tactical considerations apply to Maleme, Galatas, Retimo, 42nd Street, etc., but the real battle for Crete happened at London and Berlin.

 

The fact that the battle proved the paratroopers to be nothing more than a surprise resource, not destined to win an attrition battle by themselves (as Arnhem and many other instances were to confirm), points out the importance - not taken into consideration during planning - of the seaborne reinforcements; all the really heavy hardware (tanks and artillery) got to the island by ship, and it was that kind of stuff which really won the battle for the Axis.

I agree with you in the fact that Jerry, specially Adolf, saw the whole enterprise as a sideshow, most likely undertaken because it was the logical step after conquering mainland Greece and with the Wops in the Dodecanese since long before, but hadn´t Barbarossa ocurred so soon after, the whole weight of the Hun would have fallen upon a brave, resourceful but sadly under-everything garrison, and Middle East Command, so poor in resources, would not have able to do the minimum necessary to help.

The whole issue was an strategical one; tactical considerations apply to Maleme, Galatas, Retimo, 42nd Street, etc., but the real battle for Crete happened at London and Berlin.

 

A typica military cock-up! Freyburg diverted by the belief from Ultra that there would be a sea-bourne invasion. Atrocious communications. Freyburg was the wrong man for the job, having learnt his war in the 1st WW and completely unfamiliar with the velocity the battle was being fought with or even the concept of air-bourne troop deployment. Churchill "parachuted" (ha) him into the command within days of the invasion, thus he had no grip on the strengths or weaknesses of his troops. He certainly had some fine troops eg 2 Divisions of Anzacs; a Battalion each of the Black Watch, Leicesters and York & Lancs, the Welch. Ok, there were a lot of refugees from Greece who had been landed without kit or materiel who were more flotsam than usable units. Add to that the complete air-control the Germans had including wall-to-wall bombing of troops and the outcome was predictable BUT IF......Hill 107 hadn't been relinquished and the Ju 52s were denied landing at Maleme...then at the end of the 1st day the Brits were winning. My Dad was a Sapper Officer with the 42 Field Coy RE. They fought as Infantry and withdrew with their equipment but which had to be destroyed at the Quayside.

 

As I recall, the Germans jumped into Crete with their weapons in separate containers. They loudly complained that they were shot at before they were able to land.

The key to Maleme was the New Zealanders and they were overwhelmed.

I had great pleasure attending a re-enactment there in 2001, the 60th anniversary. Everything used that day was authentic to the time. After much "fighting", a platoon of Germans appeared out of the smoke and started to goose step toward us. Suddenly from the side, a group of Greek children dressed in Greek national dress appeared. They surrounded the Germans, linked hands and started dancing around them. It was a most moving moment.

I had the pleasure of attending a memorial service at police HQ in Xania. The Cretan police fought with great heroism. A Digger friend of mine broke down when he told me how he had watched the Germans put the police up against a wall and shoot them.

After Maleme fell, the Aussies still held Rethymno and Iraklion. They were forced to surrender by an order given by their own command.

 

I had the pleasure of attending a memorial service at police HQ in Xania. The Cretan police fought with great heroism. A Digger friend of mine broke down when he told me how he had watched the Germans put the police up against a wall and shoot them.

Cretan police? Even though I knew about them, it still sounds like a very interesting topic. Do you (or anyone else) have any more info about their involvement in the struggle?

 

I can't add much more. They were pressed into action as the Cretan troops had been sent to the north of Greece and were unavailable.

It was a most impressive occasion at police HQ that included a march past in front of the Duke of Kent.

 

As far as possible all non required troops, for whom there was no role in the defence of Crete, were evacuated prior to the German landings, largely service and base units.

The troops were evacuated on returning transports.

3,200 British, 2,500 Australians and 1.300 New Zealanders were sent to Egypt (and therefore not taken POW)

Spider

 

The loss of Hill 107 and the airfield at Maleme held by the 22 Batt NZEF was the turning point in the battle of Crete.

The airfield was shrouded in dust after the bombing and the gliders and paratroops landed soon after partially screened by the dust and smoke.

The Germans landed on the airfield as well as it surrounds and once the German Mountain troops and supplies were landed from transports the airfields fate was sealed.

For the Germans to land aircraft on a held airfield is extraordinary and the troops straight into battle.

There were also major problems with communication within the defending forces which caused a break down in communications and the disposition and reinforcing of troops.

The 2/7 Aust Batt (a battle tried and tested battalion with almost full strength) was available and poised to move however was delayed by communications

The defending forces were also running out of supplies and the defended areas were isolated disrupting supply.

The Germans on the other hand quickly concentrated there efforts once the airfield at Maleme was open to transports, although still very dangerous to do, and landed reinforcements and supplies and then consolidated and advanced.

Once the foothold was made they exploited it to there advantage very quickly.

If effective communications was available prehaps a different outcome as the Germans were on the brink of abandoning the offensive due to the heavy troop and aircraft losses.

A sea asault was not an option as it was tried and failed earlier.

Spider