El Alamein October/November 1942

Discussion in 'North Africa & the Med' started by BFBSM, Feb 18, 2011.

  1. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER Patron

    Hi Lidski,

    Please post away. I am sure they will be eagerly eyed by all.

    Hopefully someone may also be able to give you a lead on your grandfather.

    Cheers

    Geoff
     
  2. BFBSM

    BFBSM Very Senior Member

    Hi there,

    I also recently stumbled upon about 100 or so photographs that my grandfather had mostly of Tobruk/North Africa, lots of pictures of English and Australian looking troops. I have no information on my grandfathers service and no military records apart from knowing that he was a photographer in the second world war based in North Africa. Can anyone shed any light on a few pics if I post them?

    I for one would love to see the images, for the best response you should start your own thread.

    Mark
     
  3. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Welcome to the forum lidski. I would love to see the photographs... Who is/was your grandfather?

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  4. Hamburg44

    Hamburg44 Junior Member

    Dear Jaeger,

    let me allow to answer to some points of you. First of all I have to accept some good points of your sobering arguments.

    I wonder by what measure you would call North Africa an efficient sideshow for the germans?

    1. The N. African theatre may have bound up a few number of german divisions, but the divisions were armoured or motorised divisions. It was the mobil divisions that the Germans relied on to do their manouvre warfare.

    The 15th and 21th (5th light) panzers and the 90th light were new formations with no elite status (DAK-Strength in first year about 50.000 men and 300 tanks) . Barbarossa starts with some 160 divisons and 3600 tanks and 3 milion men.

    2. The axis achived nothing in the campaign. No lessons learned, or blooding of new men. This was the exact opposite for the allies. With the exeption of Brooke, Alex and Monty there were no (nil) commanders able to fight the germans an win before north africa. The campaign would see it's fair share of blunders, but the losses on the british side would be worth it. When the campaign was over the docrine and training in the British army was good enough to defeat the germans in battle.

    achievments of the german med-campaign:

    - diversion of vigilance,

    - two year silence in Europe, no sledgehammer, no major allied operations in the balkan (petrol in Rumania), in norway (iron ore) and southern europe (reistance-movments).

    - busying and tearing down of allied forces and material

    for example:

    • losses of hundreds of merchant ships incl. costly warmaterial on the way to africa and malta (source lloyds war losses),
    • diversion of precious allied merchant tonnage, fuel on the long way round the cape,
    • high losses of the allied navy in the med (sinkings of 1 battlecruiser, 3 carriers, dozens of cruisers and destroyers and other auxiliary ships, serioully damage of more than 4 battleships, 3 carriers and dozen other warships,
    • diversion and losses of thousands of allied air craft,
    • diversion and losses of hundreds of thousands allied troops,
    • saving of italy as partner for some two more years,
    • the balkan- campaign in 1943 keeps turkey neutral


    The same story, if not more important for the Americans who had nil experience of modern warfare.

    The training effect of lost battles is important, but the long allied training-way in North-Africa was a very hard way to learn. And some lections of modern warfare could perhaps have already learnt in Poland, France, Dieppe, Belge, Greece, Crete, Russia,... ?

    On the the other side, too much experience was not always better:
    After D-Day some green british, canadian and US divisions (11.th armoured, GAD, 3.can.ID, 4.US armoured division) were better rated from allied generals than some desert-veteran-divisons (f.example the 7th armoured divison, the 51 highlanders, 50 th ID, 1st US tank division).

    3. The Germans could not afford to fight an unnecessary campaign. The germans were short of equipment, let alone the motorised bits, clearly shown in the reorganisation of the armoured divisions. (removing a tank regiment.)

    Of course thats absolutly right, but they could also not afford an allied landing in Europe (sledghammer, norway, greece,..).

    This was more pronounced in a 'bling' campaign such as North Africa.
    In 1941 Rommel went with 12% of the availiable pz III, and 9% of the pz IV. Between 5th light and 15th Pz divisions they had 301 panzers (5th 155pz, 15th 146pz). This is on the eve of Barbarossa. Not to mention lorries, fuel, airplanes etc.

    After six months of fighting over 300 tanks were lost. The campaign would claim over 2500 tanks (including the itallians).

    The italien material was not up to date (compare the first Campaign 1940/41).


    To sum up.

    The North African campaign helped the british develop their manouvre warfare, build proper tanks, train the army to meet the germans and win, and master coalition warfare.

    The better tanks were produced in US and Russia. Aliled forces and generals showed their manouvre capabilities in the first campain against the italic forces in 1940/41.

    To the Germans the campaign proved a drain on highly trained personell and equipment for little if any gain.

    The drain was of course high, but the diversion of some mayor opponents to a "secondary" continent for over two years was in my opinion a strategic achievement.
    I wonder by what measure you would call North Africa an efficient sideshow for the germans?

    1. The N. African theatre may have bound up a few number of german divisions, but the divisions were armoured or motorised divisions. It was the mobil divisions that the Germans relied on to do their manouvre warfare.

    2. The axis acheived nothing in the campaign. No lessons learned, or blooding of new men. This was the exact opposite for the allies. With the exeption of Brooke, Alex and Monty there were no (nil) commanders able to fight the germans an win before north africa. The campaign would see it's fair share of blunders, but the losses on the british side would be worth it. When the campaign was over the docrine and training in the British army was good enough to defeat the germans in battle.

    The same story, if not more important for the Americans who had nil experience of modern warfare.

    3. The Germans could not afford to fight an unnecessary campaign. The germans were short of equipment, let alone the motorised bits, clearly shown in the reorganisation of the armoured divisions. (removing a tank regiment.)

    This was more pronounced in a 'bling' campaign such as North Africa.
    In 1941 Rommel went with 12% of the availiable pz III, and 9% of the pz IV. Between 5th light and 15th Pz divisions they had 301 panzers (5th 155pz, 15th 146pz). This is on the eve of Barbarossa. Not to mention lorries, fuel, airplanes etc.

    After six months of fighting over 300 tanks were lost. The campaign would claim over 2500 tanks (including the itallians)


    To sum up.

    The North African campaign helped the british develop their manouvre warfare, build proper tanks, train the army to meet the germans and win, and master coalition warfare.

    To the Germans the campaign proved a drain on highly trained personell and equipment for little if any gain.
     
  5. Oldman

    Oldman Very Senior Member

    Lidski
    Welcome to the forum
    By the amount of photos he could have been a war photographer or a member of the
    press.

    Please post I for one would be interested in seeing his work
     
  6. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    Hamburg44

    achievments of the german med-campaign:

    - diversion of vigilance,

    - two year silence in Europe, no sledgehammer, no major allied operations in the balkan (petrol in Rumania), in norway (iron ore) and southern europe (reistance-movments).

    - busying and tearing down of allied forces and material

    for example:

    • losses of hundreds of merchant ships incl. costly warmaterial on the way to africa and malta (source lloyds war losses),
    • diversion of precious allied merchant tonnage, fuel on the long way round the cape,
    • high losses of the allied navy in the med (sinkings of 1 battlecruiser, 3 carriers, dozens of cruisers and destroyers and other auxiliary ships, serioully damage of more than 4 battleships, 3 carriers and dozen other warships,
    • diversion and losses of thousands of allied air craft,
    • diversion and losses of hundreds of thousands allied troops,
    • saving of italy as partner for some two more years,
    • the balkan- campaign in 1943 keeps turkey neutral


    Hello

    I'll start of by division of vigilance. I don't see what you are getting at, the losses in the air and on the sea were a lot worse for the axis than the British and later the US.

    Secondly there was no two years of silence. Every night the drone of hundreds of aircraft would spell terror for the civillians on the continent.

    Special operations by the commandoes, in particular Archery & Anklet, made Hitler garrison Norway with 350,000 men. Think of what the germans could have done with these resources in the east. But I digress.

    The notion of invasion of ANY part of mainland europe before it actually happened is a pipe dream. It would have been a shambles, and a slaughter. And it might have resulted in a peace treaty. The shortages of equipment to the TA units after Dunkirk lingered on for years. The Americans were not ready to go to war any sooner. They only arrived in africa when it was all over..

    As for the losses you list, the allies could afford them. The axis could not. The US produced every possible article, and the losses could be readily replaced. Not so for the axis side. Besides the Axis failed, the sealanes remained open.

    As for the 'Forgotten campaign of Italy', it was a tragedy for Germany. It tied down resources which could have made a real difference on the eastern front. When Hitler tied himself to the mast for Italy, it was Germanys loss.

    The same story, if not more important for the Americans who had nil experience of modern warfare.

    The training effect of lost battles is important, but the long allied training-way in North-Africa was a very hard way to learn. And some lections of modern warfare could perhaps have already learnt in Poland, France, Dieppe, Belge, Greece, Crete, Russia,... ?

    On the the other side, too much experience was not always better:
    After D-Day some green british, canadian and US divisions (11.th armoured, GAD, 3.can.ID, 4.US armoured division) were better rated from allied generals than some desert-veteran-divisons (f.example the 7th armoured divison, the 51 highlanders, 50 th ID, 1st US tank division).



    Sadly oldguards and national pride (the French just surrendered, we did brilliant) hindered the opportunity to learn from the French debacle.

    You have to go to the core of the British army to explain the lethargic development and dispersion of doctrine. It was not until Monty gained his fame that he would be able to put it across to the army. (Apart from the two commands he had in 1940-1942 in England)

    The exploits of the virgin divisions in 1944 are up for debate. Most Highlanders from the 51st would point to the loss of Douglas Wimberly and the appointment of Bullen-Smith for the poor initial showing. The 51st performed brilliantly when Rennie (a Black Watch man) was appointed GOC.

    Point is. During the 30ies the army budgets were so small that large formation exercises were impossible. Ex. Tiger in 1942 was the first army sized exercise in the UK. Along with Montys ex. Binge and SuperBinge (corps exercises) these were revolusionary. The germans had done these throughout the 30ies.

    Training small units is easy. It is my job to produce officers for the future. But training for high command is difficult. In the 20ies and 30ies most officer training were aimed at colonial policing. That makes combined arms operations training, let alone army sized training, redundant.

    So the theatre was the best classroom that the army could have gotten.

    3. The Germans could not afford to fight an unnecessary campaign. The germans were short of equipment, let alone the motorised bits, clearly shown in the reorganisation of the armoured divisions. (removing a tank regiment.)

    Of course thats absolutly right, but they could also not afford an allied landing in Europe (sledghammer, norway, greece,..).

    As I have pointed out the Allies did not have the experience or resources to make landings in either Norway or Greece. When they were inable to keep on fighting whilst the host nation were unconquered, they would certainly not managed it alone.

    The drain was of course high, but the diversion of some mayor opponents to a "secondary" continent for over two years was in my opinion a strategic achievement.



    I simply fail to agree.

    It is like letting somebody get tired by repeatedly stabbing you to death. Yes the opponent get tired, but you are dead and dying.

    AND

    if not in north africa, the army would be at home training. The notion of the British Army 1940-1942 doing combined operations with divisions and corps on contested beaches is just silly.
     
  7. Hamburg44

    Hamburg44 Junior Member

    Dear Jaeger,

    Good points,

    let me see if I can find some other remarks...

    I'll start of by division of vigilance. I don't see what you are getting at, the losses in the air and on the sea were a lot worse for the axis than the British and later the US.

    If you add italien and german losses there is no question. But if you compare allied and german losses there may be a difference:

    for example:

    german army losses in North-Africa (kia, wia,mia) from 01.11.1941 - 31.08.1942 :

    21.621 , source Heeresart 10-days-casualties reports

    allied 8th army losses (kia, wia,mia) from 01.11.1941 - 31.08.1942 :

    102.000 , source The Meditarranean and the Middle East III, Playfair

    If you consider tank, gun and vehicle losses you will find a comparable loss rate allied/german for this period.

    For fhe loss rates of allied/german aircraft I have no resilent data, but after all i knew I think the relationship was not too bad for the germans.

    German naval losses in the med were low compared to allied losses, a lot of the lost ships of the german merchant navy in the med were captured in France and Greece.

    Secondly there was no two years of silence. Every night the drone of hundreds of aircraft would spell terror for the civillians on the continent.

    This is right, but the effects of the bombing on german was economy until summer 1943 were limited.

    Special operations by the commandoes, in particular Archery & Anklet, made Hitler garrison Norway with 350,000 men. Think of what the germans could have done with these resources in the east. But I digress.

    This is right, but most of the troops in norway were secondhand and training divisions. I do not remember a really striking division in norway. The Panzerdivision Norwegen was a Traning unit with outdated and captured tanks. Trained recruits were regulary absorbed to the eastern front.

    The notion of invasion of ANY part of mainland europe before it actually happened is a pipe dream. It would have been a shambles, and a slaughter. And it might have resulted in a peace treaty. The shortages of equipment to the TA units after Dunkirk lingered on for years. The Americans were not ready to go to war any sooner. They only arrived in africa when it was all over..

    May bee but the Russians could not allow such a luxury.

    As for the losses you list, the allies could afford them. The axis could not. The US produced every possible article, and the losses could be readily replaced. Not so for the axis side. Besides the Axis failed, the sealanes remained open.

    Of course the allies could afford a lot of losses. But this argument is a death-striking argument against efficancy.

    After all I know, there was a allied shipping crisis in 1942, the PQ-conveys were stopped after PQ 18. It took a long time to get some spitfires to Malta, and the US-Shermans for the 8th army were stripped of the 1th and 2nd US armoured divisions.

    The Germans had to conduct a poor mans war in africa. Sometimes
    more than 50 % of its vehicles were of captured allied origin as uniforms, guns, food and fuel. Thousands other vehicles were bought in French Africa.

    As for the 'Forgotten campaign of Italy', it was a tragedy for Germany. It tied down resources which could have made a real difference on the eastern front. When Hitler tied himself to the mast for Italy, it was Germanys loss.

    Again this is right, but the forgotten campaign tied up many more allied mechanized and motorised forces. So far I know, because of a shortage of trained men some british divisions and brigades had to disbanded in 1944. The terrain in Italy was in favour for the defender in comparison to France.
    More Mechanized forces in France could have been of more worth than in Italy.
    Sadly oldguards and national pride (the French just surrendered, we did brilliant) hindered the opportunity to learn from the French debacle.

    You have to go to the core of the British army to explain the lethargic development and dispersion of doctrine. It was not until Monty gained his fame that he would be able to put it across to the army. (Apart from the two commands he had in 1940-1942 in England)

    Monty was of course a great general. But men like Auchinleck, Gott and Connors were also capable.

    The exploits of the virgin divisions in 1944 are up for debate. Most Highlanders from the 51st would point to the loss of Douglas Wimberly and the appointment of Bullen-Smith for the poor initial showing. The 51st performed brilliantly when Rennie (a Black Watch man) was appointed GOC.

    Point is. During the 30ies the army budgets were so small that large formation exercises were impossible. Ex. Tiger in 1942 was the first army sized exercise in the UK. Along with Montys ex. Binge and SuperBinge (corps exercises) these were revolusionary. The germans had done these throughout the 30ies.
    Most german divisions had no occasion to train on army or corps level.

    The training time for most of the german combat troops was much shorter than for the allied forces because of chronical shortage of men, material and fuel.


    if not in north africa, the army would be at home training. The notion of the British Army 1940-1942 doing combined operations with divisions and corps on contested beaches is just silly.[/QUOTE]

    Of the allied D-Day-Divisions only the big red one and the 50th ID were africa-veteran-division. The only other africa-veteran-divisions in Normandy were later employed with mixed results (7th armoured, 51 th Highlander)

    For example the capture and defence of Narvik with the help of the navy could possibly have shorten the war (blockade of the german iron ore transports in winter). Perhaps the dividends of such a campaign could have been higher than the defence of malta or Tobruk. The losses would have been high, but the allied losses in Africa and Malta were also high.
     
  8. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Hamburg, would you please edit your post to separate quotations from others from your replies? The way it is it's a mess impossible to understand.

    I would suggest you use the quotes icon (you know, the little text ballon button), or italics or whatever. Otherwise it's quite difficult.

    Thanks in advance! :)
     
  9. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Za
    I very much doubt if having quotes in his postings will help anyone understand what he is on about - we are dealing with a very strange mind here- which I shall be ignoring from now
    Cheers
     
  10. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    Dear Jaeger,

    Good points,

    let me see if I can find some other remarks...

    I'll start of by division of vigilance. I don't see what you are getting at, the losses in the air and on the sea were a lot worse for the axis than the British and later the US.

    If you add italien and german losses there is no question. But if you compare allied and german losses there may be a difference:

    for example:

    german army losses in North-Africa (kia, wia,mia) from 01.11.1941 - 31.08.1942 :

    21.621 , source Heeresart 10-days-casualties reports

    allied 8th army losses (kia, wia,mia) from 01.11.1941 - 31.08.1942 :

    102.000 , source The Meditarranean and the Middle East III, Playfair

    If you consider tank, gun and vehicle losses you will find a comparable loss rate allied/german for this period.

    For fhe loss rates of allied/german aircraft I have no resilent data, but after all i knew I think the relationship was not too bad for the germans.

    German naval losses in the med were low compared to allied losses, a lot of the lost ships of the german merchant navy in the med were captured in France and Greece.

    Secondly there was no two years of silence. Every night the drone of hundreds of aircraft would spell terror for the civillians on the continent.

    This is right, but the effects of the bombing on german was economy until summer 1943 were limited.

    Special operations by the commandoes, in particular Archery & Anklet, made Hitler garrison Norway with 350,000 men. Think of what the germans could have done with these resources in the east. But I digress.

    This is right, but most of the troops in norway were secondhand and training divisions. I do not remember a really striking division in norway. The Panzerdivision Norwegen was a Traning unit with outdated and captured tanks. Trained recruits were regulary absorbed to the eastern front.

    The notion of invasion of ANY part of mainland europe before it actually happened is a pipe dream. It would have been a shambles, and a slaughter. And it might have resulted in a peace treaty. The shortages of equipment to the TA units after Dunkirk lingered on for years. The Americans were not ready to go to war any sooner. They only arrived in africa when it was all over..

    May bee but the Russians could not allow such a luxury.

    As for the losses you list, the allies could afford them. The axis could not. The US produced every possible article, and the losses could be readily replaced. Not so for the axis side. Besides the Axis failed, the sealanes remained open.

    Of course the allies could afford a lot of losses. But this argument is a death-striking argument against efficancy.

    After all I know, there was a allied shipping crisis in 1942, the PQ-conveys were stopped after PQ 18. It took a long time to get some spitfires to Malta, and the US-Shermans for the 8th army were stripped of the 1th and 2nd US armoured divisions.

    The Germans had to conduct a poor mans war in africa. Sometimes
    more than 50 % of its vehicles were of captured allied origin as uniforms, guns, food and fuel. Thousands other vehicles were bought in French Africa.

    As for the 'Forgotten campaign of Italy', it was a tragedy for Germany. It tied down resources which could have made a real difference on the eastern front. When Hitler tied himself to the mast for Italy, it was Germanys loss.

    Again this is right, but the forgotten campaign tied up many more allied mechanized and motorised forces. So far I know, because of a shortage of trained men some british divisions and brigades had to disbanded in 1944. The terrain in Italy was in favour for the defender in comparison to France.
    More Mechanized forces in France could have been of more worth than in Italy.
    Sadly oldguards and national pride (the French just surrendered, we did brilliant) hindered the opportunity to learn from the French debacle.

    You have to go to the core of the British army to explain the lethargic development and dispersion of doctrine. It was not until Monty gained his fame that he would be able to put it across to the army. (Apart from the two commands he had in 1940-1942 in England)

    Monty was of course a great general. But men like Auchinleck, Gott and Connors were also capable.

    The exploits of the virgin divisions in 1944 are up for debate. Most Highlanders from the 51st would point to the loss of Douglas Wimberly and the appointment of Bullen-Smith for the poor initial showing. The 51st performed brilliantly when Rennie (a Black Watch man) was appointed GOC.

    Point is. During the 30ies the army budgets were so small that large formation exercises were impossible. Ex. Tiger in 1942 was the first army sized exercise in the UK. Along with Montys ex. Binge and SuperBinge (corps exercises) these were revolusionary. The germans had done these throughout the 30ies.

    Most german divisions had no occasion to train on army or corps level.

    The training time for most of the german combat troops was much shorter than for the allied forces because of chronical shortage of men, material and fuel.


    if not in north africa, the army would be at home training. The notion of the British Army 1940-1942 doing combined operations with divisions and corps on contested beaches is just silly.

    Of the allied D-Day-Divisions only the big red one and the 50th ID were africa-veteran-division. The only other africa-veteran-divisions in Normandy were later employed with mixed results (7th armoured, 51 th Highlander)

    For example the capture and defence of Narvik with the help of the navy could possibly have shorten the war (blockade of the german iron ore transports in winter). Perhaps the dividends of such a campaign could have been higher than the defence of malta or Tobruk. The losses would have been high, but the allied losses in Africa and Malta were also high.

    Try this
     
  11. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    Hamburg44.

    I am not sure if further debate is going to be successful, so I'll sum up the important points.

    1. The numerical losses of ANY type of equipment or men cannot be judged on a 1 on 1 basis in the N.African campaign. Much in the same way as the losses on the eastern front. Why? look at the PRODUCTION numbers. How many Shermans produced? T34?

    The Axis had a limited pool of resources and men. Their losses were irreplaceable. The losses on the Allies side were (and this feels awful considering that there are veterans such as Tom reading this) affordable.

    2. What the allies needed was to develop their doctrine and train their leaders. The N.Africa campaign was a good classrom.

    What the Allies could not afford was madcap sceems such as to launch combined operations against a hostile beach. This is the trickiest of all operations. (Churchill was a sinner in this respect...)

    3. The opening of extra fronts (N.Africa), and lenghtening of existing ones, such as Norway, was strategic blunders that mr.Hitler could not afford. Dispersal of force is never going to be a winning formula. Instead of making a schwerpunkt in the east, axis resources were wasted on places such as Berknes, Rauma and Volda.


    Your remarks about Narvik in particular, and Norway in general show that

    A. You have no military background, and a limited grasp of the complexity of military operations. No offence, but there is a reason why beeing a soldier is a profession.

    There is almost something Churchillian about the casual way you imply that Narvik could be captured and defended by the Army and Navy.

    B. No idea of the enormous cost in men and materieel Festung Norwegen drained the Third Reich.

    The ammount of FLAK batteries, coastal batteries, assorted boats and aircraft etc. This was technical equipment and trained manpower was required. That is 350,000 men that could have been used to rebuild 6th Army....
     
  12. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Jaeger --
    no need to be embarrassed about all Tank Crews being expendable as we were well aware of that situation with our inability to offset the the efficiency of the 88mm's at all times - but it was truly driven home prior to the 0peration Diadem or as some would have it Cassino #4 when the 8th Army Commander Lt.Gen. Oliver Leese boasted that he had 2000 Tanks .....and could afford to lose 50%....OR... 5000 men !
    he nearly made it as we went into the Gothic Line Battles with 1200 Tanks..and came out the other end with around 650 Tanks..all leading to the disbandment of 1st Armoured Div and then 25th Tank bde to fill the gaps....we always had too many Tanks - not enough Infantry..

    Cheers
     
  13. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    Tom

    Cheers, it still feels a bit cruel to talk of tank men as expendable though.

    I recall that Bimbo Dempsey was quoted to say before Goodwood that he had hundreds of Shermans idle on the beach. He could afford to loose tanks not infantry.
     
  14. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Jaeger-
    It was that scoundrel Montgomery who thought that men were important and so he made sure that metal did the job as he knew that a Tank could be built in a day- but a man took 20 years - that was usually the main reason for him being called so slow at times and not wasting manpower as he recalled the first war - whereas those who called him slow didn't have the same philosophy or professionalism - and it showed in the Butcher bills....
    Cheers
     
  15. Hamburg44

    Hamburg44 Junior Member

    Dear Jaeger,

    Thanks for correcting my reply. I had some trouble with the posting.

    I think you are right Jaeger,

    a further debate will produce no better results.

    I accept your agenda without sharing some points.

    So long Russia carried most burden in fighting and losses against the german aggressors the UK and other western nations had the chance to train their armies on the job in North-Africa for some more years.

    The result of the training was perhaps not as great as hoped, because most allied fighting troops of 1941 and 1942 (UK. South Africans, Australians, New Zealanders) became casualties (for example about allied 100.000 pows and including the campaigns in Greece and Crete until El Alamein 1942).
    The US forces suscceded after D-Day with many unblooded troops. Only the big red one, the 2nd US-armoured and some US-paras had some fighting ecperience before arriving in the normandy.

    The allied losses of tanks in the desert and the sea (some 1000 in 1942 until El Alamein on the landfront and some 1500 at sea on the way to 8 th army in the same period ) were extraordinary high.

    Of course the allies could afford those losses, but a lot of tank units of the 1rd army (tunisa) and of the 8 th army had to fight with outdated two-pounder-Valentines and cruisers because there was a shortage of Shermans.


    The diversion of merchant shipping and their escorts round the cape and the loss of about 300 merchant ships with more than one million tons of war material in 1942 on the way to North Africa and Malta reduces the arrival of men ans munitions for the bulding up of Overlord. The planned operations for 1943 were cancelled.
     
  16. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    No problem Hamburg44.

    The various editing tools can be a bit tricky the first times around.

    Happy posting.
     
  17. robert.c

    robert.c Junior Member

    here is part of a poem written during the battle at el alamein the full version has 41 verses i found it amongst my uncle andrews war stuff
     

    Attached Files:

    CL1 likes this.
  18. BFBSM

    BFBSM Very Senior Member

    Attached is a folder in which images of a report written for the Americans by General Major Eckhard Christian, following the end of the war, in or about 1947 to be exact. It is written from memory. (Source: Fold3.com)

    http://photobucket.com/D-172-El-Alamein

    It made for interesting reading.

    Mark
     
  19. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Attached is a folder in which images of a report written for the Americans by General Major Eckhard Christian, following the end of the war, in or about 1947 to be exact. It is written from memory. (Source: Fold3.com)

    http://photobucket.com/D-172-El-Alamein

    It made for interesting reading.

    Mark

    Hello Mark,

    Could you resend a clearer copy of the report; this one is very hazy?!?

    Best,

    Steve.
     

Share This Page