Hi all, I'm new to the forum (thought i'd join as I have a real interest in WWII), and have many unanswered questions, but 1 of the main ones is i've been reading a lot about the defense of Berlin at the close of the war, under Helmuth Weidling, where it seems like despite being hampered by woefully inadequate troop numbers, he still mounted a pretty formidable defence. Was it as good a strategy as it looks, or was there more he could have done? Thanks everyone.
I think the poor man was in "Catch-22" a no win situation holding the Russians back for a short time was possible but preventing them from encircling Berlin and taking the city was beyond his and any means which then existed. Hitler's endless desire to attack even when all was lost saw what might have defended Berlin being wasted first in the West and then lastly in the east chasing illusions and deranged dreams.
Ok well first of all I think that Weidling did the best he could which wasnt very much to begin with. By the time Weidling, commanding 56th Panzer Corps assumed command he was doomed. It was the veritable "poison chalice". Helmuth Reymann was the previous Commander who was appointed in March 1945. He was appointed to command a "Fortress City" but quickly found out that the title was a joke. There were no defenses, no evacuation order given, no provision for procuring food or supplies for either the population or the garrison. Garrison.......... that in itself was a misnomer. The "Garrison" was stripped by Army Group Vistula to help defend the onslaught that was about to descend upon the Seelow Heights on 16th April. So before the assault even started there was precious few troops to defend the city. Gotthard Heinrici had already decided to stand or fall at the Oder. No Stalingrad for the citizens of Berlin. If they couldnt hold them at the Oder then the City would fall. When the attack fell, Zhukov's forces punched straight through 9th Army (this is relevant, dont worry), The majority of the forces ended up pushed North or South to the hell that was the Halbe Pocket. But the one formation that got pushed straight down Reichstrasse 1 towards the City was Weidling's Panzer Corps. Hitler dismissed Reymann and Weidling was unfortunate enough to attract the Fuehrer's attention when his HQ was uncontactable for a number of hours. By the time that he was given responsibility the outer suburbs had been penetrated. There were few cohsive formations in the City, and though the defenders fought like Tigers they were doomed the moment 9th Army's defenses broke on the Seelow Heights. So in answer to your question, Weidling could have done little else to change the situation. I still though think that Busse the commander of the 9th Army could have been more proactive in heading westward much faster. More troops may have broken out of the Halbe pocket if he had acted faster.
I've just been reading an article entitled The Defense of Berlin which is on the Naval History Website. Its from the US Historical Division which comprised of Wehrmacht Officers and whose task was to write about their experiences fighting the Soviets: The German Defense of Berlin I've now realised that the LVI Panzer Corps actually withdrew into Berlin on the express orders of Hitler, thus causing the 9th Army's left wing to collapse. Le Tissier's Book "Slaughter at Halbe" does not seem to be clear about this. By the way the above is an excellent article about the preparations, topography of area to be defended, Force numbers etc.
I enjoyed Segfried Knappes 'soldat' which has a good account of the last days, inc his time with Weidling. Kev
