i believe typhoons were first used in large numbers,to engage fw190s,do we have any after action reports etc.yours very sincerely,lee.
I want to read this link, but everytime I click on it and start reading, after a few seconds it defaults to another page. Does anybody else have this problem, and is there a way I can view the first page only? cheers You're not alone Marcus, looks like there's a redirect added by the sites author, perhaps to make sure you pass through his front page first. I stopped the page changing by immediately clicking 'Stop' once it opened (red X to the right of the address box at the top of IE), hitting 'esc' should do the same thing. Hope that works for you, Adam.
During 1942, when the North Irish Horse was under command of Lt. Colonel (later Sir, Major-General) David Dawnay, Churchills of the North Irish Horse, were constantly being tested as to their climbing ability on Salisbury Plain, Dartmoor and elsewhere - almost to the point of them toppling over. We who crewed them during these hazardous tests constantly wondered why. When the Churchills started doing battle in the mountains all became known. What prompted Dawnay's foresight is another story not relevant to this topic except to note that he came to it before the after-battle report of Operation Jubilee reached him - he had realised/foresaw that the Churchill 's climbing ability would excell that of any other AFVs deployed during WWII - that 15 of the Calgary Regiment's successfully climbed off the chert beach at Dieppe on to the promenade was the proof. Of the lessons learned from the raid, the one handed to the Germans on a plate was not, as they subsequently found (but continued to ignore) in Tunisia and Italy, as Churchills successfully climbed to where the enemy assumed no tank could possibly reach -the Churchill earned its name 'The Mountain Goat' after climbing the "impossible" Djebel Tanngoucha. Articles on both this feat and that at Dieppe are in place. Cheers, Gerry
I think the Churchill's finally getting the respect it deserves in the history of wartime armour. more authors from David Fletcher to John Buckley (and of course your remarkable website Gerry) are giving stronger credence to it's superb mobility in Italy, Normandy, Reichswald etc. whereas previously those with a positive view like Bryan Perrett seemed somewhat lonely voices amongst much lazy criticism. I couldn't deny it had a difficult birth but it really is a remarkable machine. (Mind you, I am rather biased... I could sit on that Crocodile at Southsea all day ) Cheers, Adam.
Freebird - I wopuld recommend anyone researching to read Villa with a pinch of salt. It is all very conspiratorial. For Villa the simple answer is that Mountbatten acts without authority. This is simply not the case. There are sevral CoS entries related to the relaunch of RUTTER. A counter arguement to Villa has been provided by Peter Henshaw who has pointed out these minutes and the various decision making processes that went into the operation. Ross Yes its true, I wouldn't cite it as the "definative" version of Dieppe, but it does go into some detail on the political reasons, which are mostly on the mark. The insights into the motives of the other players, Roberts, Pound, Brooke, Leigh-Mallory, McNaughton, Montgomery etc, I found were excellent. It is of course his opinions, but the political & "turf battles" certainly played a part. Other than Mountbatten running 'Jubulee" without authorization there are several other explanations. (And even if he didn't I would still hold him responsible for running a shoddy operation) He does go into some other possible explanations, 1. Mountbatten ASSUMED that he could run this kind of raid operation, no COS approval was needed. 2. It was approved as a "bluff" operation, to fool the Germans. 3. It was approved by Brooke & the other COS's as a substitute for other operations. (Brooke would not normally approve this kind of operation, but felt he had to allow SOMETHING instead of "Sledgehammer".) Most people can question "what was the point of Dieppe?" The part about the relationship between "Jubilee" & "Sledgehammer" seems quite accurate, it is backed up by Brooke's own writings. (Turn of the Tide) He seemed to spend the spring & summer of '42 trying to prevent Churchill & the Americans from approving something far worse than Dieppe. (eg. "Imperator", "Jupiter" or "Sledgehammer")
My photos of Dieppe this summer. http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/travel-places-see/11866-dieppe-just-too-late-65th-anniversary.html
i believe typhoons were first used in large numbers,to engage fw190s,do we have any after action reports etc.yours very sincerely,lee. Lee - There are quite a few after action reports. You can start with specific squadrons Operation Record Book whcih contain there Form 540. This details the action for the day. There are also in the TNA a series of composite squadron report on the air action over dieppe. Ross
1. Mountbatten ASSUMED that he could run this kind of raid operation, no COS approval was needed. 3. It was approved by Brooke & the other COS's as a substitute for other operations. To pick up on these points as they are inherently linked. The COS do give approval to the relaunch of the operation on the day before RUTTER is due to go ahead. Mountbatten is told that if the operation is cancelled he should make moves to re-launch it a the earliest possible oppurtunity. So Mountbatten assumes nothing. There is also several other minutes, that the various official histories mention and Henshaw, where Mountbatten makes that COS well aware of the operation. the first of these is the appointment of Hughes-Hallett as Naval Force Commander. Something that Mountbatten had to do for all planned operation. This is dated 16 July. There is also a proposed minute in Portal's files that details a proposed inclusion into the COS minutes about the operations re-launch on 17 July. All of this is done a full month before the operation occured. Thus, claiming this was an unauthorised action is quite wrong. Ross
To pick up on these points as they are inherently linked. The COS do give approval to the relaunch of the operation on the day before RUTTER is due to go ahead. Mountbatten is told that if the operation is cancelled he should make moves to re-launch it a the earliest possible oppurtunity. So Mountbatten assumes nothing. There is also several other minutes, that the various official histories mention and Henshaw, where Mountbatten makes that COS well aware of the operation. the first of these is the appointment of Hughes-Hallett as Naval Force Commander. Something that Mountbatten had to do for all planned operation. This is dated 16 July. There is also a proposed minute in Portal's files that details a proposed inclusion into the COS minutes about the operations re-launch on 17 July. All of this is done a full month before the operation occured. Thus, claiming this was an unauthorised action is quite wrong. I think Villa's point was that the COS approval to re-launch meant that he would have to work uo all the details & then come back for final approval, which Villa claims the minutes do not show. However, as I said earlier, I don't think that I can buy into his theory about that point, and even if I did I don't really think it makes much difference, as I believe that even if the COS didn't put it on paper they gave tacit authorization. All of that aside, I found his analysis of the politics behind the scenes very interesting, and goes a long way to explain why the rather dubious plan came about in the first place. I think that the claim about "lessons learned" is a bit of a face-saving measure too. What do you think about his criticism of the commanders of the operation? (Roberts, Leigh-Mallory & Hughes-Hallett) I know from other sources that his portrayal of the Canadian army's problems (with inactivity) are true, I think Villa is right when he says that for this reason it would have been very hard for Roberts as a rookie commander to bring up objections to parts of the plan. Do you also agree with his assertion that most of the later blame on Roberts is unfair? Should Hughes-Hallett & Leigh-Mallory be given blame for not pushing for more Naval & Air support? I also don't have a great opinion of Leigh-Mallory. (for his actions in the Battle of Britain & later) Villa states that their failure to push for more support doomed the chances of the operation. (2,700 casulties)
