Has anyone read Jonathan Fennell's book Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein? I'm interested in people's views on his belief that it was Montgomery's arrival in Egypt that was the catalyst for a change in Eighth Army's morale in August 1942. According to the 'blurb' for his book on Amazon "He shows for the first time that a major morale crisis and stunning recovery decisively affected Eighth Army's performance during the critical battles on the Gazala and El Alamein lines in 1942." Bryn
Bryn have not read this book but on the slice of information we have - I would agree with his thought that Monty was the catalyst of change - at that time..... The 8th army since June 1940 when Italy decided to join in the war had many ups and downs with three different leaders in Wavell for example we had a solid victory at Beda Fomm - Ethiopia - and the tragedy of Greece -Crete etc - not necessarily his fault but he paid the price - Then came Auchinlek - whose choice of Army Commanders let him down with Cunningham then Ritchie between them on a high at Crusaders alleged Victory /Defeat to a very low low when Rommel miraculously came storming out of El Ageilha - to start off the Gazala Gallop ending at El Alamein - and the demise of Auchinlek.. Then appeared this funny little man with white knees who told the assembled low morale Army that he would hit Rommel for six out of Africa - yeah right - we've heard it all before BUT what he said came true with the change of tactics at Alum El Halfa- where Rommel was clobbered - and again at El Alamein a few weeks later - where he was clobbered once more and the 8th Army started the march to expel the enemy from the desert - the Hospitals emptied - sick lists disappeared - no one was going to miss this - after all these years to-ing and fro-ing - morale climbed to 1010%- The cause - the funny little guy with the white knees - who said at one point - "our task is to kill Germans - even the Padres - Once per day and Twice on Sundays- how can you not follow this comic..... Cheers
I wish I had read it, I could have sorely used it for my own book. My own view is that while morale was important (it always is), the critical factors in 8th Army's problems of 1942 were leadership and tactics, neither of which were adequate. I studied two divisions, the 50th Northumbrian and the 9th Australian. Morale data (NYD (N) statistics, courtmartial records, etc) for the 50th during the summer of '42 are unfortunately rather poor, but whatever its morale problems the division fought quite well at Gazala and at Matruh, though it suffered heavy losses in both places. On the other hand, there is some indication that morale had declined by July--not surprisingly, in the light of retreats and heavy losses. Data for the 9th Division are much better. The 9th had been out of action since Tobruk, and the intensity of combat at First Alamein certainly produced a fair number of combat-stress cases and some court martials and desertions too; but the problem was far from critical, and the 9th probably performed better at First Alamein than any other 8th Army Division. Good training and excellent leadership by Morshead and his subordinates were the main reasons for this. I read a report by a senior RAMC officer on 8th Army morale during July. He gave some raw figures for NYD (N), and he found that things were worst in those units that had seen the most combat since Gazala, and in composite organizations formed from weakened units. The infantry battalions of 50th Div that saw action at First Alamein qualified under both headings, though none were specifically mentioned in the report. (No names, no pack drill, as so often in British documents.) By contrast, figures for NYD (N) in the 8th Army during Second Alamein were significantly better. So, Montgomery and his new regime did help, but when I was writing my book I didn't think the problem was as bad as Montgomery made out.
An interesting subject and I shall have to keep an eye out for the book mentioned. Certainly things appear to have changed in the desert with Monty's arrival, along with supplies of better tanks and more troops if I remember correctly. Regards, Jerry
Thanks for contributions offered so far. I think Fennell's book is very good but I disagree to some extent with his conclusion. I think the problem with morale is it covers lots of things including 'will to combat' and 'belief in leaders/victory'. I think Eighth Army never really lost one, but never really had the other until Montgomery came along. That's why I disagree with the idea of a 'morale crisis' amongst front line troops. After all, Auchinleck's forces did defeat the Axis advance in early July 'First Alamein' TTH, you may be interested to know that Fennell used censors reports as the basis of his study. Bryn
Bryn Would disagree with you that Auchinlek's defeat of the axis advance at 1st Alemein blunt truth is that the 8th Army was at it's lowest morale after the panic retreat from Gazala which saw the loss of 50 th Div;s 150 Bde - HQ of 4th Armoured bde - loss of two Sth African bdes and Tobruk with another 33,000 pow's and managed to find the best and shortest defence lines available..... Whereas Rommel was at the end of his supply lines - and tired also - and as he recuperated - Montgomery arrived Cheers
What was your book, by the way? Armies of Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2011). It's a comparative study of the 9th Australian and 50th Division across the war. Have you read Niall Barr's, Pendulum of War? It's one of the two best books I have read on Alamein, and Barr came more or less to the same conclusion that I did about what ailed 8th Army.
Armies of Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2011). It's a comparative study of the 9th Australian and 50th Division across the war. And a very good book it is. Kudos to you.
And a very good book it is. Kudos to you. Thanks, Orwell. At a time when I am dealing with about six different flavors of tsouris, that is much appreciated.
Yes, I have read Barr's book. You're right, it is excellent. The detail is immense but it's still readable. On morale, I have been striving to make clear a differentiation between 'combat effectiveness', 'will to fight', 'belief in victory' and other aspects of 'morale' - ll of which Fennell looks at. However, last weekend I watched 'Went the Day Well' (one of my favorite films). This contains the classic WW2 stereotypical remark from the young Harry Fowler when asked 'Do you know what morale is?' 'Yeah, 'course, it's what the wops ain't got'. I'm sure that's how the concept was seen at the time. Hopefully, we've gone beyond that now! Still, a great film! Bryn
I think Eighth Army never really lost one, but never really had the other until Montgomery came along. Sorry, but I think this is quite wrong. There seems to have been a tremendous belief in victory amongst the troops that crossed the wire on the night of 17/18 November 1941. Of course, they were disabused of that within days, but it doesn't mean they never had it. All the best Andreas
Andreas Couldn't agree more as I have said that morale in 8th Army was an up and down thing as perhaps with most people - success in battle is a chancy thing as the first contact with the enemy tends to bend the plans.....such as Crusader victory/defeat....but was lost in the mutual admiration of some budding authors books ... Cheers
Andreas I'm not disagreeing but how did that manifest itself? Was it in letters? Comments made subsequently? Someone who was there could obviously make observations on their own feelings, that of those immediately around them and perhaps the 'atmosphere'. I know you've done a lot on Crusader so it would be interesting to know on what sources your remarks based. Tom, I'm sorry if anything I've said has offended you. Bryn
Brynley no need for apologies having spent 35 years in sales - I have been insulted by experts but probably annoy easily these days - when agreed is designated about morale of 8th Army to find budding authors wittering on about what should have been in their books- can't go wrong with the TRUTH - without any revisions..... you have been given some good examples of 8th's morale from myself and Andreas - so accept it by checking the sick lists before ANY battles - if they are long morale is NON existent - short sick list - keenness to fight i.e. HIGH morale e.g 50th Div - 7th AD after Gazala gallop hospitals full long sick lists - arrival of Monty and after Wadi el Halfa - hospitals empty very short sick lists.....believe it...! Cheers
so accept it by checking the sick lists before ANY battles - if they are long morale is NON existent - short sick list - keenness to fight i.e. HIGH morale e.g 50th Div - 7th AD after Gazala gallop hospitals full long sick lists - Tom: I am a student of the 50th Div, and I was wondering where you got your info about 50th Div sick lists.
Some general thoughts. There are several problems with judging morale. First, nobody seems to have a really satisfactory definition of what it is (and what it is not). Second, it is a very difficult thing to measure. You can use NYD (N) [combat stress/battle fatigue] rates and court-martial statistics, as I did in my book, but neither is a fully accurate indicator. I found cases where units performed quite well in battle despite relatively high rates of one or the other. The 6th Airbn Div had a pretty high rate of court martial offenses prior to D-Day, but the division fought magnificently once the invasion began. And third, not all units and divisions are the same. They have their own personalities and histories, and morale in each outfit is influenced by factors peculiar to itself. In the 50th Division, for example, the 69th Brigade had a consistently poorer disciplinary record than the 151st Brigade. In the 231st Bde in Normandy, the 1st Hampshires had more serious morale and discipline problems than its sister battalions.
TTH just thinking in terms of my own unit to measure morale - one major factor was the man at the top - in the 50th Div case - Graham was an exceptional leader and their morale at Mareth was first class although taking a beating and then absorbing a less than good Bde to replace the 150th- again after D Day - best of the three divs in XXX corps- 8th Army - Monty after El Halfa- morale at it's highest - 8th Army under Leese boasting that he had 2000 Tanks and could afford to lose 50% - morale slumped in the Tank units - BUT under Mc Creery - a winning Tank man - everyone wanted in to finish it off Cheers
Andreas I'm not disagreeing but how did that manifest itself? Was it in letters? Comments made subsequently? Someone who was there could obviously make observations on their own feelings, that of those immediately around them and perhaps the 'atmosphere'. I know you've done a lot on Crusader so it would be interesting to know on what sources your remarks based. Tom, I'm sorry if anything I've said has offended you. Bryn War diaries, orders of the day, personal reminiscence after the fact. I believe 8 Army was very much keyed up and ready to have a go. It was the subsequent events and the leadership failures exhibited throughout CRUSADER and the counter-offensive that set the stage for the recovery under Montgomery. All the best Andreas
