I find blaming placing the blame on british spending a bit unfair. Britiain in 1939 had one of the best equipped armies in the world; even the tanks weren't too bad compared to what the germans had then. What the BEF/RAF lacked was centralized planning, inter-arm discipline and inter arm co-operation. Of course it also lacked size; but this was meant to be offset by the marginot line, so even that is understandable. As in the previous post, it was a stopgap. The BEF is even more understandable when you consider that by advancing everything away from the highly effective 1918 continental sized ww1 army; high command was trying to avoid the mistakes and slaughter of the trenches. The irony is that it was this need for change that arguably what drove the BEF to defeat in 39/40. It never had the time to grow in size, and it did not understand several key concepts of the then modern age. But who did? The world was not ready for blitzkreig as the french found out; but it wasn't really spending that was the issue.
No. 60 reminded me of one of the many things that I like about France. "Every time a French girl sits down she pulls her dress or skirt up." Les jambes !
History as shown the valour and fighting capability of the French but I was disappointed to read just how many Frenchmen based in UK in 1940 chose to be repatriated to Vichy France rather than continue the fight with De Gualle Free French Forces. 2 Royal Navy Officers and a Leading Seaman killed in Plymouth attempting to secure the surrender of the French Submarine Surcouf to ensure it did not align with Vichy France (approx 20% of the crew remained with Free French the remainder chose to be repatriated). Thousands of US/UK Casualties incurred fighting Vichy French in Syria and North Africa. There was also a prolonged fight against Vichy French Forces by the British in Madagascar.....was this necessary? There is a good book entitled 'Britain's Last War with France' by Colin Smith I hope to find in my Christmas Stocking ....it may help to change my predjuiced view....but I suspect not. If there is a call to arms for a Longbow man for Agincourt again ...you can count on me!
For some the Vichy government was seen as the continuacy of legitimate government of France, in internal exile. The others were taken as no more than a bunch of adventurers, divided among several factions. De Gaulle came out on top but he did not have the simpathy of everyone.
The French - what an enigma and the subject of some completely unwarranted stereotypes over the last 60 years. Just like the "Drunken Irish", "Humourless Germans", the Cheese-eating Surrender ......... (you know the rest) has become the Stereotype most associated with the French especially over the last few years. Many people forget how the French bled in the First World War, how much the scars from that conflict failed to heal. People who castigate the French do so unfairly. Successive Governments in France, weakened by political instability failing to modernise the French Army. Even had it the means to do so, the French General Staff was too cowed and rooted in the past to take on board the progress made by other armies. Consumed by a Defensive strategy that was doomed to failure the French Soldier was let down badly by his superiors, both political and military.
By the start of 1919,the rundown of the RAF was initiated and to comply with the "Ten Year Rule", (assumption that the British Empire would not be involved in a great war during the next 10 years) laid down in government policy statement of August 1919,the RAF expenditure was budgeted at £17 million anually, sufficient it was thought to maintain 40 squadrons. By 1923 there was a further consideration by the politicians in that it was thought that the most likely future enemy would be the French and from this assumption,the Government sanctioned a Metropolitan Air Force to consist of 23 squadrons,14 to be bomber squadrons.Fighter protection was to be provided by a circle of RAF stations around London. This would be known as the 1923 Expansion with Yatesbury in the west and the clutch of RAF stations surrounding London was thought sufficient to protect the capital. Further expansion of the Royal Air Force was planned then in 1923 to be completed by 1928 with 52 squadrons (35 bomber and 17 fighter).This plan was not concluded as the December 1925 Locarno Pact, which settled the status of the Rhineland and the German/French and German/Belgian frontiers gave Britain the assurance, together, with severe financial restrictions that an increase in RAF strength was not deemed necessary. The "Ten Year" rule was abandoned in March 1932 and the failure of the League of Nations Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933 and the rise to power of Hitler convinced Britain that the future enemies would be Germany and Italy which gave rise to the RAF 1935 Expansion.Priority to expansion of the RAF was a priority for the Government and the RAF was well below the strength of 1923.For instance at the end of the 1933/1934 financial year,the RAF had on charge,316 bomber aircraft for 28 squadrons which was 7 squadrons below strength from the total aircraft numbers agreed in 1923. Harry, I didn't shorten the above because there's one major factor that has to be taken into account when looking at the pre-expansion RAF and reckoning it as below below even paper strength...from 1924 until 1939 the RAF was ALSO having - out of its appropriations - to find the cost of running, manning and equiping the Fleet Air Arm! :mellow: The 1935 Expansion saw a plan to lay down 100 permanent airfields and an attempt to upgrade the RAF aircraft inventory. Hitler's new Luftwaffe was found to have superior aircraft and "not surprisingly" it was establishd that the open cockpit Heyford and Hendon did not have a specification to compete over Germany.Can you imagine the Heyford attempting bomber operations against German targets from East Anglian bases?With a range of 920 miles with a bomb load of 1600 lbs,the Heyford had hardly the range to return to the nearest British base. Then if you look at the Order of Battle for Bomber Command on June 30 1937,you will find inferior aircraft with specifications that were not up to the mark for the future war.These were the Hind,Audax, Overstrand,Hendon,Heyford,Virginia,Harrow with the Blenheim,Anson,Battle and Whitley in short numbers coming into squadron service.Not exactly aircraft that would capable of competing against the Luftwaffe ...which is why both at the time of Abyssinia AND Munich, the Air Staff declared that it couldn't carry out the functions Cabinet expected of it - either to wage a war abroad with italy over Ethiopa, or in 1938 to defend the UK home base. The Air Staff were QUITE determined that it wouldn't be going to war before the end of the Air Plan in autumn 1939... You have to remember that the way the Air Plan was "layered" you couldn't just look at the Plan in any given month and say - "STOP! We've got a BIT more of everything, so now we can fight"...for that wasn't the case; squadrons had to be growth bases build, technical staff recruited and trained....and the hardware itself, the aircraft, had to go through several generations of progressively-improving aircraft crammed into a very short few years. Which segues into... As for Bomber Command it had to struggle with its twin engined aircraft at the expense of losing valuable aircrew, until the Air Minstry specifications,created post 1935, came through the design, production and tried and tested stages to adequately equip the bomber force which was to contributed so well to the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany. Cabinet halted ALL spending on Bomber Command in 1938 after Munich until Fighter Command was completed - thanks to the Air Staff playing the "We can't defend the UK Home Base" card This played merry hell with the layered nature of the Air Plan, for not only did it stop at a blow the ontake of new designs...it halted the building plan for its fields AND the start of BC training, especially night flying, which IIRC only began again in May-June of 1939! Cabinet had the standard politicans' blind spot of only thinking in terms of aircraft and squadrons...for getting the men that had to go in them had to be "grown" from somewhere too - and the spending Moratorium ALSO stopped the spending on Ansons and Airspeed Oxfords, so Bomber Command's multi-engine trainer programme stumbled too. And when it DID restart again....a goodly part of what trainers there were got seconded to Coastal because the spending moratorium had hit them TOO! but for the RAF AASF for France,the sole aircraft utilised, the inferior Battle was to give a disappointing performance and proved to be incapable of supporting the BEF even taking into consideration the swift advance of the Blitzkreig. The Battle was another design stream that was stunted terribly by the 1938 moratorium; it was only ever planned as a stopgap aircraft - but was still in service by 1940 because no replacement had materialised. And don't forget the poor Lysander in Army Co-op service in 1939-40 as a ...bomber...
The French - what an enigma and the subject of some completely unwarranted stereotypes over the last 60 years. Just like the "Drunken Irish" Stereotypes of the French go back a lot longer than Sixty years. Six hundred is closer to the mark....and you're not seriously going to deny that Irish culture involves the odd pint are you ? Anyone else going to be celebrating Trafalgar day in two weeks time ?-_- Provocative ? Moi ?
What, that battle lost by the Spaniards? Anyway, not too many people complain about the French First Army; I wonder why, they were French after all. French Army B under the command General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny landed in southern France after Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of the area. On September 25, 1944 French Army B was redesignated French First Army. Liberating Marseille, Toulon, and Lyon, it later formed the right flank of the Allied Southern Group of Armies at the southern end of the Allied front line, adjacent to Switzerland. It commanded two corps, the French I and II Corps. The French First Army liberated the southern area of the Vosges Mountains, including Belfort. Its operations in the area of Burnhaupt destroyed the German IV Luftwaffe Korps in November 1944. In February 1945, with the assistance of the U.S. XXI Corps, the First Army collapsed the Colmar Pocket and cleared the west bank of the Rhine River of Germans in the area south of Strasbourg. In March 1945, the First Army fought through the Siegfried Line fortifications in the Bienwald Forest near Lauterbourg. Subsequently, the First Army crossed the Rhine near Speyer and captured Karlsruhe and Stuttgart. Operations by the First Army in April 1945 encircled and captured the German XVIII S.S. Korps in the Black Forest and cleared southwestern Germany. At the end of the war, the motto of the French First Army was Rhin et Danube, referring to the two great German rivers that it had reached and crossed during its combat operations. De Lattre
Stereotypes of the French go back a lot longer than Sixty years. Six hundred is closer to the mark....and you're not seriously going to deny that Irish culture involves the odd pint are you ? Anyone else going to be celebrating Trafalgar day in two weeks time ?-_- Provocative ? Moi ? Deny the odd pint? Not at all, just that we're not always drunk!
Deny the odd pint? Not at all, just that we're not always drunk! I will definately celebrating Trafalgar Day (although more of a PICKLE Night man myself)...there were even Frenchmen serving onboard HMS VICTORY???
