Anyone got this or read it? If so, what's it like? Cracking Hitler's Wall: The 1st Assault Brigade Engineers on D-Day: Amazon.co.uk: Richard C. Anderson: Books
Paul Have not (yet) got hold of a copy of this but there has been much coverage on the "Missing-Lynx" modelling forums where the author is a member - See the "Allied WW2" Forum. Noel
Finally got this - a nicely produced book. Must say I am not sure I agree with some of his comments about the use of specialist armour, which seems very defensive/US biased in respect of the US use (or lack of use) of it. Was also surprised at the lack of veteran interviews and previously unpublished images of which there were virtually none. However, well worth the money.
Got mine last week as well. Pleased to see that it's proper history with footnotes and references. I couldn't resist the lure of the statistics so tried a like-for-like comparison of sapper casualties across the five beaches - AVREs and Crabs were there to do sappery things so did they make a difference in that limited area? Format is: BEACH: sapper cas / total cas / % Figures are straight from the book to avoid bogging oneself in data and dispute: U: 117 / 0391 / 30% O: 847 / 3496 / 24% G: 142 / 1023 / 14% J: 088 / 1166 / 08% S: 164 / 1063 / 15% Even more telling by Bde/RCT --8 RCT: 117 / 0391 / 30% 116 RCT: 395 / 1799 / 22% -16 RCT: 452 / 1697 / 27% 231 Bde: 062 / 0534 / 12% -69 Bde: 080 / 0489 / 16% 7 C Bde: 049 / 0462 / 11% 8 C Bde: 039 / 0704 / 06% --8 Bde: 164 / 1063 / 15% US sapper cas are roughly double Br & Cdn, assuming that the overall casualties make a proper adjustment for the severity of the asault. I'm not sure I would argue that the armouring of some of the Br/Cdn sappers is the whole reason for the difference. The sappers cas on UTAH are proportionately even worse than OMAHA which suggests that harassing artillery fire on the beaches (which was mentioned as significant) may have accounted for some of them during post-assault clearance. It's also possible that the US simply put too many engineers on the beaches as targets. That is a gut feeling at this stage, not evidence of a deep knowledge of the make up of the US and Commonwealth sapper orbats for D-Day - we talk of squadrons and companies, they of battalions and brigades. Going back to the guns: perhaps the better penetration from the Br/Cdn beaches led to quicker suppression of indirect fire onto the beaches, leading to less casualties. First thought is that it correlates quite well - the high SWORD casualties are analogous to UTAH & OMAHA. SWORD was exposed to German guns on the other side of the Orne we couldn't get to; UTAH had all the inundated ground between the beach and the guns; OMAHA we know about.
Idler Like the facts and figures but are these all casualties or just KIA? if the are all then the RE/RCE got away very lightly indeed. Also the argument about the AVRE not been used by the Americans on Omaha Beach in particular will drag on forever. There will also be other factors like clearing obsticles and mines also stray shells and the odd air raid, accidents eg vehicles and such like. Sapper may be able to provide an insight into the state of the beaches and how the RE's coped with them, unless he was in a unit that had to push on fast.
All casualties, though the book has a breakdown where there is one. I'm always a bit wary of the missing figures in particular as I'm sure a few would have gone astray but reported in later. I would recommend Gawne's Spearheading D-Day for the US side of things. Having now opened it, the Engineer Special Brigades were Beach Group like formations with a leaning towards logistics - not really assault engineers. The Special Engineer Task Force that was set up for gapping and clearance on OMAHA. In short, a 41 man mixed Army/Navy 'platoon' plus a Sherman Dozer was assigned for each of the 16 planned lane plus a half as much again in reserve. 2-3 battalion's worth, maybe. UTAH's 8 lanes seem to have attracted roughly the same numbers of troops but they weren't organised in the same way and called the Beach Obstacle Demolition Parties. Commonwealth beaches had a single Field Company and 2 LCOCUs per brigade in addition to the Funnies. I'm getting dangerously close to having to sit down and do this properly but it still looks like around twice as many sappers on the US beaches than the Br/Cdn ones, even counting the sappers under armour.
Paul , I got this one after about four years of waiting for a copy to come up at the right price. Gives some of the low down on the German side of things , what was there , how it was built and what remains today. The Allied use of specialist armour - not something I would profess to know a great deal about.....my late father told me that Omaha was due in part to the Americans refusing to take the "funnies" - that was his view. ( How accurate this is I don't know - he didn't have a huge respect for the Americans and no doubt this "got in the way"). Will consider getting a copy as it will certainly educate me - anyone have any views on the subject I would be all ears .
If it is of any interest to this thread? I think the preparation by the Royal Engineers was the cracking of this problem The DD tanks first in with the Assault Sappers. First it is well to understand that Sword was the mist heavily defend of all the beaches.And in depth..... The Assault Sappers prepared the way for everyone top follow. My company supplied the three Assault teams to create path off the beach and onto the road beyond... Highly trained teams .So equipped that they were ready for any situation that may arise. To that end they had Assault mine clearing teams.And Demolition teams. so that anything in the way would be removed, no matter what. In the event the Sappers landed ahead of everyone but were soon backed up by the Dragoons DDs The teams landed on Queen red and Queen white. The teams were as follows 3 Platoon Lt MH Edwards RE with Sgt Davies JG. On the right under command 1S Lancs Reg. With 4 demolition teams. Each carrying twoX30lb Beehive charges. And two mine clearing teams. 2 platoon. Lt RAc Trench RE (Digger) Sgt Rees. EH on the left. Similarly deployed under command 2 E Yorks 1 Platoon Lt RA Field RE Sgt JW Thomas Deployed 2 sections on the right and 2 on the left. With the task of opening up maintenance routes behind each Battalion. And from the main lateral rout from Hermanville to the Canal bridging site at Benouville There is much more but that is the nub of it. Hope it is of interest? Sapper
Sapper, You'll be pleased to know that 246 Fd Coy - the detachment with 1 SUFFOLK - does get a brief mention in the 1 Aslt Bde book, though they aren't listed in the index. Am I right in thinking that, as Div RE, your Company's task was to get 'your' infantry off the beach, not clearing the beach for those coming in behind?
Idler . That unit with the Suffolks, was another section of my company, the one where they tackled the Hillman site, by providing a mine free path through the defences. under heavy fire. Lt Arthur Heal C de G. and sappers. They, by their gallantry opened up this huge site. Not one bomb or shell had dropped on the area. A big site 650 metres by 450....Some of it is still there. We used it later on as a base to operate from. BUT never inside the place, only in between the concrete placements. does that help? Cheers There was more of the company elsewhere Sapper. The teams on the beach task, was to get everyone ashore and on to the road. I forgot to mention that we had in reserve the mobile flame throwers.
It helps - thank you. I've been re-reading your Swordman thread on ARRSE so I'm still a bit awestruck...
