Did the Japanese deserve the Atomic Bomb?

I don't agree that they deserved it. Maybe I am naive but I don't believe that too many people on this earth deserve a horrible death.


I can think of quite a few actually

 

Somewhere in this thread it was stated that the A-bomb at the time was seen as just another bomb only an especially big one with no stigma was attached, that came later. The Japanese civilians had so much "entitlement" to be bombed, or perhaps even more than say the citizens of Amsterdam or Coventry due to the way industrial production was dispersed along a large number of small, private workshops. In total war you hit the other side's economy and that's what the B-29s were doing. The Japanese weren't doing the same to the American civilians because, well, they didn't have the means to. They had acquired enough practice already in the Asian continent.

 

Somewhere in this thread it was stated that the A-bomb at the time was seen as just another bomb only an especially big one with no stigma was attached, that came later. The Japanese civilians had so much "entitlement" to be bombed, or perhaps even more than say the citizens of Amsterdam or Coventry due to the way industrial production was dispersed along a large number of small, private workshops. In total war you hit the other side's economy and that's what the B-29s were doing. The Japanese weren't doing the same to the American civilians because, well, they didn't have the means to. They had acquired enough practice already in the Asian continent.

There is no doubt that anybody who had the atomic bomb would have used it!

 

But then supposing the shoe had been on/in/into/over/beside the other foot we would be lamenting the Chinese, Korean, Russian, Taiwanese, Philipine, Indonesian, Myanmarian, Kambodian, Singaporean, British, Australian, NZer, USAer, you-name-it victims of the nuclear holocaust indulged in by the "criminal Japanese".

Oh, and we wouldn't be writing in English (or an approximation thereof), by the way. Thinking again, we wouldn't be lamenting at all!

 

I've just been all the way through this topic and have read every post.
One thing that annoys me about some opinions, is that which reflects the Japanese as sinned against, as the victims. The annoyance arises from reading how much a wilful ignorance of the time and the train of events contribute to the formation of such opinions.

Fortunately there were only a couple who held them, so the minority is hardly worthy of continuing mention.

I realise that over 10 months have elapsed since the last post. But having joined your excellent group only around a week ago I was unaware of this discussion until now.

The major reasons for Truman's decision to deploy the nuclear bombs have been covered, but I would like to emphasise one or two points.

Firstly, the mokusatsu episode.

The Japanese language is an exceptionally subtle one and the word can be translated with varying shades of emphasis. The Potsdam Declaration had been published and communicated to Japan on 26th.July. I won't place it all here, it is too long a document. But it is interesting to note that Douglas Fairbanks Jr [the film star] contributed much to the opening phraseology of the Declaration.

The Japanese War Cabinet decided to publish an expurgated version of it and it appeared in newspapers on 28th.Jul. with the news that the government would "mokusatsu" it. This word in Japanese could variously be interpeted as "To shelve it", "to take no notice of", "to ignore by keeping silent", "to treat with silent contempt". The final cabinet release read in part; "The Potsdam Declaration is only an adaptation of the Cairo Declaration and our government will place no importance on it. In short, we will 'mokusatsu' that".

Japanese English language newspapers headlined that Japan would ignore the Declaration. In the USA the ignore was interpreted as rejection and plans went forward for the deployment of Little Boy and Fat Man

Secondly, the seeking of peace by Japan.

It was upon the fall of Singapore [Feb 14th 1942] and very close to the maximum spread of the expanding Japanese Empire that the first suggestions for a negotiated peace was suggested to the Emperor by Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and supreme confidant of the Emperor. It came to nothing. [Lester Brooks, BEHIND JAPAN'S SURRENDER ch.10].

The first serious suggestions surfaced in May 1944 when a very secret group was set up by the army it was designated G20 and it was charged to investigate the prospects of a negotiated peace. It produced a paper "Measures for Termination of the Greater East Asia War". Upon being consulted about it, Tojo exploded in indignation and shipped the leader of the group, Col.Makoto Matsutani, to the China front, others were arrested and imprisoned or stripped of authority.

Japan attempted several negotiated settlements during and late in the war, mostly through Russia and its Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Secretly agreed terms of the Potsdam terms of surrender required Russia to declare war on Japan within months of the Axis defeat in Europe. In addition, the Japanese failed to appreciate the continuing Russian hostility and imperative for revenge over defeat in the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War that saw the ignominious destruction of its great navy in Tsushima Strait and the invasion by Japan of Siberia at the outbreak of WWl at the behest of the Allies. Molotov personally informed the Japanese

Ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, that Russia declared a state of war between their respectve countries as of midnight 8-9th August 1945. Russian troops by this time had already entered Manchuria. [Herbert Feis, CONTEST OVER JAPAN]

Russia wanted a slice of the action without doing much to earn it. Wouldn't China want a piece of the action if Russia got it so easily? China had a far more legitimate claim.

Japan had a dread of Russian occupation, cognisant as it was of the brutality meted out to the Germans when Russia invaded Germany itself and when Russian armour defeated all before it in dispossessing Japan of Northern China. It preferred by far an occupation by the western Allies.

The Japanese knew that a Russian occupation would be merciless and the War Cabinet always had that threat formost in their considerations. They were only slightly less afraid of an Allied occupation [basically a US one] but nevertheless expected a terrible vengeance to be exacted by them. Surrender to China was out of the question for her vengeance would have been worst of all if indeed the civil war there had not distracted that nation. Japan had no one to whom she could appeal for mediation. She was friendless and isolated and desperate.

Nor did the Allies wish Russia to invade the home islands of Japan. The administrative nightmare of a divided occupation of Berlin and Germany was a significant factor in preventing Russia from another similar occupation. The Allied plans for the rehabilitation of Japan were diametrically opposed to those that could be forseen in any Russian plans. It was a given that the latter would execute the Emperor Hirohito for war crimes.

Thirdly, the prospect of invasion

Japan had prepared well for an Allied invasion of its homeland. It expected it after the Battle of the Marianas [the Marianas Turkey Shoot the Americans called it], and their defeat at Saipan and then Okinawa.
In the home islands, extensive and wide-spread stocks of small and medium arms and ammunition had been stored in secret. In excess of 4000 kamikaze planes were prepared in hidden airfields. Propaganda had ensured that every capable Japanese was to die in defence of their homeland. Estimates of the cost in lives upon an invasion of the islands vary widely but even the most conservative provided a figure close to half a million combined Allied and Japanese killed.

The occupation in this way would have been a tactical and logistical nightmare that could have seen the Allies not only fighting the IJA and every Japanese civilian but perhaps well supplied Russian troops as well. Be assured, Russia was far from an exhausted war-weary nation. Stalin had an almost endless supply of manpower and his factories, moved east away from German reach, were churning out a vast quantity of war materials.

As it was, Russia re-occupied all of Sakhalin and the Kamchatka peninsula [Russian territory anyway] and all the Kurile Islands [mostly Japanese territory]

The situation was coming to the boil and could prove very costly to the Allies if no immediate action was taken. Even after the dropping of the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet was unbelieving of the power unleashed. There were still hard-line figures arguing for an all out effort in the group and a very real fear among each one of an armed forces rebellion at the very suggestion of a surrender. Home propaganda had left the Japanese incapable of understanding how critical the situation was and how near was utter destruction and utter defeat.

One of the biggest stumbling blocks was the intransigence of the armed forces of Japan. Even after the Hiroshima bomb they fumbled investigations into what sort of bomb it was, physicists were sent to investigate, reports were dilatory and inconclusive. They were not convinced by Allied broadcasts of a nuclear device, an atomic bomb, being dropped on Hiroshima. War Minister, Gen.Korechika Anami and half of the cabinet were insistent on fighting to the death. Principally because the Potsdam terms would not guarantee the life of the Emperor or the national polity.

Eventually and against centuries of tradition, Hirohito himself cast the deciding vote.

JAPAN'S LONGEST DAY written by historians and journalists who lived through the 24 hours prior to the surrender broadcast on 15th August and published by Kodansha International is a chronicle of a nation on the precipice of anarchy and revolution. High government officials and armed services officers were assassinated by fanatical young turks who could not accept the shame of surrender. Assassination attempts were made upon the lives of the emperor's advisors and these young army hot-heads set in motion plans to take over the royal palace.

Several young officers ransacked the studios of NHK from where the the emperor's recording of the surrender speech would be broadcast to the Japanese people. It was touch and go whether the Allies would hear a surrender declaration or a defiant continuance of war declaration.

Biggles, Prime

 

Welcome Biggles,

I've just been all the way through this topic and have read every post.
One thing that annoys me about some opinions, is that which reflects the Japanese as sinned against, as the victims. The annoyance arises from reading how much a wilful ignorance of the time and the train of events contribute to the formation of such opinions.

Fortunately there were only a couple who held them, so the minority is hardly worthy of continuing mention.

Proves we give "the other" opinion a go here even though those opinions are sometimes formed as you say with the benefit of time.

Some also find it difficult to debate without using the benefit of hindsight.

Cheers

Geoff

 

Biggles,

Hello and welcome to the forum.

A good post and a lively debate ensued from the original question.

Given the high death and injury toll accrued by the American and Allied forces and the fact that the closer to the Japanese Homeland the fighting became worse, it is little wonder that the decision to drop the bomb was made.

Regards
Tom

 

As one of those being trained to take part in the assault on Japan, I was not too bothered about whether the Japs deserved it or not - just pleased it was dropped. The behaviour of the Japs towards their prisoners was unspeakable, unfortunately it reflected on the civilian population and they all got well and truly despised.

Jim

 

Its a basic answer, based on family experiences, and others, but two werent enough.

 

First I wasn't aware that the USAAC had nuked Japan to save them from the Reds; secondly, the naval capability in means available to said Reds to perform an invasion in enough scale to overrun Japan seemed to have been lacking.

 

YES

 

YES


I'll second that, for all the reasons mentioned in the previous 30something pages.

 

First I wasn't aware that the USAAC had nuked Japan to save them from the Reds; secondly, the naval capability in means available to said Reds to perform an invasion in enough scale to overrun Japan seemed to have been lacking.

Well it's hard to know what some men thought about possibility of Soviet invasion of Japan at that time but I agree with Za that Soviet Navy wasn't strong enough to support invasion of Japan.

By August 1945, the Pacific Fleet had already had two cruisers, one destroyer leader, ten destroyers, two torpedo boats, 19 patrol boats, 78 submarines, ten minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49 "MO" anti-submarine boats, 204 motor torpedo boats and 1459 war planes.
From here. Also Soviets didn't have large landing crafts, only small ones, and not in sufficient number for such large scale invasion. So I don't think that that was much likely scenario.

 

Exactly, they'd have to borrow their LCT, LST, LCI etc etc from the Americans, who

a ) apparently wouldn't be too keen on the thought

b ) needed them for their own purposes.

 

Soviet invasion of Manchuria (1945) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
On August 18, several Soviet amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there were already Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden and undeniable establishment of Soviet sovereignty.
Russian amphibious operations - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History
Gives a history of Russo-Japanese claim and counter claim on northern disputed regions of the Kurile Islands plus antagonisingly brief assertions that Russian forces were not devoid of amphibious landing craft.
1.JmA - WW2 Russian paratroopers
Will provide ample confirmation that the Russians had a considerable number of experienced paratroopers.
Research is continuing in this issue, though it is not first priority.

I'm satisfied that from the nearest Kuriles at least a concerted amphibious landing supported by paratroopers could have been successful on Hokkaido. Circumstance points to an invasion of Japan's home islands by the USSR being a modest affair by comparison with the USA's Operation Downfall. Russian success in northern China and Manchuria was a powerful bargaining tool that Stalin expected would count for much in any negotiated settlement with the USA concerning areas of occupied Japanese territory. It deprived Japan of many thousands of soldiers to fight on the home front. The impression I gained from a more detailed study of this time suggests that a more modest force [perhaps no more than those amphibious forces that took and occupied the entire Kurile chain] intended to occupy Hokkaido initially and then to await and observe the degree of success that greeted Operations Olympic and Coronet against the southern island of Kyushu by US forces that were massive by comparison. This I have discovered is partially confirmed at; Operation August Storm | World War II Database
In this article it is stated that MacArthur threatened military hostilities if Russia invaded Hokkaido. This is contrasted with the report in AMERICAN SHOGUN by Robert Harvey and elsewhere that MacArthur and the Russian General Kuzma Derevyanko, head of the Russian delegation to the signing of the surrender document, engaged in a very heated discussion on occupation by Russia that resulted in MacArthur threatening to Jail Derevyanko and his entire delegation. If there is evidence elsewhere of MacArthur threatening military confrontation over the Russian threat, I'd appreciate a reference.
To advocate that the Russian Pacific Fleet was insufficient to the task ignores the fact that the Japanese had no navy to oppose them. The Soviet Union was an ally, remember? The first request for her intervention by her allies in the war against Japan was contained in the agreement reached at the Tehran Conference 28Nov-1Dec 1943. That requirement was confirmed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. The USSR was expected to enter the war against Japan within 3 months after the surrender in Europe.
At the time of the Yalta meeting, Feb.4-11 1945, the Little Boy uranium bomb's feasibility was already established. Its simplicity and supporting laboratory research and testing of U235 in a "gun" configuration made field testing of the device unnecessary in the estimation of its developers. Its first test was over Hiroshima. If the bomb had failed then security restrictions ensured that very few would have been the wiser. If it had been announced as a demonstration on some uninhabited territory and had failed then the boost to the morale of the IJA and IJN would have been catastrophic and US prestige would have suffered serious damage.
As it happened, the USSR invasion never occurred. Gen.Derevyanko recommended to Stalin that no occupation of home islands was feasible in the face of a hostile US reaction.
He may have had in mind that the USA was in the enviable position of being able to deploy nuclear weapons. The general almost certainly was unaware of Russian espionage that put nuclear weapons into his own nation's hands in the near future. Stalin's agreement with his general's recommendation is something of a puzzlement. Conventional Russian forces in or near the theatre were on a par with those of the USA.
It is proposed that Stalin relinquished claims on mainland Japan for his allies' consent to Russian involvement in and occupation of Romania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and some Balkan regions. Roosevelt agreed to this but Churchill was adamantly opposed, especially concerning Poland. But that's another story.
Biggles, Prime

 

YES.
If this was not done then then much more death and misery would have continued for years.

 

YES.
If this was not done then then much more death and misery would have continued for years.

maybe necessary...but people (innocent people) do not deserve to be bombed. even, at that time unborn, generations are suffering from cancer nowadys because of enola gay´s legacy. so death and misery continous.

 

Biggles all landings you mentioned in your post occurred after Japan surrender on 15 August 1945, and its more likely than not that this landings was unopposed.

On August 18, several Soviet amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there were already Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden and undeniable establishment of Soviet sovereignty.
and from one of links you provided

However, nearing the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union ignored the Neutrality Pact that was valid between Japan and the Soviet Union and entered the war against Japan. After Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet forces occupied all of the Four Northern Islands from 28 August 1945 to 5 September 1945.
Also there is no mentioned of the strength of these landings. So it could be battalion or brigade scale. The fact that after Japan capitulation, Soviets landed in Korea and Kuril Islands doesn't mean that they were also capable to execute large scale landing on Japan mainland.

 

And did they land on beaches a la Overlord or did they disembark on harbour? And on the brigade or battalion question, how many trips did the same ships do to bring more troops? We don't know, what we know was that the landings occurred after capitulation, that is when nobody was firing and landings could proceed at ease.

But back to thread topic: Yes, Lebach, we all agree on that, but this is a similar discussion as on Dresden. The sad fact remains that non-combatants get the wrong end of the stick everywhere and can't do anything about it.

 

Sol,
I appreciate your raising the issue of the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR 13 April 1941. The simple reality is that Churchill and Roosevelt persuaded Stalin to break it with the request that the USSR enter the war against Japan within 3 months of surrender in Europe. This was a secret condition of the Potsdam Declaration and not communicated to Japan. I'm moved toward the opinion that Stalin saw his threat to Japan more as a bargaining chip to gain control of buffer zones in eastern Europe, especially Romanian oil, a cherished slice of eastern Poland that included the Polish Corridor and Danzig [Gdansk] and thirdly a huge chunk of Germany.
You write; Also there is no mentioned of the strength of these landings. So it could be battalion or brigade scale. The fact that after Japan capitulation, Soviets landed in Korea and Kuril Islands doesn't mean that they were also capable to execute large scale landing on Japan mainland.
My contention is that the same amphibious forces that secured the entire Kurile chain could have occupied Hokkaido with paratroop support. My previous post gave my thoughts on this. A large scale landing would not have been called for simply to occupy the major centres of Hokkaido seeing as most of the invasion was accomplished against no opposition [as noted below].
Invasion of the Kuril Islands - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The above site provides a brief overview of the Russian occupation of the Kuriles. Although no mention is made of resistance by Japanese forces, the last two brief paragraphs suggests there may have been.
On August 23, the 20,000 strong Japanese garrisons on the islands surrendered as part of the general surrender of Japan.
Between August 22 and September 1, the Soviets occupied all of the Kuril Islands without further resistance.
The above second paragraph is capable of being misconstrued. In fact it means that the conquest of the entire chain of islands was accomplished between Aug 22 and Sep 1. All the islands are still occupied by Russia. This includes the northern territory islands claimed by Japan that are closest to Hokkaido, Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai Rocks.
Both nations have worthy substance in their claims to these islands.

Biggles, Prime