Dieppe Uncovered

Discussion in 'Books, Films, TV, Radio' started by roscoe, Aug 22, 2012.

  1. roscoe

    roscoe Junior Member

    One of the best documentaries I have ever seen.

    Battle of Dieppe uncovered; James Bond creator involved - YouTube

    The true reason for the Dieppe Raid is now uncovered.

    The raid was a PINCH raid disguised as a full operation to fool the Germans.

    A unit started by Ian Fleming (yes the James Bond author) attempted to get a former river gunboat (flat bottom, shallow draft) into Dieppe Harbour. Their task was to go into the German Naval Headquarters at the Hotel Moderne and snatch the FOUR ROTOR Enigma Codes. They needed to snatch the code books but at the same time not inform the Germans that we had the code books. Otherwise they would have changed the codes.

    Bletchley Park had been blind to the U Boat code for six months since the Germans had added another rotor to the Enigma. Atlantic convoys were being devastated and times were desperate.

    The raid (supposedly) failed because the element of surprise was lost. The Canadians task was to silence the guns at the harbour entrance. Most didn't make it off of the beach.

    The gunboat was severely damaged attempting to break through the harbour entrance.

    Fleming's Unit was on the gunboat they were to make for the Hotel Moderne and snatch anything, including prisoners, from the German Naval Headquarters there. They were then tasked to give what they had to Commander Robert Dudley Ryder VC who would take it back to England. Dudley Ryder had won the VC during the St Nazaire Raid onboard HMS Cambeltown.

    We're told that that the raid was unsuccessful however many vessels in the harbour itself also had the Four Rotor Enigma onboard. It is a coincidence that very shortly after Bletchley (with the help of Alan Turing) cracked the four Rotor code.

    The story told is that they got a code book from U 559 on 30 October 1942. The code was cracked in early November which means that Turing cracked it within a few days. However if the code books had been snatched during the Dieppe raid (19th August) then it would have given them more time.
     
  2. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    I've moved thread from the 1940 section of the forum.

    1940 The Campaign in Belgium, France and Holland' - 1940 and all that - Same war, but almost a different era.
     
  3. Phaethon

    Phaethon Historian

    I also saw this documentary, and thought that it was very good. I was a little worried about the nature of ‘cutting edge’ research and the slightly sensationalist nature of ‘previously unseen facts’, but I do understand that these days in order to get a documentary made you have to be a little self promoting, so I’ll let that slide.

    Despite it being thoroughly enjoyable I do have three points about it however.

    Firstly, I was not aware that there was or that there is, a ‘grand mystery’ behind Dieppe. In my experience researching combined ops it seems common knowledge that Russia was pestering Britain regarding being more active in the way, and Churchill’s cabinet papers make it quite clear that he himself was pushing for an operation to hit back at the enemy.

    Secondly, I think the Veterans (who had their ear a lot closer to the ground to these events then we historians now do) should have had more attention paid to them, rather then insisting that things were going on behind the scenes that they were unaware of. Most veterans seem under the impression that they were used as guinea pigs/pawns prior to a second front and I think this is actually very likely given the facts of the time.

    Finally, leading on from point two, I have to say that in the second world war it was not unusual for conglomerate operations being formed to satisfy different needs of the British Military.
    In my experience with BLAZING (which was cancelled partly in favour of the larger JUBILEE) the mission satisfied the main criteria of testing tactics/the effectiveness of infantry and tanks against a heavily fortified beach (a near as damnit quote from the operations main objective).

    ...However also in BLAZING the RAF were simultaneously testing their ability to defend an invasion against enemy aircraft, whilst also attempting to confront and destroy enemy fighters on their own terms. This was in parallel with the need to test S.Zuckerman and J.Bernals formula for the number of aircraft/bombs needed for neutralizing beach defences; and I also know that the Parachute Brigade was pushing for a test to land troops on a coastal strip, and combined ops wanted to know about the effectiveness of landing special forces in support of/as a diversion of a large operation.

    You have to remember that by the time of JUBILEE, much smaller and far more cost effective operations had already been highly successful in capturing German documents and equipment: BITING having been carried out in February that same year. Asking me to believe that the raid was a large scale diversion so that they did not realize the Allies intent is a little hard to swallow given the scale of the diversion (I know the authors covered other areas but this was the programmes main message).

    I think it far more likely that several different plans converged to make JUBILEE what it was, and the lessons learnt made OVERLORD possible.
     
  4. 17thDYRCH

    17thDYRCH Senior Member Patron

    I am a Canadian. I have been to Dieppe.
    It was a fiasco, nothing more and nothing less.
     
  5. roscoe

    roscoe Junior Member

    I also saw this documentary, and thought that it was very good. I was a little worried about the nature of ‘cutting edge’ research and the slightly sensationalist nature of ‘previously unseen facts’, but I do understand that these days in order to get a documentary made you have to be a little self promoting, so I’ll let that slide.

    Despite it being thoroughly enjoyable I do have three points about it however.

    Firstly, I was not aware that there was or that there is, a ‘grand mystery’ behind Dieppe. In my experience researching combined ops it seems common knowledge that Russia was pestering Britain regarding being more active in the way, and Churchill’s cabinet papers make it quite clear that he himself was pushing for an operation to hit back at the enemy.

    Secondly, I think the Veterans (who had their ear a lot closer to the ground to these events then we historians now do) should have had more attention paid to them, rather then insisting that things were going on behind the scenes that they were unaware of. Most veterans seem under the impression that they were used as guinea pigs/pawns prior to a second front and I think this is actually very likely given the facts of the time.

    Finally, leading on from point two, I have to say that in the second world war it was not unusual for conglomerate operations being formed to satisfy different needs of the British Military.
    In my experience with BLAZING (which was cancelled partly in favour of the larger JUBILEE) the mission satisfied the main criteria of testing tactics/the effectiveness of infantry and tanks against a heavily fortified beach (a near as damnit quote from the operations main objective).

    ...However also in BLAZING the RAF were simultaneously testing their ability to defend an invasion against enemy aircraft, whilst also attempting to confront and destroy enemy fighters on their own terms. This was in parallel with the need to test S.Zuckerman and J.Bernals formula for the number of aircraft/bombs needed for neutralizing beach defences; and I also know that the Parachute Brigade was pushing for a test to land troops on a coastal strip, and combined ops wanted to know about the effectiveness of landing special forces in support of/as a diversion of a large operation.

    You have to remember that by the time of JUBILEE, much smaller and far more cost effective operations had already been highly successful in capturing German documents and equipment: BITING having been carried out in February that same year. Asking me to believe that the raid was a large scale diversion so that they did not realize the Allies intent is a little hard to swallow given the scale of the diversion (I know the authors covered other areas but this was the programmes main message).

    I think it far more likely that several different plans converged to make JUBILEE what it was, and the lessons learnt made OVERLORD possible.

    Well the evidence presented by O'Keefe is compelling. The particular trigger word for me was the word SIGINT in one of the documents that O' Keefe uncovered.

    SIGINT at that time was ULTRA. Enigma and Ultra are a particular expertise of mine. I do lectures on the subject for a veteran charity.

    It does seem that the allies knew that the intention of the raid had been compromised by the Germans as early as May that year. Indeed even Montgomery had advised that the raid be cancelled. The barges at southern England ports had been attacked by the Luftwaffe and the Germans had been seen exercising against a sea borne assault. Notwithstanding the strange clue in the Daily Telegraph crossword on the 17TH AUGUST (2 days before the raid) - Clue "French Port" - Answer "Dieppe" (Coincidence Right?) .

    Yet they still went ahead with the assault. Why?

    The original plan was to have paratroopers land inland to silence the guns but this was shelved.

    The particular piece of evidence is the part where they decided to carry on with the assault with a conference onboard a Navy Destroyer even though it was clear that the whole thing was rapidly turning into a disaster.

    It is difficult to gauge the success of the breaking of the Four Rotor Enigma code (codename Shark) because the capture of the Short Code Books in October 1942 from U 559 coincided with the introduction of HF/DF in April 42 and the introduction of the 10cm Type 271 radar.

    The U boat monthly losses had been climbing since April.
     
  6. martin14

    martin14 Senior Member

    We're told that that the raid was unsuccessful however many vessels in the harbour itself also had the Four Rotor Enigma onboard. It is a coincidence that very shortly after Bletchley (with the help of Alan Turing) cracked the four Rotor code.




    In that case, they could have gone after the ships, and there was no need for the Raid at all.


    I am a Canadian. I have been to Dieppe.
    It was a fiasco, nothing more and nothing less.

    QFT; me too.. so has Canuck, and I believe he would concur.


    To our British friends:

    We love you.
    We respect you.
    We support you.
    We like being associated with you.

    I waited years to stand on that beach, and see for myself what's what, before making much of a comment about it.
    Rutter and Jubilee were moronic ideas right from the beginning.
    Whoever said "let's go to Dieppe" should have been shot for idiocy.

    Last minute withdrawal of the parachute and bombardment, combined with intelligence failures, and not being
    smart enough to cancel the mission when it was discovered by the German convoy only guaranteed the massacre that was coming from choosing the wrong place right from the get go.

    We were dumb enough to volunteer for it.
    Commander of 2nd Division should have looked at this plan and refused; our mistake, he didnt.
    He was removed a few months later anyway.

    You can try to make nice by posting stories about the 'real' reasons,
    cutting radar wires, Enigma machines, placing spies, anything you want.
    Most of us Canadians aren't buying it.


    We were hung out to dry that day.


    We may have forgiven, but we will not forget.
     
    canuck likes this.
  7. 17thDYRCH

    17thDYRCH Senior Member Patron

    Martin14

    I totally concur with your statements.
     
  8. roscoe

    roscoe Junior Member

    In that case, they could have gone after the ships, and there was no need for the Raid at all.




    QFT; me too.. so has Canuck, and I believe he would concur.


    To our British friends:

    We love you.
    We respect you.
    We support you.
    We like being associated with you.

    I waited years to stand on that beach, and see for myself what's what, before making much of a comment about it.
    Rutter and Jubilee were moronic ideas right from the beginning.
    Whoever said "let's go to Dieppe" should have been shot for idiocy.

    Last minute withdrawal of the parachute and bombardment, combined with intelligence failures, and not being
    smart enough to cancel the mission when it was discovered by the German convoy only guaranteed the massacre that was coming from choosing the wrong place right from the get go.

    We were dumb enough to volunteer for it.
    Commander of 2nd Division should have looked at this plan and refused; our mistake, he didnt.
    He was removed a few months later anyway.

    You can try to make nice by posting stories about the 'real' reasons,
    cutting radar wires, Enigma machines, placing spies, anything you want.
    Most of us Canadians aren't buying it.


    We were hung out to dry that day.


    We may have forgiven, but we will not forget.

    The new research into the possible reasons for continuing with the raid has been done by a Canadian.

    For what it's worth we in the UK will be eternally grateful for what the Canadians did in the Second world war.

    Despite the spin Dieppe 19th August 1942 was a tragedy

    But a cursory look at the casualties during the battle of the Atlantic puts the Dieppe losses into a different category. Never forget that many Canadians lay at the bottom of the Atlantic with no grave. Victims of Hitlers most lethal weapon. Look at the sudden escalation of ship losses after February 1942 when the Kriegsmarine introduced the four rotor enigma into its U Boats and into the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. In early 1942 the pair of them had made a daylight dash up the English channel. On 4 June 1942 they, the Admiral Hipper and four destroyers sank the Aircraft Carrier HMS Glorious and two accompanying destroyers. The total killed or missing was 1,207 from Glorious, 160 from Acasta and 152 from Ardent, a total of 1,519.

    And these German Capital ships had the four rotor Enigma.

    At Dieppe, 907 Canadians were killed. 30,000 men of the British Merchant Navy alone were lost between 1939-1945.

    U.S. Navy reported the Allied United Nations lost 4,774 vessels totaling 21,141,00 tons to Axis air and sea attacks.

    It is easy to pass judgement in the comfort of your armchair but how would you think if you were losing similar numbers of people (and sometimes more) on a daily basis?

    Desperate Times.
     
  9. Drew5233

    Drew5233 #FuturePilot Patron 1940 Obsessive

    Clue "French Port" - Answer "Dieppe" (Coincidence Right?) .

    Thats interesting as it immediately reminds me of the crosswords just before D-Day with coincidental clues associated to Op Overlord. Was there ever an investigation? Perhaps to keep this thread on topic you could post in the link below?

    http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/nw-europe/17106-d-day-crossword-coincidence.html

    Cheers
    A
     
  10. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Saw this show last night and must say - being harsh on Authors etc - that i was NOT impressed as there was way too much pinning words and snatches of sentences taken from "Official" reports etc and blowing up the efforts of Ian Fleming in being the master mind behind the whole event.

    I was beginning to doubt it all when the Author made TWO real errors -1) two weeks after Fleming and an Admiral (sic) had formed the 30th Commando in early '42- Mountbatten had taken over and 2) the last survivor of 30th Commando is adamant that they didn't have clue as to which building they were supposed to attack.....?

    The COS had nothing to do with passing the plan ? - find that hard to believe as Alanbrooke was Chief at that time and had his fingers on the pulse PLUS it was Montgomery in charge at that time - who gave up and cancelled the raid as being compromised etc .....he then went off to 8th Army ....

    Mountbatten on the other hand was on the unemployed list until inserted by Churchill into the COS committee much to the chagrin of Alanbrooke .....and that Mountbatten revived the plan.....both Churchill and the COS were fully engaged in worrying about Auchinlek
    and 8th Army's progress at the Crusader Battle and the subsequent helter skelter Gazala Gallop at the time to worry about what Mountbatten was up to.....thus the tragedy....

    The other thought that passed through my head was that it is just as well that there are SOME of us - alive at the time and can still recall that event - as it happened and have NO doubt that in another 60 odd years - another historian will find NEW evidence that it was all John Wayne's fault.

    A survivor of the raid DIDN'T know which building to attack ...come on .....?
    what would happen if the guy who did know was killed ....?
    Cheers
     
  11. martin14

    martin14 Senior Member

    It is easy to pass judgement in the comfort of your armchair but how would you think if you were losing similar numbers of people (and sometimes more) on a daily basis?




    I said before I haven't said much about Dieppe until I had had the chance to
    see it for myself.

    I have stood on Juno beach.. nice and flat, no problem.
    I have stood on Omaha beach.. ugh, bomb the hell out of it, and it was still a very difficult time.

    Dieppe
    Imagine a soup bowl; cut it in half, put the town at the bottom, and the sea right next to it. Then no sea bombardment,
    no bombing inland, and no parachute drop.

    In spite of my other losses, I as a layperson would never have been stupid enough to throw 6000 men into that,
    it smacks too much of the Somme.


    I would have done.... something else.......................... ANYTHING else.



    But thanks for the movie link, I think I'll watch it this evening. :)
     
    sherlock likes this.
  12. sebfrench76

    sebfrench76 Senior Member

    I was born and raised in Dieppe,now livin in Rouen,40 miles away.
    The guy who decided this operation should have asked my opinion before....
    He never walked on the beach unless he would have know that it is impossible to stand on this kind of soil.
     
  13. sherlock

    sherlock Member

    In all honesty, I haven't seen it yet, but it sounds abit too revisionist for my tastes. New facts are always of great interest, but sometimes those "facts" seem to be contrived to gain publicity, or television ratings. When I eventually watch it maybe I'll buy into it, but I don't think so.
     
  14. leccy

    leccy Senior Member

    Having watched it seemed that he was trying to fit the facts to the whole raid was a cover for the intelligence unit trying to get cypher material.

    I am more of the opinion that the intelligence unit took advantage of a raid to try and gain cypher material.

    Knowing how the Allied pooled all their resources and included all those who could possibly help in the planning and intelligence lead ups would not surprise me if several ops were just lumped together without an overall direction.

    Ok so I may be being a little sarky there, Operation Frankton, Combined operations/Claude de Baissac of Special Operations Executive and Bordeaux anyone
     
  15. canuck

    canuck Token Colonial Patron

    I think Watson and Leccy have identified the key points. I've seen the program and my opinion is that it is simply a re-packaging of known facts. I read decades ago that 30 Commando was tasked with intelligence gathering during the raid so the fact that they fancied an Enigma machine should surprise no one. That a handful of commandos among a force of 5,000 men had the primary mission just seems to be a flight of fancy.
    In fact, mounting a raid of that complexity simply to mask an attempt to obtain a code machine would make the planners of this fiasco bigger imbeciles than we know them to be now.
    The network got some good ratings and the historian achieved some notoriety but it looks like hype to me. I did not see anything compelling enough to convince me of this new "theory".
     
  16. canuck

    canuck Token Colonial Patron

    Well the evidence presented by O'Keefe is compelling. The particular trigger word for me was the word SIGINT in one of the documents that O' Keefe uncovered.

    SIGINT at that time was ULTRA. Enigma and Ultra are a particular expertise of mine. I do lectures on the subject for a veteran charity.

    It does seem that the allies knew that the intention of the raid had been compromised by the Germans as early as May that year. Indeed even Montgomery had advised that the raid be cancelled. The barges at southern England ports had been attacked by the Luftwaffe and the Germans had been seen exercising against a sea borne assault. Notwithstanding the strange clue in the Daily Telegraph crossword on the 17TH AUGUST (2 days before the raid) - Clue "French Port" - Answer "Dieppe" (Coincidence Right?) .

    Yet they still went ahead with the assault. Why?

    The original plan was to have paratroopers land inland to silence the guns but this was shelved.

    The particular piece of evidence is the part where they decided to carry on with the assault with a conference onboard a Navy Destroyer even though it was clear that the whole thing was rapidly turning into a disaster.

    It is difficult to gauge the success of the breaking of the Four Rotor Enigma code (codename Shark) because the capture of the Short Code Books in October 1942 from U 559 coincided with the introduction of HF/DF in April 42 and the introduction of the 10cm Type 271 radar.

    The U boat monthly losses had been climbing since April.

    I don't think anyone would dispute the desire of the Allies to acquire a a four rotor Enigma machine. However, it the need was that urgent and if the Dieppe raid was to mask to the attempt to steal one, why delay the raid by almost five months (after Mountbatten's first go ahead order)? Combined Ops could surely have executed a smaller operation in much less time. Also, if the U-boat threat was the biggest motivating factor in wanting the code machine, why did the RN withdraw the support of capital ships from the raid?
    It doesn't add up.
    The only fact which makes me believe there is even a slight chance that the program's thesis is valid is the knowledge that the Dieppe raid was overseen by that pompous twit Mountbatten.

    Mountbatten is routinely described as a vain, egotistical, inept, brutal and deceitful psychopath. I've often wondered if the IRA were in the employ of a Canadian veterans group.
     
  17. rrh0325

    rrh0325 Junior Member

    This is just another attempt to justify what happened on that terrible beach. There have been many attempts....And we all knew there were the french underground and others going in. They were never identified, just mentioned in many many books. So this movie is not ground breaking. The real question to me is there were many succesful commando raids...One of them here at Dieppe that could have easily got what was needed and been gone. And not had such a loss of life if this was truly what was wanted.

    With my Dad being one of the first groups to hit the beaches Right in front of the casino. There was little chance at this operation being succesful. From all that I have read...And trust me there is not much that I have not read on the attack the preperation and the aftermath.

    Trying to give this operation this kind of attention will show it for what it truly is.

    Thanks to all the Windsor veterans and the others who are still here. Hamilton also played a big role....

    Thanks again
     
  18. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

    Hansard - Churchill promises made. 'Military advisers - great disaster!' -Mountbatten to blame? A case of keeping the threat 'real' and tying up enemy divisions in defence- could it be that and not the list of 'theories?' Or Political get out of the hole speak!

    In his own words to The House 11 November 1942:


    It would have been most improvident for us to attempt such an enterprise before all our preparations were ready. They have very greatly advanced. Enormous installations have been and are being brought into existence at all our suitable ports, but no one would have been justified, nor indeed would it have been physically possible, in making an effective invasion of the Continent during the summer or autumn of 1942.
    Here let me say a word about pressure. No amount of pressure by public opinion or from any other quarter would make me, as the person chiefly responsible, consent to an operation which our military advisers had convinced me would lead to a great disaster. I should think it extremely dishonourable and indeed an act of treason to the nation to allow any un-instructed pressure however well meant, or sentimental feelings however honourable, to drive me into such reckless or wanton courses. Again and again, with the full assent of my colleagues in the War Cabinet, I have instructed the Chiefs of the Staff that in endeavouring to solve their problems they should disregard public clamour, and they know that His Majesty's Government, resting securely upon this steady House of Commons, is quite strong enough to stand like a bulkhead between the military authorities and the well-meant impulses which stir so many breasts. It is not for me to claim the whole responsibility for what has not been done, but I should be quite ready and well content to bear it.
    Why then, it will be said, did you allow false hopes to be raised in Russian breasts? Why then did you agree with the United States and Russia to a communiqué which spoke of a second front in Europe in 1942? I must say quite frankly that I hold it perfectly justifiable to deceive the enemy even if at the same time your own people are for a while misled. There is one thing however which you must never do, and that is to mislead your Ally. You must never make a promise which you do not fulfil. I hope we shall show that we have lived up to that standard. All British promises to Russia have been made in writing or given across the table in recorded conversations with the Soviet representative. In June I gave the Russian Government a written document making it perfectly clear that, while we were preparing to make a landing in 1942, we could not promise to do so. Meanwhile, whether or not we were going to attack the Continent in August, September or October, it was of the utmost consequence to Russia that the enemy should believe that we were so prepared and so resolved. Only in this way could we draw and keep the largest possible number of Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais, along the coast of France and in the Low Countries. We have drawn and have kept at least 33 German divisions in the West, and one-third of the German bomber air force is there, and this bomber force is not being used to bomb us to any extent. Why? It was being saved up for these very landings should they occur on the beaches, and they have remained, playing no effective military part for a considerable time. We ourselves are also engaging, including the Middle East and Malta fighting, more than half of the whole fighter strength of Germany.




    DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS (Hansard, 11 November 1942)



    Search: dieppe (Hansard)



    It would appear some MPs were suspicious of leaks. There is of course (in the above dieppe hansard) denials. The question that might be reasonable to ask 'would it make the defender commit more resources and then we would have to carry out the mission to give leaks credibility? Increasing the value of future leaks - a question not a theory! We were after all well advanced in the world of spooks and dirty tricks.
     
  19. Tullybrone

    Tullybrone Senior Member

    Third attempt to post this comment .........previous 2 crashed on me!

    I recently came across 2011 book by Nicholas Rankin - "Ian Fleming's Commandos" - The story of 30 assault Unit in WW2 - in my local library

    He does not claim that the Dieppe Operation was a disguised "pinch raid" but asserts that the March 1941 500 strong Commando raid on the Lofoten Islands (with a much publicised succesful destruction of local fish oil stores used for military glycerine production by the german munitions industry) was a cover story for the real purpose of the raid to "pinch" the Enigma machine from the German harbour vessel (armed trawler) Krebs. They also recovered the February 1941 German naval Enigma "Home waters" keys.

    Steve Y
     
  20. geoff501

    geoff501 Achtung Feind hört mit

    We're told that that the raid was unsuccessful however many vessels in the harbour itself also had the Four Rotor Enigma onboard. It is a coincidence that very shortly after Bletchley (with the help of Alan Turing) cracked the four Rotor code.

    The story told is that they got a code book from U 559 on 30 October 1942. The code was cracked in early November which means that Turing cracked it within a few days. However if the code books had been snatched during the Dieppe raid (19th August) then it would have given them more time.

    To clarify a few dates.
    Bletchley knew the existence of the M4 four wheel machine as early as January 1941, from Enigma decrypts which referred to the machine.
    When it entered service on 1st February 1942, some information was already known. As early as December 1941, the four wheel machine had been used in error with the same basic settings as a 3 wheel message. BP was able to recover the 4th wheel wiring from this error (it's actually a new reflector and a new wheel, so has 26 different positions). Through 1942, other messages were sent in error enabling the entire M4 wiring to be recovered.
    What they did not have was any code books. This changed with the captures from U-559 on 30th October 1942. I'm not even sure if this capture included a M4 but it did have the Wetterkurzschlüssel code book, or weather codes. This was M4's undoing as these short codes were sent on the M4 with the 4th wheel in the 'neutral' position, in the same basic setting as the M3. Bletchley did not receive these documents until 24th November, almost 4 weeks later. The first break was on 13th December when 5 Bombes were run with successful cribs, giving the positions of 12 Atlantic U-Boats from the previous 5 days.

    I understand there were many objectives for Dieppe, although RM Commandos were briefed on what documents to look for, I don't believe it was anything like a main objective. There had been several Enigma captures, usually small isolated boats where all the witnesses could be contained, which makes more sense for capturing intelligence from documents.

    The world is full of 'ifs', If USS Roper had captured U-85 (as it very nearly did, but decided to depth charge the hell out of the abandoned boat, instead - with men in the water) in April 1942.......
     

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