One of the many funny things about this subject is the bewildering expectation of many British officers that good morale was something to be expected no matter what the situation. Auchinleck and others wanted more severe penalties for desertion and so on, but what on earth did they expect from the men? Eighth Army's leadership from January 42 to June was simply awful. The Germans won four straight battles in a row and inflicted severe loss and disorganization on the units they did not completely destroy. Of course morale will weaken under such circumstances. What I find more remarkable is that this supposedly disheartened army rallied and gave Rommel a very bloody nose at First Alamein--that is, before Montgomery appeared on the scene. Niall Barr quite rightly points out that the middle and junior-level leaders of 8th Army were learning fast, already laying the tactical and operational groundwork for the success of Second Alamein. First Alamein was a convincing defensive victory for 8th Army; the problems came when Auchinleck tried to counterattack. He was quite right to do so, but he did not grip his army either personally or professionally. Dorman-Smith was a malignant influence and Auchinleck's corps commanders were simply no good. Barr defends Gott and Ramsden, but for the life of me I can't see why. Corps commanders are supposed to coordinate the actions of divisions to achieve the objective, but Gott and Ramsden failed to do this over and over again. Once yes, twice no, as they say after you foul someone on the soccer pitch. I agree with Dan Pienaar, the air accident that prevented Gott from taking over 8th Army was a blessing from God. In the 9th Australian Division, the men were still solid despite the frustrations of July. The real morale problem, in my opinion, lay among the commanders. Morshead and his staff were not downhearted, on the contrary they were aggressive and determined to hurt the enemy. But Morshead was fed up. He had seen his division jerked around and committed to poorly-coordinated, half-baked operations, and he had no confidence left in Auchinleck and Ramsden. Pienaar and Freyberg felt much the same way, and when a general loses the confidence of his subordinates his usefulness is gone.
Rant on. I think that's the tragedy of Auchinleck. He clearly outgeneralled Rommel every time he bothered to try. But unlike Rommel, he had far too much time for non-performers under him after he sacked Cunningham (leaving Richie in place after the counteroffensive, and not just not sacking Messervie but giving him 7 Armoured, when he had proven he was incapable of leading an armoured division). In fact, the Auk punished performance when he accepted Godwin-Austen's resignation in February instead of removing Richie, and that must have been felt hard in the Army. Rommel went too far in the other direction, sacking even sensible people (or removing them from the core of the action, such as Cruewell during the Gazala battle in May) on a whim. From Brigadier upwards 8 Army had a serious performance issue, in my view. What’s with all the DSOs? « The Crusader Project Rant over. All the best Andreas
This was the review I posted on Axis History Forum in Jan and shows that I thought it was pretty good overall. I've just finished reading "Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the path to El Alamein" by Jonathon Fennell - which Santa delivered for Xmas! An academic (and therefore blooming expensive!) book, the author has done a great job of discovering new sources and analysing them to trace the morale of 8th Army during the summer of 1942. Using sources as varied as sickness rates, absence rates and most intriguingly previously un-published censor reports which he found in the Australian archives, Fennell's work tends to support the thesis that 8th Army suffered from a serious morale crisis during June and July 1942. His research extended to South African, Australian, New Zealand and UK archives so his work begins to reflect the Commonwealth nature of the 8th Army. His work also shows that the improvement in morale that followed was not down solely to the appearance of the little man with the "funny hat". As well as the undoubtedly benign influence of Montgomery's arrival and immediate orders, there appears to have been a more general improvement in the standard of training, recruitment and retention of British troops during 1941-42 which began to bear fruit around this time. Combined with the improvements in equipment that were beginning to be supplied, and perhaps the more static fighting environment, these sufficed, just!, to produce success at Alam Halfa and then later in the offensive. These few sentences really fail to do justice to the depth of research that has gone into this work, which I would strongly recommend for anyone interested in either the North African campaign or the Commonwealth armies more generally. It appears to be the first in a new series from Cambridge University Press - I hope they are all this valuable (although my bank manager might not appreciate the prices!). An Interlibrary loan is definitely recommended if you have the ability to do it. Regards Tom
Tom sounds about right as Monty's arrival coincided with Alanbrooke's main strategy - and control over Churchill's madcap ways and the influence of Eden....which proved to be the winning formula despite many arguments from too many people who hadn't a clue as to what Strategy was all about - the replacement of Godwin- Austen - Gott and Norrie by Leese - Horrocks and Kirkman although still stuck with Lumsden solidified the Army into a winning team.... Cheers
Hi Tom (O'Brien) Thanks for the review which I think is a very fair and accurate one of Fennell's book. I agree about the inter-library loan option. I was lucky to get my copy from a friend who reviewed it and passed it on! Bryn
... Eighth Army's leadership from January 42 to June was simply awful. The Germans won four straight battles in a row and inflicted severe loss and disorganization on the units they did not completely destroy. Of course morale will weaken under such circumstances. What I find more remarkable is that this supposedly disheartened army rallied and gave Rommel a very bloody nose at First Alamein--that is, before Montgomery appeared on the scene. Niall Barr quite rightly points out that the middle and junior-level leaders of 8th Army were learning fast, already laying the tactical and operational groundwork for the success of Second Alamein. First Alamein was a convincing defensive victory for 8th Army; the problems came when Auchinleck tried to counterattack. He was quite right to do so, but he did not grip his army either personally or professionally. Dorman-Smith was a malignant influence and Auchinleck's corps commanders were simply no good. Barr defends Gott and Ramsden, but for the life of me I can't see why. Corps commanders are supposed to coordinate the actions of divisions to achieve the objective, but Gott and Ramsden failed to do this over and over again. Once yes, twice no, as they say after you foul someone on the soccer pitch. I agree with Dan Pienaar, the air accident that prevented Gott from taking over 8th Army was a blessing from God. In the 9th Australian Division, the men were still solid despite the frustrations of July. The real morale problem, in my opinion, lay among the commanders. Morshead and his staff were not downhearted, on the contrary they were aggressive and determined to hurt the enemy. But Morshead was fed up. He had seen his division jerked around and committed to poorly-coordinated, half-baked operations, and he had no confidence left in Auchinleck and Ramsden. Pienaar and Freyberg felt much the same way, and when a general loses the confidence of his subordinates his usefulness is gone. I especially concur with your criticism of the corps commanders. My only caveat is to accept that Gott had some hand in the initial plan for defending the Alam Halfa Ridge - for which Barr gives him credit. Otherwise neither he nor Ramsden impress in the actions of the second half of July 1942 - for which Auchinleck must also take a share of the blame for not giving a clear steer on the purpose of these attacks. The concern seemed to be maintenance of operational tempo whatever the cost 'keeping the enemy on the back foot'.
