It may be of interested to those researching infantry battalion deployment and their communications set-up during ww2 to see an actual line communication diagram which I have added to my War memoirs, page 47. It shows a formidable and textbook layout of the 7th/9th Royal Scots when in a defensive position on the west bank of The Rhine on 10th March 1945 at Xanten. The telephone network diagram has lines radiating out in all directions. An analysis shows the forward deployment of three rifle companies. On the left to 'C' Company, 'B' Company in the centre and 'A' Company on the right. They are also linked to each other by line. On the extreme left flank is the Carrier Platoon with a line linked into 'C' Company, but the diagram shows that Carrier Platoon line extends through its Platoon Headquarters to Carrier Section(s) located on the river bank. The three-inch Mortar Platoon is looped into the line going to 'C 'Company. Around Battalion Headquarters are 'command' links to the Battalion Commander (C.O.), Adjutant and I.O., to 155 Infantry Brigade Headquarters and also to the Royal Artillery switchboard which has its own line to its Forward Observation Post. The diagram shows the line to the Battalion Intelligence Officer has an extension to an Intelligence Section Observation Post located in a church. 'D' Company in the rear, in reserve, is linked up by a line which also links to Support Company Headquarters and the Regimental First-Aid Post. The battalion on the left is the 4 KOSB and is connected to main battalion HQ switchboard, whilst the 6 Cameronians on the right is linked through 'A' Company. It is a formidable set-up of communication, providing complete integration. There is even a line from the Battalion switchboard to the Officers Mess . . . luxury indeed! Joe Brown
Thanks very much for posting that scheme. I found a repro copy of the 1945 Bn Sigs pamphlet a few years ago, which was very interesting as regards radio, but gave very little detail on line, not even a total of the line and telephone equipment issued. Some of the lines on the diagram appear to be double, such as back to 155 Bde HQ and out to the Intel Sec OP (?); would you know if that indicates those were duplicated lines at all, which is mentioned in the training manual? Interesting to see line out to the Carriers, I take it they were operating dismounted at the time. Thanks, Gary
Gary, There is a direct line from the the 7/9RS exchange back to HQ 155 Inf Brigade, and this would be laid and supplied by Royal Signals. There is a Royal Artillery network radiating from the RA exchange: One line connection going back to 155 Inf Brigade, another linking across to the 7/9RS exchange, laid and supplied by RA signallers; and there is also a line connection going forward to their RA OP. The Battalion Section Intelligence line from 7/9RS exchange goes to the I.O. office at Battalion HQ but it also extended forward to the Battalion Intelligence Section OP (it is on an 'omnibus' circuit; the exchange answering a call on that line would have to determine which telephone was making the call!) The Carriers are likely to be operating dismounted with the Brens on fixed lines during dusk and darkness. Nice to hear from you. Regards, Joe
Thank you for posting that information, it is very interesting to read. Would there have been a line from the Battalion I.O to the Brigade I.O directly or would communication have been through the Headquarters Exchange? Thank you. I also found your memoirs a fascinating read.
nickgrace1. Thank you for your kind comments. Communication with the Brigade I.O. would be on the line connecting Bn. to Bde and calls made through The Battalion Signals Office Exchange. Joe
Joe. Thank you very much for the reply. I have to admit it is very interesting for me to read as I have been researching into the work of a Battalion Intelligence Officer and feel I am only scratching the surface so your memoirs have certainly helped me learn a great deal more. So thank you. Nick
Nick. Interested to know you are researching the work of a infantry battalion I.O. When I was appointed by my C.O. to do the job, he had in mind that I was a trained Signals Officer, having formerly been a Signals Corporal in the 8RS and usually in charge of the Signals Office at Bn HQ and so was experienced in the organisation and operation of a battalion headquarters. But more important it seemed sensible to keep me at Bn HQ as an immediate reserve to the existing S.O. and to the Adjutant, and therefore gave me the job as I.O. There was no handover but relied on the Intelligence Sergeant and the small section of six men to 'install me' on the basis of what they had done and were currently doing. I quickly realised what was expected and began reading intelligence files about the German Army, their organisation, tactics and weaponry. I quickly established a close liaison with 155 Infantry Brigade I.O. and the IOs in the two other battalions in the Brigade. I would be working closely with the former as he would be briefing me on the enemy at the same time the CO was received his orders from the Brigade Commander. You quickly understood that as Tactical Staff Officer to the C.O. you had to think in the same terms as he did and no longer as a Platoon Commander. You were his aid when he controlled the operational development of his plan in attack. By his side you were required to know every detail of his plan as well as the fire plan of your own support arms and artillery, the role of the tanks in support, and a first-class map case marked with objectives and the various code words which marked the progress of the battle. The test of your competence as an I.O. can be summarised when in an night attack against an overwhelming enemy, the numbers much greater than anticipated and seemingly sited in an impregnable defensive position, Bn Tactical HQ unable to communicate with the Brigade Commander as the wireless was damaged by the depth of flood water in which we were operating, and at a moment when the night attack was at its worst in the dawn of first light, the C.O. turns to his I.O. and says, 'Joe, make your way back to the Bde Comd and tell him the situation as you know it'. He then proceeded to outlined to me three alternatives the Bde Comd may wish to consider. He expected me to know and be able to detail to the Brigadier as competently as he would have done, the precise position confronting each of our three attacking companies and the difficulties they were encountering from devastating 20mm fire from impregnable roof top positions. The three tactical considerations he wanted the Bde Comd to consider, was in the best practice of a junior formation commander faced with an overwhelming enemy, to be the eyes of the senior commander and report alternatives that may be deployed to continue the attack and overcome the enemy resistance. By sheer determination of our platoons we did in fact break through on to the objective taking 600 prisoners with 50 enemy dead on the battlefield. As an I.O. I personally missed the comradery of being an officer in a Rifle Company at the centre of a platoon of 35 men. The compensation was being at the 'centre of things' at the side of the C.O. helping him as he commanded the Battalion. Hope that will add to your insight of the role of an officer who has the responsibility of being a Battalion I.O. Joe Brown
That is just fascinating for me thank you. Would I be right in thinking that there was not any formal training for a Battalion I. O?
Nick, I did attend one course which I found of the greatest value: An Aerial Interpretation Course for Intelligence Officers which was held in Cambridge. Using a stereoscopic viewer you examined pairs of the same aerial picture and were able to study in detail enemy emplacements and even determine the calibre of certain weapons. As the War progress the importance of aerial photography for studying enemy positions and terrain became more general and I tried whenever possible to get as much aerial recce information as possible that could assist the Battalion during an operation. Aerial photographs were excellent for briefing patrols and for preparing troops for an attack, taking the place of sand or earth models which the Intelligence Section would often prepare to brief officers and men taking part in a major operation. Low obliques were first-class and in many cases much better than an actual recce. Whilst on the Cambridge course became aware of the availability of Aerial Photographic Interpretation Maps [all the details gained by Aerial interpretors where plotted on a map, such as '?nebelwerfer posn'] and always tried to have an up-dated copy in the Intelligence Section for whatever area or role we were engaged, either attack or defence. Regards, Joe
Joe. Thank you that is so helpful. I really appreciate all of your help and taking your time in replying to my questions. Thank you. Nick
