Glorious and Hurricanes

When discussing using Hurricanes as carrier aircraft in another forum, I found this website discussing that issue.

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

Within the article was this picture. Note the caption.


I don’t believe that this picture is of No.46 Sqd after landing on the Glorious on 7 June. Instead I believe it is picture of Glorious taking the squadron to Norway on 26 May.

Haarr in The Battle for Norway p. 310 states the Hurricanes were immediately stored below in the hangar after landing. He also states on p.336 that the 28cm shell exploded amongst the Hurricanes stored below. The article itself states that once a Hurricane landed, it must be immediately struck down below to keep the flight deck clear for landings as the planes required the full length of the deck.

The flight deck must also be kept clear for Glorious to operate its own aircraft. It is likely that the picture is when Glorious was preparing to launch the Hurricanes. The planes have been spotted on deck so they can be launched in rapid succession. The other picture in the article showing a Hurricane taking off has the same sea state and weather. Note the aircraft spotted on the aft section of the flight deck.


A final point is who took the picture and how did it survive the sinking? It is not clear from Haarr which destroyers accompanied Glorious when she was detached to received the Hurricanes on 7 June. Ardent and Acosta had already returned from refueling, so it is likely they accompanied the carrier (Haarr p.309). All three ships were lost on 8 June, so who took the photo?

Thoughts?

v/r Jeff

 

Maybe some answers (or clues/pointers) within here Jeff.

46 Squadron C.O., Cross, Kenneth Brian Boyd (Oral history)

He discusses both taking off and landing on HMS Glorious.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80010259

Note that from the description I jumped straight into reel 2, but I really should listen to it all from reel 1 on.

Still working on the photos, hoping that they will be somewhere within IWM Collections too.

Kind regards, always,

Jim.

 

What a great resource. Quite an enjoyable listen. Cross confirmed the use of sandbags to weight the tails. No mention of whether the Hurricanes were below deck when the Twins attacked.

Thank you.

v/r Jeff

 

I think that you are correct Jeff.

John Winton's comprehensiive book "Carrier Glorious" agrees with Haarr that the RAF fighters were in the hanger when Glorious was bought to action by the two German battlecruisers.

It was determined at Bardufoss that with a 14lb sandbag in the tail section that a Hurricane could land safely within the length of Glorious's flight deck.

Glorious flew off four 823 Sqn Swordfish to Bardufoss to act as guides for the RAF fighters on the afternoon of 7th June.

About 7pm three 46 Squadron Hurricanes, including one flown by Cross himself, arrived over Glorious to see if they could land on without arrestor hooks. All three sucessfully landed using only 3/4 of the length of the flight deck.

At 1:15am on the 8th June the 10 remaining Gladiators of 263 Sqn began landing on the Glorious, these had no problems landing as the FAA used Sea Gladiators themselves. Then came seven more 46 Sqn Hurricanes, all of which also landed sucessfully.

I think Jeff is correct in his comments about the photo being taken earlier than 7/8 June as AFTER all the RAF fighters had landed Glorious landed on a Walrus and the remaining Swordfish guide aircraft, so the flightdeck aft would have to be clear to allow them to land.

From what I have seen of FAA flight deck procedures during the war if there was any deck park on a carrier it would have been forward not aft as they used a barrier when landing to (hopefully) prevent landing aircraft running into the deck park. Once forward of the barrier the returning aircraft would be rapidly taken down into the hanger via the forward aircraft lift.

For her final operation Glorious had a reduced air group for her own protection consisting of some Sea Gladiators of 802 Sqn and 6 Swordfish of 823 Sqn, so there was plenty of room for the RAF fighters to be stowed in the ships hangers. Glorious was capable of stowing and operating a maximum of 48 aircraft according to Conway's Fighting Ships 1922 - 46.

Carrier operations (FAA style) 1942:

 

See Winton's "Carrier Glorious"
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carrier-Gl...74171&sprefix=carrier+glorious,aps,324&sr=8-1

The flight deck was clear when the twins were spotted, until a couple of Swordfish were brought up on flight deck with the intention of flying a search. They were destroyed with the first hits.

All aircraft landing on Glorious had to be struck down into the immediately to clear the flight deck for the next. The reason was quite simple. The useable flight deck length of the flight deck was only 530ft. The mid-1930s extension over the quarterdeck was not useable. Its purpose was to smooth the airflow over the after part of the ship and it had a downward curve to its aft end. The landing circle which represented to planned touchdown point was in front of the after lift shortening the landing area even further.
MaritimeQuest - HMS Glorious Page 2


Glorious also did not have a crash barrier to prevent a landing aircraft from running into anything on the deck ahead of it. The first British carrier fitted with a crash barrier was Ark Royal which was fitted some time in 1939 after her completion. Without a crash barrier each aircraft had to be struck down before the next touched down.

 

Thank you Ewen, I think all the stuff I have seen about flight deck ops relates to Ark Royal (as in some scenes in Find/Fix/Strike above) or later fleet carriers.

 

Hi Jeff,

Hopefully this is of interest (from ADM 205/10 - 1st Sea Lord correspondence with PM).

According to a letter dated 20th Jan, 1941, sent to General Ismay with information re RN carrier fighter progress to pass on to the PM:

"
General Ismay.

With reference to the Prime Minister’s minute M.72/1 of 23/1/41, a report has been received from the Ministry of Aircraft Production which states that work to modify 12 Grumman Martlets to fold would take at least four months, and would depend on:-

(a) When the drawings of the folding wing design were received from the U.S.A. where the design has taken six months to perfect.
(b) Whether a completely new wing has to be made or whether the existing wing can be made to fold. The latter process would, if feasible, be almost as long as the construction of a new wing.

2. It has taken the designers six months to perfect the design for a folding Grumman, which is very complicated from a stress point of view and entails redesigning a large part of the aircraft.
D.N.A.D. held a conference with Air Ministry representatives on 28th January, 1941. All agreed that the figure of four months given by M.A.P. would be the minimum time required for the folding wing modification.

3. C. in C., Mediterranean, has already been offered and accepted a squadron of folding Grumman Martlets as soon as they become available (about April 1941).

4. As regards Brewsters, the 18 now at Alexandria are the only aircraft of this type available. They are non folding and have no arrester hooks. They can, however, be operated from EAGLE, and up to five from FORMIDABLE given sufficient wind speed. C. in C., Mediterranean, has surrendered 12 of these to the R.A.F. for Malta.

5. The need for higher speed carrier borne aircraft has long been appreciated, but the difficulty has lain in obtaining production of an aircraft capable of fulfilling all carrier operational requirements.
For many of their functions carrier borne fighters require long range and navigational facilities. A two seater fighter has therefore been the aim and was vindicated in the Norwegian campaign. It was realised that for defensive purposes a single seater fighter might be acceptable with consequent improvement in performance and the Sea Gladiator was introduced. This was still too slow and the possibility of producing a folding Hurricane or Spitfire was investigated early in 1940. After careful and exhaustive tests neither was found suitable.

In December 1939 Staff requirements for a single seater fighter were submitted for approval by D.N.A.D.

In July 1940 Board approval was obtained for an initial order of 100 N.11/40 Blackburn single seater fighters; production to be proceeded with when possible without detriment to more vital requirements.
Six weeks ago the First Lord had a personal conversation with Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Westbrook urging the need now for bringing the N.11/40 into immediate production. The difficulty is the demand for “Sabre” engines for the “Typhoons”.

6. To fill the gap before the production of the Blackburn fighters 26 Brewster fighters on order for Belgium were taken over (18 of these are now at Alexandria) and also 81 Grumman fighters on order for France. At the same time orders were placed for 100 Grummans modified to fold, an additional 150 being ordered later. Every effort has been made to overcome teething troubles with the guns and certain engine defects.

7. Naval opinion is still not decided whether a single seater fighter will be able to carry out all the functions required and the majority consider that both single seater and two seater types are necessary. In this connection it should be pointed out that fighter command do not operate their fighters more than forty miles from the coast, due to navigational difficulties. It is realised that a two seater inevitably means some sacrifice of speed – probably of the order of 80 knots – but the ability to return to the carrier is of paramount importance.

8. The present policy is to have both two seater and single seater fighters, and for this reason we have recently formed 3 Grumman squadrons with the intention that carriers can have a proportion of both types, the proportions being adjusted to suit the type of operation.

9. I have sent copies of this reply to the First Lord, Chief of Air Staff and Fifth Sea Lord, and D.N.A.D.).

30th January, 1941."

Regards

Tom

 

This thread took me back to 2022 when I bought 'Ministries of Deception: Cover-ups in Whitehall' by Tim Slessor, which has a chapter 'An Accident of War' on HMS Glorious, Ardent and Casta - his father had served on HMS Glorious. pgs.174-227.

This book has not been cited here before.

The chapter opens with two quotes:

From Capt. Stephen Roskill author of the RN Official History of WW2

By Vice Admiral Sir Louis Bailly, RN 1932-1972.

I also found a review in 2022 and now cite it in part:

By Tam Dayell (then a MP) and behind a The Spectator paywall: The price of admission

The book appears to be still available. See for an example: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Ministries-Deception-Cover-ups-Tim-Slessor/dp/1854108778

Yes, there are other threads here, at a glance I cannot identify one where there is a discussion on the sinkings. I used an online search with: "hms glorious" site:ww2talk.com

 

I didn't know many of the circumstances behind the sinking until I read Haarr's book. The fact D'Oyly-Hughes wasn't flying any patrols is frankly astounding. Beautiful weather in the late afternoon and not a plane in the sky. It does make a case for why aviators should command carriers.

The entire issue between the captain and the air group commander Heath appears to pettiness on the captain's part.

The 46 Squadron blokes got caught in the middle. They did an amazing thing and got buggered for doing it.

 

When it comes to the loss of Glorious we will never know the full story because the main actor, D'Oyly-Hughes went down with his ship. Many questions remain unanswered some of which may have implicated other more senior officers to a greater or lesser extent. But a few things need to be borne in mind.

1. Admiralty intelligence was completely unaware of S&G being at sea, having somehow lost track of them in their radio analysis over the preceding days.
2. The nearest U-boats were east of Shetland (1) west of the Orkneys & Shetlands (3) well south of her position when intercepted. Their were only a of the total of 20 U-boats at sea that day spread from just off the German coast en route to/from patrol areas to off the Portugese coast. But Glorious was zig-zagging and her speed of 17 knots would have allowed her escorts ASDIC to work.
3. Glorious was short of fuel, being the principal reason for her being detached. During most of the Norwegian campaign ships kept having to return to the Shetlands or Scapa Flow to refuel. Replenishment at sea for the RN, while possible, was not the regular thing it became later in WW2.
4. She was far enough off the coast that a defensive fighter CAP, as it later became known, was not required. So the only suitable aircraft for a search were her 6 Swordfish. Once smoke on the horizon was spotted, two were brought to the flight deck and their crews were being briefed when the first shells fell. Too little, too late.
5. The whole ships crew were looking forward to leave. Torpedoes were being broken down and warheads returned to the magazines.
6. Contrary to many accounts, D'Oyly-Hughes was a trained pilot, holding a civil licence.

As for having a trained aviator in command of a carrier, that is much more of an American thing and not RN. But it was and is far easier to do in the USN. And you don't simply go from being a flier to getting command of a carrier.

At one point I looked at the career paths of early WW2 US carrier captains & task group commanders. I quickly realised that their aviation related careers inter-war allowed them to climb in rank with postings to increasingly senior aviation positions in Naval Air Stations, flying boat squadrons and on seaplane tenders not just on the few aircraft carriers in service.

The RN's Royal Naval Air Service was amalgamated with the RFC to form the RAF on 1 April 1919. Almost all the RN's experienced aviation personnel went with it. The Fleet Air Arm of the RAF was formed in 1924 to be responsible for all flying from RN ships. It became an increasingly acrimonious relationship over the next decade, and one where the RN only began to get control of naval aviation back with the Inskip Report of late 1937, with full control being achieved in May 1939. But everything other than that related to flying from ships remained with the RAF as part of Coastal Command.

Within the command structure on the carrier their was a senior officer to advise the captain on aviation related matters. That was JB Heath's role on Glorious. Unfortunately he and D'Oyly-Hughes clashed over a proposed operation which resulted in the latter wanting the former court martialled. It would be better described as a "professional disagreement" but with the senior officer less well inclined to take the advice of the better qualified junior ranking officer put there to advise him on aviation related matters.


In the FAA, inter-war the RAF supplied over 50% of the pilots and the senior officers advising carrier captains on aircraft operations interwar. The RN supplied the Observers, who were part of a carrier's complement not the squadron's. All shore bases were RAF and we had virtually no seaplane carriers. But all this meant that a naval officer wanting an aviation career could only rise to the rank of Lt Commander as leader of a squadron before having to transfer to another speciality.

As WW2 went on, RN officers who had been naval fliers in 1939/40, rose through the ranks to become Air Group commanders, Commander Flying and even carrier captains.

 

Tom
An interesting find. But a few observations.

In relation to the Martlet & folding wings, the 100 aircraft order was an option under the French contract that Britain took over in June 1940, which was exercised later that year. As ordered they were to have fixed wings and the first 10 were delivered as such in March 1941, subsequently being labelled Martlet III.

When Britain learned of Grumman's "sto--wing" it negotiated a contract change to delay the remaining 90 so the new wing could be fitted. Grumman didn't fly the folding wing until April 1941 with production starting a few months later. Meanwhile it continued building fixed wing F4F-3/3A for the USN. The USN agreed that Grumman should then give priority to building 50 of the folding wing version for the RN with the remainder following in 1942. The first batch were put aboard Illustrious in Dec 1941 when she sailed for Britain after her US repairs.

In March 1942 the captain of Illustrious reported to the Admiralty that his engineers had managed to rewing a fixed wing Martlet I with folding wings which must have come from a folding wing Martlet II damaged in a deck landing accident. This was done while she was on passage south from Freetown to the IO.

The Brewster B-339B for Belgium, 33 of which came to Britain, were as noted not fitted with arrester gear. At least one or perhaps two were decklanded on Eagle when she operated out of Alexandria in early 1941. The photographic evidence suggests they used their undercarriages to catch the arrester wires. Given the relatively weak nature of the undercart on this type, that was not something to be recommended.

Really interested in the possibility of 5 being given to Formidable. There has been a heated debate elsewhere about when the Illustrious class were fitted with outriggers to support tails of fixed wing fighters beyond the edge of the flight deck. 5 is the number Formidable had by the time of Operation Torch when she had Seafires. But the mystery is when they were fitted. Do you have anything more on this?

Regards
Ewen

 

The debate about outriggers on Tully's Port starts here. One must be logged in the read the thread. Much good info. Quite long:

https://propnturret.com/tully/viewtopic.php?p=36553&hilit=outriggers#p36553

There is a second, much older and shorter thread here:

https://propnturret.com/tully/viewtopic.php?t=4415&hilit=outriggers

Pista! Jeff

 

Yep. I've participated in both those discussions