Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

Post 252 has a short statement for the 'Court of Inquiry' from Air Commodore (George) Beamish. There are two passages for the RAF's involvement on 1/7/1942:

'On 1st July no air support was requested for this brigade' and 'Information from ground sources as a whole was particularly scanty on this day, despite the fact that information was requested from all units, and particularly 1 SA Division.'

He noted 108 bombing sorties were flown that day.

In my research I have found: a) an attack on Deir el Shein, possibly at 0615hrs by sixteen RAF bombers on 15 Panzer & 21 Panzer divisional assembly areas, which disrupted their assembly; b) the 2/5th Essex Chaplain refers to around 1400hrs four RAF Boston bombers attack German artillery, with no effect.

Wiki shows after commanding the RAF in Crete, May 1941:

From: George Beamish - Wikipedia and G R Beamish_P

 

This can be explained by the way the air support system functioned.

Close Air Support for 8 Army in CRUSADER

Above description for CRUSADER but functionally the same by Alamein. In order to generate requests, you needed the units on the frontline to request a strike, that would feed into the Tentacle at Bde or Div level, and then upwards into the RAF system before it would be actioned. As I suspect 18 Ind Bde i) had zero exposure to this system as a recent arrival and ii) had no connection to a tentacle (and may not even have known who or what they were), this was never going to happen.

With no requests, the RAF would bomb on the basis of its own information, e.g. confirmed visuals from fighter planes over the battlefield, where these were far enough away from a bomb line. I suspect something like this triggered the 1400 bombing and possibly the early morning strike.

All the best

Andreas

 

G/Cpt Beamish was sent off in September to form No. 270 (Bomber) Wing (it may have been renumbered thereafter), a Blenheim IV equipped wing. In December he was slated to command the air element of Bencol (see here: BenCol – Original Objective and here: BenCol: Advance on Benghazi I – Planning). But then his successor as Cdr Plans Section SASO (G/Cpt Dearlove) was lost in a friendly fire incident at Gialo, where the Blenheim he was travelling in with SASO WCdr Bowman (GTI) was downed by 6 LAA Bty. Beamish was thus brought back to replace his own replacement. By January 1942 he was acting SASO and confirmed in February 1942.

All the best

Andreas

 

And this was the last statement that I found related to 1 Jul 42:






Regards

Tom

 

I also copied some files that over a broader perspective on British operations in the Western Desert during the summer of 1942 including a response from George Erskine to questions from the South African official historians. I'll post them up in a separate thread when I get a chance a I think they will be of general interest.

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

Greenway's undated statement is in fact an extract from 2/3rd Gurkha's War Diary; which he oddly does not state. Why? The War Diary in two places refers to him, first when the battalion left Iraq:

And in a summary after 3/7/1942 up to 31/7/1942:

The only difference is the list at the end of how many grenades they had.

 

Post 258 refers to a statement by Lt. Col. Bampfield, 4/11 Sikhs, this is an exact copy of an additional typescript in their War Diary (dated 3/8/1942) with the exception of his last sentence:

 

Hi,

Isn't that likely to be the other way round? He produces a written statement for the Enquiry and a copy goes into the War Diary for the record?

Same with Bampfield's statement perhaps?

It's interesting that there was an emphasis on understanding what had happened at Deir el Shein on 1 Jul 42 alongside a broader enquiry into what had happened at Gazala, Tobruk and Matruh. Does that suggest a feeling that 18 Ind Inf Bde hadn't done well enough? Or that they had been left isolated and unsupported by those formations who were tasked with covering the gaps between the "boxes"?

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

Yes, in the absence of a date on either Bampfield or Greenway's statements to the 'Court of Inquiry' that is plausible. I just find that both being undated odd for a 'court'. Plus, I think Bampfield was relied upon for earlier 30 Corps documents on the action, indeed he may have been the author - as they too have no author's name.

Bampfield after 1/7/1942 was the only infantry C.O. available to the 'court' and I found the statements by the two artillery officers with the 18th Indian Brigade of value, especially Stansfield, a brigade artillery commander useful. Yet to fully read the CCRA (Dennis) and QMG (Lysaght-Griffin) statements.

As Norrie ordered Deir el Shein "box" and was removed on 8/7/1942 a week later (I have noted this, not researched Auchinleck's decision) how much was the 'court', with a mix of officers from the 8th Army and the UK, limited by its terms of reference. Was it a 'court' to identify "lessons to be learnt and implemented" or to produce a timeline of what happened?

I did spot this passage just in 'El Alamein 1942: Turning Point in the Desert' by Richard Doherty, published 2002. Could the cited 8th Army report refer to the 'court'?


I have not seen this book, and Google Books does not readily show the footnote cited. I may check local libraries for holdings.

 

Post 257 has photographs of two witness statements for the ‘Court Of Inquiry’ by 30 Corps staff officers: Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

Below is a summary of relevant information provided, posted with the two statements converted to Word and the font size increased. See Post 270: Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

Some information is given in brackets and a few footnotes, two refer to contrary information.


DA & QMG Brigadier Edward Henry Lysaght-Griffin[1]

Refers to supplying the 18th Indian Brigade on 29/6/1942 with 2500 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition and twenty thousand Indian Troops rations. Followed the next day with three thousand rounds of 2-pounder ammunition; three thousand rounds of 25-pounder ammunition; one thousand 40mm HE rounds, plus five hundred rounds 40mm AP and one hundred thousand rounds .303 (rifle & MG).

On 30/6/1942 18th Indian Brigade’s second line Transport Company was lost. The 10th Indian Motor Brigade Transport Company, with seventy trucks (ten extra) or part of it was helping the evacuation.



Brigadier Meade Edward Dennis, M.C.[2] CCRA

Refers to spending most of 29/6/1942 collecting and sorting out retreating artillery units who were in a very disorganised state.

An artillery Liaison Officer, from British Troops Egypt, conducted a detailed artillery reconnaissance at Deir el Shein, which was handed onto 18th Indian Brigade on their arrival and remained till 30/6/1942.

(Possibly) By 30/6/1942 1600hrs I had collected twelve (25-pounder) guns from 121 Field Regt., and 288 Battery, 124 Field Regt., minus one gun. I ordered Lt. Col. Lushington (121 Field Regt.) to take command of the artillery at Deir el Shein. His 97 Field Regt. had six 25-pounders, two 6-pounders and one 2-pounder.

The situation on 30/6/1942 was twenty-five 25-pounders, sixteen 6-pounders (The Buffs), two 6-pounders (97 Field Regt.), fourteen 2-pounders (18th Indian Brigade) and six 6-pounders (other Royal Artillery units)[3]. Lt. Col. Lushington had arrived.

For the artillery communications were almost non-existent; all wireless set batteries being run down and (telephone) cable expended. The anti-tank positions were exposed to the North and West. I asked for forty kilometres of cable to go in 1/7/1942, it did not arrive.

The 97 Field Regt. ‘had taken part in every rearguard action from Sidi Barrani to El Alamein, and neither its six remaining guns nor personnel were in any condition to fight. ’The ‘gun areas were cramped, limited very much to the Deir el Shein depression.’ I asked the Corps Commander that the position could not take twenty five (field) guns and asked to withdraw 97 Field Regt. I kept Lt. Col. Lushington with me[4], sending back a Liaison Officer back to get them out, he didn’t get back.

(Cited in full) ‘It was unfortunate that all ranks were told that the 1st Armoured Division were coming to their assistance, and they subsequently saw an armoured force approach the position and then turn away. From then on they seemed to have considered the position hopeless, and to have realised that no further help would be forthcoming. The effect of this disappointment cannot have done other than lower the morale of the whole garrison, especially the Indian troops.’

[1] See: https://www.britishmilitaryhistory....s/124/2019/12/XXX-Corps-History-Personnel.pdf and 1661 Brigadier Edward Henry Lysaght LYSAGHT-GRIFFIN, CBE, DSO, MiD**, Durham Light Infantry

[2] From: https://www.britishmilitaryhistory....s/124/2019/12/XXX-Corps-History-Personnel.pdf and Biography of Major-General Meade Edward Dennis (1893 – 1965), Great Britain Awards: 5574 Major-General Meade Edward DENNIS, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, MiD***, Royal Artillery

[3] The total numbers given by Dennis nearly match those given by Lt. Col. Stansfield.

[4] Lt. Col. Lushington himself states he returned to the “box” by 1200hrs.

 

I think reference 48 in the book you mention in post # 269 is to WO 201/538 (Eighth Army: lessons from operations | The National Archives).

The dates seem to fit. It's on my "to do" list for next time I get to Kew. Jonathon Fennell uses it as one of his sources for his book about the North African campaign: Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign

Regards

Tom

 

That's the one. It hoovers up prior documents.

All the best

Andreas

 

Post 220 refers to 'Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945' by David French, pub. 2001, which has a chapter on The Desert War 1940-1942, with x28 pgs. and it was read this week. I have added a few dates in brackets and footnotes for reference.

Three passages in the chapter have relevance to my focus:

On pg. 216 “Jock” columns[1] were banned after the fall of Tobruk (21/6/1942) and French cites PRO WO 106/2223[2] ‘Notes from Theatre of War. No.6 Cyrenaica, November 1941-January 1942, published July 1942.

On pg. 217 French adds some context: The 8th Army had no fewer than six commanders in sixteen months and some twenty divisions or equivalents were in action between 1941-1942. Only four fought in more than two battles. The British ‘seemed incapable of profiting by our experience. No-one seemed able to analyse our weaknesses and those of the enemy; there was no development of a dynamic tactical policy.’ Citing Major General David Belchem[3] (On 1/7/1942 he was a staff officer at 8th Army HQ) in a 1954 letter to Basil Liddell-Hart.

On pgs. 236-239 French describes air support and ground co-operation – known as Air Support Control[4] (ASC). In June 1942 the time between summoning close air support and to arrival was on occasion reduced to thirty-five minutes.


[1] See: Jock column - Wikipedia and Jock Columns Post 9 attributes their end to an order issued by Montgomery, who took command 13/8/1942.

[2] See: Pamphlets: notes from theatres of War, Cyrenaica | The National Archives

[3] See: David Belchem - Wikipedia and Biography of Major-General Ronald Frederick King David Belchem (1911 – 1981), Great Britain

[4] Andreas Baumann describes the system to generate requests, needed the units on the frontline to request a strike, which would feed into the Tentacle at Brigade or Divisional level, and then upwards into the RAF system before it would be actioned. He suspects that the 18th Indian Brigade had zero exposure to this system as a recent arrival; had no connection to a tentacle and may not even have known who or what they were – so this was never going to happen. With no requests, the RAF would bomb on the basis of its own information, e.g. confirmed visuals from fighter planes over the battlefield, where these were far enough away from a bomb line. He suspects this may have triggered the 1400hrs bombing of artillery positions and the early morning bombing of the assembly areas for 15 and 21 Panzer divisions. See: Close Air Support for 8 Army in CRUSADER and Post 262 Deir el Shein sources - July 1942

 

Just rediscovered my post in December 2023 on the 'Court of Inquiry' in a Tobruk thread: Fall of Tobruk

Just found a footnote referring to an article in 2008 by Professor Andrew Stewart, Kings College London @ UK Staff College, on the repercussions of the surrender: 'The ‘Atomic’ Despatch: Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Fall of the Tobruk Garrison and Post-War Anglo-South African Relations'.
Link: Vol. 36 No. 1 (2008) | Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies

I am not in any way an expert on the incident and issues, what intrigues me are the references to a 'Court of Inquiry' into the surrender:

.
A footnotes states: Operations in the Western Desert, 27 May 1942-2 July 1942’, Report of the Court of Enquiry, Volume One, WO106/2234; Volume Two, WO106/2235. Both documents are in the National Archives, minus alas when they were released.

 

Not sure French got that right.

I) Jock columns continued to operate through July 1942, and were the only thing shoring up the southern end of the Alamein position. I'd go with Montgomery's order on that one.

II) Divisions that fought in more than two battles 1941/42 (I count Alamein as at least two battles:

1) 7th Armoured (COMPASS, BATTLEAXE, CRUSADER, Gazala, Alamein 1 and 3)
2) 4th Indian (COMPASS, BATTLEAXE, CRUSADER, Gazala, Alamein 1 and 3)
3) 1st Armoured (CRUSADER, Gazala, Alamein 1 and 3)
4) 1st South African (CRUSADER, Gazala, Alamein 1 and 3)
5) 2 New Zealand (CRUSADER, Gazala, Alamein 1 and 3)
6) 9th Australian (Siege of Tobruk, Alamein 1 and 3)
7) 50th Infantry (Gazala, Alamein 1 and 3)

Not sure what point Belchem is trying to make, other than engage in a CYA exercise ('It's not the staff I was on's fault, because nobody was around for long enough to understand how the Axis operated at tactical level.'). As the meme goes:



All the best

Andreas

 

This week I returned to read ‘The Early Battles of the Eighth Army’ by Adrian Stewart[1], published in 2002, thankfully a copy was in the Library of Birmingham.

Updated the quotations to correctly show authors 19/5/24

On pg.69 he refers to six 6-pounder anti-tank guns on 27/5/1942 were captured[2] from the 7th Motor Brigade.[3]

On pg. 105 he cites William Jackson[4] on pg. 251-252: ‘Fortunately Norrie on whom Rommel’s main blow was to fall, had made up his mind and had told his subordinates that was the last ditch. 30 Corps would fight and die where it stood.’

Jackson states on pg. 254 ‘Misunderstanding and plain muddle led to the (18th) brigade being over-run by the Afrika Korps as darkness fell.'

Stewart concludes: ‘Norrie rightly concluded that in fixed defences it (18th Indian Brigade) would be capable of putting up an effective resistance…As indeed it did.’

‘Their (18th Indian Brigade) sacrifice had not been in vain. The Afrika Korps had wasted an entire day – in practice, as it happened, even longer – and had lost eighteen tanks – one third of its strength.’

[1] See: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Early-Batt...show_all_btm?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews Mini-bio: Adrian Stewart — Johnson & Alcock and Pen and Sword Books: Titles by Adrian Stewart

[2] This was not the first time 6-pounders had been captured. The Afrika Korps knew its capabilities.

[3] See: https://www.britishmilitaryhistory....s/124/2020/09/7-Armoured-Division-1941-42.pdf A mix of artillery and infantry units, part of the 7th Armoured Division. The incident where the guns during the Gazala battle(s) were captured was not readily identified.

[4] No footnotes in the book and the book is: ‘The North African Campaign 1940-1943’ by William G.F. Jackson, pub. 1975. See: https://www.amazon.co.uk/African-Campaign-1940-43-W-G-F-Jackson/dp/0713430273

 

I refer the honourable gentleman to 1st South African Division Operation Order No. 37 of 1 July 1942 which I posted up early in this thread:

"
INFORMATION

1. Enemy.
Enemy has launched an attack on EL ALAMEIN posn.

2. Own Tps
(a) 10 Ind Div, 29 Ind Inf Bde and 2 FF Bde have been withdrawn to DELTA where they come under orders DELTA Force.
(b) Eighth Army, less 1 SA Div, is to withdraw to WADI NATRUN posn on general line EL NUBARIYA canal about 540903 – RAS SULI MANIYA 520867.
(c) On arrival AMIRYA area 1 SA Div comes under comd DELTA Force.

[...]

INTENTION

6. If considered necessary 1 SA Div will withdraw from EL ALAMEIN posn to AMIRIYA for defence of ALEXANDRIA."

Which is hardly a ringing endorsement of any Corps instruction that the Alamein position was to be held to the last man, etc. It also doesn't tally with what we have seen about several units of 18 Ind Inf Bde being converted into "columns" nor with the general thinning out of the South African division and the despatch of several of its infantry units to the east. I think there was much more uncertainty in the mind of the British command on 1 July 1942 than they, and most historians, have subsequently admitted.

It would be really interesting to see primary sources for the New Zealand Division for this period.

Regards

Tom

 

I think the Kiwis were unimpressed. Check the last but one sentence in the 5 NZ BDe war diary.



Order No. 11 below.



All the best

Andreas

 

Also reasonably certain that Inglis was massively unimpressed by Gott.

It is quite possible that Norrie (for once) had the right idea and executed it. I wouldn't go by the South Africans on this one. Pienaar was not their greatest commander, and never got over Sidi Rezegh in my view, also his reticence to close with the enemy predated that. Just look at the number of clown shows they put on during 1st Alamein, which even their own semi-official history has a hard time remaining polite about.

Ask me what I really think.

All the best

Andreas

 

Andreas & Tom,

Thank you both.

Currently I pursuing "loose ends", mainly books not read and available. Plus, as you know identifying information from what you both have supplied. My focus remains the 18th Indian Brigade on that day.

Every so often the reading finds points that need to be mentioned, e.g. the lack of RAF support - even if there were two bombing attacks. Which begs the question were the numerous awareness and training memos circulated to 18th Indian Brigade in Iraq?

I will not cite French's book, except in a footnote and add Andreas's remarks.

Yes, Tom I recall the preparation and circulation of contingency plans for a retreat from the El Alamein position. It does illustrate the British practice of planning and circulating plans "in case". I expect it was better to do so before a retreat. Some authors have commented it was a mistake by Auchinleck to do so.

Even on my limited reading the "thinning out" meant sizeable infantry reserves built up in the rear (Nile Delta plus) and Montgomery moved them forward quickly upon taking command.

Adrian Stewart is not the only author to commend Norrie for his stance. I do find it curious Norrie never wrote his memoirs and left the Army in September 1944, after some background posts, to become the Governor of South Australia.

I still have two sets of documents from Andreas to write up: 8th Army "lessons" and SIGINT.