I have waited for some time to get my mitts on this book. It all started when Martin and Adam came up with interesting quotes and opinions on this and the other forum. The book starts off by stating that there is a common perception that the British Armour in Normandy performed poorly. The Germans could have done better, the tanks were rubbish and Tommy is no soldier. The book sets about analyzing this according to thre columns. Tactics/doctrine, Tank gap and Morale. The Author gives a brief overview of the battles fought during the Normandy campaign to define the scope of the book. It works great as the reader is put in the picture straight away. The tactics and doctrine section opens with the header operational technique. This is really the combined arms doctrine as the British used it in the 3 last years of the war. The doctrine was shaped by a few key ingredients: Casualty conservation, sustaining morale and exploitation of materiel. In short the British army sought to use metal rather than flesh to assure victory on the battlefield. By welding the various arms (arty, inf armour and airpower) into a single unit, the combined firepower and mobility would win the battles. The book continnue by telling of the dififculties of the Norman countryside with it's cramped lanes and dense undergrowth. The British however learned rapidly after initial successes with 'bite and hold' missions that left the germans counterattacking and sustain massive casualties. The British Armourd divisions were however ill prepared for this fighting since they had trained for the explotation phase of the battle. With little room for manouvre the armoured divisions had to revise battledrills and the arrangement of their brigades. The Tactics and doctrine sections wrong footed me from the start. As someone who has worked with these issues for a decade and a half I was abhorred at the mix up of doctrine and battledrills. The author talk about loose interpretation of doctrine when clearly discussing battledrills and vice versa. One of the things I had looked forward to in the book was the promises from previous readers on the ammount of doctrine in the book. It turned out to be a lot more on drills and organisation than pure doctrine. However the section describe the steep learning curve in the British Army in general and the armour in particular during the campaign. Pip Roberts is the prime example of the flair in the forces that arrive at mixed brigades and flexibility. The Tank gap section is highly fashinating. The section surprisingly talks up the Allied armour. Armour protection of the allied tanks were good enough, since the warhead will defeat it. (strange as he talks about the Centurion later) The firepower was the real problem of allied tanks. A true and accurate estimate, but he manages to turn this into a tank mismatch where he provide the numbers that the allied Medium Velocity 75mm gun penetrates all german tanks bar the 30% of top models. (some 100 Tigers and 650 Panthers) This was a strange sentiment. It's like proclaiming that you have made a condom that provides protection from all types of VD bar, Syphilis and HIV. The advent of the Firefly was to rectify this and that brings us to the most interesting chapters of the book. Design & Planning and Production & Supply. This really makes the book for me. It show the underlying reasons for sluggish development of British tanks, and why the Centurion (and to a lesser degree the Comet) turned out to be such wonderful tanks. This section is well researched and links politics, industrial and historical together to explain the weird and at times absurd actions on development of tanks. A tid bit was learning about the Tank Board. A board that changed their terms of reference 4 times, changed chairman 4 times and went trough 27 different members in a two year period. Compare that to the Inspector General of the Panzerwaffe Guderian experiences... The final chapter discuss morale, and the perceived view that the british lacked enthusiasm and drive. This is refuted by counciling the lists of AWOL, desertion and drunkeness charges. The lack of drive is more linked with the cramped conditions and close co-operation with the infantry. The morale seems to have been boosted by the fact that the men in the tanks lived close to oneanother and the distance between commander and trooper was small. All in all the book surprised me. It turned out to be a pleasant surprise. It is well researched and many of the works Buckley rest the book on sits comfortably on my shelf. If there is something to put my finger on it is his reluctantness of accepting the tankies own thoughts, opting for the larger picture. This was most evident on the tank gap. It really got to me as a soldier. I can recall heated arguments over AT recoiless systems with the same predicament as the tankies with their 75mm pea shooters. The 30% that it doesn't penetrate is out there somewhere on the battlefield and it is the man in the sharp end that has to deal with it.
One of the things I had looked forward to in the book was the promises from previous readers on the ammount of doctrine in the book. It turned out to be a lot more on drills and organisation than pure doctrine. Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: from Dunkirk to D-Day by Timothy Place discusses infantry and armour doctrine at some length. For artillery doctrine, try Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham. Best, Alan
Hello Allan. I have Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: from Dunkirk to D-Day . Cheers.
However the section describe the steep learning curve in the British Army in general and the armour in particular during the campaign. Pip Roberts is the prime example of the flair in the forces that arrive at mixed brigades and flexibility. I appreciate that there is a gap between identifying and implementing a solution, but perhaps Roberts had simply read Immediate Report No.3: Co-operation of Armour and Infantry dated 12 June 1944 (TNA/PRO CAB 106/963), particularly para 3: 3. The Solution The solution to this which worked well on the front of 7 Armd Div, advancing on two roads (FOLLIOT-BERNIERES BOCAGE and BAYEUX-TILLY SUR SEULLES) was to put an infantry battalion under command of of the Armoured Brigadier and an Armoured regiment under command of the Infantry Brigadier each being responsible for one road. 'Worked well' may be open to dispute if you include Essex Wood (see the recently bumped thread) or anything about Tilly, but the report is arguably talking about the approach up to these battles. It's worth noting that the infantry referred to were not 7 Armd's own inf bde, it was 56 indep Inf Bde on loan from 50 Div. 131 Queen's Brigade had only recently come ashore. As described, the swap would result in a slight imbalance: Armd Bde: 2x armd regts, 1x inf bn, 1x motor bn; Inf Bde: 1x armd regt, 2x inf bn Immediately before setting off for Villers Bocage, 7 Armd again attached only a single Armd Regt to support 131 Bde's two-battalion operation (though with no great results, it must be said). Even the exploitation to Villers Bocage was balanced brigade group rather and not tank-heavy. The Guards (so derided by Harrison-Place) took balance to the extreme with the formation of four very-nearly-equal 'Regimental Groups' by throwing the Armd Recce Regt into the mix: an Armd Regt + Mot Bn (Gren Gds), two lots of Armd Regt + Inf Bn (Coldm Gds and IG) and Armd Recce Regt + Inf Bn (WG). Of course, they may have inadvertently arrived at a right answer for the wrong reason; cap badge politics, for instance. Thanks for posting your thoughts on Buckley. It sounds like a decent one to get one day. As an aside: The British however learned rapidly after initial successes with 'bite and hold' missions that left the germans counterattacking and sustain massive casualties. We knew that before we landed, didn't we? Second Army's job was one big 'bite and hold' - with lots of nibbling - until the breakout.
Thank you for the input idler Quote: The British however learned rapidly after initial successes with 'bite and hold' missions that left the germans counterattacking and sustain massive casualties. We knew that before we landed, didn't we? Second Army's job was one big 'bite and hold' - with lots of nibbling - until the breakout. I may have phrased myself poorly. What I meant was: after initial success with bite and hold, they learned rapidly... As for Buckley blowing Pip's trumpet I think it is par for the course when historians discuss armd. commanders. Pip himself rate Looney Hinde in his book. I find in reading about the Armd bde's in the desert that the commanders had identified the need for a balanced force, and a vehicle that would allow the infantry to keep up with the armour. Cheers
