Dieppe Remembered "In the spring of 1942, the Allies planned a large raid on German occupied territory to take place during the first week of July 1942. Originally code-named "Operation Rutter," the objective was the French port of Dieppe." At Dieppe, 907 Canadians, including 56 officers, lost their lives in a battle that lasted for only nine hours. A total of 3,369 men were killed or wounded. At Dieppe, the Canadian Army lost more prisoners than in the whole eleven months of the later campaign in North-West Europe, or the twenty months during which Canadians fought in Italy. Totals: 6,108 men took part in the raid (from the Land Forces), 1,946 were taken prisoner, 2,460 were wounded 4,963 were Canadians (907 fatalities), 1,075 were British Commandoes (52 fatalities), 50 were American Rangers (3 fatalities), with 20 others. In addition, the Royal Navy suffered 75 killed, with 269 missing or prisoners. Overhead the RAF and RCAF lost 119 aircraft - the highest single-day total of the war (62 fatalities) while the Luftwaffe lost just 46 Read more on Dieppe at my site... here (including video and photos). --------------------------------- Dieppe: 'None had come back' By Wade Hemsworth The Hamilton Spectator (Aug 19, 2006) Sixty-four years ago today, Vern Smart watched six landing craft leave his ship, carrying 120 Canadian soldiers toward the beach at Dieppe, France. Some of those soldiers were machine-gunned right there in the water. More were shot down as they tried to cross the short, rocky beach at the foot of the steep cliffs directly below the German enemy. And then Vern lost track of them forever. He was an able seaman out of Hamilton's HMCS Star, a Delta grad who had grown up on Park Row North. And there he was, just five days after his 22nd birthday, positioned on the deck of the Duke of Wellington with a Lewis machine gun in his hands. A sniper hidden in those cliffs took aim at Vern. He heard the bullet whistle past his ear and saw the splash of seawater. "That's where I learned to keep my head down," he says with a little chuckle. Vern didn't keep his head down long. He stood, often, to fire up at the German planes that were pouring over the horizon toward the attacking force of 6,100 -- 5,000 of them Canadian. He hit one of the enemy planes and it fell from the sky in flames. After nine hours of intense combat, what is probably the most infamous slaughter in Canadian military history was over, and the Duke of Wellington returned as scheduled to pick up the surviving men and landing craft. There were none. The ship headed back to England empty, still under fire. "It was hard to believe that all of those men had gone ashore and none had come back," Vern says. As the Germans chased them back across the channel, Vern looked up in the sky and saw a man floating down through the clouds toward the water. A moment later, a parachute emerged from the mist and the man dropped into the sea. He was a Polish pilot who had been flying a British plane, one of 106 RAF planes shot down in that day's fierce air battle. The Canadian sailors cut his parachute loose and pulled him aboard. The truth is that Vern Smart doesn't have many more memories of Dieppe than that. It has nothing to do with age, though he recently turned 86 and is among a dwindling number of men who survived the doomed landing that would come to define courage for generations of Canadians. It has more to do with the nature of battle, where everything happens so quickly, where all the senses are overwhelmed, and where your head is down some of the time. Instead of remembering it in sequence, like a movie, Vern Smart remembers Dieppe in a collage of disjointed moments. The moments play across the screen of his imagination whenever he thinks of the war -- on Remembrance Day or when he reads articles like this one or when the subject of the war comes up at other times. Through all of the 64 years since Dieppe, those images have come up in the same way. They've popped up through his decades of work as a welder and supervisor at Westinghouse, through the last 59 years of his marriage to Maggie and the birth of their three daughters. They were there when the family built a new brick house in the middle of a stubble field on the east Mountain and they've come back as a neighbourhood grew up around it. Today, the jangled vignettes of Dieppe are with him through long dialysis sessions at St. Joe's down the hill. They will be with him this morning while others with better legs are gathering by the lake to commemorate that day at a special remembrance service. When the next generations of kids who are in school today get to be his age, Vern Smart only wonders if anyone will remember at all. RHLI at Dieppe Here's a look at the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry's participation in Dieppe: Number who participated in the Dieppe raid: nearly 600 Number killed at Dieppe: 179 Number taken prisoner: 174 Number who returned to England: 217 Number who later died of their Dieppe wounds: seven Total number killed and wounded: 480 Total number neither killed nor wounded: 102 -- only one in six. Memorial parade today The annual Dieppe memorial parade will take place at 10:45 a.m. today at Dieppe Veterans Memorial Park on Beach Boulevard, just east of the lift bridge. Reverend Bryan Robertson, a former RHLI commanding officer, will conduct the ceremony. Dieppe is the only campaign that has been memorialized in Hamilton every year since it took place. whemsworth@thespec.com 905-526-3254 Link: Hamilton Spectator - News
A tragic loss that will never be forgotten. "They shall not grow old, as they who are left grow old" Lest we forget.
We shall never know what was the purpose? But before I joined my RE Field company, they had embarked and sailed along the French coast at that time. then turned, and sailed back to England. Its all a bit hazy, and not much is written about it. Just a terse sentence. I cannot find out more. What we do know, is that the Dieppe fiasco provided a huge amount of knowledge that was put to good use on June the 6th 1944. In fact it would be fair to describe the knowledge gained as absolutely vital. Somewhere I read that this was Mountbattons venture.Though I cannot produce that now, for it is something I read a long time ago? Can anyone fill in the missing bits? Sapper
I forgot! what was even more odd about that sailing: is that normally the Royal Engineers Assault Companies are first in, and last out. That was what happened on D Day, the RE were ashore first. So what were they doing out in the channel? Rest in Peace lads. Sapper
By 9 May, the main elements of the plan had coalesced and taken shape and so the outline was put in front of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and adopted. Intelligence indicated that Dieppe was not particularly heavily defended and that the beaches in the vicinity were suitable for the landing of infantry and tanks. While there were some misgivings about adopting this variant, most notably from Mountbatten, featuring as it did a direct frontal assault on the most heavily defended part of the Dieppe beachfront, most were optimistic about its chances. Operation Rutter was planned to take place between the 4 and 8 July. After weeks of training and preparation the troops embarked on their craft but the order to sail was not given as the period of time when the tides were most suitable coincided with a bout of very unsettled weather. On top of this, the Germans spotted the convoy gathered in the Solent and bombed them. While very little damage was done, it was possible that the enemy would now be alerted to the fact that some sort of amphibious operation was about to be undertaken. This, coupled with the weather getting even worse, forced the operation’s cancellation. From the Ashes While most believed that this would mean an end to the operation, Mountbatten and his staff had other ideas. Many operations of this sort had been cancelled and they thought that this plan was good enough to warrant another go. Mountbatten lobbied Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff and eventually received the go-ahead to try again, despite there being grave concerns over security. By now, it was common knowledge to too many people that Dieppe had been the target of Operation Rutter and the desire to see the attack go ahead was overriding caution and common sense. By this time, Montgomery had left South Eastern Command to take over the Eighth Army in North Africa but as he left, voiced disapproval that the same target was to be attacked in the new plan and in a letter to his superior, General Paget, urged that a new target be chosen because of the possibility of a breach of security. However, the go-ahead had come from the very top and so Mountbatten’s staff resumed work on a new outline plan, given the codename ‘Jubilee’, now to take place during mid-August. Montgomery’s responsibilities were passed to the new commander of the Canadian I Corps, Lieutenant General Harry Crerar who saw the plan through to execution. Mountbatten had asked for a battleship to accompany the raid to engage targets that were on the shore with enough firepower to do some damage but be accurate enough to stand a chance of not obliterating the entire town. The Navy Chiefs, terrified of loosing a capital ship to German air power, swiftly rejected the idea and it was decided to leave the task of shattering the German defence to the RAF. The two main objectives for the RAF during Jubilee were to firstly, provide air cover for the assault and secondly attack the enemy's defensive capability. The size of the landings however meant that Air Vice Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory could contemplate a third objective. He intended to literally and metaphorically throw the 'gauntlet' down to the Luftwaffe and entice it into battle. It was likely that as the landings developed, the Germans might view this as a prelude to a full-scale invasion and react accordingly. The RAF therefore had some sixty-eight squadrons available, more than that available to Air Chief Marshal Dowding at any time in the Battle of Britain. As the plan that was to be implemented slowly slipped from that originally envisaged, the great pre-assault bombardment by the RAF's heavy bombers and the Navy's battleship became further and further diluted until it was reduced to fighter-bomber raids and strafing attacks by Hurricanes and light selected gunfire by destroyers and a gunboat. The ground forces assaulting Dieppe would pay the price. The raid on Dieppe cost many lives. Out of the 6,000 men who had taken part in the landings, 4,384 were killed, wounded or missing - a loss of 73%. All the equipment landed on shore was lost. The Royal Navy had lost 550 men and 34 ships. The RAF, in what was the largest single-day air battle of the war, flew 2,617 sorties and lost 106 planes, while the Luftwaffe lost 170 planes
I forgot! what was even more odd about that sailing: is that normally the Royal Engineers Assault Companies are first in, and last out. That was what happened on D Day, the RE were ashore first. So what were they doing out in the channel? Rest in Peace lads. Sapper Hi Sapper, This site said they did land however seems they were cut to pieces as well. This was from: ieppe 1942:: The tanks that had been loaded for the attack were of little use. Where they got ashore and were not destroyed by the Germans anti-tank fire, the shingle on the beach meant that movement was difficult at best, impossible at worst. Canadian Royal Engineers tried their best to help out the stricken tanks but in murderous circumstances. 314 Canadian Royal Engineers were landed at Dieppe; 189 were killed or wounded on landing - an attrition rate of 60%. Of the 24 tank landing craft, 10 managed to land their tanks - 28 tanks in total. All the tanks were lost, even though some did manage to leave the beach and get into Dieppe town centre - where they were destroyed. There seemed to be only one success during the actual raid: "One landing craft did land unnoticed and its 20 occupants took out the Goebbels battery based there to such an extent that it failed to fire an effective shot during the time when the landings took place in Dieppe. However, this was the only success of the Dieppe raid."
I remember reading something about Lord Mountbatten involvement in the Dieppe raid. I' m sure it was mentioned that Mountbatten used it as an experiment for future beach landings. Or was it credited to him in an effort to justify the tragic losses incurred - using "the knowledge gained was invaluable" to get them out of a scrape - as an excuse. Why sent that many troops into a one way ticket situation. Was there an objective to all this. I am sorry if I sound cynical but I believe it was a balls up. Putting Churchills on a beach and they cant get off it because of the composition. I'm saddened so many brave Canadians lost out over it. If the Canadians had turned round afterwards and felt they were just used as cannon fodder, one could understand it.
According to what I've read the Canadians ASKED to go. They were peed off that the ANZACS and other Commonwealth Forces were busy fighting the War and they were sat around the UK doing nothing to win the War.
Rationale The 1942 raid on the French port of Dieppe, code-named Operation Jubilee, was spearheaded by Churchill's new Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten, who chose the Canadian 2nd Division to lead the attack. The aim was to seize and hold a major Channel port, test new amphibious equipment, gather intelligence from prisoners [and possibly Enigma-encoded German radio traffic] and gauge how the Germans responded to an invading force. A primary goal was also to boost Allied morale, devastated by losses in North Africa and Russia. Churchill hoped the use of Canadian troops would satisfy the Canadian commanders following the long inactivity of Canadian forces in England. General Andrew McNaughton, who commanded the First Canadian Army and General H.D.G. Crerar, commander of I Canadian Corps eagerly accepted this chance for Canadian soldiers to get some combat experience. They had been stationed in Great Britain for two years without having ever engaged the enemy in a major operation. Canadian public opinion was starting to question this inactivity, and Canadian soldiers were raring to go. Churchill also wanted some good news to counter the defeats in Africa that Spring. The British press were clamoring for action, the Soviets were pushing Roosevelt to open a second front in Europe, and the overconfident Americans in turn were pressuring Churchill to mount some kind of operation. The British Prime Minister, who felt that one Gallipoli in a lifetime was enough, balked at a full-scale assault with litle chance of success. But he gave the green light to Mountbatten.
According to what I've read the Canadians ASKED to go. They were peed off that the ANZACS and other Commonwealth Forces were busy fighting the War and they were sat around the UK doing nothing to win the War. Yes they were pushing for action as they were all volunteers and had been in Britain since November 1939.
Rationale The 1942 raid on the French port of Dieppe, code-named Operation Jubilee, was spearheaded by Churchill's new Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten, who chose the Canadian 2nd Division to lead the attack. The aim was to seize and hold a major Channel port, test new amphibious equipment, gather intelligence from prisoners [and possibly Enigma-encoded German radio traffic] and gauge how the Germans responded to an invading force. A primary goal was also to boost Allied morale, devastated by losses in North Africa and Russia. Churchill hoped the use of Canadian troops would satisfy the Canadian commanders following the long inactivity of Canadian forces in England. General Andrew McNaughton, who commanded the First Canadian Army and General H.D.G. Crerar, commander of I Canadian Corps eagerly accepted this chance for Canadian soldiers to get some combat experience. They had been stationed in Great Britain for two years without having ever engaged the enemy in a major operation. Canadian public opinion was starting to question this inactivity, and Canadian soldiers were raring to go. Churchill also wanted some good news to counter the defeats in Africa that Spring. The British press were clamoring for action, the Soviets were pushing Roosevelt to open a second front in Europe, and the overconfident Americans in turn were pressuring Churchill to mount some kind of operation. The British Prime Minister, who felt that one Gallipoli in a lifetime was enough, balked at a full-scale assault with litle chance of success. But he gave the green light to Mountbatten. Thanks for that Erik, I'm much obliged,clears some things up. It begs the question though of what was going to happen to these troops if they had taken a strong foothold. How were they to consolidate their gains.
Erik, thank you for your posting. Wednesday, 19th August, 1942. We will never know how many owe their lives due the efforts of those who gave theirs on that day. The value of the lessons learned and put into practice is beyond calculation. Some small but important corrections to what has been posted: Of the 29 tanks that exited the landing craft 27 made it to the beach, 2 having drowned. Of those that landed, 15 negotiated the chert making the climb up on to the promenade. As the planned destruction of the road blocks by REs did not take place the Churchills, being unable to make further progress, orders were given to return whence they came, 10 making it back to the beach successfully.
Erik, thank you for your posting. Wednesday, 19th August, 1942. We will never know how many owe their lives due the efforts of those who gave theirs on that day. The value of the lessons learned and put into practice is beyond calculation. Some small but important corrections to what has been posted: Of the 29 tanks that exited the landing craft 27 made it to the beach, 2 having drowned. Of those that landed, 15 negotiated the chert making the climb up on to the promenade. As the planned destruction of the road blocks by REs did not take place the Churchills, being unable to make further progress, orders were given to return whence they came, 10 making it back to the beach successfully. I read somewhere years ago that Mountbatten said: "10 allied lives were saved on D-Day for every allied combatant that died at Dieppe!"
Thank you Spidge. I too recall something that Mountbatten said (or wrote) after Dieppe, but not the details. His estimate of a 10 to 1 ratio of lives saved from the lessons learned by the Allies, without specific data to base it on appears to be an exercise in guess-work, but doubtless it must have be a substantial one. Fortunately, one lesson that could have been learned by the Germans was not. If it had been, an analysis of how and where the deaths of the eighty-three men of the North Irish Horse who gave their lives in WW II occurred, indicates the number would have been greater.
Heck of an experiment. Had forgotten the Allies lost so many in the air as well. The first aerial victory for the Mustang was an Fw-190 over Dieppe by a Canadian called Hollis Hills I think flying a Mustang Mk I. Cheers Andy
Thank you Spidge. I too recall something that Mountbatten said (or wrote) after Dieppe, but not the details. His estimate of a 10 to 1 ratio of lives saved from the lessons learned by the Allies, without specific data to base it on appears to be an exercise in guess-work, but doubtless it must have be a substantial one. Fortunately, one lesson that could have been learned by the Germans was not. If it had been, an analysis of how and where the deaths of the eighty-three men of the North Irish Horse who gave their lives in WW II occurred, indicates the number would have been greater. I agree that 10 to 1 is an easy figure to pluck out of thin air however with the benefit of hindsight he could see many of the holes that were in the initial operation. Mountbatten in the initial plan "Rutter" had asked for a Battleship to decimate the defences he thought was there however they ended up with 4'' guns from destroyers which were inadequate in firepower and accuracy as they could not get lose enough to the shore without coming under fire from shore batteries. Intelligence agencies of the allies were not consulted in detail for the initial "Rutter" or "Jubilee" operations. Intelligence on defences from early 1941 was used. Bomber aircraft were initially included to wreak havoc on the defences however this was watered down as well. Fighter aircraft was less than originally promised as was the object of their targeting orders. "Older" officers in the Canadian divisions were replaced with the exuberance of youth and therefore it was supposed .....experience. Co-ordination to the beaches was not all it could have been. When the battle was lost, inexperience apparently requested more reserves to be landed. Poor communication with other groups and the flotilla was apparently of grave concern after the landings. The Allied Command, based on the HMS Calpe, seeing nothing happening on land because of extremely thick smoke and being badly informed because of failing transmissions, sent in fresh back-up troops. Their arrival was announced prematurely when they unexpectedly ran into a small German convoy sailing from Boulogne to Dieppe. After the cancellation of "Rutter" Monty sent a letter to his superiors to the effect that another site be selected as security would have been breached. This was rejected. The Germans through this security breach mayhave/did know that Dieppe was the initial target. In naming the operation "Jubilee" it could have enforced Dieppe as a target as "Jubilee" was the actual code name for Dieppe. The Royal Regiment of Canada landed later than planned at Puys in broad daylight. The tanks that were to cover the Royal Hamilton and Essex Scottish were 15 minutes late and could not offer the planned support. The Germans lost 40 aircraft while the RAF lost 107. This too was the largest one day loss ever for the RAF. The RAF suffered the same fate as did the Germans in the BoB. In this it was close to German airfields. Allied air reconnaissance had failed to locate gun positions hidden in the cliffs surrounding the port and it was these that caused such devastation. Major General JH Roberts (Canadian) ordered two of his reserve units ashore; The Royal Marine 'A' Commando were fortunate to have a commanding officer who turned back some of the landing craft to avoid fatalities. No written record remains of the Chiefs of Staff approving the raid and it is rumoured that Mountbatten proceeded without authorisation.
Thanks for that Erik, I'm much obliged,clears some things up. It begs the question though of what was going to happen to these troops if they had taken a strong foothold. How were they to consolidate their gains. They were to assault the targets and be pulled out in 12 hours.
This begs another question? What would have been the result on D-Day if Dieppe had been a success? This debacle may have given the Germans a false sense of security.
Are we saying basically it was to try out beach landing/assault techniques and gave the chance for the Canadian forces a chance to cut their teeth so to speak??
