Eighth Army training - spring/summer 1942

I thought it would be interesting to do some digging into primary sources to look at this subject to see how fair the following comments actually are. Taken from Douglas Porch's Defeat and Division and his context setting for a description of the siege of Bir Hakeim:

"
p.414

[…]
Finally, a lack of systematic training in the British forces, especially in theater, undermined the ability to transmit and inculcate “lessons learned” from each action. This problem was accentuated by the fact that experienced units were frequently rotated out of the line to be replaced by regiments and even divisions newly arrived from England or India, that were totally unfamiliar with and unprepared for the conditions and fast-moving tactics of desert warfare. Officers on their way to the front were simply handed pamphlets that explained the latest German equipment and tactics, in the hope that they might find time to read them. Once at the front, the British often mixed and matched units into “composite battalions”, brigade groups, Jock columns, and so on. And while this offered advantages of operational flexibility, it also prevented the formation of meaningful command relationships and standardized operational practices, among a diverse army made up of British and imperial soldiers, not to mention Poles, Free French, and other flotsam of Europe’s defeated armies and desperate refugees. It also undermined esprit de corps in an army whose foundational unit was the regiment, whose fighting qualities were underpinned by regional pride and the special history and traditions of each regiment. New weapons, including tanks, were distributed to front-line units with little or no training on how to use them, much less a tactical and operational concept. This constant churning of units was matched on the leadership level, a spinning carousel of commanders, each more clueless than the last. Rommel would face six different British commanders in the Western Desert, each of whom had to deal with micromanagement of operations by Archibald Wavell and Claude Auchinleck from Cairo, not to mention the crack of Churchill’s bombastic lash from London. [Note 64: Fennel, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, pp. 200, 214-215, 225.]

There is certainly some evidence of micromanagement by Auchinleck and "direction and guidance" from Churchill but I'm not so sure what the evidence actually shows for training by 8th Army formations in and about the Gazala line. More to follow!

Regards

Tom

 

I look forward to seeing the primary evidence. This is an important subject, well done Tom.

 

It's not reflecting reality. As always there are some elements that are true, but the overall picture being painted here is simply not reflective of the underlying causes of the defeat.

1) we know there was systematic training, e.g. lectures on battlefield experience.



2) The pamphlets contained far more than 'latest German equipment and tactics', they contained regulations for the use of units.
3) 'Composite battalions' I'd like to see the evidence for that. I am not aware of it, other than in the case of tank units which had been completely written down, and then formed composite squadrons which were integrated into composite regiments. Later you also get e.g. 3/5 RTR but this was again a matter of maintaining combat capability while reacting to catastrophic losses. Never heard of this for the infantry, or artillery (with the possible exception of 7 Medium).
4) The origin of the forces has nothing to do with the inability to form command relationships. Red Herring alert.
5) See 3. Consequence, not cause of performance issues.
6) Tanks were issued with no training. Evidently wrong, reading war diaries would help.

When 1 Armd Div was taken to the cleaners by the D.A.K. not one of the issues above applied. They still ended up in a catastrophic defeat.

I think someone has taken in 'The Desert Generals' a bit too much.

All the best

Andreas

 

Re composite Battalion….

3rd Coldstream Guards & 2nd Scots Guards formed a short lived composite Battalion in July 1942.

Attached pages from Howard & Sparrow CG Regimental History 1920/46.

Steve

 

Thanks, much appreciated.

This seems to be the same urgent expediency, which was then quickly resolved. It was in my view a consequence and not the cause of performance failures, and I struggle to see how it has anything to do with the training issue being discussed.

All the best

Andreas

 

I’ve no “skin” in the discussion Andreas due to limited knowledge.

I’ll leave it to the experts and get back to watching the football on Sky.

Steve

 

Thanks Steve and enjoy the football.

Second para of the response wasn't aimed at you, but the original argument by Mr. Porch (or Fennell, whoever it was that came up with this). Apologies for not making that clear.

All the best

Andreas

 

Hi Andreas,

Sorry, but you missed (or I didn't make clear) the "finally" at the start of the paragraph.

Earlier he talks about other causes for the Eighth Army's woes, I just thought I'd like to see what actual training was done once the army settled down behind the minefields of the Gazala line.

And answering your points in turn:

1. "we know there was systematic training, e.g. lectures on battlefield experience" - by systematic I (and perhaps Porch) was talking about actual rehearsal of formations (as formations) in their allocated roles on the ground. Auchinleck's recommendation to Ritchie about the armoured divisions fighting as divisions as (he hoped) they had been trained. Which seems an important thing for him and his staff to be certain of whilst he was debating strategy with Churchill and Brooke!
2. "The pamphlets contained far more than 'latest German equipment and tactics', they contained regulations for the use of units." - Agreed in the main, although not sure "regulations" is the right term. Doctrine not being the same as regulations...
3. "'Composite battalions' I'd like to see the evidence for that." I'd heard about the "Composite Guards Battalion" before - and Fennell comments upon its poor morale. Not sure of others - except for the tank units as you say. Some of that was certainly a consequence of heavy losses but there were also decisions made about stripping tanks from existing units to feed to the remnants of already battered units.
4. "The origin of the forces has nothing to do with the inability to form command relationships." I'm not sure about this to be honest. The Commonwealth formations did all have commanders who were aware that they represented very important proportions of their entire armed forces and so were, perhaps, less keen to see their troops thrown into "forlorn hopes". And, thanks to Morshead and Freyberg, the Aus and NZ divisions were fought more as divisions when Auchinleck's/Dorman-Smith's battle group theory was the latest fad.
5. Not sure which point you are referring to?
6. There are a lot of comments in the historiography about how little training units received on their new 6-pdr guns, for example. And, he did say "little or no training". We might perhaps agree that tallies with some units experiences...

Regards

Tom

 

And a teaser from 1st Armoured Division HQ RA (WO 169/4056) for April 1942:



Edited to add: That's it for April '42 according to the CRA's diary. There was also a large turnover of personnel in the RA Branch.

Regards
Tom

 

And a little about technical training from the same source:

107 RHA (of 1 Armd Div) drew "16 new 6 pdrs from A.V.P. El Adem" on 24 May 1942. At 1500 the next day, 1st Armd Div's CRA and BMRA "saw 6 pdr practice by 107 RHA". Also on 25 May 1942, 11 RHA "collected their 6 pdrs" and on 26 May 1942, "2 R.H.A. drew their 6 pdr A/Tk guns". Not at all surprising, therefore, that 1st Armd Div gunners received "little or no training" in their use.

No significant formation training is recorded in the war diary for May 1942, but fair to say that there is plenty of evidence to show that the gunners were conducting training shoots at the regimental level.

More during the week.

Regards

Tom

 

I seem to recall from Colvin that in that period there were plans which involved infantry and armoured regiments which were to marry up in the early morning for an attack despite not having worked together, and then there being issues with them actually both arriving at the forming up point (if that's the correct term) at the same time. Am I remembering that correctly?

That's more of a coordination issue but it kind of falls into the vague category of standardized operational procedures. Whether infantry and armour had ever trained or fought together, before being assigned to do so, was an issue which continued to bedevil the British army until the end of the war.

 

I'm not saying it was good or sufficient training (and we know in some cases it wasn't, because of time pressure), but training there was. Integrating individual replacements, as raised here is a different issue from unit training however, as it is always an issue in a far-flung location where they may trickle in, rather than arrive as a class, or get a desk job first before going to a unit.

I think this potato/potahto. It looks like instructions to me, but we can call it 'doctrine' if that prevents heart attacks in former UK army soldiers.

Unless they came with crews I am not sure about this proving the point. I see this again as a consequence, rather than a cause. We know this didn't happen unless something very really extremely bad had already happened before.

Well yes, but that's not really a command issue, and I don't think these issues existed in Monty's Eighth Army to the degree that they did in Ritchie's - which would lead me to conclude that it was not the origin, but the commander. Also, command relationships were e.g. difficult in January 1942 with Messervy, Godwin-Austen and Tuker, all of whom were British, and the failed attempt to cut off the Axis in December 1941 was a purely British effort (13 Corps with 7 Motor, 22 Armoured, 22 Guards Bdes). That's why I consider this a red herring.

It was 'the constant churning of units' - apologies, it made more sense in my head.

As you note in your next few posts, it is pretty hard to get training if the guns get in so late. Looking at tanks however, the M3 Stuart? Trained on at unit level from at least August, first use in November. The Grant? Trained on from February in units, last unit kitted out in April, first use planned in June.

I don't buy this whole argument.

All the best

Andreas

 

I think it is very much a familiarity/training issue. You really want your supporting infantry and tanks to be used to working with each other and operating together. Not just conceptually (the tanks had worked with infantry before and vice versa) but practically (this tank unit had worked with this infantry unit before). Too much to go wrong otherwise.

All the best

Andreas

 

One more, albeit minor, infantry example:

Agar-Hamilton & Turner do mention (pp.8-9) that the garrison of Commonwealth Keep before the battle of Gazala started included a composite company comprising platoons from one British and three SA battalions. Not sure why they felt the need to do that?

Edited to add: they also claim (p.10) that the British had two complete armoured brigades in reserve (1st and 8th) and that they were cannibalised during the battle to provide “dribblers of reinforcements” to battered formations rather than being employed as complete formations as they had been prepared to do.

Regards

Tom

 

What do we mean by "Systematic Training"?

Soldiers need to be proficient in handling their weapons.

Soldiers need to be trained in tactical procedures at different levels for the different phases of war
- Platoons/troops
- Companies/squadrons
- Infantry Battalions/ armoured Regiments
- Brigades
- Divisions
- Army Corps
- Army
...and the supporting arms - artillery, engineers, signals and logistics all need to practice at different organisational levels.

On top of this, the different bits at different levels need to work as combined arms teams which presumes that there is a combined arms doctrine for fighting as infantry armour and artillery groupings.

I know a little about training. Training needs to be built up. A "divisional training exercise" does little to develop tactical skill at battalion or company level. Cloth models, TEWTs and command post exercises allow commanders and staff to train without messing soldiers about.

I doubt the Eighth Army had the time to train properly in the period, assuming that the commanders had a realistic view of their capabilities.

 

The hypothesis is this:

"Finally, a lack of systematic training in the British forces, especially in theater, undermined the ability to transmit and inculcate “lessons learned” from each action."

Reversing this would indicate that in the author's belief, application of 'systematic training' would have transmitted and inculcated "lessons learned" from each action, and led to better outcomes.

I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that given the obvious errors in the rant, the author has not been anywhere near primary documentation, and has little idea what these words mean in the context of Eighth Army in 1941/42. The book this is in is about France in 1939/40, and it appears to me as if the evidence for these claims is reliance on secondary sources such as Fennell.

The whole section is a Smorgasbrød of 'all the things that were bad about Eighth Army in 1941/42 that ever appeared in print', in a paragraph.

All the best

Andreas

 

Montgomery's real talent was training. He was aware enough of the training standard in the Eighth Army to insist on a delay before El Alamein to allow for troop training before his set-piece attack. He was aware that success on the battlefield also depended on formations breaking down into "hard hitting packets" and that this was hard to do but the Germans were very good at this. Montgomery did not have the time or resources to put right performance at the combined arms battlegroup level. He certainly did not have the temperament to discover mission command as applied by the Wehrmacht. Montgomery's reliance on set pieces was playing to his and his army's strengths. To be fair, Montgomery did try to encourage lessons learned. There was a week-long study period in Tripoli to share the lessons learned at El Alamein and in the pursuit.

 

More primary source evidence of 8th Army training whilst in the Gazala line - same source (i.e. WO 169/4056 - 1 Armd Div CRA):



11 RHA also conducted firing practice on 10 May 1942. I'll do a bit of digging to see whether 11 R.H.A. provide any more details.

Regards

Tom

 

Tom and others,

Wasn't there a thread here several years ago on the circulation of training leaflets etc before mid-1942, in the Middle East? I try to check later.

Updated 1453hrs

Unable to find such a thread! Instead I have added a number of posts drawing upon my own research.

 

Hi David,

Hopefully not just one per latrine!!

I had a quick look in the 22 Armd Bde war diary for May 42 and found this instruction for the exercise the Bde carried out on 15 May 42 (WO 169-4251):



I thought this raised a couple of interesting points:

1. The planned 1 Armd Div exercise (a Divisional Wireless "scheme" according to the WD narrative) having been cancelled, this seems an appropriate attempt at the Brigade-level to take the opportunity given by the move to train in an "advance to contact" formation and then to practice the transition into an independent Brigade Group attack.

2. Although a 22 Armd Brigade TEWT was conducted on 21 May to "study the approach march to intercept an enemy advance from the West and NW" there doesn't appear to have been any divisional level exercises - either with troops or just around the sand table before a couple of glasses of warm whiskey!

More to follow.

Regards

Tom