Published in Paris in 1945 by the 'Information & Education Division' of the US Occupation Forces. "The French didn't put up a real fight against the Germans. They just let the Heinies walk in." No one - least of all the French themselves - will try do deny the enormity of the defeat and the humiliation France suffered in 1940. French military leadership and strategy was tragically inadequate. But this does not mean that the French did not put up a "real fight". In the six week Battle of France, from May 10 to June 22, 1940, the French lost, in military personnel alone, 260,000 wounded and 108,000 killed. A total of 368,000 casualties in six weeks is not something to pass off lightly. Yes, the Germans gave the French a terrible beating. But it took the combined strength of the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, Canada, etc., to beat the Germans. It's asking rather a great deal of France to match such strength against hers.
Ideas change over the years and only Francophobes with little understanding of those times would display such ideas today.France was not alone in taking a beating. Only Great Britain and Russia of the European states managed to evade defeat and full occupation by the German Army. However it took lost battles ,casualties and prisoners before the tide was turned. Mistakes were made in the early part of the war which High Command must take the blame for it is they who give the orders and decide the strategy. In this case it lead to disaster and defeat. Members with more knowledge than I can probably make a better case . Today I find the quoted words offensive both for the casualties the French Armed Forces suffered and the trial and tribulations of the French nation had to endure. I think the words should be consigned to the dustbin. England ,of all nations ,knows that Frenchmen can fight. In history we have both faced them and stood in line with them often enough.
Agree with arktike. The main point is that Germany geared herself for war with the introduction of conscription in 1935 and further laid down her warlike intentions with Goering's 4 Year Plan in 1936,the intention of which was to prepare for war by 1940 and with these plans,the German economy switched from a peacetime economy to a war economy.The German economy was based on the motivation to expand her armaments industry by government spending with little regard to balancing the books. France for her part was plaqued by political instability and the lack of vision as a nation became all too apparent.There was a distinctive split between the left wing and right wing political groups and overall the nation could not cope with the struggle ahead,not that the French fought to any degree less,courageously, than the BEF.Blame was put on the Leon Blum government from 1936 for being unprepared but his support suffered due to antisemitism.Indeed the likes of those who were to form the Vichy government quickly aligned themselves to the Nazi cause and then put Blum on trial to account for the defeat of France. Great Britain during this period,perhaps weary of war,and with respect to the economic slump of the 1930s, were not prepared for war.The reorganisation of the RAF in 1936 to form Bomber Command and Fighter Command laid the cornerstone for future successes, aided,most importantly, by the decision to phase out the biplane fighter for the Hurricane and Spitfire.But overall,defence spending was inadequate to sucessfully engage the Nazi war machine as Great Britain found to its cost with the BEF in 1940. Any land frontier can be overrun by an adjacent country with a greater balance of power and readiness but it takes a much greater effort in terms of manpower and technology to overcome an enemy who can only be assaulted and overcome by sea.Such was the contrasting fortunes of France and Great Britain.In May and June of 1940, the French had to fight on French territory.There was little they could do in terms of withdrawing to French oversea territories and if they had been able to do so,most of these territories were quickly under the influence of Vichy who thought that legally they were the rightfull successors to the failed goverment. On the other hand, on the subject of the the British withdrawal to live to fight another day,some French to this day, will insist that France was let down by the British in withdrwaing from France. Great Britain also had the appeasers who failed to see any wrong in Hitler and indeed praised him and his regime for his domestic policies etc.It is fair to say that these people saw Hitler as the vanguard of the opposition to the Soviet Union and were fearful of an advance westwards of this ideology.It it has to be said that such people would have readily sought an accomodation with Hitler rather than stand alone and fight as Great Britain did for a further 18 months.Great Britain could have had her own "Vichy" government had she not been so steadfast in her opposition to Hitler's aggression.
...laid down her warlike intentions with Goering's 4 Year Plan in 1936,the intention of which was to prepare for war by 1940... Great Britain during this period,perhaps weary of war,and with respect to the economic slump of the 1930s, were not prepared for war.The reorganisation of the RAF in 1936 to form Bomber Command and Fighter Command laid the cornerstone for future successes, aided,most importantly, by the decision to phase out the biplane fighter for the Hurricane and Spitfire.But overall,defence spending was inadequate to sucessfully engage the Nazi war machine as Great Britain found to its cost with the BEF in 1940. This is not actually the case; can I recommend John James' The Paladins to you? To grossly paraphrase - the RAF began planning for wear with Germany BY NAME in February 1933, sopent the next two years exercising their ideas, and in 1935 presented Cabinet with an Air Plan and a range of spending options to allow Bomber Command to take the war to various target locations in Germany...and Cabinet accepted and decided in October 1935... The Air Plan was tailored/layered to put the RAF in a position to pursue an air war against Germany and to defend against them in the autumn of 1939... Oh - look.... :mellow: The historical BEF was never intended to be more than a stopgap ten divisions or so until Britain completed to build up to a WWI-level of mobilisation; unfortunately, THIS couldn't begin until the outbreak of war - though the expansion of the Territorials in 1938-9 showed the way. France planned the same - it would have had several million men under arms and a new generation of AFVs and combat aircraft by 1941; in the meantime, both planned a defensive war BOTH nations plans would have been at the cost of a HUGE impact on the nations in their transformation from peacetime to full war economies...as did Germany;but one thing to remember is that though Germany began to grow here domestic industries towards wartime production levels...the entire process ALSO used up the financing Hitler obtained in the middle of 1933, the "Von Papen Loans" negotiated by Hjalmar Schacht. This money was running out in 1939, and the interest in the loans coming due... Germany was looking at instant bankrupcy in 1940 unles they obtained the wealth of another nation or nations as they had done in the "Flower wars" of the late 1930s...except they had run out of countries to dominate and force into the Reich without a fight Britain's self-funded industrial growth of the late 1930s was therefore ideally going to be more sustainable in the long run that is...if only we hadn't ended up running a world war ON OUR OWN for over a year and a half! Looking at the war itself - in the FIRST World War - it was only the agricultural produce of Denmark and Holland that kept Germany in the war, especially as more and more manpower ended up in the trenches, and materiel coming through from the Scnadanavian neutral (until the Allies got the Quota System up and running in 1915) I.E a huge amount of the foodstuffs, chemicals, material (cloth LOL), leather, animal fodder etc HAD TO BE BOUGHT AND PAID FOR... In WWII, espeically after May 1940 - Germany got the agricultural produce of ALL the same nations FOR FREE...and got a huge amount of empressed manpower...and the national exchequers of their straight conquests....as well as for some time raw materials and oil fromm the USSR. So it shouldn't be forgotten that the German "economic miracle" of producing so much for so long wasn't that much of a miracle - they got a huge amount of what they had had to pay for in 1914-18 for free - and more besides
Interesting discussion, but my impression is that this thread is now morphing into a discussion of the Britain's performance in 1940 and not France's. Let's face it, the German military was victorious up until the Battle of Britain. The campaign in the west defeated French, British, Belgian, and Dutch forces. Yet, many people insist on attributing the defeat to French willingness to fight. Odd.
No-one slags off the Poles for not fighting but their country was over run in a similar times scale. In fact everyone seems to praise them. But everyone likes to dig at the French.
Let's face it, the German military was victorious up until the Battle of Britain Not by any means wholly; the Graf Spee, the KM getting half its destroyers and a selection of its heavier surface units sunk or damaged off Norway, the British and French taking Narvik etc. - there are actually quite a few tactical victories buried in the tale of woe.
Published in Paris in 1945 by the 'Information & Education Division' of the US Occupation Forces. Lovely stuff. Looked on Internet archive for more from these 'Information & Education Division, TSFET' chaps, and there's quite a bit. Internet Archive Search: Information & Education Division and Education Division, TSFET Enjoyed these so far: How I Got Wounded An Army is Quite a Thing Quite some effort going on to keep the chaps on the spot informed. 'Army Information Branch' quite good too: Internet Archive Search: creator:"Army Information Branch, Information and Education Division, A.S.F., United States Army" History of the Organisation itself here: (largish pdf.) http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/eto/eto-076.pdf The Information and Education Division was established in the War Department in August 1944, thirty-two months aftor the United States became involved in World War 11. 3. It was established in tho European Theater of Operations in April 1945, forty months after Pearl Harbor. 4. As the war went this was a long tine for a program to settle on a name. Actually, the program began before hostilities. It began in July 1940, when the morale Division was established under the Adjutant General, War Department.
No-one slags off the Poles for not fighting but their country was over run in a similar times scale. In fact everyone seems to praise them. But everyone likes to dig at the French. Those who are liking to dig at the French have maybe a bad conscience :is is always interesting to give one other the guilt for a defeat,especially when the support given to the "one other " was minimal.and for the 'victories ',it is an old tactic to claim them for one self ,ex:not mention that at Dunkirk a third of the troops was evacuated by French ships
Those who are liking to dig at the French have maybe a bad conscience :is is always interesting to give one other the guilt for a defeat,especially when the support given to the "one other " was minimal.and for the 'victories ',it is an old tactic to claim them for one self ,ex:not mention that at Dunkirk a third of the troops was evacuated by French ships ...and apparently the French like to have a dig at the British. I don't think that it's really fair to call the resources placed by the British in France 'minimal' or to imply that Gort's forces didn't do all they could to defend another country up until the point where the cause was obviously lost. The sad fact is that Sedan was not defended in depth (would it be impolite to mention that it didn't fall in the BEF sector ?) and that once Germany had embarked on the risky but ultimately succesful move to outflank both the British and French forces, things were, given the poor communications available, likely to go badly wrong. Contemporary reports available to the English reader do suggest that there was a substantial collapse of morale amongst a large part of the French force at a point where better leadership could have made a difference and this has coloured subsequent views. When all is said and done, it should not be forgotten that the British and French fought as allies in 1940 and the real blame for the loss of the brave men of both armies lies further eastwards.
Somehow this thread keeps turning back to the British. Why is that? Is it because Britain has a share the defeat of May and June 1940 just as much as France, Belgium and Holland?
..or because by definition it's a thread about British and American perceptions of the French, and only partly about the French themsevles???
...and apparently the French like to have a dig at the British. I don't think that it's really fair to call the resources placed by the British in France 'minimal' or to imply that Gort's forces didn't do all they could to defend another country up until the point where the cause was obviously lost. The sad fact is that Sedan was not defended in depth (would it be impolite to mention that it didn't fall in the BEF sector ?) and that once Germany had embarked on the risky but ultimately succesful move to outflank both the British and French forces, things were, given the poor communications available, likely to go badly wrong. Contemporary reports available to the English reader do suggest that there was a substantial collapse of morale amongst a large part of the French force at a point where better leadership could have made a difference and this has coloured subsequent views. When all is said and done, it should not be forgotten that the British and French fought as allies in 1940 and the real blame for the loss of the brave men of both armies lies further eastwards. About the strength of the BEF:5 divisions were send in 1939 and 5 in 1940,relative to the french strength that was ...not very important ? I did not say the BEF did not figth well,of course they did,like the French,but if there had been 25 BEF divisions,maybe the outcome would had be different . The point is that the popular image in the UK still today is that only the British fought and the French were flying and surrendering .In the UK nobody knws that after Dunkirk the French resistance was stiffening and that the German casualties were doubling . But I think that these false assumptions never will be corrected,the general public not reading a serious book about WW II,only looking to History Channell And let's not talking about WW II information in the schools
LJ, considering that the German indirect approach strategy was to avoid confrontation with the enemy's main body, the Brits could have your 25 divisions in the same location and the result would be a bigger Dunkirk. The Brits and French believed - like any sane person with a blind hindsight eye would - that they had to fight in Belgium, not in their rear.
Somehow this thread keeps turning back to the British. Why is that? Is it because Britain has a share the defeat of May and June 1940 just as much as France, Belgium and Holland? I think that it's difficult to view any one army in isolation and the original question (which related to US perceptions) was widened by the inclusion of current French perceptions of the British. It has to be borne in mind that many of these ideas on both sides took root at a time when there was a distinct lack of real information and in fact a serious level of disinformation. That the myth of a French unwillingness to fight had also been generally accepted in the U.S. is shown by the need to put things right in the 1945 document. The French had the misfortune to be defending the vulnerable crossing at Sedan and there is no doubt that the units involved were not up to the task and the Command structure was incapable of providing armour and reinforcements to stem the breach. This doesn't mean that there was a general unwillingness to fight, simply that at that point they were soundly beaten and from then on the defenders were on the back foot. LJ may feel that the BEF should have been bigger but it was the cream of a hastily reinforced small peacetime army and the proportion of equipment lost is highlighted by the subsequent defence of Britain featuring Beaverettes and Armadillos - hardly the material of choice for an army that hadn't been fully committed. I don't know if the views of the 'general public', whoever they are, should be taken too strongly into account. Most of them simply aren't interested and will also not know that the BEF continued to fight in France after Dunkirk. Perhaps we should actually be grateful that France fell quickly. If the German advance had been held, the alternative may well have been a re-run of the Great war with even more loss of life and distruction.
That the myth of a French unwillingness to fight had also been generally accepted in the U.S. is shown by the need to put things right in the 1945 document. Unfortunately the lessons spread by this document did not go far enough, especially when fanned by particular political needs at particular times. It is interesting that nobody was complaining about the French at the time of Operation Daguet.
This is not actually the case; can I recommend John James' The Paladins to you? To grossly paraphrase - the RAF began planning for wear with Germany BY NAME in February 1933, sopent the next two years exercising their ideas, and in 1935 presented Cabinet with an Air Plan and a range of spending options to allow Bomber Command to take the war to various target locations in Germany...and Cabinet accepted and decided in October 1935... The Air Plan was tailored/layered to put the RAF in a position to pursue an air war against Germany and to defend against them in the autumn of 1939... Oh - look.... :mellow: The historical BEF was never intended to be more than a stopgap ten divisions or so until Britain completed to build up to a WWI-level of mobilisation; unfortunately, THIS couldn't begin until the outbreak of war - though the expansion of the Territorials in 1938-9 showed the way. France planned the same - it would have had several million men under arms and a new generation of AFVs and combat aircraft by 1941; in the meantime, both planned a defensive war BOTH nations plans would have been at the cost of a HUGE impact on the nations in their transformation from peacetime to full war economies...as did Germany;but one thing to remember is that though Germany began to grow here domestic industries towards wartime production levels...the entire process ALSO used up the financing Hitler obtained in the middle of 1933, the "Von Papen Loans" negotiated by Hjalmar Schacht. This money was running out in 1939, and the interest in the loans coming due... Germany was looking at instant bankrupcy in 1940 unles they obtained the wealth of another nation or nations as they had done in the "Flower wars" of the late 1930s...except they had run out of countries to dominate and force into the Reich without a fight Britain's self-funded industrial growth of the late 1930s was therefore ideally going to be more sustainable in the long run that is...if only we hadn't ended up running a world war ON OUR OWN for over a year and a half! Looking at the war itself - in the FIRST World War - it was only the agricultural produce of Denmark and Holland that kept Germany in the war, especially as more and more manpower ended up in the trenches, and materiel coming through from the Scnadanavian neutral (until the Allies got the Quota System up and running in 1915) I.E a huge amount of the foodstuffs, chemicals, material (cloth LOL), leather, animal fodder etc HAD TO BE BOUGHT AND PAID FOR... In WWII, espeically after May 1940 - Germany got the agricultural produce of ALL the same nations FOR FREE...and got a huge amount of empressed manpower...and the national exchequers of their straight conquests....as well as for some time raw materials and oil fromm the USSR. So it shouldn't be forgotten that the German "economic miracle" of producing so much for so long wasn't that much of a miracle - they got a huge amount of what they had had to pay for in 1914-18 for free - and more besides Regarding the readiness of the RAF to take the war to Germany,I think it would be best to explore the status and being of the Royal Air Force from the end of the Great War through its many reorganisations, which were intended to reflect the political situation in Europe and the financial capability of Great Britain to afford a modern air force up to the state of the Royal Air Force in the summer of 1939. By the start of 1919,the rundown of the RAF was initiated and to comply with the "Ten Year Rule", (assumption that the British Empire would not be involved in a great war during the next 10 years) laid down in government policy statement of August 1919,the RAF expenditure was budgeted at £17 million anually, sufficient it was thought to maintain 40 squadrons. By 1923 there was a further consideration by the politicians in that it was thought that the most likely future enemy would be the French and from this assumption,the Government sanctioned a Metropolitan Air Force to consist of 23 squadrons,14 to be bomber squadrons.Fighter protection was to be provided by a circle of RAF stations around London. This would be known as the 1923 Expansion with Yatesbury in the west and the clutch of RAF stations surrounding London was thought sufficient to protect the capital. Further expansion of the Royal Air Force was planned then in 1923 to be completed by 1928 with 52 squadrons (35 bomber and 17 fighter).This plan was not concluded as the December 1925 Locarno Pact, which settled the status of the Rhineland and the German/French and German/Belgian frontiers gave Britain the assurance, together, with severe financial restrictions that an increase in RAF strength was not deemed necessary. The "Ten Year" rule was abandoned in March 1932 and the failure of the League of Nations Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933 and the rise to power of Hitler convinced Britain that the future enemies would be Germany and Italy which gave rise to the RAF 1935 Expansion.Priority to expansion of the RAF was a priority for the Government and the RAF was well below the strength of 1923.For instance at the end of the 1933/1934 financial year,the RAF had on charge,316 bomber aircraft for 28 squadrons which was 7 squadrons below strength from the total aircraft numbers agreed in 1923. The 1935 Expansion saw a plan to lay down 100 permanent airfields and an attempt to upgrade the RAF aircraft inventory. Hitler's new Luftwaffe was found to have superior aircraft and "not surprisingly" it was establishd that the open cockpit Heyford and Hendon did not have a specification to compete over Germany.Can you imagine the Heyford attempting bomber operations against German targets from East Anglian bases?With a range of 920 miles with a bomb load of 1600 lbs,the Heyford had hardly the range to return to the nearest British base. Then if you look at the Order of Battle for Bomber Command on June 30 1937,you will find inferior aircraft with specifications that were not up to the mark for the future war.These were the Hind,Audax, Overstrand,Hendon,Heyford,Virginia,Harrow with the Blenheim,Anson,Battle and Whitley in short numbers coming into squadron service.Not exactly aircraft that would capable of competing against the Luftwaffe.The redeeming feature at this date being the state of the RAF at this time was that at least the civil engineering program had gone exremely well and all units were based at the new RAF permenent airfields. Looking at the Order of Battle for Bomber Command for September 1939,the Blenheim,Wellington,Whitley,Hampden equipped Bomber Command Groups but for the RAF AASF for France,the sole aircraft utilised, the inferior Battle was to give a disappointing performance and proved to be incapable of supporting the BEF even taking into consideration the swift advance of the Blitzkreig. As for Bomber Command it had to struggle with its twin engined aircraft at the expense of losing valuable aircrew, until the Air Minstry specifications,created post 1935, came through the design, production and tried and tested stages to adequately equip the bomber force which was to contributed so well to the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany. Regarding the German war economy.The ability to wage war successfully was based on the concept of swift successful campaigns.A gamble that victories would come first before the war economy became exhausted.Furthermore,occupied countries were made to pay German occupation costs.Even Vichy who thought themselves a "member of the club"had their country bled dry as any other overrun country and had to meet the occupation costs of the German occupation forces. Hitler's intentions was always to live off a defeated nations output whether it be raw materials,agricultural output and manpower.While occupied countries starved,foodstuffs were transported back to the Third Reich to keep its population properly fed.The attraction of the Ukraine was that it was considered Germany's bread basket for the future.
No. 58 58. "French women are too damned expensive." Prices are made by demand and supply. If there weren't so many men after the same commodity, prices would come down. If you want to see how much it costs a French woman to live, see question 86.
