The Lysander was designed as an Army Co-operation aircraft. It appears never to have been used in its role (not quite sure how whole-hearted the effort was in France in 1940). The FW189 was the same role, designed at the same time, slightly bigger and slightly greater performance. It was used in role throughout the war. Why could the Luftwaffe provide the army co-operation service with a specialised army cooperation aircraft but the RAF could not?
The role of the Lysander as an Army co-operation aircarft was replaced by the Auster during WWII, the Lysander saw use in Army co-operation in Burma, Iraq, and Syria
The Auster 'Fly In' takes place every year at Popham Airfield (Near Winchester Hants): Few miles away! https://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&sugexp=les%3B&gs_rn=0&gs_ri=hp&tok=ZdD6yVIhLeSCirCRIB6USQ&pq=auster+fly+in+popham&cp=25&gs_id=22&xhr=t&q=auster+fly+in+popham+2012&safe=off&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&bpcl=39314241&biw=1280&bih=923&um=1&ie=UTF-8&tbm=isch&source=og&sa=N&tab=wi&ei=89K5ULCtD8W70QXVg4HQDA (1941) Air Publication 1582C Pilot's Notes Lysander III and IIIA Aeroplanes Mercury XX Engine (1940) Kurz-Betriebsanleitung Fw 189 A-0 mit Motor As 410 und Argus-Verstell-Luftschraube
Lysanders were dropping supplies to the BEF at Calais in 1940. The only problem was someone forgot to tell the RAF that Calais had already been captured. There's a thread in the 1940 section about it.
The Lysander was designed as an Army Co-operation aircraft. It appears never to have been used in its role (not quite sure how whole-hearted the effort was in France in 1940). The FW189 was the same role, designed at the same time, slightly bigger and slightly greater performance. It was used in role throughout the war. Why could the Luftwaffe provide the army co-operation service with a specialised army cooperation aircraft but the RAF could not? I think the answer lies with the dynamic situation after 10 May 1940.When the phony war ended on this date and Hitler launched his synchronised assault on the Low Countries and France,the BEF and French Army suffered from a lack of air superiority.So there was little chance to exploit the Lysander's defined role as the Allied Armies were hardly ever in a position to take an offensive role.Throughout this campaign,the Allied armies were on the defensive from the German 10 May breakthrough to their withdrawal to the Dunkirk perimeter. Overall,it is much easier to put up army co-operation aircraft at times of air superiority than occasions when ground forces are struggling to contain the enemy on the ground and those ground forces lack overhead support.
ARMY CO-OPERATION PLANES AT PRACTICE - British Pathé The last frames in the above at 1.26 look very much like the road and slope next Imber Village! THE ARMY OF TODAY - British Pathé
Westland Lysander in Action - YouTube The Lysanders at the end of the clip being bombed up are from 225 Squadron. Sqn Histories 221-225_P It's also important to note that in France 1940, the main German army co-operation plane wasn't the FW 189 but the HS 126. Henschel Hs 126 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia was a design similiar in performance to the Lysander. The HS 126 took heavy losses just as the Lysander did in 1940 (Peter Cornwall's Battle of France records a significant number of HS 126 losses) and was gradually replaced by the FW189 which served mainly on the Eastern Front. The RAF replaced the Lysander with two types, light aircraft like the Auster for artillery spotting and camera equipped fighters like the Mustang for reconnaissance.
Why could the Luftwaffe provide the army co-operation service with a specialised army cooperation aircraft but the RAF could not? Because the Luftwaffe wanted to cooperate with their army, but the RAF did not? Putting that aside, the Lysander was a specialised aircraft. It was specifically developed for the army cooperation role; the problem may have been that army cooperation meant different things to different people. The Lysander shares characteristics with the Henschel 126 which was the predecessor of the FW 189.
I always though I did a recce in a Lysander, now this thread raises doubt that it may have been an Auster. On 30 December 1944 we were hurriedly moved forward to thickened up the 52 Lowland defences because the Germans during the Ardennes Offensive launched a major attack at Geilenkirken and we took up a position on the right of the line linking up with the Americans. It was there that our Battalion Commander was telephoned by the Corps Commander and told no matter what happens, no withdrawal! I remember going with my C.O.to the neighbouring American infantry regiment to co-ordinate our lines of fire. During that anxious time and being on duty in the Battalion Command Post during the night I was able to pinpoint the exact location of a Nebelwerfer by compass bearings and the intersection coinciding precisely with an aerial interpretation map which queried a possible Nebelwerfer position. Being in track vehicles they quickly move in and out of alternative locations I got our Battery Commander to see what fire he could quickly bring down on the map reference. He came back and told me all guns not on fixed-lines would take it on and at that point woke up the C.O. The Colonel agreed I could try and arrange with Division HQ to see if I could go up with the 'milk run' which was carried out each morning by a Lysander. Early the next morning I was on that flight, covered the pulverised position of the Nebelwerfer and scanned the area directly in front of the Battalion hoping to implement the information our very active patrol programme had obtained. During the recce we came across a troop of tanks harbouring in a wood which the pilot said was new information. It was the third time I had flown; the first time seven years before on a five shilling flight round the hills of my home town in Scotland, the last occasion a 'jaunt' a few months before in an Army glider. During the flight my main concern was that my heavy 'tackety' boots would not pierce the thin frame of the aircraft, which I though was a Lysander. Joe Brown.
I recall, although not when it actually started, that poor results at training RAF pilots as artillery observers lead to artillery officers being trained to fly light AOP aircraft. The larger and more complex Lysander may have been too much aeroplane perhaps?
Lysanders were also used to attack German columns on a number of occasions in late May 1940 in France - albeit unsuccessfully!
The culminating point in this chapter of errors was the introduction just before the Hitler war of the Lysander monoplane, whose advent coincided with with the introduction of the new race of very fast monoplane fighters. This aircraft was of advanced design, incorporating extensive high-lift devices to give a wide speed range and a short take-off and landing run. Like the White Knight in Alice in Wonderland, it carried around the wherewithal to attempt practically any of the innumerable tasks which an army might at short notice require of it. As a flying machine it was good, with a top speed of over 200 m.p.h. Its pilot and rear gunner had a good view. But it was heavy, weighing about two and a half tons. Its engine was nearly one thousand horse power. Despite the slow flying devices, it was still tied to operating from airfields, and no pilot, however strong in the arms, could throw it about with the abandon necessary to shake off a hostile fighter. The RA trialled 'Flying Observation Posts' at the end of 1938 using Audaxes and Lysanders. The results were encouraging enough that four or five types of light aircraft, including the Autogiro, seemed to show that the Taylorcraft, though not really suitable, was the most promising. ... A trial against Spitfires, the fastes fighters then in existence, which carried out mock attacks, showed that a light aeroplane, even without previous warning, had quite a good chance of dodging the fire of the modern fighter. The first Air Observation Post flight - D Flight - went to France in April 1940 with the intention of going into action on the Saar in mid-May. However, its allotted artillery was called away to a more pressing engagement and D Flight returned unblooded to the UK. From Unarmed into Battle.
Thanks some interesting points and quite a lot of 'incorrect facts'! Field Service Regs, Vol 2 Operations was the army's peak doctrine. The 1935 edition was in force when WW2 started. It gave the RAF's Army Cooperation role as: Close and medium recce of own and enemy dispositions; photo recce; artillery reconnaissance (locating hostile btys, observation of arty fire); dropping small qtys of supplies; intercommunication. Some of these tasks required flying over hostile territory. The Austers of the AOP sqns were explicitly forbidden from flying over en territory and hence were incapable of fulfilling key requirements of the army cooperation tasks, most notably locating and engaging hostile batteries. They weren't much good for photo recce either, not least because the sqns didn't generally have the capability to process the film (it was always the army's responsibility to distribute and interpret tactical air photos but not develop), hence the APIS in the corps CB office, and the 'centre of excellance' at Larkhill). If you want a reliable account of the origins of AOP (not forgetting the all important formation of the RA Flying Club in the early 1930s), see Mead's 'The Eye in the Sky - History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army 1785-1945'.
Perhaps it was deemed by the RAF (after a certain time in service) that the Lysander was simply too good an aircraft for the Army Observation role, and that it would be much more valuable in Special Operations. Just a supposition/possibility. DSCN1782 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! DSCN1781 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! DSCN1784 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! DSCN1783 | Flickr - Photo Sharing!
The people who made the decisions: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE. (Hansard, 16 October 1940) RAF - Army Cooperation: Sir Archibald Sinclair's Statement.: 4 Mar 1942: House of Commons debates - TheyWorkForYou
Can any of the airplane enthusiasts in the forum compare the performances of the Lysander, Storch and L4 Cub, especially the short field takeoff and landing capabilities? Thanks, Dave
Mead's The Eye in the Air is arguably the more scholarly work, but it does draw on Unarmed into Battle which had been written by two officers closely involved with AOP development. To be fair to them, their criticism of the Lysander is from their perspective as Gunners interested solely in artillery observation. I don't think they ever claimed that the Auster was the answer to the Army Cooperation conundrum.
The people who made the decisions: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE. (Hansard, 16 October 1940) RAF - Army Cooperation: Sir Archibald Sinclair's Statement.: 4 Mar 1942: House of Commons debates - TheyWorkForYou Interesting, the first thing in my mind was "was Trenchard still alive in 1957 when the AAC was formed"! IIRC Army Cooperation Group (5 sqns) was formed in the 1920s and became a Command in the mid 1930s. In essence the role was that of the Corps Sqn (RFC and RAF) in WW1. These were actually war winning because they were vital in defeating the German artillery (recce not attack). Fortunately for UK in WW2 the German artillery was a shadow of its former self. It's also useful to note that FSR 1935 did mention the use of RAF fighters for attacking ground targets, but this was not army cooperation in the usual sense. RAF army co-op sqn signallers equipped with radios and pads of the vital RAF Form 776 (for their orders from the battery signed by the battery comd - obviously airman weren't capable of receiving verbal orders unlike army NCOs) were assigned to medium and heavy batteries and remained with them until 1942, but they weren't very busy. Sqns had Army LOs on strength to brief and de-brief pilots.
Thanks some interesting points and quite a lot of 'incorrect facts'! Field Service Regs, Vol 2 Operations was the army's peak doctrine. The 1935 edition was in force when WW2 started. It gave the RAF's Army Cooperation role as: Close and medium recce of own and enemy dispositions; photo recce; artillery reconnaissance (locating hostile btys, observation of arty fire); dropping small qtys of supplies; intercommunication. Some of these tasks required flying over hostile territory. The Austers of the AOP sqns were explicitly forbidden from flying over en territory and hence were incapable of fulfilling key requirements of the army cooperation tasks, most notably locating and engaging hostile batteries. They weren't much good for photo recce either, not least because the sqns didn't generally have the capability to process the film (it was always the army's responsibility to distribute and interpret tactical air photos but not develop), hence the APIS in the corps CB office, and the 'centre of excellance' at Larkhill). If you want a reliable account of the origins of AOP (not forgetting the all important formation of the RA Flying Club in the early 1930s), see Mead's 'The Eye in the Sky - History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army 1785-1945'. Hi, Was interested in reading your comments regarding AOPs using Austers because my father was an artillery officer taught to fly one of these aircraft. He landed in Normandy on June 29th 1944 and played a very active role in directing artillery fire from then until the end of the European conflict when he arrived in Hamburg (what was left of it). He left his own account of the campaign and I also have his Flight Diary and the Squadron Diary both of which demonstrate the contribution made by Auster pilots, not least in photographic reconnaissance often using oblique photo techniques as well as taking the risk of flying above enemy lines, for example to survey the bridges over the Rhine before it was crossed. The unfortunate pilot was obliged to photo every bridge in the area lest by concentrating on one he gave the game away! Because there was no ongoing battle the enemy were able to concentrate on his presence, and he was undoubtedly a brave man. I have a handwritten account of his feelings before and during his flight, an operation for which he received a D.F.C. His squadron did in fact have the means of developing the photographs that they took and this recorded in the squadron diary that I possess. Pilots were often required to photograph points of interest and also to convey senior officers who wished to view areas of conflict. Austers were used in place of Lysanders because the latter were too heavy and powerful for short take offs and landings in the ALGs used by AOP squadrons. Their pilots required skills of a high order both as fliers and artillerymen. Regards Rob
There were several reasons why the Lysander Army Co-operation Squadrons did not work the way they were intended to. The RAF didn't place any great priority on Army Co-operation. It was lower in their priorities than fighter command or Bomber command. The RAF as an independent air force didn't seem to like roles which involved close co-operation with the other services. The 1940 experience reduced confidence in the concept. a) in 1939 the army doubled in size, but the RAF were not established for an equivalent increase in army co-operation flights. b) ineffective experience in France 1940. The RAF did not think the Lysander was survivable and equipped Tactical recce squadrons with high performance aircraft. The Gunners did not think that artillery observation could be carried out effectively from a fast single seat fighter, nor that pilots could be properly briefed on the detailed tactical situation. The tactical recce squadrons carried out TAC Recce while the Army developed a AOP squadrons flown by RA officers. This achieved through a lot of arguments and grudging acceptance.
