(adamcotton @ Jan 1 2006, 06:21 AM) [post=43856]"I find virtually all denigrations of Patton to be based more on an "amalgum" as you say of the movie Patton and a pro-Monty envy, than a specific knowledge of the man and the details of his fighting. If you want to know the truth, read his letters and his diary. One does not lie about tactical operations and reasons for it in their diary as it is a personal book documenting history for later review. There is no reason to put on a show for ones’ self. The Patton Papers has letters and diary entries and explains the contexts that Patton comments on. They are highly detailed." Jimbo, it is rather naieve of you to state that diaries, by their nature, do not lie! You are obviously unaware that Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig (commander of the BEF) kept meticulous day-by-day diaries during the First World War. He subsequently edited and re-wrote these before publishing them for public consumption after the war - I wonder why? [/b] Adam, Patton died a few months after the war. I doubt he could have edited his notes to where they would not have been easily contradicted by his superiors and subordinates that he wrote about. In addition most of the letters in The Patton Paper were letters sent from Patton to others though there were a lot posted the other way and some posted about Patton where Patton was not even involved like letters from Ike to Marshall and vice-versa. Lastly the compilation was done by Martin Blumenson a member of Patton's command staff. It would have to be a co-conspiracy where both men were not afraid of being made fools out of things that would be blatantly obvious. But in general if you wish to deceive people by modifying history, you would do it with giving one historian too much esteem as a historian only knows what is publicly available to know about any subject and this is subject to propagating errors as well. I don’t say that everything read in a diary is true but I do say it was what the person believed and understood at the time. The more times something gets “retold” the more it deviates from reality. So I disagree with you that I am naïve to place a good deal of credence on interdepartmental correspondence and personal notes of a man that could be so easily contradicted. Since historians rarely agree, then that means all of them are wrong except possibly one of them on a given subject and perhaps they all are. This we know. So to put credence on historians is what really deserves the label “naïve”. (Max (UK) @ Jan 1 2006, 08:01 AM) [post=43860]</div><div class='quotemain'> You better stick with the slapping incidents. They are your only chance to get a lick in on Patton. If you want to know the truth, read his letters and his diary. [/b] You've obviously done extremely limited and biased reading on Patton/Monty, "Jimbo". If I felt it was worth the time, I would join in this argument. Alas, I don't. That line about his letters and diary is a classic. Hilarious !! [/b] Conspicuous by its absence is any intellection substance to your posts, Max.
You really need to do a little more study of the attack on the Battle of the Bulge and the counterattack of Patton. Rundstedt was not involved in the operational conduct of the Battle of the Bulge, a fact you're obviously not aware of. Or maybe you can give us one single operational order he gave during that campaign ? The Germans ahead of Patton were not refitting they were running and abandoning armor that could not get away fast enough. The fact they were moving in retreat made them prey to fighter/bombers. And all of a sudden they stopped running and god knows how, they managed to launch a counterstroke at Arracourt. Didn't you just say that "Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army had been refitting since the end of August"? Make up your mind Exx. Was it the complete German army there or no one at all? Geez... You need reading courses as well one might say. I was referring to 2 different situations: the German counterstroke at Arracourt in september, and Patton's offensive in november. Obviously, september is not november, though that might surprise you. Like I said, you don't know what you are talking about. Von Runstedt led the breakthrough in the Ardennes and got stopped at Bastone where Patton decimated his forces. You better start at the beginning Exx. Lol. In fact, Im beginning to wonder if you know anything at all about that battle. The above claim is a wonderful piece of uneducated crap to say the least. Or maybe, you can quote one single book about that Battle mentionning the presence of Von Rundstedt in the Ardennes area during the battle ? The Germans were in retreat. Even after reinforcing it Patton's (Walker's) XX corps moved up to the border of it. The Germans knicknamed Patton’s XX Corps “the Ghost Corps”. Funny that when it comes to really dealing with facts, like German units positioning, you just bravely avoid further details. The “late” November-early December offensive of Patton’s caused a fall of the reinforced Metz in 12 days and drove the Germans 60 miles back across the Siegfried Line in 36 hours with tremedous losses to the Germans. 12 days for an entire army facing at best one German corps. Guess why the Germans werent that impressed. Exx, I suggest you quit surfing and start reading some books on the Northwestern campaign in Europe. I would for sure take your advice, as soon as you can prove to everyone that Rundstedt was involved in some way in the operational conduct of the Battle of the Bulge. Until then, it seems obvious you're the one having troubles with facts.
(Glider @ Jan 1 2006, 09:15 AM) [post=43865]Trying to look at this impartially I would suggest that Patton is the better attacking General. There is no doubt that Monty missed opportunities that Patton would have exploited. However I believe that if you were fighting a defensive battle then Monty would be your man. In defence you need that attention to detail, careful allocation of resources and the ability to motivate your troops to believe that after reverses that they can win. Whilst both could motivate their troops, Patton wouldn't have had the patience needed for that kind of battle. His reliance on offence could easily have seen him expose his troops and led to defeat. As Jimbo pointed out its a problem that Patton saw in himself but he had been able to attack in another area and impose himself on the enemy. In a true defensive battle such as the Germans faced in Russia he probably wouldn't have had that luxury. The Diaries are illuminating but diaries from anyone by there nature, tend to have a bias, as do a persons history when written by that person. For example to blame the Battle of the Bulge on Market Garden is pushing things a bit. Market Garden was stopped by the troops in place, the problem being that Monty didn't believe that they were there. It should also be remembered that Monty's actions during the Battle of the Bulge were spot on and I don't feel that he is given enough credit for that. What he said and the impression that he gave that he personally saved the day were way off mark, but his actions in the heat of the moment were good. It should be remembered that Market Garden was a gamble worth taking. If the final bridge had been relieved and secured there was a significant chance that the war would have been shortened considerably. The tragedy is that these two generals wouldn't/couldn't work together. We all know that the releiving forces were little more than a day late. If Patton had been given charge of the relieving forces its my belief that they would have got there in time even if he had been forced to kick them all the way personally. The original thread was about Montgomery and was he a liability. In summary my view is that he wasn't a liability but he wasn't as exceptional as he was made out to be. [/b] As far as Market Garden it’s affect on creating the Ardennes Offensive is two fold. First it stopped Patton from crossing the Siegfried Line and the Rhine River where a dash through the forest could never have been done. To wait for the weather of winter that allowed them to group such an offensive would have meant they would have done it deep into Germany. There are not too many places to do it there and you wouldn’t have had 90% of that army in the first place. The Ardennes was tactically useless and the whole offensive was predicated on capturing Antwerp which they would have been several hundreds of miles from and would never have been attempted. The second problem was one of supply that we needed from Antwerp in September. Market Garden delayed this about two and a half months. Market Garden was not necessary and it was actually “three bridges too far” in my honest opinion. It was not a tactical imperative as it was sold to be but rather a chance for Monty to get out of his defensive posture that he had his forces in constantly bogged down and relatively ineffective. Monty was simply afraid that Patton was going to run away with the show and Ike didn’t have the backbone to discipline Monty or relieve him. Patton could have crossed into Germany faster. He was 10 days away by the current run he was on. Monty was defeated by (as Angie claims) one and one half worn out Panzer divisions (9th and 10th Panzer) when he had the entire 30th corps, three airborne divisions and all the air support and supply he could request. To think that this would have been the first time Monty would not have been stalemated and bogged down by his propensity to go on the defensive when he had the initiative in the entire war, especially when the Germans would have moved up their armor from the south is hardly an expectation. You do realize the comments on Monty saving the day was a terrible affront to the Americans that won that battle as well as the ones that died there? Did you know that Monty virtually didn’t even participate in the Ardennes with his entire forces because he was constantly “preparing” the entire month. Patton said he made a bad mistake by making VIII Corps a passive front? Patton called him a “tired little fart” and said Monty was so disappointed that he didn’t understand that war requires taking risks and would never take them. Did you know that when Ike went against Bradley’s wishes by putting First and Ninth Armies under Monty (for fear of their supply being cut off) offensive had already stalled? Did you know that Monty even refused to counterattack with these divisions after the offensive petered out letting Germans escape back to Germany? Despite this Monty claimed he “rescued” the Americans and it incensed Ike Brad and Patton, Bradley so much that he went to Ike and said that if he did not severely discipline Monty that Bradley would resign. Ike in his spineless fashion simply went to straighten it out in the press but the press simply was not interested in it. Then Winston Churchill seeing a new war was about to break out, stepped in and went before Parliament with the famous rebuke of the British for taking credit for an American battle in which many Americans died. The worst part of Monty was not his soulless greed for fame, but the fact that it was his incompetence that enabled the Ardennes Offensive in the first place. He is as much to blame as Hitler for killing those Americans and he has the audacity to pull that detestable stunt? Monty’s legend is not supported by his campaigns. You cannot have every one of your operations, even small ones, fall under intense criticism and dubiousness and be considered a great leader. In my opinion the propped up legend of Monty robs blind the other British legends because it makes others view the accolades of the true legends as equally fabricated. That means he should be a liability to the British WWII pundits as well. I can look at all the special ops the British soldiers executed, the SAS etc, and tell that they are “ballsy” and it is ironic that they of all people would give so much reverence to man so undeserving. This is not a personal attack on Monty, its an honest and sincere discussion of reality. I have nothing personal against him, I never knew the man. I really do think his legend is a tragedy to the British who helped win defeat Germany. His was the mentality of WWI static warfare. Some experience is bad, really bad. You look at the British forces today in Iraq, their leaders don’t pussyfoot around there. Remember the rescue of the British soldiers held in captive Basra? Need I say more?
Monty was defeated by (as Angie claims) one and one half worn out Panzer divisions (9th and 10th Panzer) when he had the entire 30th corps, three airborne divisions and all the air support and supply he could request. Actually there were more than 2 SS kampfgruppen involved in Market Garden: Army Group B Commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model Fifteenth Army - General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen LXVIII Corps - General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer 346th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Erich Deister 711th Static Division - Generalleutnant Josef Reihert 719th Coastal Division - Generalleutnant Karl Sievers LXXXVIII Corps - General der Infaterie Hans Reinhard Kampfgruppe "Chill" - Generalleutnant Kurt Chill 59th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Walter Poppe 245th Infantry Division - Oberst Gerhard Kegler 712th Static Division - Generalleutnant Friedrich Wilhelm Neuman First Parachute Army - General der Fallschirmtruppen Kurt Student LXXXVI Corps - General der Infanterie Hans von Obstfelder 176th Infantry Division - Oberst Christian Landau Kampfgruppe "Walther" 6th Parachute Regiment - Oberstleutnant Friedrich Freiherr von der Heydte 107th Panzer Brigade - Major Frieher von Maltzahn Division "Erdmann" - Generalleutnant Wolfgang Erdmann II Parachute Corps - General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugene Meindl XII SS Corps - Obergruppenführer Kurt von Gottberg 180th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Bernard Kloster Kemper 190th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Ernst Hammer 363rd Volkgrenadier Division - Generalleutnant Augustus Dettling
(jimbotosome @ Jan 1 2006, 06:56 PM) [post=43876]Conspicuous by its absence is any intellection substance to your posts, Max. [/b] Like I said, you're not worth the time. Your view is typical and biased. Been there, done that.
Jimbo I wish that you would read what I wrote and replied instead of repeating the one speech that you have. I should remind you that I agree with a number of your points, just not the way you put them across. You cannot deny that had Market Garden worked then the war could have been shortened and for that basis it was a plan worth trying. The Tragedy was that if the two had worked together I believe it would have worked and I don't know how many lives would have been saved. I cannot help feeling that you are not looking at this neutrally. If Patton had dreamed it up you would probably have said things differently. Of course I realise that what Monty said was way out of line. I said the following in my previous posting 'What he said and the impression that he gave that he personally saved the day were way off mark'. You didn't have to spend ages typing it out again. However to Blame Monty or anyone else for the Ardennes offensive strikes of desperation. The Ardennes offensive happened because of incompetence in the US Military in a) not seeing it coming, images/smilies/default/cool.gif not taking the most basic precautions wether or not you knew it was coming, c) A total failure of the Command Structure in ensuring that things were kept tight, d) a reaction close to panic in that command structure when the storm hit. You were saved by the courage and resilience of a small number of ordinary foot soldiers who fought against the most incredible odds. To blame any other country or person for the Ardennes offensive is indefensible. War is war. You play the cards that you have been dealt. Once Market Garden was over there were a new set of cards. There were months between the end of Market Garden and the start of the Ardennes. The Germans had time to monitor and plan for the offensive well, suprise so did the US Army. The Germans used that time, the US Army generals didn't and the foot sloggers paid the price. I agree with most of your points about Patton but not trying to blame the Ardennes on someone else. Interesting point. If Monty had been in charge of the area that was attacked with his eye for detail and being prepared. Its my belief that the German offensive would have been more effectively dealt with.
(Glider @ Jan 1 2006, 04:42 PM) [post=43890]Jimbo I wish that you would read what I wrote and replied instead of repeating the one speech that you have. I should remind you that I agree with a number of your points, just not the way you put them across. You cannot deny that had Market Garden worked then the war could have been shortened and for that basis it was a plan worth trying. The Tragedy was that if the two had worked together I believe it would have worked and I don't know how many lives would have been saved. I cannot help feeling that you are not looking at this neutrally. If Patton had dreamed it up you would probably have said things differently. [/b] Glider, all due respect, I don’t think you and I agree on a number of points at all. You and I take completely different approaches to understanding. You take a de facto approach to find the historians you like and follow their analysis. Me I take the facts that are not in question and the claims that are, and do my own analysis using logic to filter out the rhetoric masqueraded as fact by historians. I trust my own instincts for logic than accepting the conclusions of someone I don’t know who may be (and often is) a moron. If you follow my posts you will notice that my signature is that historians are far more “religious” than logical. They are trying to sell their “spin” on a given subject. Who wants to read “yet another book” on any subject? Historians therefore need to put on a dog and pony show or people simply wouldn’t buy their book or take the time to read it. This means historians MUST stand under proper scrutiny and not accepted for their lofty reputation as though there is some historian aristocracy. Recently one historian stirred a pot here because he said the British soldiers were somewhat useless. Am I to use this idiot’s prating to reach conclusions about British soldiers? No. Why? Because it is logically baseless. Blanket statements like that contradict common sense not just conventional wisdom. I did read your assessment, I simply disagreed with your conclusions and your claim that we were in agreement. Nothing personal but then again this is what a discussion forum like this is good for. If the two armies were separate like every American commander wanted then I could blame or credit Monty only for his own battles and the same with the US battles. They handle it properly in Iraq. They give each Allied army its own sector and avoid overlap and interaction of the divisions that cause confusion and weakness in one or the other. American division in WWII should NEVER have been moved under Monty. Coordination is ok but the philosophies are too different. It cost more lives of Allies than it saved. Yes, I can indeed deny that had Market Garden have worked then the war could have been shortened, and as such was NOT worth the try, for that is the very essence of being neutral, looking outside the box. As a matter of fact I created a thread called “How Do You Know It Would Have Been Faster?, Market Garden "shortcut"” under Battle Specifics (#2615 I think) where I make a case against this fallacy. I won’t bore folks with the details of it but you can go there and try to pick it apart if you wish. But aside from that I doubt there is a single person on this forum that in their heart of hearts would not expect Monty to get bogged down as he did the entire campaign even when he was facing a lot less resistance than he would have at Holland. He had two bridges and was in position to take the third before he was shut down. Sure he had wasted 2nd Paratroopers but he still had a full Corp there and two extra paratroop divisions. He could have also turned right a bridge short and drove into Germany. This rigid inflexibility that characterized Monty's style prevented him from doing anything but his original objective. And even if he had had that “all strategic” third Arnhem Bridge, he still had 3 major things he overlooked that doomed the operation. No supply through Antwerp, no reserves to keep 30th from begin decimated, and a crap-load of German divisions moving to his rear capturing 30th Corps by cutting their communications off. The operation failing in the early stages actually was serendipitous because it could have been a major disaster tactically had it have succeeded in that stage. (Glider @ Jan 1 2006, 04:42 PM) [post=43890]Of course I realise that what Monty said was way out of line. I said the following in my previous posting 'What he said and the impression that he gave that he personally saved the day were way off mark'. You didn't have to spend ages typing it out again. However to Blame Monty or anyone else for the Ardennes offensive strikes of desperation. The Ardennes offensive happened because of incompetence in the US Military in a) not seeing it coming, images/smilies/default/cool.gif not taking the most basic precautions wether or not you knew it was coming, c) A total failure of the Command Structure in ensuring that things were kept tight, d) a reaction close to panic in that command structure when the storm hit. You were saved by the courage and resilience of a small number of ordinary foot soldiers who fought against the most incredible odds. To blame any other country or person for the Ardennes offensive is indefensible. [/b] Glider, sorry to have to say this, and I mean no personal disrespect, but that is the most uninformed assessment of the reasons for Ardennes Offensive I have read to date (not saying someone out there hasn’t screwed it up more, I have just ever read one). I am not sure if you know nothing about it (you did get on me for remarking on the obvious above) or just refuse to consider the events objectively. But at the risk of telling you something you already know I will give it a shot. The possibility of the Ardennes Offensive was predicated on two critical principles, enough days of overcast weather to avoid complete decimation or detection by air and a weak point to attack. The Ardennes was that point because as the outcome proved it was “not tank country” and was used for resting troops who had been in long combat as well as blooding new troops. It was strategically the least logical and tactical place to attack the “get this” 600 mile long American front. The British had a 100 mile front. It was true the offensive was a suicide mission and as such unexpected and the troops that would have been destroyed later were destroyed sooner. As far as the reason the assembly and offensive was not seen, is that reconnaissance was normally done by air. Due to the string of overcast days this could not take place. According to Bradley, the American command was getting recon reports of forces assembling all up and down the entire front. There was nothing about the Ardennes recon that distinguished it from any other. Normally air recon clarifies the situation (except when it is ignored like in Market Garden) but in this case there was very little air due to weather conditions. But, there is one factor that was the most crucial of all to enabling the Ardennes Offensive (as I pointed out but you failed to see). That was that fact the American army MUST be on the west side of the forest for this to occur. Impossible because Patton was already to the Saar at the start of September you say? No, I say, enter Monty. Ok Glider, in your own words, why were the American troops slaughtered at the Ardennes? Come on, be honest. Why if they had advanced to that longitudally, over three months earlier at rapid speed where they not DEEP into Germany and atleast at the Elbe River as they would be three months beyond that point? Come, on, you can say it. I’ll start you off…M____t G____n. You fill in the blanks please. And who dreamed up this master plan? More help: M___y. And who did I blame in the original post for this fiasco? I_e or as Patton called him Divine Destiny. Incidentally there was no panic in the Ardennes Offensive. Certainly there was concern (believe it or not American generals care about the wellbeing of their men too). The only problem they had was realizing the magnitude of it because it was coming through the most illogical place to hold an offensive, the Ardennes Forest. WWII ground forces were woefully dependent on air, in this case for recon (I have also argued this counter-traditionally as well). You can fault Bradley if you wish for not reacting faster with enough troops but then again had it have been a feign, and if he overreacted with moving forces too quick, some other front would have been in deep trouble (that's the point of a feigned attack). But then again, why in the “HE-double hockey sticks” were American forces STILL in France/Belgium? They had no underground intelligence since the Germans were now fighting from Germany. Now going back to the previous post which you found with contempt (did you read it?) I stated that the German Offensive could not have been launched with the Allies deep into German territory. There would have been no hidden assembly areas and more importantly as I stated as the Germans would have lost at least 90% of their forces. One cannot assemble divisions that had been destroyed and captured. My claims are well thought through. They are not willy-nilly off-hand comments. Now since you want to defend Market Garden, let’s take the gloves off (it’s a metaphor). Berlin suffered dearly. Not just from prolonged bombing but from the fact that in Feb 1945, FDR (almost dead at the time) let Stalin walk all over himself and Churchill because he didn’t have the strength to resist much to Churchill's chagrin. He gave away Berlin to the Russians. The Russians were reputed to have raped all the women that stayed in Berlin and shot those that escaped and they tried starving the whole city out after the war which necessitated the Berlin Airlift. What operation extended this war to keep Patton from Berlin months before Malta so it could be given away by a dying president? (do you need me to do the fill in the blanks thing again?) BTW: We also can debate whether the Aryans or the Mongels were the more wicked "race" to use an "evolution" term but that tends to get the thread locked. I don’t pull punches Glider. If you want to play games, there is a forum for that too (they’ve got everything here!). The problem with your assessment of Market Garden is one that is common to most WWII pundits. They look only at the direct costs of Market Garden. There is a business term called “opportunity cost” (I am sure “spidge” knows the term well) it is never considered probably because people really don’t think that deep about their assessments. Opportunity cost is the cost of not doing something. If you sum the cost of Market Garden along with the opportunity lost by halting Patton rather than letting him to rush to Berlin, then you get the true risk of doing Market Garden. This is why you should always attack. Sure there is an occasional situation when you must dig in, especially when the enemy is attacking in an overwhelming force, but then again as Patton believed only passive defense can get you into that position in the first place. That was the lot of the enemy to him. Always attack because the sooner you destroy your enemy the less bad things can happen as I have shown you. Time is the enemy of the stronger. (Glider @ Jan 1 2006, 04:42 PM) [post=43890]War is war. You play the cards that you have been dealt. Once Market Garden was over there were a new set of cards. There were months between the end of Market Garden and the start of the Ardennes. The Germans had time to monitor and plan for the offensive well, suprise so did the US Army. The Germans used that time, the US Army generals didn't and the foot sloggers paid the price. [/b] No, sometimes you have to play the cards someone else swaps you. It was not Pattons idea to sit in France for the fall and winter of 1944. The cards dealt him were a breakout that could not be stopped until it reached Berlin just as it did when resumed in Jan 1945. You have a baseless claim to say that the US generals didn’t use that time. They were either out of fuel or supporting Monty’s great strategy of how to get an army “bogged down” in Holland instead of France or Belgium. Patton would have been across the Rhine driving to the Ruhr if Monty had done is assigned job and taken the Antwerp port to shorten the supply routes, when instead he was trying to capture a bridge with a Corp while Patton was only 10 days away. It took Monty two months to get enough men killed in Holland to retreat. By that time Patton would have been flying up the Autobahn ignoring the speed limits. This is not even considering how many people would died either from starvation or slaughter in the concentration camps. No, Glider, the opportunity costs of Market Garden are much higher than you can begin to imagine. (Glider @ Jan 1 2006, 04:42 PM) [post=43890]I agree with most of your points about Patton but not trying to blame the Ardennes on someone else. Interesting point. If Monty had been in charge of the area that was attacked with his eye for detail and being prepared. It’s my belief that the German offensive would have been more effectively dealt with. [/b] You know Glider, you could just as easily look at it as though Monty is trying to blame his facilitation of the Ardennes Offensive on the allies who were dumb enough to fall for his Market Garden campaign. It is strictly a matter of how deep you want to analyze “cause and effect” and the domino theory of time sequence. If you want to discard the opportunities lost and disregard the damage that delay brings in war then you and I would probably agree Monty had nothing to do with it. It was Patton that understood tactics and warfare in such detail that he predicted the entire progression of the start of the Italian campaign a week before it started including the German counterattack down the Sele at Salerno. Patton studied war and history almost exclusively from the age of 16. Sure he was very offensive oriented but that did not mean he couldn’t master a defense. Just look at his defense at Kassarine Pass that turned into a massive counterattack that drove Rommel back through from El Guetar all the way to be defeated at the Mareth Line. Since Patton was never driven out of a single defensive position he was dug into no matter what attacks the Germans threw up against him, and did not have a single retreat the tactical entire war, I would say he was as good at defense as he was at offense. Tactical knowledge it tactical knowledge. As a side discussion, I think we all would like to know what would have happened in Italy if Patton had kept command of Seventh Army. I believe that because of the ease with which Patton had cruised in North Africa and how fast he raced across Sicily that they suspected it was a case of the Germans being weak rather than Patton's prowess and figured that Clarke could handle Italy just as well while Patton helped plan OVERLORD. I guess we will never know. A better cliche would have been to Ike who withheld Patton from OVERLORD for disciplinary reasons (that's a strictly American Army command principle) and that is "You don't throw the baby out with the bath water".
Well it's a new year and I've have my first good laugh reading this thread. Thank you. Of course, if this is not a joke, there could be enough here to fertilise the Amazonian Rain Forest for the next ten years? For example, the Ardennes offensive was not caused by Monty, it was caused by Ike and/or whoever may have influenced him. Monty saved Uncle Sam's butt. On 7th December 1944, at Monty's suggestion, Ike held a conference at Maastrict involving himself, Monty, Tedder and Bradley. Patton wasn't there because he was too junior. The object was to determine a plan of action. I'm not going to type out the pages, but suffice it to state in Monty's plan was; "12 and 21 Army Groups both to operate north of the Ardennes The right flank of 12 Army Group to be about Prum." Among Eisenhower's decisions; "....he did not agree that we should shift the whole of 12 Army Group to the north of Prum................12 Army Group would stretch from Orsoy - astride the Ardennes - to Worms". This placed Bradley south in Luxembourg. With Bradley's 12 Army Group split the resultant gap in-between of some 90 miles (the Ardennes) covered by 8 American Corps which consisted of four Divisions under Middleton. 16 December Germans launch the Ardennes offensive. 10:30 hrs on 20th December, Eisenhower phones Monty and orders him to take immediate command of all American forces on the northern flank of the 'bulge'. This put two Armies under Monty, the inexperienced Ninth Army (Simpson) and the experienced First Army (Hodges). Within 30 minutes Monty had Dempsey and Crerar, from his 21st Army Group, in his HQ to implement a plan of action. 12 noon Monty left his HQ for First Army HQ where he found the situation desperate. He deployed British units to fight along side the Americans, particularly the Ninth, established a field communications network, and had the whole of British 30 Corps (Horrocks) to cover the route to Brussels/Antwerp in case the Germans continued the breakthrough - actually, Monty deployed 30 Corps before getting Ike's phone call! (don't you just love a real Field Marshall). Monty also had the 6th Airborne Div. deployed. After stabalising the situation, Monty mounted a counter attack on 3rd January and on 8th January Gen. Model was given permission to withdraw. So, in the real world Patton only helped with a bit of the battle, but hey, if I were an American film company that's the only bit I'd want to make a film about as well. And, to pre-empt a slagging of Horrocks, he commanded the American freshman 84th Division with his 43rd Wessex Division to take Geilenkirchen in the Siegfried Line, as a favour for Gen. Simpson (US Ninth Army) - done 18th/19th November and held till German counter attacks desisted. View attachment 1443 Of course, the whole episode should never have happened if Monty's plan for disposition after crossing the Seine and the invasion of Germany had been followed. He drew this up as Normandy was concluding and discussed it with Bradley on 17th August. The principals were, for his 21 Army Group and Bradley's 12 Group to move north together with Monty on the coast side and Bradley inland. Between them they would have forty Divisions which would be powerful enough to take on anything. The Dragoon Force who landed in the south of France would move on Nancy and then Saarland. In Belgium a powerful airforce would be established, bridgeheads would be secured across the Rhine before winter began and industry in the Ruhr seized. Bradley was in full agreement. However, on 21st August Ike held a staff meeting and declared that as of 1st September he was taking personal command of all Army Groups, and 12 Army Group was to head east towards Metz and Saarland and link up with Dragoon Force. Before orders were issued, Monty argued his case and the values of a concentrated blow and the pooling and concentration of resources and logistics. He also pointed out that engagement on such a huge front would entail virtually everyone fighting all the time, totally inadequate reserves and piecemeal depletion of supplies. The Ruhr would not be achieved by winter and the weather would bog-down many forces not halted for other reasons. The war would not be ended as quickly as it could be. In Monty's plan there should be one commander, and, if Ike felt American public opinion was a stumbling block he should give command to Bradley whom Monty would serve under. Eisenhower stuck with the 'broad front' policy and, as is now know, the things Monty said were likely to happen did. Whatever plan may have been the best, it wasn't this one. No.9
At the end of the day after market garden was over whoever dealt the cards the situation was how it was. even you in your posting have not denied that a period of Months elapsed before the Ardennes. The german attack wasn't dreamed up in a few days. I know that it relied on a long period of bad weather but its planning, organisation nad positioning of troops took time. All that activity over a period of weeks was totally missed. To say the USA were not ready because the weather was bad and it was an illogical place to attack is no excuse. In war you should always be ready, defences should always be in place and this is what stops troops being slaughtered. Pickets and recce should always be done. With all the advantages that the USA had, there was no excuse. I have also said a number of times that Monty's action during the battle were spot on, which you have not commented on and the posting by No 9 outlines brilliantly. Once again I repeat that Patton was the better attacking General but Monty was your man for defence. At the end of the day after market garden was over whoever dealt the cards the situation was how it was. even you in your posting have not denied that a period of Months elapsed before the Ardennes. The german attack wasn't dreamed up in a few days. I know that it relied on a long period of bad weather but its planning, organisation nad positioning of troops took time. All that activity over a period of weeks was totally missed. To say the USA were not ready because the weather was bad and it was an illogical place to attack is no excuse. In war you should always be ready, defences should always be in place and this is what stops troops being slaughtered. Pickets and recce should always be done. With all the advantages that the USA had, there was no excuse. I have also said a number of times that Monty's action during the battle were spot on, which you have not commented on and the posting by No 9 outlines brilliantly. Once again I repeat that Patton was the better attacking General but Monty was your man for defence.
(jimbotosome @ Jan 1 2006, 05:41 PM) [post=43871](angie999 @ Jan 1 2006, 08:02 AM) [post=43861](jimbotosome @ Jan 1 2006, 02:10 AM) [post=43844] Patton had many weaknesses. Fortunately, few of them affected his ability as a combat leader. [/b] What abilities would they be? He was good at rapid movement in undefended territory, often ignoring logistics in the process, but no better than average in actual battle. Of course, he though he was the best, but then he would. [/b] Angie, the inference here is a common one and comes mainly from the those with a favor for Monty. The inference is that Hitler didn't care if Patton destroyed Germany and conquered Berlin quickly as long as he could keep Monty tied up at Caen. In doing this he never moved any armor to stop the breakout and he was satisfied with holding Monty at bay while his empire fell to Patton. Even you have to admit that argument is not only unfactual but a tad irrational. [/b] What does Caen have to do with it? 3rd Army and Patton with it were not operational until late July 1944 and they played no part in the American breakthrough. On the other hand, by the time Patton was stopped in early September, the British had taken Brussels and Antwerp and the American 1st Army was approaching Aachen. These rapid advances in late August and early September were possible because the German 7th Army had been destroyed and 15th Army was pulling back. As far as the German Panzers are concerned, just check which divisions were employed in Normandy on a piecemeal basis and effectively destroyed in the process, mainly on the British front as it happens.
(Exxley @ Jan 1 2006, 08:38 PM) [post=43887]Monty was defeated by (as Angie claims) one and one half worn out Panzer divisions (9th and 10th Panzer) when he had the entire 30th corps, three airborne divisions and all the air support and supply he could request. Actually there were more than 2 SS kampfgruppen involved in Market Garden: Army Group B Commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model Fifteenth Army - General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen LXVIII Corps - General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer 346th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Erich Deister 711th Static Division - Generalleutnant Josef Reihert 719th Coastal Division - Generalleutnant Karl Sievers LXXXVIII Corps - General der Infaterie Hans Reinhard Kampfgruppe "Chill" - Generalleutnant Kurt Chill 59th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Walter Poppe 245th Infantry Division - Oberst Gerhard Kegler 712th Static Division - Generalleutnant Friedrich Wilhelm Neuman First Parachute Army - General der Fallschirmtruppen Kurt Student LXXXVI Corps - General der Infanterie Hans von Obstfelder 176th Infantry Division - Oberst Christian Landau Kampfgruppe "Walther" 6th Parachute Regiment - Oberstleutnant Friedrich Freiherr von der Heydte 107th Panzer Brigade - Major Frieher von Maltzahn Division "Erdmann" - Generalleutnant Wolfgang Erdmann II Parachute Corps - General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugene Meindl XII SS Corps - Obergruppenführer Kurt von Gottberg 180th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Bernard Kloster Kemper 190th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Ernst Hammer 363rd Volkgrenadier Division - Generalleutnant Augustus Dettling [/b] I think you both need to be careful here. In another topic, I was cautioning against treating II SS Panzer Corps as two divisions when their total triking power amounted to a lot less than one. The same applies to the above order of battle - effectively none of these impressive sounding formations was up to strength. Also, 1st Parachute Army, mainly consisting of 32 weak infantry battalions, had responsibility for a much wider front than market Garden. The point is, I believe, that Market Garden was defeated by the need to advance up one single road, so that effectively the small fighting spearhead of XXX Corps which led the advance could be fairly easily stopped for a time at any point where the Germans could establish a block. They could also attack the road in flank to delay reinforcement. This caused accumulated time losses, so that by the time they arrived at the Nederrijn, 1st Airborne had been eliminated at the bridge and surrounded at Oosterbeeek. Market Garden was always a risky operation - a calculated risk. The calculations were not far out though and I think the difference lay in a series of individually small allied mistakes. It was worth the risk because of the size of the prize, the Ruhr.
(jimbotosome @ Jan 2 2006, 02:03 AM) [post=43895]It was strategically the least logical and tactical place to attack the “get this” 600 mile long American front. The British had a 100 mile front. [/b] I am not disputing your figures, but you need to qualify them a bit. US forces consisted of four US and one French armies. 21st Army Group consited of one British and one Canadian army. (jimbotosome @ Jan 2 2006, 02:03 AM) [post=43895]Just look at his defense at Kassarine Pass that turned into a massive counterattack that drove Rommel back through from El Guetar all the way to be defeated at the Mareth Line. [/b] Kasserine Pass, 19-22 February 1943. Patton appointed to command II Corps 5 March, after Eisenhower rightly sacked Friedental, which Bradley had recommended to him. By the way, I was somewhat under the impression that the battle of Mareth, 16-28 March 1943, was between the 8th Army under Montgomery and the 1st Italian Army (Messe), which admittedly included at that stage 15th ansd 21st Panzer Divisions.
Historians put their own spin on things..? does this mean all written history is rubbish..? Does this also mean everything written on here is also rubbish? Does this mean in fact that everyone who writes history puts their own spin on things..? I wonder the publishing buisness isn't down the tubes..? Sorry I just don't get this, where historians write things that only they agree with..? Is this all authors or just the ones most people don't like. Regards MG
(angie999 @ Jan 2 2006, 12:01 PM) [post=43908](Exxley @ Jan 1 2006, 08:38 PM) [post=43887]Monty was defeated by (as Angie claims) one and one half worn out Panzer divisions (9th and 10th Panzer) when he had the entire 30th corps, three airborne divisions and all the air support and supply he could request. Actually there were more than 2 SS kampfgruppen involved in Market Garden: Army Group B Commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model Fifteenth Army - General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen LXVIII Corps - General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer 346th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Erich Deister 711th Static Division - Generalleutnant Josef Reihert 719th Coastal Division - Generalleutnant Karl Sievers LXXXVIII Corps - General der Infaterie Hans Reinhard Kampfgruppe "Chill" - Generalleutnant Kurt Chill 59th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Walter Poppe 245th Infantry Division - Oberst Gerhard Kegler 712th Static Division - Generalleutnant Friedrich Wilhelm Neuman First Parachute Army - General der Fallschirmtruppen Kurt Student LXXXVI Corps - General der Infanterie Hans von Obstfelder 176th Infantry Division - Oberst Christian Landau Kampfgruppe "Walther" 6th Parachute Regiment - Oberstleutnant Friedrich Freiherr von der Heydte 107th Panzer Brigade - Major Frieher von Maltzahn Division "Erdmann" - Generalleutnant Wolfgang Erdmann II Parachute Corps - General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugene Meindl XII SS Corps - Obergruppenführer Kurt von Gottberg 180th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Bernard Kloster Kemper 190th Infantry Division - Generalleutnant Ernst Hammer 363rd Volkgrenadier Division - Generalleutnant Augustus Dettling [/b] I think you both need to be careful here. In another topic, I was cautioning against treating II SS Panzer Corps as two divisions when their total triking power amounted to a lot less than one. The same applies to the above order of battle - effectively none of these impressive sounding formations was up to strength. Also, 1st Parachute Army, mainly consisting of 32 weak infantry battalions, had responsibility for a much wider front than market Garden. The point is, I believe, that Market Garden was defeated by the need to advance up one single road, so that effectively the small fighting spearhead of XXX Corps which led the advance could be fairly easily stopped for a time at any point where the Germans could establish a block. They could also attack the road in flank to delay reinforcement. This caused accumulated time losses, so that by the time they arrived at the Nederrijn, 1st Airborne had been eliminated at the bridge and surrounded at Oosterbeeek. Market Garden was always a risky operation - a calculated risk. The calculations were not far out though and I think the difference lay in a series of individually small allied mistakes. It was worth the risk because of the size of the prize, the Ruhr. [/b]I would agree as well Angie. Note that my only point there was to debunk the claim that "Monty was defeated by one and one half worn out Panzer divisions (9th and 10th Panzer)". I did recognize the point that most of those units were understrenght (hence why I used the word Kampfgruppen instead of Pz-Divisionen). But still, even with understrenght units, it was plain obvious that the failure of MG has more to do than with 2 refitting SS Pz-Divisions.
(No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]Well it's a new year and I've have my first good laugh reading this thread. Thank you. [/b] Wow, how original that is. No, thank you for letting me know what goes on inside your head.
(No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]For example, the Ardennes offensive was not caused by Monty, it was caused by Ike and/or whoever may have influenced him. [/b] I think that would be Monty because if records are correct he badgered Ike into Market Garden. (No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]Monty saved Uncle Sam's butt. On 7th December 1944, at Monty's suggestion, Ike held a conference at Maastrict involving himself, Monty, Tedder and Bradley. Patton wasn't there because he was too junior. The object was to determine a plan of action. [/b] Thanks Monty. (No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]I'm not going to type out the pages, but suffice it to state in Monty's plan was; "12 and 21 Army Groups both to operate north of the Ardennes The right flank of 12 Army Group to be about Prum." [/b] Don’t doubt Monty wanted to move south to Bastone. Being constantly stalemated we was always needing more and more US divisions and would do anything to get them. The protection of a Forest must have seemed very appealing to him. (No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]Among Eisenhower's decisions; "....he did not agree that we should shift the whole of 12 Army Group to the north of Prum................12 Army Group would stretch from Orsoy - astride the Ardennes - to Worms". This placed Bradley south in Luxembourg. With Bradley's 12 Army Group split the resultant gap in-between of some 90 miles (the Ardennes) covered by 8 American Corps which consisted of four Divisions under Middleton. [/b] The Ardennes was without question the least likely area for an offensive because as we saw it would be suicide to bring tanks through there. But oh, the beauty of hindsight… (No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]10:30 hrs on 20th December, Eisenhower phones Monty and orders him to take immediate command of all American forces on the northern flank of the 'bulge'. This put two Armies under Monty, the inexperienced Ninth Army (Simpson) and the experienced First Army (Hodges). Within 30 minutes Monty had Dempsey and Crerar, from his 21st Army Group, in his HQ to implement a plan of action. 12 noon Monty left his HQ for First Army HQ where he found the situation desperate. He deployed British units to fight along side the Americans, particularly the Ninth, established a field communications network, and had the whole of British 30 Corps (Horrocks) to cover the route to Brussels/Antwerp in case the Germans continued the breakthrough - actually, Monty deployed 30 Corps before getting Ike's phone call! (don't you just love a real Field Marshall). Monty also had the 6th Airborne Div. deployed. After stabalising the situation, Monty mounted a counter attack on 3rd January and on 8th January Gen. Model was given permission to withdraw. [/b] I thought they were cussing Monty because he wouldn’t move but chose to “refit” then entire time. Hmmm…are we talking the first time the Germans attacked through the Ardennes in the Battle of France? I am getting confused… (No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]So, in the real world Patton only helped with a bit of the battle, but hey, if I were an American film company that's the only bit I'd want to make a film about as well. And, to pre-empt a slagging of Horrocks, he commanded the American freshman 84th Division with his 43rd Wessex Division to take Geilenkirchen in the Siegfried Line, as a favour for Gen. Simpson (US Ninth Army) - done 18th/19th November and held till German counter attacks desisted. Eisenhower stuck with the 'broad front' policy and, as is now know, the things Monty said were likely to happen did. Whatever plan may have been the best, it wasn't this one. No.9 [/b] And to think that the US had to keep stripping off division after division to send to Monty throughout 1945 just so he could make it to Germany to see the surrender. No wonder the US tore across Germany. They had the wrong approach to war. I've got to get out more... (angie999 @ Jan 2 2006, 06:01 AM) [post=43908]I think you both need to be careful here. In another topic, I was cautioning against treating II SS Panzer Corps as two divisions when their total triking power amounted to a lot less than one. The same applies to the above order of battle - effectively none of these impressive sounding formations was up to strength. Also, 1st Parachute Army, mainly consisting of 32 weak infantry battalions, had responsibility for a much wider front than market Garden. The point is, I believe, that Market Garden was defeated by the need to advance up one single road, so that effectively the small fighting spearhead of XXX Corps which led the advance could be fairly easily stopped for a time at any point where the Germans could establish a block. They could also attack the road in flank to delay reinforcement. This caused accumulated time losses, so that by the time they arrived at the Nederrijn, 1st Airborne had been eliminated at the bridge and surrounded at Oosterbeeek. Market Garden was always a risky operation - a calculated risk. The calculations were not far out though and I think the difference lay in a series of individually small allied mistakes. It was worth the risk because of the size of the prize, the Ruhr. [/b] Well, Angie, #9 just told me that XXX Corps was not a "small force" but one big enough to stop the German Offensive through the Ardennes and saved the Yanks as well as Exx's comments in a previous post on this thread. You three need to coordinate on this.
Allow me to make this little question in to the debate. I would like to know exactly what books/articles that you have read? Books/articles concentrating on the military careers on these two - Patton and Montgomery? I think it would be relevant to know as I think that we have seen some very strong opinions and IMO not always open-minded. Kind Regards Steen Ammentorp The Generals of World War II
(jimbotosome @ Jan 2 2006, 03:36 PM) [post=43921](No.9 @ Jan 1 2006, 11:37 PM) [post=43897]Among Eisenhower's decisions; "....he did not agree that we should shift the whole of 12 Army Group to the north of Prum................12 Army Group would stretch from Orsoy - astride the Ardennes - to Worms". This placed Bradley south in Luxembourg. With Bradley's 12 Army Group split the resultant gap in-between of some 90 miles (the Ardennes) covered by 8 American Corps which consisted of four Divisions under Middleton. [/b] The Ardennes was without question the least likely area for an offensive because as we saw it would be suicide to bring tanks through there. But oh, the beauty of hindsight…[/b]Anyone old enough by May, 1940 would have quite a different view about that.
(angie999 @ Jan 2 2006, 06:23 AM) [post=43909]I am not disputing your figures, but you need to qualify them a bit. US forces consisted of four US and one French armies. 21st Army Group consited of one British and one Canadian army. [/b] What happened to the Poles? (angie999 @ Jan 2 2006, 06:23 AM) [post=43909]Kasserine Pass, 19-22 February 1943. Patton appointed to command II Corps 5 March, after Eisenhower rightly sacked Friedental, which Bradley had recommended to him. By the way, I was somewhat under the impression that the battle of Mareth, 16-28 March 1943, was between the 8th Army under Montgomery and the 1st Italian Army (Messe), which admittedly included at that stage 15th ansd 21st Panzer Divisions. [/b] I think what Patton was referring to was his major reduction of Rommel's groups that sent them in retreat to the Mareth line and allowed them to be easily overrun. I also believe that the "Allies" (Monty did want the US excluded from the victory, you have to admit that) broke the Mareth Line on April 8th, 1943 and in the next five days had 240,000 Italian and German PWs. (angie999 @ Jan 2 2006, 05:46 AM) [post=43907]What does Caen have to do with it? 3rd Army and Patton with it were not operational until late July 1944 and they played no part in the American breakthrough. On the other hand, by the time Patton was stopped in early September, the British had taken Brussels and Antwerp and the American 1st Army was approaching Aachen. These rapid advances in late August and early September were possible because the German 7th Army had been destroyed and 15th Army was pulling back. As far as the German Panzers are concerned, just check which divisions were employed in Normandy on a piecemeal basis and effectively destroyed in the process, mainly on the British front as it happens. [/b] Patton's original breakout would have driven to the Siegfried Line. It was just that he had to execute a pincer move to Argentan because Monty (as usual) was bogged down an not budging at Caen. Had Monty have been moving as he had boasted Patton could have continued to Germany and Monty could have liberated Paris instead. Hope that clarifies my point. (Colonel Gubbins @ Jan 2 2006, 08:25 AM) [post=43915]Historians put their own spin on things..? does this mean all written history is rubbish..? Does this also mean everything written on here is also rubbish? Does this mean in fact that everyone who writes history puts their own spin on things..? I wonder the publishing buisness isn't down the tubes..? Sorry I just don't get this, where historians write things that only they agree with..? Is this all authors or just the ones most people don't like. Regards MG [/b] Colonel, Historians are supposed to be authorities on a given subject. When they disagree with each other (which you know happens a lot) then their authority has to be questioned just out of common sense. At least one of them (if not both of them) don't know what they are talking about. They are simple humans just like you and me. The God left publishing a long time ago. (Steen Ammentorp @ Jan 2 2006, 09:42 AM) [post=43922]Allow me to make this little question in to the debate. I would like to know exactly what books/articles that you have read? Books/articles concentrating on the military careers on these two - Patton and Montgomery? I think it would be relevant to know as I think that we have seen some very strong opinions and IMO not always open-minded. Kind Regards Steen Ammentorp The Generals of World War II [/b] I guess this is directed at me. I can't list every book I have ever read nor every show I have watched on the History Channel nor every post of people I do have a little authoritative respect for like Angie. You could say are beliefs are an "amalgum" (sorry Adam!) of our exposure to history. More importantly you can't put all your eggs in one basket and believe any single author. I think the conclusions of "Historians" have little or no more weight on a given issue versus the conclusions of those of us "lay people" who have looked at both the same general evidence they have. I get more out of a debate with Angie than the monologue of the "great historians". Boy, I wish I was polite and tactful as Steen. Geoff, I need some kindness lessons! Do you have the time? I find myself holding wooden spoon and stirring away even when I didn't intend to...
(jimbotosome @ Jan 2 2006, 03:52 PM) [post=43924](angie999 @ Jan 2 2006, 06:23 AM) [post=43909]I am not disputing your figures, but you need to qualify them a bit. US forces consisted of four US and one French armies. 21st Army Group consited of one British and one Canadian army. [/b] What happened to the Poles? [/b]The 1st Polish Armoured Division was under command of II. Canadian Corps. Angie was talking about armies. (jimbotosome @ Jan 2 2006, 04:00 PM) [post=43924](Steen Ammentorp @ Jan 2 2006, 09:42 AM) [post=43922]Allow me to make this little question in to the debate. I would like to know exactly what books/articles that you have read? Books/articles concentrating on the military careers on these two - Patton and Montgomery? I think it would be relevant to know as I think that we have seen some very strong opinions and IMO not always open-minded. Kind Regards Steen Ammentorp The Generals of World War II [/b] I guess this is directed at me. I can't list every book I have ever read nor every show I have watched on the History Channel nor every post of people I do have a little authoritative respect for like Angie. You could say are beliefs are an "amalgum" (sorry Adam!) of our exposure to history. More importantly you can't put all your eggs in one basket and believe any single author. I think the conclusions of "Historians" have little or no more weight on a given issue versus the conclusions of those of us "lay people" who have looked at both the same general evidence they have. I get more out of a debate with Angie than the monologue of the "great historians". [/b] And I think the majority of the readers here would be more willing to listen to what D'Este or Weigley can tell us about the merits and flaws of Monty and Patton than say someone who still has to prove that Rundstedt was involved in the operational conduct of the Battle of the Bulge.
