** IMPORTANT - Can we please have a discussion about the Eastern Front without it having to be closed - Its getting very frustrating - as HO as often said we should talk about Campaigns and Orders of Battle and this thread is an effort to follow up on his idea - PLEASE LETS TRY AND DISCUSS THIS WITH RESTRAINT!!!!! In September 1941 Kiev was captured by the Germans and with it over half a million Russian Troops fell into German Hands. This operation inevitably drew German forces away from the Thrust towards Moscow but also destroyed a Key Soviet Army. My question to you guys is this: Were the Germans right to force Guderians army to turn south to complete the encirclement even though it meant delaying the drive for Moscow? Or was it a case that if they kept going east then they would run the risk of a large salient in the Soviet Line with the Soutwestern Front intact and a credible Danger to the German Advance? Were they right or wrong to encircle Southwestern Front? I'd love to hear your opinions!
This is another case of a Hitler order confusing the intentions of those on the ground isn't it? The Soviet forces around Kiev were still in reasonably good condition weren't they? Avoided by the German Generals who didn't want the offensive to get bogged down in house to house type operations at such an early stage. Hitlers order stems from the enormous desire he felt to posess the Ukraine. Very hard to say how far Germany could have got if Guderian hadn't turned back. Maybe they would have avoided a lot of the Winter Privations they suffered from setting off too late in the first place? Instinctively If they'd carried on then at least they wouldn't lose any more time. The Soviet Salient, though strong and re-inforced could have been dealt with at a later date without too much danger of it becoming a 'Stalingrad', (and along much shorter supply lines).
The Southwestern Front consisted of 5 armies the 5th 6th 12th and 26th Armies under the command of General Kirponos who was killed when his headquarters was overrun in Sept 1941. I will try and get a more detailed Order of Battle in relation to these formations and post it here.
As I'm not an Eastern Fronter is this what you refer too? http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/eastfront1/opbarbarossa.htm If it is, then if they hadn't taken the SW Front out wouldn't the SW Front troops have moved north and hit the German Moscow thrust in the Flank? Which is what I've just re-read what you asked, sorry. I'd protect my flanks. But I'm an ex-Lance-Corporal not a General.
This is another case of a Hitler order confusing the intentions of those on the ground isn't it? The Soviet forces around Kiev were still in reasonably good condition weren't they? Avoided by the German Generals who didn't want the offensive to get bogged down in house to house type operations at such an early stage. Hitlers order stems from the enormous desire he felt to posess the Ukraine. Very hard to say how far Germany could have got if Guderian hadn't turned back. Maybe they would have avoided a lot of the Winter Privations they suffered from setting off too late in the first place? Instinctively If they'd carried on then at least they wouldn't lose any more time. The Soviet Salient, though strong and re-inforced could have been dealt with at a later date without too much danger of it becoming a 'Stalingrad', (and along much shorter supply lines). Yes I know what you are saying VP but I wonder if they Russians would have used the Kiev Salient as a launching pad for an offensive of their own. Guderian's Troops could well have been cut off and although it is unlikely that they would have to surrender, again time would have been lost whilst they extricate themselves and see off the Russian Threat.
I wonder if they Russians would have used the Kiev Salient as a launching pad for an offensive of their own. Guderian's Troops could well have been cut off and although it is unlikely that they would have to surrender, again time would have been lost whilst they extricate themselves and see off the Russian Threat. Didn't Stalin forbid a breakout from Kiev when the encirclement finally came? It does seem that the Soviets were more concerned with consolidation at that time. Perhaps worth the risk?? If Guderians advance continued and took him to Moscow succesfully there could still be considerable German pressure on Kiev from the south to aid in a later encirclement of the Russians...??? Time (and the lack of it) does seem to emerge again as the significant factor doesn't it? I'm going to have to go and stare at some maps here . still can't find any decent Oob's for the area....Any joy? Cheers, Adam.
Just been reading about this in War of The Century by Laurence Rees. He says what I did. It was right to protect flanks and there was every possiblity of the armoured thrust to Moscow being cut off by the troops on their flanks and then there would have been a large pocket of Germans surrounded in or near the Soviet capital. He agrees Hilter was correct to make them turn away from Moscow. I believe the destruction of the Red Army was more important than taking ground.
Well, gentlemen. I'll say that when Germans turned their wa to the South defensive positions of soviet troops on that direction were rather poor. I'm silent about possibility of attacks from that direction. soviet reserves were concentrated on the Bryansk Front, which tried to parry the German blow. Need to mention they were somewhat less than Guderian mentioned ("20 divisions of Timoshenko". Btw the Bryansk Front commander was Yeremenko) Battle scheme for operations in that area can be seen here http://www.rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/1941SW/Kiev/MC2_Kiev_Sept_1_10_41.jpg Other schemes see Maps 1941 South-West One can see that the SW front had no any significant tank units on that direction. soviet Stavka saw possibility of the blow to the south, but paid too much hopes to the counter-blow of Yeremenko. Blow from the Dnieper bridgehead to the North was almost missed by Soviet command. they didn't paid enough attention to it and the result was a catastrophe. I have enough detailed OOBs if anybody are interested.... Regards, Alex
I was having trouble getting OOBs for this campaign so AMVAS, I 'd be obliged if you could supply some OOB's for the Southwestern Front.
I was having trouble getting OOBs for this campaign so AMVAS, I 'd be obliged if you could supply some OOB's for the Southwestern Front. Ok, I'll give it on Sept. 1'41 So, lets start... SW Front: 5th Army: 15th Rfl. Corps (45,62 RD) 31st Rfl. corps (193,195,200 RD) 131st RD, 5th Fortified Region 1st Airborne Corps (1,204 Airborne Bde) 1st AT Artillery Bde, 231,368,458,460,543 Corps Art. Regt, 212,331,589th SCCR Art. Regiments 23,243,263 Separate AA Bn 9th Mechcorps (20,35 Tank div.) 22nd MechCorps (19,41 Tank Div) 215th Motorised division 152nd Separate Tank Bn 15th Separate Armored Train Battalion 117th Motorised Engineer Bn 11th Pontoon Bn 147th Separate Sapper Bn 26th Army HQ of the 6th Rifle Corps 41,159,199,227,264,289,301 Rfl. Div. 15th Mot. Rfl. regt. 8th Fortified Region 209,229 SCCR Art. Regt. 186th At Art. Regt. 669th Light Art. regt/228th Rfl. Div. 17th Separate AA Bn 7th Motorised div. 37th Motorcycle Regt., 57,60,91 Separate Tank Bn 65,119 Motorised Eng. Bn 37 Pontoon Bn, 195th Separate Sapper Bn 37th Army HQs of 27,64 Rfl. Corps 28th Mnt. Rfl. Div. 87,124,146,147,165,171,175,206,228,284,285 Rfl. Div. 1st Fortified Region 272,377 Corps Art. Regt. 538th Howitzer Art. regt. 135th SCCR Gun Art. Regt 45th Separate AT Bn 63rd Separate Tank Bn 3rd Motorcycle Bn 48th Separate Eng. Bn, 120 Mot. Eng. Bn. 13th Mot. Pontoon Bn, 8th Separate Sapper Bn 38th Army 97,116,196,212,297,300,304 Rifle Div. United Regiment of Poltava Tractor School 5th Cavalry corps (3,14,34 Cav. Div), 37th Cav. Div. 441,445th Corps Art. Regt 555th SCCR gun Art. Regt. 558th AT Art. regt. 6th Separate AA Bn. 89,94 Separate Tank Bn 21st Motorcycle regt. 56th Separate Eng. Bn, 45 Motorised Eng. Bn. 28th Pontoon bn, 277th Separate Sapper Bn. 40th Army: 135,293 Rfl. Div. 2nd Airborne Corps (2,3,4 Airborne Bde) 1042nd Rifle regt/295th RD 5th AT Art. Bde. 21st Corps Art. regt. 595,738,760 AT Art. regt. 205th Separate AA Bn. 10th Tank division, 53,55,65 Separate Tank Bn. 286th Separate Tank Bn. Front HQ: 81,99 RD 3rd Airborne Corps (5,6,212 Airborne Bde) 3,4,6,13,15,17 Fortified Regions Two Separate Flame Thrower Battalions (type "A" and "B") 233rd Corps Art. regt. 376,506 SCCR Howitzer Art. regt 197,754,756 AT Art. regt 85 Separate AT Bn 3,4 air defence Divisions, Ostersky, Kanevsky, Kievsky Brigade Air defense regions 20,25,29,75,307,386 Separate AA Bn 129th Tank Bde. 36th Air Defense Fighter Aircraft Division 19,62 Bomber Aircraft Divisions 15,16,17,63 Mixed Aircraft divisions 316 recon Aircraft Regiment 12,14 Separate Eng. Bn. 1,2,66,86 Motorised Eng. Bn 5,10,12,13,15,25,30,31,32 Pontoon Bn 187 Separate Sapper Bn. (SCCR=suprime command-in-chief reserve. Or High command reserve) Regards, Alex P.S. Take into account the 21st Army, which can be also seen on the map between the 5th and 40th armies belonged to the BRYANSKY Front
AMVAS, Thank you so much for that. That is some amount of troops and it also goes some way to disprove the theories of Suvorov. If Stalin was planning to attack Germany why was the greatest concetration of Soviet Soldiers in the Southwestern Front???
AMVAS, Thank you so much for that. That is some amount of troops and it also goes some way to disprove the theories of Suvorov. If Stalin was planning to attack Germany why was the greatest concetration of Soviet Soldiers in the Southwestern Front??? Take into account many unit numbers (especially for the tank troops) were only figures and nothing more. Real strength of them was not too much as well as some rifle units. I'm not going to discuss pro and contra for Rezun/Suvorov's theories. One need to write a book for this. I can only say every string in his papers contain lie, inexactness or at least quuestionable thing. Besides all he's total fool in technical topics!!! :mad111: Lets stop here about Rezun, or I'll become too angry...:box2: In any case figures for September can't stay for the same for June 22. I have those on every month of the war and for June 22 they differs much from September's Regards, Alex
Just reading in David Glantz Barbarossa that Hitler's intention was to destroy the Red Army rather than achieve any specific terrain or political objective. "The mass of the [Red] Army stationed in Western Russia is to be destroyed in bold operations ...." quoted from [the real] Gotthard Heinrici . Capturing 600 000 soldiers from any other Army but the Red Army would have been a crippling blow. OK, so maybe there wasn't a threat of encirclement but what other Army would carry on fighting taking these kind of losses?
Owen, thats just the point. In the case of any other army, the destruction of the army in the field would bring about the surrender of almost any other country. But Russia is an entirely different matter. My own opinion on this is that Hitler couldnt make his mind up about what he wanted to do. First it was take Leningrad, then the Ukraine, then he decided to make Moscow the main target, I mean there was no coherent strategy that was adhered to. The mark of a good plan is one that is flexible but Barbarossa was too flexible in that it did not have a final objective and that was part of its downfall.
Gentlemen, the year 1941 was such a horrible for the Red Army, that I can't find words to describe it! It was a way from one catastrophe to another! All the year long, on all directions!!! There were only some variations in degrees of those catastrophes. From horrible to monstrous ones, to my opinion Only one figure. When after war the number of losses were counted it was found that RKKA lost 98% of prewar staff killed, captured and missed in combat!!! Regards, Alex
It was an absolute miracle that the Red Army survived as a cohesive unit. The more I read about it the more I realise how lucky they were.
I've posted this elsewhere but seems fit to put it here too. From David Glantz, Barbarossa. ....the army's personnel strength rose from 5 373 000 on 22 June to 6 889 000 on 31 August and an estimated 8 million on 31 December. Whereas prewar German estimates had postulated an enemy of approximately 300 divisions, by December the Soviets had fielded more than twice that number. This allowed the Red Army to lose more than 4 million soldiers and 200 divisions in battle by 31 December, roughly equivalent to it's entire peacetime army, yet still survive to continue the struggle. By 31 December, the Red Army lost a total of 4,308,94[?] men and 229 divisions
Number of Soviet troops on June 22: Western theatre: 2,742,881 men Troops not engaged in combats: 2,691,848 men
Number of Soviet troops on June 22: Western theatre: 2,742,881 men Troops not engaged in combats: 2,691,848 men Amazing that 50,000 troops can be considered a fraction.