If you look at the raid on Munchen Gladbach,it followed the start of the Blizkreig on 10 May and with it followed the 6 weeks that shook the world..ended with the defeat and destruction of the BEF and French Army.Nothing to do with any strategic response from the RAF.The sacred cow targets were the two opposing capitals which were not touched until events developed in August 1940. Muchen Gladbach was deemed to be a communications and railways centre which was feeding the Wehrmacht over the untouched bridges at Maastricht just over the border into Holland.Daylight strikes on these bridges had brought little success due to accurate flak and the night raid on Munchen Gladbach followed.It became increasingly obvious that the RAF aircraft such as the Blenheim,Battle, Whitley and Hampden were not adequate for daylight operations. Poor weather and inferior availability of aircraft prevented operations being mounted on 13 May and operations resumed on 14 May to attempt to stem the flow of German forces across the Meuse at Sedan but lost 35 aircraft of the 71 Blenheims and Battles put up on the day. After the Luftwaffe had bombed Rotterdam before a surrender deadline had expired,the RAF strategic offensive commenced against Germany on the night of 15 May,Churchill gave clearance to raid the heartland of Germany.111 Wellingtons,Hampdens and Whitleys raided targets in the Ruhr and communication centres in Belgium for the loss of one aircraft due to navigational error, the first time an air bomber fleet over 100 aircraft had been assembled.One important point was that these aircraft had been dispatched from English airfields and thus were not prone to air strikes or their bases being overrun as the RAF element in France had experienced. It took sometime for the RAF bombing offensive to be effective...inferior aircraft whose daylight operational losses along with valuable aircrew, forced their role to to that of night bombing...poor navigational and bombing aids.Bombing performance did not improve until the 4 engine heavies came into being with the huge aircrew training programme.By early1942,the RAF was a completely different force that had entered the war in September 1939.In the spring of 1942,the Lancaster started to appear on squadrons,bombing aids started to make a difference after the Butt Report had delivered an inadequate record of bombing performance.H2S and the Gee navigational system and the introduction of the Pathfinder principle in the summer of 1943 saw a continual improvement in bombing efficiency.By the new year of 1944,most 4 engined heavies had H2S installed as standard.Greater bomb loads were developed for the Lancaster and as production rates increased, more Lancaster dedicated squadrons came into being from late 1943 and early 1944. In the end the German air defence system was overwhelmed despite the ever extension of the "Hammhuber" early warning line.If there was an advantage to the RAF,it was that the investment in radar and electronic counter measures undertaken by the British exceeded that of the Germans...Hitler would only sanction investment in new technology if the payback was not more than one year.The British scientific philosophy was one of a quest for continual improvement. As for the RAF bombing offensive against the Germans,there was little the British air arm could do after the fall of France until the invasion of Normandy to take the battle to the German heartland.It was more than a thorn in Hitler's side, especially from June 1941 when he chose to fight on two fronts in pursuit of his ideology.As the RAF grew stronger and the USAAF came into the war,the working up of the USAAF saw the Germans being capable of being raided by night and day.Interestingly the USAAF at that time had little, if any, expertise of night flying and found the weather over Europe such,that they preferred daylight operations. There is no doubt that the RAF/USAAF bombing offensive had a severe impact on the German war economy despite the management of the German armament industry production by Speer.From November 1944,the German synthetic fuel oil production capacity had been damaged to such an extent that the Luftwaffe flying training was severely restricted. Further the Ardennes offensive in December 1944 depended largely on ground forces overrunning Allied fuel dumps. The cost of civilian lives has always been questioned but while the Allies made it clear that any resolution would be by unconditional surrender,Goebbels in October 1943 had the German population accept that Total War would be the only option for Germany. Coming to civilian casualties,I saw a figure of 650.000 German civilians killed during the war....later from German sources saw this figure at 500000 casualties.The British civilian casualties have been put at 65000...then compare it to the millions of Russian civilians killed during the occupation of Russian territory and the numbers of civilians, who lost their lives in concentration camps from 1933 and those millions who were the victim of NS ideology in extermination camps. Of course there were some, such as senior clergymen who thought despite what was at stake,the British should abide by what might be regarded as Queensbury rules in their air offense against Germany.However those British civilians experiencing Luftwaffe raids had a different observation and could not care less for the welfare of German civilians,they saw retribution as appropriate for the German nation. As has been said ,the Germans continued with Hitler's indiscriminate V weapons until the end...still firing V2 rockets at London from The Haque as late as late March 1945.Then there was the V3 super gun complex at Mimoyecques,designed to shell London,delivering 55lb HE shells at the rate of 600 shells/hour...envisaged as a retaliatory weapon by Hitler for the July 1943 raid on Hamburg.....intended by Hi to destroy London and force British capitulation.A raid by the US 9th Air Force in November 1943 resulted in one gun complex of 25 guns being abandoned. A decision by the Germans to continue to complete the remaining battery of 25 guns remained a threat.Before the remaining battery could be commissioned,the site was overrun in September 1944 and Churchill issued instructions for the site to be destroyed.This gun specification could have caused a high level of casualties in London and the south east had it not been allowed to come to fruition. Overall Bomber Command demonstrated a high level of commitment through its leadership and those individuals who unceasingly took the battle to the evil of Hitler's totalitarian Third Reich night after night.