All, it was only when discussing the general shortage o JU52s in the summer of 1940 after operations in Norway and Holland and how that and other problems would affect the roles envisaged for the FJ in Sealion - that I became aware how thin on the ground details on that role actually are! MacDonald refers to it briefly in his book on Crete; he notes that in the first draft of the Sealion plans, the only role foreseen for the FJ were drops on the high ground north of Dover and at Brighton to secure the flanks of the invasion, but SO many obstacles were evident on the planned landing grounds that finally any airborne role at all for them was ruled out, and the 7th Flieger and 22nd Airlanding divisions were to be relegated to the General Reserve. The problems cited by MacDonald as leading to this were - in no particular order or precednece - 1/ the shortage of Ju52s; over the summer of 1940 Junkers worked hard at repairing as many of the aircraft damaged in Norway and the West as possible...but it's own new-build rate seems to have been quite slow, down around 25-30 a month - and this took a back seat for June and part of July because of the reconstruction/cannibalisation work. Between the losses in Norway and those in Holland, over 2/5s of the Transportverband's Ju52's ha been destroyed. 2/ By the end of the summer, the numbers lost in Norway and Holland had been made good - but very few of these new volunteers had as yet received their jump training! Some of the losses suffered by the FJ had been quite horrendous - the high-casualty blocking action at Donbas in Norway, for instance...where their inserting Ju52s had to fly BELOW the level of Norwegian machinegunners in the mountains around the Donbas drop zone, leaving them like sitting ducks...the losses at Rotterdam...and the very-effectively defended airfields they assaulted in Norway and Holland...together of course with the casualties from cracked-up aircraft attempting to landing on boggy and wreckage-strewn Norwegian strips, flooded Dutch strips, and the unsuitable sands out at Zandvoort on the Dutch coast when they ran out of room anywhere else... 3/ an overall shortage of SILK! After the conquest of France the Germans had to scour France for material suitable for parachutes. 4/ a shortage of gliders; operations in the Spring had used up nearly the whole of the Luftwaffe's stock. 5/ a general unwillingness on the part of OKH to get involved in the same sort of mess the FJ got themselves into in Holland (so Halder records in his diary). They didn't want the whole focus of the Sealion beach landings to change into making fast, costly dashes to relieve FJs marooned far behind enemy lines as had happened in Holland. It was only when the recovering Student (from his Austrian sanatorium, he was recovering from a head wound received in Holland) heard how limited this role was to be in the original plans that he sent Gen Putziger hotfoot to OKH to beg a greater role for the FJ. It was now decided that Eben Emael-style combat engineer landings should be ade to take out the coastal gun batteries north and south of Dover. And a SECOND role was now planned for the FJ; the 7th Flieger were to make TWO mass airborne landings, at Hythe and Hawkinge, to assemble then take Lympne airfield..after which the 22nd Airlanding could be brought in. The FJ would then move to a secondary objective - and secure the line of the Royal Military Canal through Romney Marsh. Once they were relieved - both the Lympne and RMC objectives were very close to the landing beaches - they would go back into the General Reserve for the ground fighting to come.