Eighth Army training - spring/summer 1942

This thread might help, though it appears to have a doctrine focus: British Army - doctrinal development

TTH recommends Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army; read that a long time ago when it appeared in the RUSI Library and cannot recall now if North Africa got covered. It was reviewed here: Book Review - Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day

I expect you've seen this: Report: Bartholomew Committee, lessons to be learnt from operations in Flanders

Will now look at what my research paper has on training before 1/7/1942.

 

I think that is fair comment. Porch quotes no 8th Army primary sources and his remarks about the 8th Army are merely scene setting for a description of the siege of Bir Hakeim. Looking again he only quotes from a couple of French primary sources for Bir Hakeim although that may be more a lack of them rather than a shortfall on his part. He uses a large number of French primary sources in the chapters about 1939-40.

I thought his quote was a good way of introducing a thread about the perceived lack of training (systematic or otherwise) conducted by 8th Army during the period before the summer battles. It would obviously be enlightening to compare British training during this period (mid-Feb to mid-May -ish) with that of the Axis forces. That should keep me busy as the winter evenings begin to draw in.

Regards

Tom

 

From memory, I think Harrison-Place (it's his PhD thesis basically, so you can find it for free on whatever server that's on) covers home forces, and ME only tangentially as in how lessons filtered back into battle schools in the UK.

All the best

Andreas

 

The author of '‘Dance of War: The Story of the Battle of Egypt’ by Peter Bates (New Zealander), published 1992 refers in footnote 35 to a ‘Court of Inquiry’: ‘The halt at El Alamein provided time for the 8th Army to take stock of the situation. The fighting at Gazala and the ensuing withdrawal clearly demonstrated that many problems still afflicted the 8th Army, although it had fought with bravery, determination and resolve. It drove home once again old lessons about the need for improvements in combined arms tactics and training and for concentrating artillery firepower, with initial guidance for junior officers issued early in July 1942 listing the perceived lessons of the recent fighting.’

The ’initial guidance’ is identified in the footnote as: (Brigadier) J.N. Whitely, 'Notes on Main Lessons of Recent Operations in the Western Desert, 7 July 1942', WO 201/452.[1] Note Whiteley was then the 8th Army Chief of Staff at the time of Deir El Shein and previous battles @ Matruh Mersa.[2]

Research identified two other references to this document, by an Indian historian[3] and in a New Zealand Official History.[4]



[1] From: Notes on main lessons of recent operations | The National Archives Copied and available from author.

[2] See: John Whiteley (British Army officer) - Wikipedia

[3] From: The Indian Army In The Two World Wars Edited by Kaushik Roy, pub. 2011 And available online via: The Indian Army In The Two World Wars [PDF] [f0kuc95f5li0]

[4] See online: http://www.22battalion.org.nz/publications/histories/egypt.pdf

The Bates book is available via: Dance of War

 

The Buffs regimental history[1]

The 1st Battalion the Buffs was overwhelmed at Halfa or Alem Hamza or Point 204, on 15th December 1941[2] and the remnants moved back to Mena camp, near Cairo, to reform and build-up. In March 1942 it was ordered to reform as a Motor Infantry Battalion. As part of the 8th Armoured Brigade, 10th Armoured Division and moved to Khatatba to join them (from pgs. 106-107).

Equipment was ‘extremely scarce…training was limited to company level’. On 14/6/1942 the brigade began to receive full-scale equipment, including 6-pounders[3], an intake of 120 men, so the battalion had thirty-one officers and 706 men (from pg. 108). The brigade moved up to a position near Mersa Matruh, where the three armoured regiments half-trained were ordered to handover their tanks to 7th Armoured Division (from pg.109).

Major P.G. Clarke, with the battalion Anti-Tank gunners, was detached to 18th Indian Brigade at Bir el Shein…. ‘With this formation, at Bir el Shein, twelve miles west of El Alamein, on 1/7/1942, these men, who had scarcely had a chance to fire their new guns, did splendid work in support of 2/5th Essex Regiment, earning them particular praise of its commanding officer[4]. The company had lost 60% of its strength[5] by the time it re-joined the battalion ten days later’….at Tahag Camp, near Tel-el-Kebir Ordnance Depot (from pg.109).


[4] Lt. Col. Gray does make a comment to that effect in his report.

[5] Note The Buffs War Diary 5/7/1942 refers to: ‘D’ Company two officers, 68 O.Rs. and 2 guns, 2 portee and 6 other vehicles at Tahag Camp. They had lost fourteen guns in the action and one hundred soldiers..


[1] ‘Historical Records of The Buffs’ pub. 1951, by C.R.B. Knight, six pgs. obtained from Peter White, Friends of The Buffs, pgs. 108, 109 and 117 have direct relevance.

[2] A document for this action is attached to Post 32. See: Operation Crusader 1941

[3] The 6th New Zealand Brigade, in the Kaponga “box”, to the south of Deir el Shein, had twenty 6-pounders. From their War Diary 30/6/42 I 1660 DA 58/1/21 ANZ. Cited by Glyn Harper in ‘The Battle for North Africa’, pub. 2017.

 

Nigel Nicholson in his biography ‘Alex: The Life of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis’[1] refers to an interview of General John Harding[2], who at the time was a Deputy Chief of Staff, 8th Army, whether Churchill’s decision to sack Auchinleck was right. Two passages are relevant[3]: ‘Would you say that the whole of the July fighting had been a failure? Yes. It had stopped Rommel, but more by courage than skill.’ Regarding reorganizing the army at the time (end June- start July 1942) ‘to try and impose that philosophy in the middle of a crucial battle is insane…..It was a chaotic situation. The Army was in a state of confusion.’[4]


[1] Published 1973 is not an official biography but what the author termed as an “accredited” one, See: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Alex-Field-Marshal-Alexander-Tunis/dp/0297765159 For an easy summary of Alexander see: Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis - Wikipedia

[2] Wiki does not mention his staff role with the 8th Army. At the time he was a Temporary Brigadier, Deputy Chief of Staff for organisation, equipment and training at GHQ Middle East, 1942. From Post 3 in: Chief of Staff (CGS) GHQ Cairo, November 1942
See: John Harding, 1st Baron Harding of Petherton - Wikipedia Another biography refers to him in a training role and the staff. See: Somerset & Cornwall Light Infantry - SCLI - 6 October 1959 - 10 July 1968

[3] Nigel Nicholson’s book does not refer to Deir el Shein or the 18th Indian Brigade – checked on Google Books

[4] Fuller passage in Post 147: Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

 

In Chapter 2 ‘Training the Troops: The Indian Army in Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya, 1940–42’ by Alan Jeffreys which is available online via: https://www.google.co.uk/books/edit...+"essex+regiment"&pg=PT68&printsec=frontcover

 

Note Dr. Tim Moreman comments in his chapter ‘Desert Sands to the Burmese Jungle’ on pg. 232 ‘Three months training time was judged necessary by experienced “desert hands” before committing to battle…’ Within The Indian Army In The Two World Wars Edited by Kaushik Roy, pub. 2011. Available online via: The Indian Army In The Two World Wars [PDF] [f0kuc95f5li0]

 

I think it's important to look at the forest, rather than the trees here.

1) What kind of training are we talking about? Individual for officers? Unit (company, battalion)? Formation (brigade, division, corps)? Inter-unit (infantry with tanks etc)?

2) Context matters. Was it planned to rush the Buffs into battle untrained? Presumably not, but it was maybe that or risking a collapse. If that was the case, then the lack of training is not the cause for the defeat, but a consequence of it. Same with 1 Armd Div in January 1942. Taken to the cleaners, and clearly lacking training. But the idea wasn't for them to be in that situation - faulty intel meant that no attack was expected, and they had over a month before the Allied attack at El Agheila was to commence on 15 February.

3) All of these examples are valid, but there are others. Prior to CRUSADER e.g. 4 Armd Bde would have had very substantial training. Same for 7 Armd Bde. 22 Armd Bde, not so much, but then do you hold off to train them another month and delay the operation? In the end the results were not much different between the three brigades. Did the NZ Div or 4 Indian Div have insufficient training? I'm gonna go with 'no' here? Tuker explicitly mentions 4 Indian's 'high standard of training' and Freyberg refers to copious training pre-CRUSADER. The idea that there was a general 'lack of systematic training' does not wash.

4) Freyberg complains about lack of training with I tanks - but that seems to have done not much harm, and he in any way notes that the I tank manual needs revision, so it is questionable how much training (which would have been based on it) would have helped.

5) The last point in 3) is important to keep in mind. After CRUSADER it was clear that a lot of training and knowledge was subject to revision and a pretty massive exercise to distil lessons learned happened. The process of agreeing on what the lessons were and what they meant and how to reflect them in training takes time, and only when you've done all that can you start training. At the same time you are absorbing replacements for losses, who need to have basic desert training as well. Etc. pp.

Ceterum censeo command failure causa est.

All the best

Andreas

 

Sure, but as I said in the thread title and the first post, what I'm interested in is what training was conducted by 8th Army during its time in and behind the Gazala line before the summer battles began, i.e. from mid-Feb to 25/26 May 1942.

I'm going to be mainly looking at formation level training and probably at the brigade and the divisional levels as I don't think there was any attempt to conduct a full Corps level exercise (i.e. something like 7 Armd Div versus 1 Armd Div over the ground on which they were going to fight).

In addition, from what I've read in the secondary literature, that seems to be the level at which 8th Army had most difficulty once operations opened. I say that solely because there doesn't seem to have been an attempt to fight an "army battle" but more that there were two independent corps fighting individual divisional battles which disintegrated into individual brigades fighting increasingly separate and unsuccessful battles.

And, of course, Ritchie had never been trained to fight an "army battle" nor practised in doing so; and his two Corps Commanders don't immediately leap out as ideal replacements for him.

Regards

Tom

 

If you trawl through the WDs you find evidence of training.

Regiment exercise 3 RHA


Bde and Div exercises for whichever outfit 11 RHA was with.


22 Armd Bde bde exercise 15/16 May

287/288 Bty exercising co-op with tanks


6 DLI May 42


6 DLI May 42


6 DLI Bde exercise April 42


All the best

Andreas

 

Yes, I completely agree. There are plenty of details in there to show that 8th Army was training (at least up to a certain formation level). I also found quite a lot of detail in the WD of 1 Armd Div CRA Branch to show that there was much thought being given to how best to issue and train the units on the new 6-pdr A/T guns. Such as:

"16 May 1942
1115 Brig. Dennis CCRA 30 Corps in conference with CRA regarding new 6 pdr A/Tk guns.

17 May 1942
0830 Lt. Col. Bolton DSO CO 2 RHA called on CRA on 200 Gds Bde rejoining Division from Training area at Buq-Buq.
1500 Capt. Young attended conference concerning 6 pdrs with Brig. Dennis and Lt. Col. Peake G.1 1 Armd Div.
20 May 1942
1800 Lt. Col. Hickey M.C. CO 95 A/Tk Regt and i/c 30 Corps A/Tk School reported to CRA for instructions on running of 6 pdr course for the Division.

21 May 1942
1430 Brig. Fowler, Major Wyldbore-Smith and Capt. Young attended demonstration shoot by 6 pdr A/Tk guns by Rhodesian Bty 4 RHA of 7 Armd Div."

It does look like formations such as 1st Armd Div were doing their best to get the units their 6-pdrs and ensure they could conduct practice shoots as soon as possible. What I don't know is whether 7th Armd Div had been given 6-pdrs before the 1st Armd Div got theirs.

Regards

Tom

 

These chaps seem to have been practicing a brigade advance with two regimental groups each with decentralised support under command - field artillery, recce and engineers. In March 1942, 22nd Armd Bde had been reorganised as an independent brigade group, with its own supporting arms and services. It was placed under command of 1st Armoured Division on 23 April.

The tactical topic of the training does not look unreasonable as a vehicle for practicing the brigade operating as battlegroups. This was all part of the move to develop combined arms through decentralisation. The scenario is not very different to that practiced by the post war army.

Unfortunately for the Brigade, its next action would not be against scattered groups of enemy, but the Afrika Korps. The Eighth Army did not think through how to combine the "independent brigade groups" under command 1st Armoured Division to make a whole greater than its constituent parts. In the event the independent brigade groups were overrun and outfought by the Germans and Italians who fought as divisions and corps.