Re 1. I have looked at the amphibious landings that took place between Dieppe and D Day. The major landings in the Mediterranean (Torch, Husky Avalanche and Shingle) were launched at night with an attempt to obtain surprise. The Pacific landings pre D Day were on a tiny scale compared to overlord, and most of these prior to Tarawa were were unopposed. At Tarawa the 35k US marines took 3k casualties landing in daylight after a heavy bombardment against an isolated enemy they outnumbered 9:1. I doubt if the Overlord Planners would have considered that template. Mountbatten and other combined Ops observers who accompanied Husky repeatedly warned planners not to draw the wrong lessons from Op Husky and cited Dieppe as the kind of problem they faced in NW Europe. The Dieppe raised mattered because it was a lesson learned at a cost of lives. There is a natural human tendency to want to believe that resources can be stretched a little further than they really can. People donlt learn lessons from success or from other people. In WW1, it took years to learn how much fire support is needed to suppress an enemy in prepared defences. The First Day of the Somme illustrated the cost of getting it wrong. The Overlord planners were under a lot of pressure to use as much shipping as possible to transport troops. Husky landed seven divisions on D Day with 3,000 ships. Overlord landed six using 5,000 ships. Much of the difference was in the number of ships used to provide fire support or landing AFvs that provided support from the surf. Had there been no op Jubilee it is possible that Op Overlord might have been launched at the wrong time of day with insufficient fire support. Re 2. You can using the Digital Library of the US Combined arms Research Library http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/ The an excellent set of papers from the ETO USA conference on Assault landings held in London by the US Army in May-June 1943 about the problems of carrying out an amphibious landing across the channel and the techniques needed to do so. These include almost all the techniques and tactics used in on D Day a year later, including amphibious tanks, engineering tanks, landing craft with all sorts of fire support, field artillery providing fire support from landing craft . There is a second set which is the report on the training course run by Combined Operations at Largs between July 1943 and March 1944 to train the army of staff officers needed to plan Op Overlord in detail. This is evidence that D Day was based on the lessons from Dieppe rather than Husky, Avalanche and Shingle. People also tend to overlook another major result of Op Jubilee is often forgotten. That is the beneficial impact that it had on the Germans. Firstly, the shipping assembled for Op Rutter and used for Op Jubilee was noticed by the Germans and in July 1942 Hitler ordered the SS panzer Corps , the 7th Falllschirrmjaeger Diviison and four bomber gruppen to be withdrawn from the Eastern Front to France. It would be far fetched to suggest that this turned the balance at Stalingrad, but it was a reduction in German forces. Secondly, the Germans learned false lessons from Dieppe. They thought the allies would need to attack a port and that the Atlantic Wall could defeat an invader at the waters edge. Thus OKW was complacent about the defence of France. They poured concrete around Cherbourg and le Havre leaving the coastline between the Vire and the Orne was the lowest but one priority in the 7th Army sector. On the 6th June 1944 some bunkers on Omaha and Gold beaches were unfinished. Op Jubilee was a huge help to the eventual success of Op Overlord. It is unlikely that the lessons would have been learned and absorbed unless [planners were reminded of the losses at Dieppe. The men who suffered there did not do so in vain.