Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

Cheers Tom,

I note the information passed by the two unknown POW officers who delivered the Afrika Korps C.O. (not Rommel) demand that the 18th Indian Brigade @ Deir el Shein surrender. Checked the thread and research paper you supplied them before -n November 2023 - and they are in Post 140 (mention) and Post 142.

The 4th pg. anonymous eyewitness report on the fighting @ Deir el Shein, has been seen before; memorable to me as at the end it refers to Imperial Forces. It first appeared in Post 142.

The eyewitness is not named and it appears to be Lt. Col. Bampfield, of 4/11th Sikhs; the two other infantry battalion commanders were both POWs and the 121 Field Regiment C.O. was taken to hospital. His accounts of the day dominated the reporting for many years, including British and Indian historians writing.

I have prepared a table on the sequence of events, using 30 Corps WD and other sources now sometime ago.

 

Slightly off topic, perhaps, but also indicative of the command and control issues that left 18 Indian Inf. Bde fighting the DAK on its own on 1 July.

I found this message from Auchinleck to his div and bde comds on 5 July 1942 in the 30 Corps War Diary (WO 169/4034). I don't recall seeing it before so thought it might be of some interest especially given the emphatic use of CAPITALS which has a contemporary feel.

OUT MESSAGES – 5 JULY 42.

To: Main 1 Armd Div. Tac 1 SA Div. 24 Aust Bde. 9 Aust Div. 0950 hrs

"Personal and secret from C in C to div and bde comds. Reports from front line tps are still lacking in accuracy and VERY OFTEN too optimistic regarding enemy losses and movements. This MUST stop. On this information depends MY control of the battle and the ultimate defeat of the enemy. INACCURATE news wastes TIME and ENERGY and well may lead to DISASTER. I rely on your active HELP in this matter."

[CAPITALS in original.]

And, of course, stop talking about that Rommel chap...

From my humble perspective, nothing in Auchinleck's signal is incorrect in itself, I just feel that perhaps (as it seems like a complaint made by all commanders throughout history) he could have done more to explain what HE was going to do to introduce a system to get better information up through the chain of command to Army level.

Regards

Tom

 

Classic of the genre



All the best

Andreas

 

Also perhaps indicative of the confusion in some of the historiography of this period are these contradictory passages from John Connell's biography of Auchinleck:

p.667
"During this period, which Auchinleck spent entirely in the field, in hour-by-hour tactical control of Eighth Army’s operations, he could not divest himself of his strategic responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief."

So, Auchinleck, according to Connell was in hour-by-hour tactical control of Eighth Army's operations. Fine, but then we are later told that Auchinleck's plans for Operation Splendour/Manhood were 'ably conceived' according to Liddell Hart but scuppered because:

p.674
"Full comprehension of it, however, did not filter down to the lower echelons. Gott held no corps conference to plan the assault arrangements in detail, and the different formations were left unenlightened about the parts allotted to their neighbours."

What was Auchinleck doing during the planning for Splendour/Manhood? Wasn't it his task as Army Commander to ensure that his subordinate commanders implemented his instructions in the best way to make them successful? Is this an indication that in attempting to act as GOC 8th Army whilst retaining his role as C-in-C Middle East, Auchinleck was unable (or perhaps unwilling?) to 'grip' the army battle as it needed?

Connell also blames Churchill for forcing Auchinleck to attack during the latter half of July 1942. He might, though, have rightly expected Auchinleck to really 'grip' his army's operations.

There does seem to be an Auchinleck clique of historians who blame all the failures of 8th Army on either his subordinates or his superiors whilst praising him for 8th Army's achievement in finally stopping the much smaller Axis forces from brushing past them at Alamein.

Regards

Tom

 

All of the above please, and I'd take issue with the 'ably conceived' bit as well.

All the best

Andreas

 

Also just found that Niall Barr describes a Corps conference that Gott ran before Splendour so Connell and Barnett even more wide of the mark!!

Apologies to the Deir el Shein crowed - I think I'll start an Operation Splendour threat so I can work through some of my issues!!

Regards

Tom

 

Oh please do!

All the best

Andreas

 

Just found this snip in WO 201/408 which contains signals/reports/memos/tank states etc sent to DDO GHQ ME for the first half of July 1942 and thought of this thread!



Regards

Tom

 

R.G. Leughwaite.

Is that correct? I'm not convinced that's a known surname.

Better candidate:
Sir Rainald Lewthwaite (1913-2003) - Cumbrian Lives - Towards a Dictionary of Cumbrian Biography

56013 Rainald Gilfrid LEWTHWAITE, OBE, MC, MiD*, Scots Guards

 

Agreed, as I work through the file, I'll see if he is mentioned again.

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

Is there a date for this report? It appears to be after 1/7/1942 given the information provided. Without referring to my notes!

 

Hi David,

Time and date are bottom right below the signature:- 1245 hours on 3 July 1942.

Regards

Tom

 

davidbfpo

Probably no more than footnotes, but I see two hits on searches for "Shein" here:

https://www.militaryhistoricalsociety.co.uk/BulletinRan

Durbar Volume 26, No. 4 (2009) Havildar Dhirta Singh IDSM - a true Military Hero of the Punjab

Durbar Volume 27, No. 1 (2010) Correpsondence

 

Thanks Charley. Alas the original article is behind a ££wall. Years ago now I was a member of the Indian Military History Society (IMHS) and contributed several articles to 'Durbar'. Some of which are here, notably on the Indian Long Range Squadron (ILRS), although now the ILRS thread has more.

I had not found a reference to the Havildar's ecape, so I have it now. Albeit the first article found and I recognise some of the references: Long Trek to Freedom ~ Escape from Tobruk With a little more (no photos) on: https://www.noonans.co.uk/archive/lot-archive/results/64063/ He was awarded the I.D.S.M. (George VI issue) and the MacGregor Memorial Medal for the value of the information he brought back.

 

A small update. Three of the 4/11th Sikh officers, who were taken prisoner, had eluded being fully identified till now. No massive gains to be fair. Thanks to Vitellino for her help recently.

Second Lieut. Alan Cadell Barnes Wimbush, b. 22/7/1919 in London and died 23/12/2000 @ Ascot. The Cadells of Grange and Cockenzie Commissioned from Private to Second Lt. 15/11/1941 into Indian Army from: https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/35471/page/965/data.pdf and POW Card WO 423/802188 Name: A C B Wimbush . Service number: 5829184 . Date of birth: 22 July 1919 . | The National Archives. No Indian Army number known. At Wellingborough School till 1951, as a Classics teacher and resigns his commission with Wellingborough School Contingent, 30th July 1951. Was then using British Army No. 5829184, CMP shows issued to the Dragoons. https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/40893/supplement/5622/data.pdf Summer 1959 left Rendcomb College, near Cirencester. See: https://www.oldrendcombian.org.uk/w...comb-College-Chronicle-December-1959final.pdf In 1987 attended Sikh Regiment Saragarhi centenary event in India, donated money for an annual prize to the best signaller and addressed ceremony in Punjabi. Battle of Saragarhi: How official military records remember the Gulistan Bahadurs Wrote a letter to The Times 4/6/1992 about cricket and gave his address: Ascot Lodge, London Road, Ascot. Some items sent in 2020 to an online historian, pre-1914 maps and note on tribes in North West Frontier Province. 'Sorry it's taken 19 years!' Author replied 24/10/25: he was single, never married and his medals etc were sent to his regiment in India. The maps went The British Library.

Lieut. Malcolm Morrison. The War Diary refers to him arriving after the battle, but Chris Willis (Forum member) research shows him as an Italian POW held at P.G. 29 Veano and from Vitellino in Offlag 5A, Brodziany, Poland. Indian Army No. EC 2317 (Emergency Commission). From: https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C17393704 POW Card WO 416/263/149 refers. No trace CWGC and nowt online.

A/Capt. John Richard N. Harris, b. 14/11/1914 @ Norfolk. Indian Army No. AI. 742. From Vitellino held in Italian POW Camp P.G. 21 (Chieti) and held in Offlag 79 Braunschweig, Germany. Name: John Richard N Harris . Date of Birth: 14/11/1914 . Place of Birth: Norfolk . ... | The National Archives POW Card WO 416/164/143. Shown as a Temporary Captain London Gazette 29/1/1945 https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/37085/page/2577/data.pdf Nothing else found online.

I will leave them alone now, other id'd officers file await a visit to The British Library.

 

Chris
Try this website
7 Indian Infantry Brigade

and this facebook group
https://www.facebook.com/groups/190958714794186

 

I think there are a few errors in that 7 Indian Inf Bde page.

All the best

Andreas

 

Hi all,

I found this OOB for Eighth Army in WO 201/408 (GHQ MEF Ops telegrams/reports) and thought it might be of interest:



Regards

Tom

 

Anyone know how to determine the hours of darkness in North Africa on 1/7/1942? Thanks.

 

Google AI
"Based on the geographical location of the North African coast (e.g., Egypt/Libya, approx. 30-32° N) during the winter months, the hours of darkness on January 7, 1942, were approximately 13.5 to 14 hours.

• Sunset on January 7, 1942, occurred roughly around 17:15 - 17:30 (5:15 PM - 5:30 PM) local time.
• Sunrise on January 8, 1942, occurred roughly around 07:00 - 07:15 (7:00 AM - 7:15 AM) local time.
• This results in a total darkness duration of about 13 hours and 30 minutes to 14 hours.

For context, military operations in the Western Desert, such as those described in January 1942, often operated under these long night conditions."