Originally posted by angie999@Sep 8 2005, 03:55 AM Frankly, if you want to use this forum to have a discussion on national lines about what was wrong with the Brits, then the discussion between you and me is concluded. Angie, Its ironic you would say that because if you scroll back through the posts you will find that this entire tangent was started by some denigrating comments about Bradley and Patton as well as particularly laughing or mocking at Patton for running out of fuel, and all this was in the context of exalting Monty. I personally thought those comments showed an extreme bias myself and was anything but objective discourse. I sense that if my posts don't follow the British "party line" here and give "proper" homage to Montgomery as well as speak of Patton as a pariah, then it invokes a large degree of intolerance. If this is the case, no wonder opinions of Monty and Patton are so homogenized here. If you are wrong about something, you can be certain you will never know it to correct it. I try to give the “reasons” for what I believe things that the actors said and why they I think they had said them. I do this because it greatly reduces rhetoric of biases, and I fail to believe that all ideas about WWII are settled and indisputable to the “approved” historians. I find that intellectual discourse and often more valuable than merely one historians opinion. You can quote all kinds of historians but in the end it all comes down to each one’s opinions of the relevant, sparse facts that are for the most part, equally available to us all. There have been a lot of accusations of “incorrect facts” being quoted even though there are sources of this same information quoted in contrast from all sides of the issue. Yet one view is arbitrarily decreed as the “correct” facts and the other is likewise decreed as “incorrect” facts. In the absence of true absolutes, critical thinking is important. If critical thinking is discouraged, so then I am probably going to be “persona non gratis” in any discussion here because I have never been one to praise the “emperors new clothes” just because it is popular opinion. As long as you accuse me of national biases, I feel it’s fair to say to those that believe themselves to be free from such tendencies, that I see most UK posters have an intense appreciation of all thing British and a hard to mask disdain for all things American, though in rare and gratuitous comments they make sure to state otherwise. Being exposed to a lot of Americans that are fans of WWII history here in the states, I am sure such nationalistic tendencies are mutual but I rarely hear someone speak of the British as a “second class fighter”. There is a huge chip on the shoulder from many American authors including the actors themselves and especially against Hollywood. Americans don’t use Hollywood as source of history. But the biases against the American soldiers are very tangible; though I am sure they are subconscious to those posting them. Oh, sure occasionally a bone is tossed to the American soldier or staff for a good show, but it is as though Britain won the war and America was like an annoying kid brother “tagging along”, getting in the way.
I've never understood this idea whereby you apparently have to pick one out of Eisenhower, Montgomery & Patton as being a great commander & then adopt a very low opinion of the other two. As far as I'm concerned all 3 were excellent generals. The great advantage of the Allies was that Churchill & Roosevelt, advised by Brooke & Marshall, had the skill to appoint each to his appropriate level of command. Monty & Patton were great battlefield commanders but the enormous egos that both possessed meant that either would have been a catastrophe in Ike's job. He probably wasn't a great general in the traditional sense but who else could have carried out his job, which was to a large extent diplomatic & political? Perhaps Marshall, but he was needed in Washington or possibly Alexander, but the relative size of forces in NW Europe meant that the CinC had to be American. I guess that if Ike had stepped on a mine, then Bradley would have had to have taken his job. I think that he'd have done a competent job as he always did. I think that all these men were excellent generals & that they commanded good armies. They defeated the German army, which is frequently held up as being a military force of unparalleled skill. Some arguments (not on this website) sometimes read to me as if the Allies were somehow unfair in using their massive advantage in artillery & airpower. Why? Is there some sort of fair play rule in warfare that you shouldn't use all your firepower if you have an overwhelming advantage? I've not noticed the fans of the German army thinking that this was unfair in 1939-42 when they had the greater firepower & air superiority. The Allies attacked when they had the advantage & they had the advantage as a result of a deliberate strategy rather than luck. Why on earth should the Allies take higher casualties than they needed to when they could win with lower (but still high) losses thanks to their greater firepower? One final point is that on these arguments, I find it impossible to differentiate between the armies of the USA & the British Commonwealth.
Historians write (and sometimes rewrite) history with the benefit of hindsight, and their opinions (What if, if, if only) to me are to be taken with a grain of salt, whilst at the same time respecting their right to have one. Counterfactuals are easy. They have the benefit not only of hindsight but also being made outside the “fog of war”, as well as being without the risk of being wrong.
To jimbotosome; Sorry that I was a bit abrupt in my previous post. I just did not take to the prospect of having to go and re-read big chunks of various sources, such as Bradley, in order to make sure what I had said was correct. I have not re-read parts of A Soldier's Story and I would make the following observations: 1. I think that Bradley was a bit piqued at not being named ground force commander for Overlord, but he does not challenge Montgomery's planning and nowhere is it suggested that Montgomery's appointment was a "sop" to anyone. Bradley does though express the general American view that if the ground force commander was to be British, they would have preferred Alexander. Bradley says that enlarging the COSSAC plan was Eisenhower's idea and suggests he won Montgomery over to his view. Angie's view: Neither Eisenhower nor Bradley had the experience to plan Overlord in detail, whereas Montgomery did and he was mor ethan ready to step up to Army Group commander by the end of 1943. Montgomery had been shown the COSSAC plan by Churchill in North Africa and had independently concluded that a three division landing was too weak to succeed. Alexander was generaly regarded as a "good chap", but many in the higher reaches of the British army, including Brooke, had serious misgivings about his abilities and neither in Burma, the Western Desert, nor Italy, did he really stamp his personality on the campaigns he led. 2. You maintain that Antwerp was not taken on 4 September and that the port was not taken intact. Bradley specifically does say that it was taken on 4 September. Angie's view: you are confusing the taking of Antwerp with the inability to use it a supply port until the Scheldt estuary was cleared. The delay in opening Antwerp to shipping and the lost chance to trap the remains of 15th Army in the Beveland peninsula remain controversial and I do tend to think there was a missed chance on 4 September due to the failure of British 11th Armoured Division to take the Albert Canal bridges before the German front hardened. As I said. 3. Bradley clearly say Antwerp as a the key to sustaining operations into Germany. Angie's view: But this was not the reason for the crisis in early September, which was caused by the rate of advance and over-extended lines of supply. Bradley clearly did not support Market-Garden and disliked the way Montgomery had won Eisenhower over to it. However, this is not the reason for Patton's failure to close up to the Rhine in September. His 3rd Army simply ran out of fuel at precisely the same moment that the British army had to pause. Then, when he ran into the Metz defences he got bogged down. Finally, we have discussed some of these points before and here are some threads where I have set out my views: http://www.ww2talk.com/index.php?showtopic=2118&st=0 http://www.ww2talk.com/index.php?showtopic=1189 http://www.ww2talk.com/index.php?showtopic=1002
Thanks for clarifying Angie. Originally posted by angie999+Sep 11 2005, 06:54 AM-->(angie999 @ Sep 11 2005, 06:54 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'>1. I think that Bradley was a bit piqued at not being named ground force commander for Overlord, but he does not challenge Montgomery's planning and nowhere is it suggested that Montgomery's appointment was a "sop" to anyone. [/b] I do agree that Bradley was upset but not because he was not ground commander, but because there was a “ground commander” rather than Ike who was always in radio range just as Monty was. He viewed it as an additional bureaucratic level since Ike was sufficient and thought this could represent a severe conflict of interest and compromise his troops. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 11 2005, 06:54 AM Angie's view: Neither Eisenhower nor Bradley had the experience to plan Overlord in detail, whereas Montgomery did and he was mor ethan ready to step up to Army Group commander by the end of 1943. Montgomery had been shown the COSSAC plan by Churchill in North Africa and had independently concluded that a three division landing was too weak to succeed. Monty did have more experience in WWII, but not all of Monty’s experiences were good. Patton had the most experience in amphibious assaults under fire and the most command experience from WWI. But, the differences are marginal. Of course it was best to coordinate the assault. Nothing wrong with using Monty’s plan, Monty was absolutely right. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 11 2005, 06:54 AM Angie's view: you are confusing the taking of Antwerp with the inability to use it a supply port until the Scheldt estuary was cleared. The delay in opening Antwerp to shipping and the lost chance to trap the remains of 15th Army in the Beveland peninsula remain controversial and I do tend to think there was a missed chance on 4 September due to the failure of British 11th Armoured Division to take the Albert Canal bridges before the German front hardened. As I said. Unless the seaways are open a port is completely useless. So saying Antwerp was taken when the seaways were closed, is merely a point of academics. The Germans were not able to use it either because their supply lines were cut off from it. <!--QuoteBegin-angie999@Sep 11 2005, 06:54 AM Angie's view: But this was not the reason for the crisis in early September, which was caused by the rate of advance and over-extended lines of supply. Bradley clearly did not support Market-Garden and disliked the way Montgomery had won Eisenhower over to it. However, this is not the reason for Patton's failure to close up to the Rhine in September. His 3rd Army simply ran out of fuel at precisely the same moment that the British army had to pause. Then, when he ran into the Metz defences he got bogged down. I don’t quite understand your point here. You appear to contradict yourself. On one hand you say Patton had overrun his supply because he was too far away (though close to Antwerp). On the other hand you say that situations (that were outside of Patton’s control) delayed the taking of Antwerp. You are right to say that Bradley did not agree with Market Garden. There were tactical failures in Market Garden especially in ignoring intelligence. But that was not the reason Bradley was against it. He believed it was a waste of the inertia the US and Brits had in driving toward France where Germany never got a chance to dig and regroup. For that he thought, and I agree, Market Garden was a strategic mistake. Sure, there was a lot to gain, but there was also a lot to lose. It's not the two weeks of time it took to execute Market Garden that was the problem but the use of fuel, ammo and supplies needed to support the attack. It's strange to me that knowing the Metz being a redoubt with 14 fortresses mostly underground was viewed as a failure to Patton. In September, Patton routed the Germans who left the Metz fleeing in all directions. The fortresses were completely empty. The Germans did not have the ability to hold it. Then it happened. Patton ran out of fuel and ammo. Here he was in the middle of taking the most difficult defense to pierce, having annihilated it he had to sit there helpless watching the Germans reorganize and fill the forts again. He got a little fuel in October but it was too late. He was now stuck in a war of attrition. So let me reemphasize exactly what I said before. If Antwerp was open for business in Sept (including the seaways) or if Patton had gotten the extra fuel and ammo taken in the Market Garden assault, the Metz would have been held when the Germans were first routed and driven out of it in September and Patton could have driven to the Saar and gotten to the Siegfried line before the Germans could have regrouped to capture it. This would have prevented the Ardennes offensive that cost so many lives. The Germans could not have attacked a weak spot through the woods of the Ardennes because they were only able to organize the offensive because of December low level overcast weather that hid them from air reconnaissance and potentially disastrous bombing in assembly areas. The fact that the Germans were given a chance to regroup and reoccupy the Metz caused tremendous losses there as well as the Ardennes which confirms Patton’s philosophy that you never let up on a fleeing and routed enemy. You continue to attack while there is still something to attack left. When fleeing the enemy is at his weakest. So knowing this why would anyone “blame” Patton for the terrible situation at the Metz? No general assumes his supplies are going to be rerouted. Patton attack toward the Metz on August 30, before Market Garden was considered. It is as people here believe if he knew the fuel and ammo were not going to be there. I just don’t get it.
Considering the title of this topic, we are really threadjacking, but to continue: Originally posted by jimbotosome+Sep 11 2005, 07:13 PM-->(jimbotosome @ Sep 11 2005, 07:13 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'> I do agree that Bradley was upset but not because he was not ground commander, but because there was a “ground commander” rather than Ike who was always in radio range just as Monty was. He viewed it as an additional bureaucratic level since Ike was sufficient and thought this could represent a severe conflict of interest and compromise his troops. [/b] I don't quite read it this way. However, I think that Eisenhower would have been a disaster if he had tried to manage Overlord on the ground. I think he was a good theatre commander, but he never managed a battlefield in his life and was totally lacking in combat experience. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 11 2005, 07:13 PM Patton had the most experience in amphibious assaults under fire and the most command experience from WWI. I am not saying he would have done a bad job, but he was never going to be elevated to in effect Army Group commander. He was under a cloud and was lucky to get a chance with 3rd Army. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 11 2005, 07:13 PM Unless the seaways are open a port is completely useless. So saying Antwerp was taken when the seaways were closed, is merely a point of academics. The Germans were not able to use it either because their supply lines were cut off from it. I agree and I think it should have had more priority. But: 1. Considering the way the Germans defended Cherbourg and le Havre and held out in other ports like Brest, St Nazaire, Dunkirk, etc, the Scheldt was never going to be opened without a fight, which was bound to take time. 2. By the time the British got to Antwerp on 4 September, the same date that the fuel crisis hit the US 3rd Army, the supply crisis had hit. There was bound to be an administrative pause in September at a time when there was no realistic chance of Antwerp being open early enough to solve it. The argument is not, to my mind, whether the port could have been open in September, but whether the operation to do so should have had priority over Market-Garden. <!--QuoteBegin-jimbotosome@Sep 11 2005, 07:13 PM It's strange to me that knowing the Metz being a redoubt with 14 fortresses mostly underground was viewed as a failure to Patton. In September, Patton routed the Germans who left the Metz fleeing in all directions. The fortresses were completely empty. The Germans did not have the ability to hold it. Then it happened. Patton ran out of fuel and ammo. Here he was in the middle of taking the most difficult defense to pierce, having annihilated it he had to sit there helpless watching the Germans reorganize and fill the forts again. He got a little fuel in October but it was too late. He was now stuck in a war of attrition. So let me reemphasize exactly what I said before. If Antwerp was open for business in Sept (including the seaways) or if Patton had gotten the extra fuel and ammo taken in the Market Garden assault, the Metz would have been held when the Germans were first routed and driven out of it in September and Patton could have driven to the Saar and gotten to the Siegfried line before the Germans could have regrouped to capture it. This would have prevented the Ardennes offensive that cost so many lives. The Germans could not have attacked a weak spot through the woods of the Ardennes because they were only able to organize the offensive because of December low level overcast weather that hid them from air reconnaissance and potentially disastrous bombing in assembly areas. The fact that the Germans were given a chance to regroup and reoccupy the Metz caused tremendous losses there as well as the Ardennes which confirms Patton’s philosophy that you never let up on a fleeing and routed enemy. You continue to attack while there is still something to attack left. When fleeing the enemy is at his weakest. So knowing this why would anyone “blame” Patton for the terrible situation at the Metz? No general assumes his supplies are going to be rerouted. Patton attack toward the Metz on August 30, before Market Garden was considered. It is as people here believe if he knew the fuel and ammo were not going to be there. I just don’t get it. [post=38887]Quoted post[/post] First, I don't think you can look too hard for cause and effect in what happened in September and October and the Ardennes. In fact, as General Student said afterwards, in early September it was itself the most open part of the German line, but the allies consistently failed to recognise it as an area suitable for offensive operations, which is why it was so weakly defended. I maintain that even with greater priority, Antwerp could not have been open early enough to permit its use in September and possibly even early October, because the defeat of the German forces on both sides of the Westerschelde "fortress" was never going to be easy or quick. It could certainly not have been done "on the bounce" in early September, although the remnants of the German 15th Army could have been trapped there and defeated in detail. As for Patton's supply, Bradley's headquarters could have allocated him a greater percentage of total American supply, but elected to give priority to 1st Army. I still think he qould have had to fight a set piece at Metz and I just do not think that he handled this battle well. To me, his talent was in exploitation, not breakthrough. And even if he had made a breakthough in September, his line of advance lacked strategic direction and I think if he had turned north he would have struggle to get through the Hunsruck and Eiffel. But I will stop here, because this is going down the "what if" road which is totally fruitless.
Originally posted by angie999+Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM-->(angie999 @ Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'>I don't quite read it this way. However, I think that Eisenhower would have been a disaster if he had tried to manage Overlord on the ground. I think he was a good theatre commander, but he never managed a battlefield in his life and was totally lacking in combat experience. [/b] What exactly did Monty do that Ike couldn’t have? Anything major had to go through Ike anyway. Tactically, all you need is coordination but great military strategy in real time. Monty wasn’t on the US front so he was not calling field tactics anyway. As a ground commander, he was merely a title without any practical role. If Monty had really been in charge he could have ordered Patton to close up the Falaise gap when he saw that he couldn’t. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM I am not saying he would have done a bad job, but he was never going to be elevated to in effect Army Group commander. He was under a cloud and was lucky to get a chance with 3rd Army. Agreed. Patton’s mouth got him in trouble. Monty’s rebellions should have gotten him in trouble too but as I said the British didn’t have the luxury of disciplining their generals or thought they didn’t. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM 1. Considering the way the Germans defended Cherbourg and le Havre and held out in other ports like Brest, St Nazaire, Dunkirk, etc, the Scheldt was never going to be opened without a fight, which was bound to take time. No disagreement here. The Canadians could not have taken it by themselves in the timeframe needed. Monty said it was a mistake of his in the planning of Market Garden to think that they could. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM 2. By the time the British got to Antwerp on 4 September, the same date that the fuel crisis hit the US 3rd Army, the supply crisis had hit. There was bound to be an administrative pause in September at a time when there was no realistic chance of Antwerp being open early enough to solve it. Bradley claimed in his notes there wouldn’t have been. The delay did several things. 1) it committed Ike’s strategic reserve, the airborne divisions dropped into Antwerp could have helped take it quickly. 2) It allowed the Germans additional time to reinforce Antwerp. But, it was not the lack of supplies from Antwerp alone, that caused the problem but the critical timing of the redirecting of supplies to Market Garden. Patton was down to 7 rounds a day and enough fuel to run only 1/3rd of his armor, after he defeated the Metz defenses the first time. That’s not quite enough to hold it, so that means he had to give it back to the Germans to reoccupy and reinforce. Not sure how you concluded the Metz as Patton’s fault. As far as I know, the only major tactical mistake by Patton was Hammelburg in which he said in his book was a mistake which he deeply regretted. His motivation was to free his son-in-law. He felt solely responsible for the men that died on that mission, especially since he would free the camp only two weeks later. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM As for Patton's supply, Bradley's headquarters could have allocated him a greater percentage of total American supply, but elected to give priority to 1st Army. 1st Army was assigned to take Mons for the Market Garden operation, that is why they got most of the American supplies. Airborne assaults consume a lot of fuel, aircraft are very “thirsty” machines, considering the fact that you are sending in tank brigades wide open in support, that’s a massive about of fuel used. <!--QuoteBegin-angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM I still think he qould have had to fight a set piece at Metz and I just do not think that he handled this battle well. To me, his talent was in exploitation, not breakthrough. And even if he had made a breakthough in September, his line of advance lacked strategic direction and I think if he had turned north he would have struggle to get through the Hunsruck and Eiffel. Well, I guess we will never know. I am simply of the opinion that Market Garden was where the Allies got greedy. I believe that the desire to win quickly clouded their judgment. The cost of it in terms of men, supplies and progress was more than what was tallied by the tactical failure of the operation itself.
Originally posted by jimbotosome+Sep 12 2005, 05:31 PM-->(jimbotosome @ Sep 12 2005, 05:31 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'>Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM I don't quite read it this way. However, I think that Eisenhower would have been a disaster if he had tried to manage Overlord on the ground. I think he was a good theatre commander, but he never managed a battlefield in his life and was totally lacking in combat experience. What exactly did Monty do that Ike couldn’t have? Anything major had to go through Ike anyway. Tactically, all you need is coordination but great military strategy in real time. Monty wasn’t on the US front so he was not calling field tactics anyway. As a ground commander, he was merely a title without any practical role. If Monty had really been in charge he could have ordered Patton to close up the Falaise gap when he saw that he couldn’t.[/b] You are arguing that there was no need to plan the Overlord ground battle, or play the role of army group commander in Normandy, something that Eisenhower and his staff were quite unsuited for. It needed an experienced battlefield commander. Frankly, if Eisenhower ever heard a shot fired in anger, then it was just a distant rumble. I can imagine Montgomery getting Eisenhower's rubber stamp on things, perhaps receiving the odd suggestion, not much more. Don't forget that Eisenhower also had responsibility for air and sea and could not confine himself to the ground battle. The one big decision he made was to launch the invasion on 6 June, in spite of weather concerns. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 12 2005, 05:31 PM Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM I am not saying he would have done a bad job, but he was never going to be elevated to in effect Army Group commander. He was under a cloud and was lucky to get a chance with 3rd Army. Agreed. Patton’s mouth got him in trouble. Monty’s rebellions should have gotten him in trouble too but as I said the British didn’t have the luxury of disciplining their generals or thought they didn’t. But the British, Tedder aside, were not mad with Montgomery. Brooke in particular profoundly disagreed with Eisenhower's strategy and for that matter so do I. On tactics, an army group commander does not try to direct the tactics of subordinate formations. He functions at the operational level and should not micro-manage. Bradley had no complaints in A Soldier's Story about Montgomery's management style in Normandy. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 12 2005, 05:31 PM Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM 2. By the time the British got to Antwerp on 4 September, the same date that the fuel crisis hit the US 3rd Army, the supply crisis had hit. There was bound to be an administrative pause in September at a time when there was no realistic chance of Antwerp being open early enough to solve it. Bradley claimed in his notes there wouldn’t have been. The delay did several things. 1) it committed Ike’s strategic reserve, the airborne divisions dropped into Antwerp could have helped take it quickly. 2) It allowed the Germans additional time to reinforce Antwerp. But, it was not the lack of supplies from Antwerp alone, that caused the problem but the critical timing of the redirecting of supplies to Market Garden. Patton was down to 7 rounds a day and enough fuel to run only 1/3rd of his armor, after he defeated the Metz defenses the first time. That’s not quite enough to hold it, so that means he had to give it back to the Germans to reoccupy and reinforce. Not sure how you concluded the Metz as Patton’s fault. As far as I know, the only major tactical mistake by Patton was Hammelburg in which he said in his book was a mistake which he deeply regretted. His motivation was to free his son-in-law. He felt solely responsible for the men that died on that mission, especially since he would free the camp only two weeks later. I think Bradley was wrong. Patton's orders only envisaged the Metz operation as a secondary objective, but he chose to keep going anyway, Bradley never tried to stop him and Eisenhower ducked the issue. By the way, why would you drop the Airborne into Antwerp when the city and the docks were taken undamaged without a fight on 4 September? And the Germans did not reinforce South Beveland after that - the fortress troops were already there and the remanants of 15th Army actually pulled out before the peninsula was sealed at the base. Finally, there was a transport crisis however you look at it, not aided by one feature of US organisation - and one over which SHAEF had, incredibly, no control - the supply organisation, COMZ, which was a corrupt and disorganised shambles, who did not ask the troops what they wanted, they told them what they were going to get. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 12 2005, 05:31 PM <!--QuoteBegin-angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM As for Patton's supply, Bradley's headquarters could have allocated him a greater percentage of total American supply, but elected to give priority to 1st Army. 1st Army was assigned to take Mons for the Market Garden operation, that is why they got most of the American supplies. Airborne assaults consume a lot of fuel, aircraft are very “thirsty” machines, considering the fact that you are sending in tank brigades wide open in support, that’s a massive about of fuel used. At best, the total air transport fleet could deliver 1,000 tons a day, rising to 2,000 tons over a shorter "push". That is the equivalent of three and, at a push, six truck companies, nowhere near enough to cover any shortages. The air transport did not consume any fuel that could have gone to ground fources because: a. They used different fuel. b. They were UK based and their fuel was not a subtraction from that available in France and Belgium. By the way, I am happy to go on with this, but if so I intend to split this off into a separate topic, as it now should be.
Originally posted by angie999+Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM-->(angie999 @ Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM)</div><div class='quotemain'>You are arguing that there was no need to plan the Overlord ground battle, or play the role of army group commander in Normandy, something that Eisenhower and his staff were quite unsuited for. It needed an experienced battlefield commander. Frankly, if Eisenhower ever heard a shot fired in anger, then it was just a distant rumble. [/b] I don’t think Eisenhower is as incompetent as you seem to think. The point I was making about Monty’s plan is that it was not a bad plan but it was pretty much common sense that Ike would have decided too. It’s obvious that armies are better when they fight as one. I believe that the only reason Churchill thought otherwise was because it might create political problems as we saw in the case of Tobruk where the American’s viewed the Brits as wanting to squeeze them out of the victory when they had fought just as hard. None of the American generals ever said that Monty was incompetent. I have never read anything even intimating that. I find it amazing so many fans of Monty have such contempt for American generals. People trained as West Point or VMI are hardly ignorant of military principles especially those that are new like tank warfare. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM But the British, Tedder aside, were not mad with Montgomery. Brooke in particular profoundly disagreed with Eisenhower's strategy and for that matter so do I. If the Allies are to ignore the behaviors of their generals then why was Patton not planning and leading everything? Bradley was Patton’s subordinate in N. Africa and Sicily. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM On tactics, an army group commander does not try to direct the tactics of subordinate formations. He functions at the operational level and should not micro-manage. Bradley had no complaints in A Soldier's Story about Montgomery's management style in Normandy. Agreed, so this seems to me that you agree actually with Bradley (and me) that strategically, a single ground commander in Ike was sufficient. By Monty’s insistence on being the ground commander he bred angst and distrust between himself and the US forces. My point was simply, what could Monty have done (as ground commander) that Ike couldn’t other than micromanage the US forces? If Monty had been put under Bradley or Patton, he and his forces would have been just as angry as Bradley and his were. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 12 2005, 05:42 AM 2. By the time the British got to Antwerp on 4 September, the same date that the fuel crisis hit the US 3rd Army, the supply crisis had hit. There was bound to be an administrative pause in September at a time when there was no realistic chance of Antwerp being open early enough to solve it. But the difference was relative. If the administative pause as you call it had happened a month earlier it would not have contributed to an October shortage, it could have still have supported Patton, despite the fact he wouldn't need it if Market Garden had not been planned on the spur of the moment. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM Patton's orders only envisaged the Metz operation as a secondary objective, but he chose to keep going anyway, Bradley never tried to stop him and Eisenhower ducked the issue. You might be right. But Patton had succeeded. He had accomplished the objective and did it quickly. It was not known ahead of time that he would not have the resources to keep it. A general has to believe he has supplies to count on, otherwise he could never risk routing the enemy, he would rather be forced to be extremely conservative and never aggressive for fear his supplies would run out. A strategy of long slow stalemates in wars of attrition was exactly what Patton wanted to avoid having been an officer in WWI and seeing how many men that costs. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM By the way, why would you drop the Airborne into Antwerp when the city and the docks were taken undamaged without a fight on 4 September? And the Germans did not reinforce South Beveland after that - the fortress troops were already there and the remanants of 15th Army actually pulled out before the peninsula was sealed at the base. That’s one of the primary reasons for airborne, to take things intact. This is why the airborne was used in Market Garden, to take the undestroyed bridges before the enemy forces could destroy them. Originally posted by angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM Finally, there was a transport crisis however you look at it, not aided by one feature of US organisation - and one over which SHAEF had, incredibly, no control - the supply organisation, COMZ, which was a corrupt and disorganised shambles, who did not ask the troops what they wanted, they told them what they were going to get. Huh? What in the world are you talking about here? <!--QuoteBegin-angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM At best, the total air transport fleet could deliver 1,000 tons a day, rising to 2,000 tons over a shorter "push". That is the equivalent of three and, at a push, six truck companies, nowhere near enough to cover any shortages. The air transport did not consume any fuel that could have gone to ground fources because: a. They used different fuel. b. They were UK based and their fuel was not a subtraction from that available in France and Belgium. You are somewhat correct here but not completely. a. The only difference between aircraft fuel and tank fuel is that aircraft fuel has a slightly higher octane rating (100) which a tank can easily use. b. You are right that the fuel consumed by the C-47s cannot be added to the shortage. You have me there. The fuel they couldn’t deliver must be added to what is used by the British armor in a mad dash to Belgium and US Armies in support. Patton only needed fuel and ammo for Third army. That’s about one-sixth of COMZ’s supply. Just don’t cut him off and the Metz would have been held as well as attacks would have continued to the Saar. Patton did need anything more than the previous allotment he had been receiving.
Originally posted by jimbotosome+Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM-->(jimbotosome @ Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'>I don’t think Eisenhower is as incompetent as you seem to think. The point I was making about Monty’s plan is that it was not a bad plan but it was pretty much common sense that Ike would have decided too. [/b] I am not alleging that Eisenhower was incompetent overall, but I think he lacked the competence for the role of ground force commander. He was a highly regarded staff officer and a brilliant military administrator, but he had absolutely no experience as a field commander. I do not know how he would have planned Overlord, except that I think he would not have had the time to do it. Being supreme commander was also a full time job and this was not a task he could really have delegated to his staff. As an example, after Montgomery relinquished his role of ground force commander, Eisenhower's pronouncement on strategy were vague and confused in the extreme. Apart from wanting to ensure that all his armies were combatting away all along the front all the time, he seemed to have no particular strategic objectives in mind. For instance, he seemed to think that the Ruhr and Saar could be siezed and Patton could advance on Frankfurt (in itself a bit of a strategic dead end) while Antwerp was being opened. Both Patton and Montgomery knew otherwise and both, in their own way, demanded a single main thrust. And when he finally made it to France, he selected a location at Granville which had such poor communications that he was out of effective touch with both army group commanders. In early September, when events were moving fast, an important message from Montgomery on strategy took over 24 hours to get to Eisenhower and in all it took Montgomery five days to get a reply, which was actually written by Eisenhower the day he got the message. And you always get the impression that Eisenhower lacked grip. His orders lacked precision which allowed for interpretation and he was forever having second thoughts. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM It’s obvious that armies are better when they fight as one. I believe that the only reason Churchill thought otherwise was because it might create political problems as we saw in the case of Tobruk where the American’s viewed the Brits as wanting to squeeze them out of the victory when they had fought just as hard. Sorry, how does Tobruk come into this? In the original siege, there was not an American (apart from diplomats) within 2,000 miles and when it finally fell, there may have only been a few USAAF units just arriving in theatre. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM None of the American generals ever said that Monty was incompetent. I have never read anything even intimating that. I find it amazing so many fans of Monty have such contempt for American generals. People trained as West Point or VMI are hardly ignorant of military principles especially those that are new like tank warfare. Well, when Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley et all were at West Point, tanks had not been invented. Although Eisenhower and Patton had tank experience in WWI, they did not serve in this branch in the inter-war years (and in fact, the US army more or less abandoned tanks in the 1920s and 1930s). Patton went back to the horse cavalry and in 1940 commanded a mounted regiment. But more generally, West Point, VMI, Sandhurst, St Cyr, or any other of the famous academies only qualify their people to be 2nd lieutenants. It is really only after that that they begin to learn their jobs. And I am not attacking American generals overall. Although I do not agree with his every word, I gavce great respect for Bradley and I admire others like Ridgeway and Collins. I am making two specific points. The first is that Eisenhower was unsuited to the role of field force commander and the second is that Patton was a very one dimensional cavalryman, who was good in pursuit and attack, but not what I would call "rounded out". Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM If the Allies are to ignore the behaviors of their generals then why was Patton not planning and leading everything? Bradley was Patton’s subordinate in N. Africa and Sicily. How the US army deals with its generals is a US army matter. Of the two, I think that Bradley was by far the better general. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM so this seems to me that you agree actually with Bradley (and me) that strategically, a single ground commander in Ike was sufficient. By Monty’s insistence on being the ground commander he bred angst and distrust between himself and the US forces. My point was simply, what could Monty have done (as ground commander) that Ike couldn’t other than micromanage the US forces? If Monty had been put under Bradley or Patton, he and his forces would have been just as angry as Bradley and his were. There is no evidence that US troops on the ground were unhappy with Montgomery, only some US generals. Montgomery actually offered to serve under Bradley if only Eisenhower would appoint a ground force commander. Neither Montgomery nor Bradley would have allowed strategy to drift. I certainly do not agree with you. As ground force commander, Eisenhower was neither use nor ornament. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM But the difference was relative. If the administative pause as you call it had happened a month earlier it would not have contributed to an October shortage, it could have still have supported Patton, despite the fact he wouldn't need it if Market Garden had not been planned on the spur of the moment. So why did Eisenhower sanction Market Garden? One reason was undoubtedly because he was getting flak from Marshall and Arnold for not using the airborne forces and he needed to get them off his back. Also, it was not until 9 October that he gave Montgomery anything like a firm order to get Antwerp open (which was one of the things which Montgomery in his memoirs admitted was his mistake). Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM But Patton had succeeded. He had accomplished the objective and did it quickly. It was not known ahead of time that he would not have the resources to keep it. A general has to believe he has supplies to count on, otherwise he could never risk routing the enemy, he would rather be forced to be extremely conservative and never aggressive for fear his supplies would run out. A strategy of long slow stalemates in wars of attrition was exactly what Patton wanted to avoid having been an officer in WWI and seeing how many men that costs. Well, Patton's WWI experience was a bit limited compared to Montgomery, who was one of the most carefgul allied generals when it came to avoiding casualties, much more so than Patton. I don't think Patton had yet succeeded. The Germans were clearly firming up their whole front, and he was clearly never going to get to the Rhine. Originally posted by jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM Originally posted by angie999@Sep 13 2005, 01:13 PM Finally, there was a transport crisis however you look at it, not aided by one feature of US organisation - and one over which SHAEF had, incredibly, no control - the supply organisation, COMZ, which was a corrupt and disorganised shambles, who did not ask the troops what they wanted, they told them what they were going to get. Huh? What in the world are you talking about here? I am talking about the US supply organisation commanded by Lt Gen J C H Lee, over which SHAEF had no command and was a law unto itself. Bedell-Smith was extremely angry over COMZ performance, but Eisenhower would not provoke a row which would certainly have drawn in Marshall by tackling it. For instance, at the very time we are talking about, COMZ was moving its 11,000 staff (yes, 11,000) from their headquarters in Normandy to nice hotels in Paris, where by all accounts they had a nice time with the whores, booze, black market and all. They took up 90% of all the hotel rooms in Paris. <!--QuoteBegin-jimbotosome@Sep 14 2005, 02:54 AM The fuel they couldn’t deliver must be added to what is used by the British armor in a mad dash to Belgium and US Armies in support. How could they capture Antwerp without such a mad dash?
I'm sorry I missed the discussion here, my systems been down and I haven't been able to get on-line. Thanks for all the info on Allied air-support by everybody, it's going to take me a while to process it all. I think it was Angie who mentioned that there was a problem co-ordinating heavy air-support with the USAAF. This was the case with the Cobra offensive in late July 1944. The ground commanders requested that the 8th AF heavies bomb from east to west to avoid hitting ground forces. For their own reasons the 8th AF commanders decided to attack from north to south. As there was a wind blowing from the south, the smoke drifted north and so did the bombing. 111 Americans were killed, including Lieutrnant-General Lesley McNair, and 490 were wounded. Maddened men had to be physically restrained and carried to the rear. The day before the Americans sustained over 150 causualties in a bomber attack by the heavies. Although significant damage was done to the Germans in the attacks the heavy bombers weren't used for close support again.
Angie, I am going to have to do some more reading up on Bradley, Ike, and Patton. I ordered some new books today that go into more detail on these officers. I can’t find a single book on Amazon about Monty, which is disappointing. Some of the things you say don’t quite add up. I have read some things that seem to contradict them, but since it has been a while since I read them and I have many of them lent out, I will have to read up on the new ones. Tank doctrine for the US and Britain was infantile compared to Germany. I don’t think there are points for any Allied general to make about being a truly “decent” ground commander. Especially not if you are results oriented. Air power and devastating artillery covered the fact that the Allies were so incompetent at coordinating tanks and men. If it were not for these things, the Allies would have been driven back to England. As far as the thing Bradley was talking about was in Tunis I believe. I said Tobruk but I think it was Tunis. The beef was (if I remember correctly) that Monty wanted the Americans to “be his reserve” in the final battles and stay back. This didn’t sit well with them. They distrusted Monty at that point. You say that Ike was incompetent as a ground commander but in North Africa (from Torch on) he was the ground commander as well as in Sicily. These were some pretty successful campaigns that had two successful amphibious landings under fire. So technically, he was the most experienced ground commander. BTW: Patton graduated from VMI, not West Point. Also, tanks in the US were the cavalry, so Patton was an advisor in tank development. He wanted tanks to be diesel and believed they should have at least two radial guns on them. There was no horse cavalry for any significant period after WWI.
Originally posted by Dac@Sep 14 2005, 05:04 PM The ground commanders requested that the 8th AF heavies bomb from east to west to avoid hitting ground forces. For their own reasons the 8th AF commanders decided to attack from north to south. As there was a wind blowing from the south, the smoke drifted north and so did the bombing. [post=39021]Quoted post[/post] One reason put forward later was that by bombing east to west the bombers would have needed to fly in a narrow stream, meaning that the bomber force as a whole would have been a long time over the target, with attendant risk of high losses from AAA. By bombing north to south, they could fly in using a broad formation, all be over the target together and get out quickly. This sounds to me like a very valid point. The problem was, it was not what the ground troops expected and nobody told them what to expect. Bombing in WWII always tended to drift off target, by a process known as creep-back. The bombers tended to bomb the forward edge of the bombed area. RAF Bomber Command, in the later stages of the war, actually took this into account when selecting aiming points, because they had not been able to stop it.
Originally posted by angie999@Sep 15 2005, 03:12 AM One reason put forward later was that by bombing east to west the bombers would have needed to fly in a narrow stream, meaning that the bomber force as a whole would have been a long time over the target, with attendant risk of high losses from AAA. By bombing north to south, they could fly in using a broad formation, all be over the target together and get out quickly. This sounds to me like a very valid point. The problem was, it was not what the ground troops expected and nobody told them what to expect. Bombing in WWII always tended to drift off target, by a process known as creep-back. The bombers tended to bomb the forward edge of the bombed area. RAF Bomber Command, in the later stages of the war, actually took this into account when selecting aiming points, because they had not been able to stop it. [post=39052]Quoted post[/post] Thanks for that Angie, I've wondered what the reseasoning was for the north to south attack. I think you point out the unsuitability of using the Heavies in the CAS role. They lacked the flexibility of the fighter bombers used in Cab Rank. Artillery support was also effective and could be controlled by the men on the ground.
I made a post here discussing the bombing of Caen to where I drew quite a bit of criticism from a few gents that were at Caen. What I was quoting was from a History Channel documentary on D-Day that detailed the battle from Allied reconnaissance photography and interviews of people there – “D-Day: The Lost Evidence”. Here is post that seem so expressly controversial http://www.ww2talk.com/index.php?showtopic...indpost&p=15808,. Of course, going from memory, it was inevitable that I get a minor fact or two incorrect, but this evening I ran across that documentary again and sat down and watched it. This plays on the History Channel in the UK as well. You can order it on DVD/VHS or catch it when it re-airs. Here is the documentary’s link on the history channel website for those of you who wish to watch it http://www.thehistorychannel.co.uk/site/tv...gramme_2042.php. Though I got a few facts wrong, I had more right than some that had been there. For instance I said Eisenhower ordered Eighth Air Force to bomb it to stop an advance of SS Panzers. I was told that it was done by RAF Bombers, Monty ordered it and that the guys on the grounds saw them that they were indeed RAF planes. But we were both wrong, it was the US Ninth Air Force that bombed it and they did it with B-26 Marauders. The footage of the bombing and the commander of the group that carried out the bombing spoke in narration of that SORTI, it was on D-Day. He said the objective was to cut off communications and supply. It was claimed to be a senseless bombing by those that were on the ground but it turns out that I was right about the SS Panzers heading for the beaches to assault the vulnerable troops coming ashore. They were the 21st SS Panzers and they did indeed have to go around Caen because of this bombing just as I remembered and posted and that they were also hammered mercilessly by Fighter/Bombers (not Monty) and as a result, lost quite a bit of armor (in one anecdote a German officer recalled was they were astonished by the loss of 5 tanks in 10 minutes) and because they had to go around Caen, it took until 4:00pm (16:00?) for them to get around Caen, and as the documentary said, by then it was “too late”. The Allies had gotten off the beaches and had begun to coordinate. Eisenhower then ordered British American and Canadian paratroops and gliders be dropped behind the 21st SS and one of the commanders of the 21st SS Panzer group who is still alive said that they withdrew behind Caen because they saw the massive air assault coming were afraid they were going to get surrounded. It wasn’t Monty “pulling their teeth” that “annulated them” for they were not annihilated at all, but simply withdrew behind Caen in an attempt to challenge the air drops. It was fear of encirclement not destruction that rid Caen of them. I don’t know if the gentlemen telling me it was RAF was referring to possibly another bombing of Caen, not on D-Day, but Caen was demolished on D-Day to the point it was impassible by armor and that demolition was carried out by US Ninth Air Force at Eisenhower’s order. Had it not have been carried out, 21st SS would have been on the beaches opposing Monty's staging of his forces which could have destroyed them. It was a very important bombing in retrospect. It goes back to what I said that being there is not a tell-tale way to know the strategy of something ordered from above, especially if you are on the ground. You have good tactical understanding but not necessarily good strategic understanding. You cannot possibly be aware of what happened to an area before you got there. But the guys flying the missions and the Germans getting attacked would know better what was happening to their lines much better than enemies fighting their way off the beach. So, to the original question of Heavy Bombers in Normandy, the “original” June 6th Caen bombing was not a “senseless” bombing but designed to cut the communications and that was the precise point I was trying to make in the effort to remember the assumed facts of the documentary. I would advise the folks here that thought I was “blowing smoke in their face” concerning that documentary and Caen, check it out the next time it airs. It is quite an interesting documentary on the entire invasion, with lots of interviews with Allies and Axis soldiers that were there. Hope this clears up the confusion.
Originally posted by jimbotosome+Sep 23 2005, 04:47 AM-->(jimbotosome @ Sep 23 2005, 04:47 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'> For instance I said Eisenhower ordered Eighth Air Force to bomb it to stop an advance of SS Panzers. I was told that it was done by RAF Bombers, Monty ordered it and that the guys on the grounds saw them that they were indeed RAF planes. But we were both wrong, it was the US Ninth Air Force that bombed it and they did it with B-26 Marauders. [/b] The US 9th AAF and the RAF's 2nd Tactical Airforce, were the two tactical airforces which supported the ground operations in Normandy. As the topic concerns the use of heavy bombers of 8th AAF and RAF Bomber Command, we are not talking about the same thing. The B-26 Marauder was not a heavy bomber and its use was tactical bombing. <!--QuoteBegin-jimbotosome@Sep 23 2005, 04:47 AM but it turns out that I was right about the SS Panzers heading for the beaches to assault the vulnerable troops coming ashore. They were the 21st SS Panzers and they did indeed have to go around Caen because of this bombing just as I remembered and posted and that they were also hammered mercilessly by Fighter/Bombers (not Monty) and as a result, lost quite a bit of armor (in one anecdote a German officer recalled was they were astonished by the loss of 5 tanks in 10 minutes) and because they had to go around Caen, it took until 4:00pm (16:00?) for them to get around Caen, and as the documentary said, by then it was “too late”. [post=39335]Quoted post[/post] 21st Panzer Division was not an SS Division. It was a Heer division and, although it carried a famous name as one of Rommel's two Panzer divisions from North Africa, it had been reformed in theatre and made use of whatever equipment could be found for it, including probably a number of French tanks of 1930s vintage. 21st Panzer was deployed with many of its infantry and support units spread over a wide area in case of airborne landings. Its Panzer regiment was deployed south of Caen, so as to enable it to operate from there on either bank of the Orne. This was one Panzer division which was somewhat independent of OKW control because of where it was deployed and could have started to move quite early. However, the divisional commander could not be found at first (legend has it that he was staying at a hotel and was in bed with his girlfriend). When he did turn up, initial orders were to deploy east of the Orne, but then changed to a deployment west of the Orne. This involved retracing their steps around Caen. They could not cross the Orne north of Caen, because of the landings by British 6th Airborne Division and, as the day wore on, reinforcement by units arriving from the beaches. The Panzers did launch an attack from the Lebussy Wood area just north west of Caen late on 6 June. This had been predicted by at least one of the British commanders on the ground, who in effect laid an armoured ambush and drove them off with losses, although one of their reconnaisance units did reach the coast between Sword and Juno beaches - not that they were able to stay there. Tactical air support was in operation in Normandy throughout D-day, particularly from the afternoon onwards, when some of the clouds began to clear.
The 21st Panzer Division was but a shell of its North African incarnation in 1944. Most of its personnel from the original make up had surrendered in Tunisia and it was reformed with scratch units and indeed its equipment was not on the same level as formations such as the SS Panzer Divs. The 21st SS division was not a Panzer Division at all. It was called 21st Waffen Gebirgs Division Der SS( Albanische 1st Division ) and served in the Balkans and was comprised of Albanians. Its strength was never more than 5000. There were only 1 Panzer Division capable of mounting an attack on D-Day and that was 21st Panzer Division commanded by General Leutnant Feuchtinger, a political general whose sole experience before D-Day was cammanding a Horse Drawn Artillery Division in Russia in 1942. The 21st's response was very slow and also very cautious. As Angie has said there was an attack launched but it was easily repulsed. The following exerpt is from an article by Oliver Haller in Canadian Military History entitled death of the 12th SS 7-10th June 1944. It may provide an insight into the positions of 12th SS around Caen during the is period: In the early hours of 6 June 1944, the first reports of a major Allied operation were transmitted to the 12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Division.1 In anticipation of the long-awaited Allied invasion of occupied France, a company was sent to investigate the Caen area.2 Though the young soldiers of the division were uncertain of what actually awaited them, the first acts in a conflict that would claim most of their lives were being performed. However, defeat was not on their minds during that hectic morning " the men of the 12th SS were fixed on driving the "little fish" back into the sea. The situation confronting the 12th SS on June 7th was not encouraging. The 716th Bodenstaendig or Static Division, had lost two-thirds of its strength and was reduced to isolated points of resistance. During the initial hours of the 7 June advance, these were brushed aside as the 7th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades moved forward in two separate thrusts, while 8th Brigade dealt with the remaining German strong-points in the rear areas. The 9th Brigade's push towards Carpiquet forced a German reaction to secure the staging areas for a co-ordinated move against the Allies. The initial German response was purely defensive. Standartenfuehrer Kurt Meyer intercepted the Canadian advance with a battlegroup composed of his 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and 50 PzKpfw IVs from the tank regiment's second battalion.3 In the chaotic melee that erupted, the Germans managed to blunt and deflect the Canadian advance The Full article is here: http://info.wlu.ca/%7Ewwwmsds/haller.htm As regards the bombing Max Hastings, who has published a good history of the Normandy Campaign makes the following points about the Allied Bombing: To prevent this development, the allies relied, of course, upon the use of their massive air forces. Despite strong opposition from most of the air chiefs, who wished to continue to pound Germany's cities and industries, in the weeks before and after D-Day the allied high command committed scores of bomber squadrons to attacks upon the rail and road communications of north-west Europe. They were obliged to strike across a very wide front, to mask their real focus- upon Normandy. Despite Churchill's deep unhappiness, they were compelled to accept the inevitability of killing tens of thousands of French and Dutch-Belgian civilians in the process- an incidence of "Friendly Fire" casualties whose cruel necessity makes mockery of the pathetic public anguish in more recent times about infinitely slighter episodes of this kind. The air attacks on French communications were as successful as could reasonably have been expected. As in every similar deployment of modern times, whether in Korea or Vietnam or the Falklands or even the Gulf War, the bombing was effective in gravely impeding the movement of German forces. But it could not wholly prevent it. Many German formations arrived on the Normandy battlefield days or even weeks later than their commanders wished. This was of critical importance to the Normandy campaign. But even massed heavy bombing could not prevent the Germans from reinforcing and supplying their men in the line, above all by the use of night movement. Arguably the greatest achievement of allied air superiority was that it ensured that the allies could move their own forces to Normandy with only minimal interference from the German Luftwaffe. More than that, the air forces delayed the German build-up sufficiently to prevent Hitler's armies from gaining a decisive superiority on the battlefield in the first vital days. But, for all the ambitious claims of the airmen about what their forces could do, even massive bombing could not prevent the need for the most bitter and costly battle of attrition by the men on the ground, before the German front in Normandy could be broken. The overwhelming lesson of air power in the past 50 years is that it can be devastatingly effective against forces conducting movements in daylight. It is far more fallible against well entrenched positions and units, or at night
The 21st Panzer Division (second edition) came out of a tank repair shop in France, which repaired and restored captured French vehicles for active service. When it produced enough for a division, it was turned into 21st Panzer, and many of the survivors of the original who had escaped the hegira of Tunisia were assigned to it. It was thus a self-made outfit, made by its own bootstraps.
Jimbo made an assertion that the Bombing of Caen saved "Monty and his Gang" on 6th June and I would like to present an alternative view. As I have already said in an earlier post and indeed Kiwiwriter and Angie have agreed, 21st Panzer Division was not the formation it had been in North Africa. As Kiwiwriter has already said it was a unit scratch built but Carlo D'Este makes reference to a Panzer Battalion (the 22nd I think) who had 50 Mark IVs in its complement. It is common knowledge, Max Hastings, Carlo D'Este and Cornelius Ryan all report that 21st Panzer Division took an inordinate amount of time to co-ordinate a response to the invasion, both due to the fact of the complicated Command Structure and the fact that it was widely spread out over a large area. It was 07:30 before 22nd Panzer Regiment moved forward a good 5 hours since the beginning of the invasion. Feuchtinger had previously ordered 2 of his Panzergrenadier Battlions to attack the British Airborne Regiments on the Orne. When the attack happened it took place that evening and ran into a strongpoint of the the staffordshire yeomanry who "quickly dispatched" 13 Panzers and blunted the attack. A "small" tank-Infantry group broke through to Lion sur mer but turned back as dusk was falling. This was not a massive attack which would have "decimated" the beaches but was no more than a couple of battalions in strength. Jimbo, I understand your reference and am glad of this discussion but it might be useful to check out further references that support your posts and present them. I am enjoying this discussion!!
