How effective do you think airborne forces were in the war?

Discussion in 'Airborne' started by mahross, Aug 11, 2006.

?

Were airborne forces effective?

  1. Very effective

    2 vote(s)
    9.1%
  2. Effective

    5 vote(s)
    22.7%
  3. Comparitively effective

    9 vote(s)
    40.9%
  4. Not at all effective

    6 vote(s)
    27.3%
  1. mahross

    mahross Senior Member

    Just wondering how effective people think airborne forces were in the war.

    I happen to feel that they were to some degree a waste of manpower and resources. This is not to take way from there achievements. I just think that much of what was doen by them could have been achieved in another way.

    Looking at British airborne forces, especially in the 44 - 45 campaign, I feel they were a drain on much needed manpower. You have to remember that the airborne units had a higher proportion of NCO's and took longer to train and then you have the support units both from the army and the RAF. For what they achieved I personally do not think it was worth all the expenditure.

    Also the Soviets, who had pioneered airborne force, got on well without them to a large degree. Despite the fact that they had a large amount of airborne troops they were mostly used in an elite infantry role.

    Opinions?

    Ross
     
  2. plant-pilot

    plant-pilot Senior Member

    Put into perspective they were effective.

    That is that at the time they were the only way to put a reasonably effective large fighting force behind the enemy lines, to sieze and hold vital objectives. Glider forces and parachute forces in combination provided a fast delivery with small amounts of integeral transport, artillery and even light armour.

    These forces could only be effective if used correctly. As was seen on Market Garden, being lightly armed they could only hope to hold out against armour for limited periods. Commanders should have always taken that in consideration and planned short bounds rather than the series of objectives in Market Garden.

    On many other occasions, on objectives of differing sizes and importance, airborne forces proved that when used correctly they could utilize their speed, surprise and aggression and provide exactly what was expected of them. It is a pity that the many successful operations are forgoten, and some prefer to form their opinions on the one very well publicised operation, where the troops gave their all and were let down by over zeallous planning.
     
  3. Pog

    Pog Junior Member

    Hmmmm... Why do I get the feeling this is aimed at me Ross... ;)

    Ok... Lets start by answering a few of Mahross' comments;

    I just think that much of what was doen by them could have been achieved in another way.

    Really? Interesting. To be frank, I think you are very wrong.

    Lets start with looking at a few operations and other ways in which they could have been achieved.

    Eben Emael - The successful neutralisation of the worlds most modern force by a small unit of Fallschirmjager assault engineers. Inserted via glider these troops landed silinetly on the forts roof and after hard fighting took the fort. To be honest I cant see any other way this fort could have been taken without far larger use of resources. It is the opposite of Mahross' 'expensive' comment. 80 odd men, some Stuka support, six gliders and six tow planes to eliminate one of the hardest placed and most strategically important forts in the world. German staff planners estimated that to attack it via conventional means would have required a division with supporting arms. Sorry... But Eben Emael proves the very opposite to the crux of your arguement.

    Operation Biting - 120 British Paratroopers land and steal German radar parts proving to be one of the most important raids in the wars history. How could it have been achieved without airborne troops? It couldnt. The reason for their use was that the area was unsuitable for a traditional style commando raid and only airborne troops possessed the 'surprise' to enable them to steal the radar. Had a raiding force entered via the beach the fighting to breach the coastal defences would have alerted the radar garrison who would have had ample time to destroy the valuable radar system.

    Operation Deadstick - The siezure of Pegasus Bridge. Not too mention the whole role of 6th Airborne on D-Day was fundamental to the success of D-Day.... I will let Mahross tell me how their objectives could have been achieved without them.

    Gran Sasso Raid - Although perhaps more a special forces raid it shows the true potential and versatility in the deployment of airborne troops and again another operation unlikely to have been achieved in any other manner.


    Looking at British airborne forces, especially in the 44 - 45 campaign, I feel they were a drain on much needed manpower. You have to remember that the airborne units had a higher proportion of NCO's and took longer to train and then you have the support units both from the army and the RAF.

    Again, misleading and wrong. In Normandy the 6th Airborne remained in the line till the end of August. Rather than being a drain on manpower it was utilised as elite ground troops used to spearhead several advances up the coast.
    What specialist support did the army provide airborne divisions once on the ground that it did not supply to other infantry formations?
    The RAF had little to do with airborne troops after dropping them and they primarily utilised bombers withdrawn from bombing campaign service and of obselete types.
    As for the percentage of NCO's being vastly higher, I would like to see some actual data on such a sweeping comment.


    For what they achieved I personally do not think it was worth all the expenditure.

    Im sorry Ross, but although I have the upmost respect for your work, this is an ill-thought statement that honestly Im surprised you wrote.

    Not worth it? Stop thinking about Arnhem and think about Pegasus Bridge. No need to say anymore really as that operation alone vindicated the use of airborne troops in the entire war.

    Also the Soviets, who had pioneered airborne force, got on well without them to a large degree. Despite the fact that they had a large amount of airborne troops they were mostly used in an elite infantry role.


    Again, slightly wrong Im afraid. ALL nations deployed their airborne forces as elite ground troops when the need arose and unfortunately this was often in some cases. Especially the Germans and British. The Soviets conducted numerous operations on a variety of scale and success. They were used for mass drops behind German lines, piecemeal insertions to disrupt German communications, partisan support, there were drops to support ground troops advances and Naval landings. To mention one important Soviet drop as an example was the operation conducted in Romania by the 201st and 204th Airborne Brigades to stop Romanian troops from destroying various facilities. So Soviet forces DID conduct a number of operations and ALL nations deployed their airborne troops as ground forces.


    I will stop now and await Mahross' response... He knows I have plenty more ammuniton to throw at him...:D ;) Plus I gotta pack as Im off to Italy tomorrow!

    But one final point. The use of airborne troops showed the possiblities of air insertion techniques and paved the way for the helicopter borne forces and special forces actions that we take for granted as standard in modern warfare.

    They were not just effective.

    They were highly effective given the time period and technology level in which they operated and were a ground breaking revolutionary concept that paved the way for future developments.

    Without them, modern warfare may not have developed along the same path.
     
  4. lancesergeant

    lancesergeant Senior Member

    The primary role of airborned forces was to be dropped behind enemy lines cause maximum disruption. The infantry were then to fight through to relieve them. If a trained unit is deployed in a role which doesn't use it's skills then it is wasted. If an airborne unit is deployed in the way it is meant to be then they will be effective. A weakness for airborne troops is that by nature of their deployment they are going to be lightly armed and carrying limited supplies. At Crete the Germans were chewed up , a lot while on descent. When dropped on the gun emplacements in Belgium they acheived their objective.

    At Arnhem the qualities of the airborne soldier showed themselves holding out as long as they did. Any soldier deployed out of their field of expertise is going to be found lacking.

    Perhaps the reason Russia didn't deploy it's airborne troops might be put down to logistics. There is also the observations of the invasion of Crete losses which not be lost on the commanders of Russian airborne troops.

    In fact in Vjazma Germans and Italians massacred a large soviet force, the commanders instead decided the paratroops were to be spared this with the shortage of capable manpower were to receive extra training to serve the role as reserve combat troops
     
  5. Gibbo

    Gibbo Senior Member

    I went for 'comparatively effective.' They were very useful in some key operations such as D-Day &, from the other side, the 1940 German's offensive. They were, however, very expensive in manpower & other resources. Many airborne privates would have been NCOs in the infantry. In the specific case of the British, I think that the mistake was in having two airborne divisions, the 1st & the 6th, when there weren't enough transport aircraft to use all the Allied airborne forces in a single operation. The 1st wasn't used on D-Day or the 6th at Arnhem. One division would have allowed most of the airborne operations to take place but released a full division of excellent soldiers to be officers & NCOs in infantry units. The exception would be the crossing of the Rhine, in which the 6th participated but the 1st couldn't have due to its casualties at Arnhem, However, I don't think that airborne forces were crucial in that operation.
     
  6. Pog

    Pog Junior Member

    Only allowing one airborne division would have meant that you could not conduct operation if one sustained severe losses. Thus two were the minimum.

    6th Airborne could not be used at Arnhem as they were re-building after Normandy, 1st Airborne could not be used in Varsity due to its losses at Arnhem.

    So if they only had one, losses would have meant that it would be out of action till re-built and re-trained.

    As for planes... There were enough to drop a single division in one go. Not enough to drop THREE divisions in one day as in market-Garden though...
     
  7. mahross

    mahross Senior Member

    I have to admit I am baiting a bit here. Playing devils advocate to get discussion going.

    However, to some degree I do stick by what I have said especially regarding the manpower issues. Britain in 1944 was having to break up division in order to keep its limited strength in Europe going, I just think that a division(s) trained in a specific role that once fighting on the ground had to d to be reinforced by other units is worth it. My opinion is that ok maybe a brigade or even a small division for coup de main operations such as Deadstick. In terms of 6th Airborne in normandy and the advance to the seine the division operated in conjuction with the 51st Highlanders, especially in terms of artillery support, something which the division lacked. In the advance to the seine again the divison had to borrow transport for rapid movement also it had two field regiments and a medium regiment placed under its command in order to provide fire support. While this was often done in some operation for line units, the providing of a medium regiment is rare.

    As to the NCO thing what I meant was that many of the OR's could have been very effective NCO's in line units. Therefore, robbing the line regiments of a very good resource. Sorry was at work when I wrote it so was trying to hide it from the boss;)

    Most of this is brought up because I bought Harclerode's Wings of War. Be interested if people have read this and what they think of it?

    Piers I can take and don't worry when we get onto RAF air power in North Africa i'll get you:D

    Ross
     
  8. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    I notice in the discussion on Operation Varsity no-one has mentioned the 17th US Airborne Division. The "forgotten(?)" Airbourne unit.
     
  9. swd1974

    swd1974 Junior Member

    The Germans had great success with Airborne then for some reason totally stopped using them after 1941.

    Of course DDAy was huge and Market Garden made the Germans fear airborne troops.

    So overall I give it an 'Effective'
     
  10. Cpl Rootes

    Cpl Rootes Senior Member

    I think it depends on the circumstances they were used in. If, like on D-Day they are behind enemy territory with suprise for only a day or so then yes, Very effective, but if on own for a while eg. Arnhem then no, not effective
     
  11. lancesergeant

    lancesergeant Senior Member

    The Germans had great success with Airborne then for some reason totally stopped using them after 1941.

    Of course DDAy was huge and Market Garden made the Germans fear airborne troops.

    So overall I give it an 'Effective'
    Basically they stopped using them after 41 was because of the losses incurred at Crete. After this they would never be deployed in strength in an airborne role.Hitler withheld the losses until after the invasion was successful. However the fallschirmjager had acquited themselves well as their fighting spirit showed. This was supported by their actions at Monte Cassino. They were one German elite that was respected.
     
  12. Pog

    Pog Junior Member

    Basically they stopped using them after 41 was because of the losses incurred at Crete.

    No not really.

    Operation Merkur sustained casualty rates in line with Student's pre-op estimates. What really crippled the airborne role of the Germans was faulty airborne doctrine and huge losses to the transport fleets, in each operation that simply could not be sustained, and adversely effected other spheres of the war.

    In fact the Fallschirmjager were re-built and ready to take part in the attack on Malta, operation Herkukes, the following year. Another operation that would have had as bloody a bill as Crete. It was not till the rapid expansion of the Fallschirmjager from 1943 that standards began to slip and jump training began to falter. A further consideration to the point of lack of German operations on a large/strategic scale is that despite the seeming lack of interest they continued to develop new glider types, in order to move away from the faulty cooncept of Air-landed troops and maintained a huge stock of parachutes ready for use.

    The Germans did launch a number of operations after Crete, though these maybe better termed 'tactical' operations as none really utilised much over a regiments worth of troops. On the whole these more specialist operations seem to have suited the Germans better and generally succeeded with the notable exceptions of Drvar and operation Strosser in the Ardennes. Indeed the later German ops seem more on a par with modern 'special forces' use in some cases.

    Its true that they remained a respected and feared adversary throughout the war but the high standards of the 7th Flieger Division were not to be repeated in later Divisions. Von Der Heydte remarked that the men selected for Operation Strosser in 1945 seemed to be 'the misfits and trouble-makers from various units that their officers wanted to get rid of'. With the expansion aof the Fallschirmjager in the later war period, and the general degredation of the German Armed Forces, it is not surprising the Fallschirmjager suffered to. Although their zeal remained high, late war units were not of the same quality as the early war formations.

    Market Garden made the Germans fear airborne troops.


    Not sure this is true really. The Germans had a very good anti-airborne system in place and at Arnhem several of the SS units were those that had undergone training in an anti-airborne role. They certainly seemed to have learnt some lessons from Normandy, but it could be argued that Normandy's misdrops helped to negate an effective German response to the Allied airborne landings.

    Piers I can take and don't worry when we get onto RAF air power in North Africa i'll get you

    I aint arguing about that with you... you will shoot me down in flames! ;)
     
  13. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Well they look pretty damned effective to me.
    View attachment 316
    "Members of 12th Parachute Battalion, 5th Parachute Brigade, 6th Airborne Division, enjoy a cup of tea after fighting their way back to their own lines after three days behind enemy lines, 10 June 1944."
    View attachment 317
    "A 6-pdr anti-tank gun of No. 26 Anti-Tank Platoon, 1st Border Regiment, 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, 20 September 1944. The gun was at this moment engaging a German PzKpfw B2 (f) tank, and successfully knocked it out."
    (From the excellent: http://www.iwmcollections.org.uk/qryPhotoImg.asp)

    Combine that with VvV's Staunch, convincing and interesting defence of their case and I'm sold on 'effective', the only reason I can't vote 'very effective' in a ww2 context is purely down to what I see as their mishandling and misuse in the face of necessity, as suffered by so many new military weapons or concepts. If it were purely Witzig's exploits being discussed then I'd have no hesitation in the higher praise. Top bloke who continued to serve in the Bundeswehr until (if I recall) the 1970's.

    Cheers,
    Adam.
     
  14. Herroberst

    Herroberst Senior Member

    At first I thought you're kidding right?

    Airborne Forces are the most effective given the correct insertion and support of those forces.
     
  15. Herroberst

    Herroberst Senior Member

    Hmmmm... Why do I get the feeling this is aimed at me Ross... ;)

    Ok... Lets start by answering a few of Mahross' comments;



    Really? Interesting. To be frank, I think you are very wrong.

    Lets start with looking at a few operations and other ways in which they could have been achieved.

    Eben Emael - The successful neutralisation of the worlds most modern force by a small unit of Fallschirmjager assault engineers. Inserted via glider these troops landed silinetly on the forts roof and after hard fighting took the fort. To be honest I cant see any other way this fort could have been taken without far larger use of resources. It is the opposite of Mahross' 'expensive' comment. 80 odd men, some Stuka support, six gliders and six tow planes to eliminate one of the hardest placed and most strategically important forts in the world. German staff planners estimated that to attack it via conventional means would have required a division with supporting arms. Sorry... But Eben Emael proves the very opposite to the crux of your arguement.

    Operation Biting - 120 British Paratroopers land and steal German radar parts proving to be one of the most important raids in the wars history. How could it have been achieved without airborne troops? It couldnt. The reason for their use was that the area was unsuitable for a traditional style commando raid and only airborne troops possessed the 'surprise' to enable them to steal the radar. Had a raiding force entered via the beach the fighting to breach the coastal defences would have alerted the radar garrison who would have had ample time to destroy the valuable radar system.

    Operation Deadstick - The siezure of Pegasus Bridge. Not too mention the whole role of 6th Airborne on D-Day was fundamental to the success of D-Day.... I will let Mahross tell me how their objectives could have been achieved without them.

    Gran Sasso Raid - Although perhaps more a special forces raid it shows the true potential and versatility in the deployment of airborne troops and again another operation unlikely to have been achieved in any other manner.




    Again, misleading and wrong. In Normandy the 6th Airborne remained in the line till the end of August. Rather than being a drain on manpower it was utilised as elite ground troops used to spearhead several advances up the coast.
    What specialist support did the army provide airborne divisions once on the ground that it did not supply to other infantry formations?
    The RAF had little to do with airborne troops after dropping them and they primarily utilised bombers withdrawn from bombing campaign service and of obselete types.
    As for the percentage of NCO's being vastly higher, I would like to see some actual data on such a sweeping comment.




    Im sorry Ross, but although I have the upmost respect for your work, this is an ill-thought statement that honestly Im surprised you wrote.

    Not worth it? Stop thinking about Arnhem and think about Pegasus Bridge. No need to say anymore really as that operation alone vindicated the use of airborne troops in the entire war.



    Again, slightly wrong Im afraid. ALL nations deployed their airborne forces as elite ground troops when the need arose and unfortunately this was often in some cases. Especially the Germans and British. The Soviets conducted numerous operations on a variety of scale and success. They were used for mass drops behind German lines, piecemeal insertions to disrupt German communications, partisan support, there were drops to support ground troops advances and Naval landings. To mention one important Soviet drop as an example was the operation conducted in Romania by the 201st and 204th Airborne Brigades to stop Romanian troops from destroying various facilities. So Soviet forces DID conduct a number of operations and ALL nations deployed their airborne troops as ground forces.


    I will stop now and await Mahross' response... He knows I have plenty more ammuniton to throw at him...:D ;) Plus I gotta pack as Im off to Italy tomorrow!

    But one final point. The use of airborne troops showed the possiblities of air insertion techniques and paved the way for the helicopter borne forces and special forces actions that we take for granted as standard in modern warfare.

    They were not just effective.

    They were highly effective given the time period and technology level in which they operated and were a ground breaking revolutionary concept that paved the way for future developments.

    Without them, modern warfare may not have developed along the same path.

    Going to Italy....Some guys have all the luck.

    Ross, got to agree with Vic on this one and stand by my statement.
     
  16. sapper

    sapper WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    When we got to Pegasus we had get alternative ways across, quickly! If the bridge had failed? Then the forces would be split and the Airborne could not be supplied by sea.
    If I recall correctly. Our CRE The Colonel RE, Tiger Uquart, forbid armour to use Pegasus bridge, just in case it fell into the water.

    The enemy had a field day with the gliders, they were spread out on a rise in the ground, they shelled the gliders so they were not much good after that.

    6th Airborne did a wonderful job in taking the bridge, but then they did not take part in any other assaults, or actions that I am aware of. When the enemy made a thrust towards them.

    We had to get the tanks across to put a stop to that advance. That was achieved largely due to the quick thinking of our platoon officer: the late Captain Edwards RE.
    So Airborne? It does seem a great deal of work and planning for one operation only. While we were always short of re-inforcements
    Sapper
     
  17. Pog

    Pog Junior Member

    6th Airborne remained in action in Normandy till withdrawn on the 27th August.

    It does seem a great deal of work and planning for one operation only.

    Well they took part in Operation Paddle, the advance to the Seine it also liberated 400 square miles of enemy occupied territory during Operation Paddle. Before that they remained in the frontline, from 14th June till 16th August they were on 'static defense' - this was a policy of aggresive patrols, seeking out the enemy and inflicting damage on every opportunity.

    but then they did not take part in any other assaults, or actions that I am aware of.

    As shown above they most certainly did. In the first eight days in Normandy, 6th Airborne was reduced to under six thousand men.

    Battle of Breville 12th June and the six days before were ones of non-stop combat for the division.

    By the 14th July the 6th Airborne had been notified of 55 decorations for gallantry. The Division also took heavy casulaties in the Bois de Bavent.



    After three months continuous fighting in Normandy, the 6th Airborne suffered 4,452 casualties.

    To be frank, Sapper, I find your response somewhat dismissive of the actions and scarifice of 6th Airborne, who bore a huge brunt of the fighting in Normandy... Slightly offensive to the 821 airborne soldier killed in the Normandy campaign.
     
  18. lancesergeant

    lancesergeant Senior Member

    No not really.

    Operation Merkur sustained casualty rates in line with Student's pre-op estimates. What really crippled the airborne role of the Germans was faulty airborne doctrine and huge losses to the transport fleets, in each operation that simply could not be sustained, and adversely effected other spheres of the war.

    In fact the Fallschirmjager were re-built and ready to take part in the attack on Malta, operation Herkukes, the following year. Another operation that would have had as bloody a bill as Crete. It was not till the rapid expansion of the Fallschirmjager from 1943 that standards began to slip and jump training began to falter. A further consideration to the point of lack of German operations on a large/strategic scale is that despite the seeming lack of interest they continued to develop new glider types, in order to move away from the faulty cooncept of Air-landed troops and maintained a huge stock of parachutes ready for use.

    The Germans did launch a number of operations after Crete, though these maybe better termed 'tactical' operations as none really utilised much over a regiments worth of troops. On the whole these more specialist operations seem to have suited the Germans better and generally succeeded with the notable exceptions of Drvar and operation Strosser in the Ardennes. Indeed the later German ops seem more on a par with modern 'special forces' use in some cases.

    Its true that they remained a respected and feared adversary throughout the war but the high standards of the 7th Flieger Division were not to be repeated in later Divisions. Von Der Heydte remarked that the men selected for Operation Strosser in 1945 seemed to be 'the misfits and trouble-makers from various units that their officers wanted to get rid of'. With the expansion aof the Fallschirmjager in the later war period, and the general degredation of the German Armed Forces, it is not surprising the Fallschirmjager suffered to. Although their zeal remained high, late war units were not of the same quality as the early war formations.



    Not sure this is true really. The Germans had a very good anti-airborne system in place and at Arnhem several of the SS units were those that had undergone training in an anti-airborne role. They certainly seemed to have learnt some lessons from Normandy, but it could be argued that Normandy's misdrops helped to negate an effective German response to the Allied airborne landings.



    I aint arguing about that with you... you will shoot me down in flames! ;)
    Thanks for that Victor, I appreciate it for bringing this info to my attention - I am here to learn. Thanks again.
     
  19. Pog

    Pog Junior Member

    Of course we have mainly concentrated on the German/British/American airborne forces.

    The Germans benefitted from an excellent pre-war training programme and a large base of skilled glider pilots. The Western Allies benefitted from the material wealth needed to fund such expensive military formations.

    But we havent really touched on the subject of other nations airborne forces.

    The Russian were really the first to develop the strategic idea of airborne troops and should really be seen as the birth place of airborne forces. By 1941 the Soviets had five divisional sized corps of airborne troops. Their main hinderance, as with many nations, was the lack of a suitable aircraft to drop the men. Most Soviet forces climbed onto the planes wing and then jumped en-masse. The Japanese also conducted combat jumps with their airborne troops in the Dutch East Indies, but their success has to be weighed against the limited opposition that they faced. The Italian airborne forces of 'Folgore' and 'Nembo' never made actual combat jumps, though they were prepared for drops onto Malta. 'Folgore' did however have a good reputation for ability in combat and many troops served alongside Fallschirmjager formations who were very generous with their praise for their Italian counterparts.

    Lets also not forget that airborne operations took place in the Far East, with the 503rd PIR undertaking probably the most perilous combat jump of the war onto Corregidor in 1945. The DZ was small, covered with trees and ruins and bordered by 550ft cliffs on one side dropping into Manilla Bay. The DZ also had 25mph winds but the jump was still a success.

    Perhaps the thing that hindered operations most was the aircraft that were available and their lack of suitability for the task. It was not until the Commando made its appearance at the wars end that a true delivery aircraft was seen, although the JU-52 and the C-47 performed extremely well despite their faults.
     
  20. Kyt

    Kyt Very Senior Member

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