Could Operation Market-garden Have Succeeded?

53rd Welsh Division Angie.
Great mob, wih the distinction of being the one that is inscribed on the Normandy Plate. That is the plate that contains the illustrious names of all those that fought in Normandy. Nothing can take that away. EVER!
Sapper

The one on the left!
Sapper

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>Jimbo, such language is rather unacceptable, so I suggest that you clan up your act and conduct yourself a bit more like a serious student of history.

Why not read the book, which is Neillands, Robert: The Battle for the Rhine 1944 - Arnhem and the Ardennes: the Campaign in Europe, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005. Until you do, you are really not in a position to comment on his research based work.

I know that you have an utter contempt for historians - which makes me wonder how you manage to maintain an interst in the subject - but give it a go. Not just Neillands. Try a few and check what they say back to their original sources. Even you might learn something.

As for Patton, he did a pretty good job of swanning around those parts of France which the Germans had vacated. Classic cavalry tactics[/b]

I wish I had your diplomacy Angie

Quite a few from across the Atlantic mock Neillands, but I never see them proving him wrong with evidence. He always backs his claims up, and is often quoting official sources which he does alot with US offical history on his MG thoughts.

I think you will find Jimbo that Montgomery was quite hygenic and did not suffer with stinking hands. Patton's juggernaught? hmmm is that the one that steam rollered Metz? Patton bashed his men against Metz against second rate troops, and how many men did he loose in doing so? 50,000 men lost to take one town. He claimed that it would take him a week, ten later.........

Monty and his 8th army were going through El Hamma like a dose of salts, had Patton with his US 11 Corps been anything of a leader he would have cut off the 15th and 21st Panzer Divs on his way to seal the gap at Gabes ( similar to Valmontone in Italy and Mark Clark !)But NO - he was mauled by the much understrength 10 Panzers who had taken a licking at Medenine! If he had done what had been ordered the Germans would have been cut off, but then when did Patton ever do what he was ordered.


Sicilly for example where Patton usually gets all the plaudits.
After landing Patton had little opposistion until a place called Gela where the Germans launched a counter attack and Pattons men were back on the beaches, what saved the day were the warships Savannah and Shubrick, firing into the Germans from warship standards, point blank range. The blame for this ? well as usual it was'nt Patton's fault it was the rough seas and not being able to land enough men and suppiles, funny thing when the British complained of this in Normandy it was laughed at.

BUT eager beaver Patton was off racing out front in complete disregard for supplies and didnt have the support and backup he needed to push back 15th Panzer. Patton came very close to being thrown back inot the sea, well actually HE was but his men came very close.

Later on Mountbatten with a loud hailer from his destroyer, shouted to Hewitts American HQ ship, asking innocently how far Patton had got inland? Mountbatten had heard Patton was claming to be here and there within hours. Hewitt replied back, that Patton was back on board the ship.


Caen, well ive posted on here before about that and you will never understand what went on until you read some real books and not those fairy tale ones

As for Falaise, Monty gets the blame but why? Montgomery had no say in what happened, he wanted to use a long hook but Bradley and Ike didnt so Monty left them to it. Quoting from Bradley's memoirs
'Patton, in his diary, blamed Montgomery...But, in fact, Montgomery had no part in the decision, it was mine and mine alone'. So Bradley stopped Patton at Falaise not Monty and if you read the facts he was quite right to. Richard Rohmers Pattons gap is a nonsense, D'Este writes

''..(to suggest that Montgomery) needlessly sacrificed lives or deliberately allowed his enemy to escape in order to enhance his own self-glorification is a preposterous claim and Rohmer fails to offer a single shred of evidence to substantiate his absurd conclusion. Rohmer also misjudges the results of the battle by alleging the numbers to have escaped to be 200,000 - 250,000 ''with them went enormous numbers of tanks, vehicles and huge volumes of war material''. If so, it certainly would have been news to the Germans'. ( D'Este, pp454-455 ).

How many men did he loose in taking Brest? 10,000. His tactics were very poor, battering ram style, maybe he should have used a Trojan horse like what he probably read about in all those books. He boasted (sorry like many other allied generals were good at) that he would be in Brest in a few days. He tried on the 5th, 7th, 8th, 11th and 12th August to crack it but failed. Patton, now rather annoyed, and getting bored because he was not getting any headlines decided he had had enough and left it to Middleton.

The Ardennes, instead of bypassing strong points, he attacked them head on, with 130,000 at his disposal against Col Heilmann's 10,000 not exactly elite para troops, who had no artillery support unlike Patton. Why not bypass and let the reserves mop up? But no he hit them head on and hardly made an impact for days.

Patton? yea right he was too busy with his cousin

Andy

 

(angie999 @ Jan 29 2006, 05:20 AM) [post=44997]Jimbo, such language is rather unacceptable, so I suggest that you clan up your act and conduct yourself a bit more like a serious student of history.
[/b]
The word "stinking" is dirty and unacceptable? I know there are many idioms between us but stinking in English is very docile and is synonymous with darn. But if I crossed some cultural nexus with that adjective please accept my apology to anyone offended by such a “naughty” word. Was it really the word or the subject you found so offensive?

(angie999 @ Jan 29 2006, 05:20 AM) [post=44997]Why not read the book, which is Neillands, Robert: The Battle for the Rhine 1944 - Arnhem and the Ardennes: the Campaign in Europe, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005. Until you do, you are really not in a position to comment on his research based work. [/b]
Just from the excerpt of the book tells me that his opinion contradicts the official accounts of US supply by the generals that received it, do I really need a whole book of it? But, if there is some problem with me not seeing that Neillands has some point, that is going to refute the issue here that the Allies would still have been in France in December 1944 even if the MG had not occurred and the failure to open the crucial objective of Antwerp to amplify supply had not occurred, then I find it unconvincing that he even has a prayer of doing that especially from the excerpt. It seems to be a somewhat British thing, whether historians or posters here to deny that Monty’s antics had anything to do with the US being in France in Dec 1944 despite the fact they were on the border knocking on the door four months earlier. OTH I sense there seems to be a little resentment for Patton merely because his very presence near the border a little over a week away tends to epitomize this unfortunate disaster in the halting of the destruction of the German army on the verge of collapse. That hardly makes me think I would find the rest of the book disputing supply, convincing and revealing and a good use of my reading time.

(angie999 @ Jan 29 2006, 05:20 AM) [post=44997]I know that you have an utter contempt for historians - which makes me wonder how you manage to maintain an interst in the subject - but give it a go. [/b]
On the contrary, your contempt for the non-historian makes me wonder how you manage to maintain an interest in the subject discussing it with non-historians. Seems like your only allowable source of consideration is historians. There are few historians here. Not fertile ground for learning according to your theories. I personally happen to be interested in what people think and why they think it. I don't think they people here are idiots and their opinion is not worth considering. It’s far more interesting to hear what the “rabble” think than the dry drone of many historians that have little color and speak in such definitive tones. It is fine to quote historians to explain why you take a position on a given issue but it is a little suspect when you chide people for disagreeing with historians who often disagree with each other. In the reverie of the historian utterances and the point that so many of them disagree with each other is usually swept under the carpet. “We mustn’t treat them as mere humans you know”…

(angie999 @ Jan 29 2006, 05:20 AM) [post=44997]Not just Neillands. Try a few and check what they say back to their original sources. Even you might learn something. [/b]
It is not the historians I have such contempt for but the false credence and man-worship that culminates from their fanatics quoting the words they speak as if we have just heard the oracles of God Almighty Himself. This, ironically, is actually contempt for the non-historians or the non-published. If they are not certified then they are stupid and their common sense or their own innate intellects are of no use to discover the truths behind the facts of historians contradicting themselves. When I read your posts here giving such contempt for the little fellow and such unqualified praise to these contradicting historians, I am left to believe I have walked in on some WWII history feudalism where I am but a serf. Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think I am “all that and a bag of chips”, but I am also not paralyzed with the sense of inferiority that you seem to think I should be by your contempt for my kind.

(angie999 @ Jan 29 2006, 05:20 AM) [post=44997]As for Patton, he did a pretty good job of swanning around those parts of France which the Germans had vacated. Classic cavalry tactics. [/b]
To the victor go the spoils and since you did mention the Germans had “vacated” those parts, then that says a lot of what they thought of his swanning. If you think there was something wrong with keeping the enemy moving so the fighters/bombers could see and destroy them all the way to Berlin, then you don’t need historians, you need an introductory book on cavalry or basic armor warfare. Since when was destroying your enemy on the run and consolidating the gains, considered a bad thing? Is that the best you can do? At least talk about the slapping incidents for though you would seem trite, whether relevant to the subject or not, at least you wouldn’t seem illogical.

If I speak of Monty’s follies, I always seem to get Patton thrown up in my face by contrast. Bradley was Monty’s American peer not Patton. At least get that right. As far as fighting goes, Patton and Monty were completely different. Patton appreciated the basic fact that a dislodged enemy in retreat was far more vulnerable and he exploited that by aggressive tactics. Monty, when dislodging an enemy and getting them in retreat would stop to reorganize and refit so that he could maximize his force for the next battle. But that allowed the enemy to do the same, dig in and surrendered the advantage you had when dislodging him in the first place. Face it, the two had different philosophies. Patton’s was attack, attack, attack, Monty’s was minimize your losses no matter the cost.

 

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]I think you will find Jimbo that Montgomery was quite hygenic and did not suffer with stinking hands. Patton's juggernaught? hmmm is that the one that steam rollered Metz? Patton bashed his men against Metz against second rate troops, and how many men did he loose in doing so? 50,000 men lost to take one town. He claimed that it would take him a week, ten later.........[/b]
It took 10 days when Patton was able to move to conquer the Metz THE SECOND TIME (thank you Monty) not four months as such specious arguments are desperately offered to try to find something to defect attention from Monty’s antics. There was one group left to the Metz to baby sit it since it had been reinforced with Germans and to give them a chance to surrender, as soon as the late November (get this) “French” rains, made the grounds a liquid mud. France was the worst place in Europe for an armor division to be in France and yet another reason that MG should not have been allowed. If you were there would know about the constant rain that prevented either side from moving.

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]I think you will find Jimbo that Montgomery was quite hygenic and did not suffer with stinking hands. Patton's juggernaught? hmmm is that the one that steam rollered Metz? Patton bashed his men against Metz against second rate Monty and his 8th army were going through El Hamma like a dose of salts, had Patton with his US 11 Corps been anything of a leader he would have cut off the 15th and 21st Panzer Divs on his way to seal the gap at Gabes ( similar to Valmontone in Italy and Mark Clark !)But NO - he was mauled by the much understrength 10 Panzers who had taken a licking at Medenine! If he had done what had been ordered the Germans would have been cut off, but then when did Patton ever do what he was ordered. [/b]
How did we get to Africa from the Metz? Man are you ever confused.

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]Sicilly for example where Patton usually gets all the plaudits.
After landing Patton had little opposistion until a place called Gela where the Germans launched a counter attack and Pattons men were back on the beaches, what saved the day were the warships Savannah and Shubrick, firing into the Germans from warship standards, point blank range. The blame for this ? well as usual it was'nt Patton's fault it was the rough seas and not being able to land enough men and suppiles, funny thing when the British complained of this in Normandy it was laughed at. [/b]
I think it was Monty who forced Patton to land at the Gulf of Gela. Patton wanted to land at Palermo and Monty threw a fit as he always did, was he relieved? No you can’t relieve a British general no matter how unprofessional they act.

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]Caen, well ive posted on here before about that and you will never understand what went on until you read some real books and not those fairy tale ones [/b]
Well, it was Monty who set his D-Day objective to be Caen. It was Monty that boasted he could get it. It was Monty who failed to capture it. It was Monty who was in fear of a German counterattack that held up on the beaches even though the clear road to Caen had little resistance on D-Day. All Patton did was win $75 on a bet he made before the invasion that Monty wouldn’t get Caen by D-Day+30.

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]As for Falaise, Monty gets the blame but why? Montgomery had no say in what happened, he wanted to use a long hook but Bradley and Ike didnt so Monty left them to it. Quoting from Bradley's memoirs
'Patton, in his diary, blamed Montgomery...But, in fact, Montgomery had no part in the decision, it was mine and mine alone'. So Bradley stopped Patton at Falaise not Monty and if you read the facts he was quite right to. Richard Rohmers Pattons gap is a nonsense, D'Este writes
[/b]
You need to read that clearly ham. All you quoted was said was that Bradley ordered the halt not Monty so Patton was wrong. But, it was Monty that chose the Argentan line as the separation point of the two armies. Bradley had agreed to halt his troops at this point to keep from getting and giving friendly artillery and bombs dropped in this region that belonged to Monty. Again Monty boasted that he could close the gap but never did why Patton and Bradley wanted his liver on a stick for being so apathetic. Later Monty “claimed fault” in the matter by saying it was his mistake to think that the Canadians could close that gap. Quite a guy that Monty.

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]''..(to suggest that Montgomery) needlessly sacrificed lives or deliberately allowed his enemy to escape in order to enhance his own self-glorification is a preposterous claim and Rohmer fails to offer a single shred of evidence to substantiate his absurd conclusion. Rohmer also misjudges the results of the battle by alleging the numbers to have escaped to be 200,000 - 250,000 ''with them went enormous numbers of tanks, vehicles and huge volumes of war material''. If so, it certainly would have been news to the Germans'. ( D'Este, pp454-455 ).[/b]
No, no, no, no, no, ham, historians are NEVER wrong. How dare you question them and their lifes research! How many book have you written? You should be ashamed of yourself! (How’s that Angie? Sufficient homage?)

(ham and jam @ Jan 29 2006, 06:26 AM) [post=45001]The Ardennes, instead of bypassing strong points, he attacked them head on, with 130,000 at his disposal against Col Heilmann's 10,000 not exactly elite para troops, who had no artillery support unlike Patton. Why not bypass and let the reserves mop up? But no he hit them head on and hardly made an impact for days.

Patton? yea right he was too busy with his cousin[/b]
You think Patton’s performance in the Ardennes is contemptible and put a childish remark on it like that? You are showing your true colors ham.

 

Just from the excerpt of the book tells me that his opinion contradicts the official accounts of US supply by the generals that received it, do I really need a whole book of it? But, if there is some problem with me not seeing that Neillands has some point, that is going to refute the issue here that the Allies would still have been in France in December 1944 even if the MG had not occurred and the failure to open the crucial objective of Antwerp to amplify supply had not occurred, then I find it unconvincing that he even has a prayer of doing that especially from the excerpt. It seems to be a somewhat British thing, whether historians or posters here to deny that Monty’s antics had anything to do with the US being in France in Dec 1944 despite the fact they were on the border knocking on the door four months earlier. OTH I sense there seems to be a little resentment for Patton merely because his very presence near the border a little over a week away tends to epitomize this unfortunate disaster in the halting of the destruction of the German army on the verge of collapse. That hardly makes me think I would find the rest of the book disputing supply, convincing and revealing and a good use of my reading time.

So says the smart guy who obviously doesnt know anything about the German OOB in NorthWestern Europe from D-Day onward.

On the contrary, your contempt for the non-historian makes me wonder how you manage to maintain an interest in the subject discussing it with non-historians. Seems like your only allowable source of consideration is historians. There are few historians here. Not fertile ground for learning according to your theories. I personally happen to be interested in what people think and why they think it. I don't think they people here are idiots and their opinion is not worth considering. It’s far more interesting to hear what the “rabble” think than the dry drone of many historians that have little color and speak in such definitive tones. It is fine to quote historians to explain why you take a position on a given issue but it is a little suspect when you chide people for disagreeing with historians who often disagree with each other. In the reverie of the historian utterances and the point that so many of them disagree with each other is usually swept under the carpet. “We mustn’t treat them as mere humans you know”…

Yeah sure, its far more interesting and enlightning to hear that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued at the end of the US Civil war lol. Or that Von Rundstedt was himself leading the assault on Bastogne.

It is not the historians I have such contempt for but the false credence and man-worship that culminates from their fanatics quoting the words they speak as if we have just heard the oracles of God Almighty Himself. This, ironically, is actually contempt for the non-historians or the non-published. If they are not certified then they are stupid and their common sense or their own innate intellects are of no use to discover the truths behind the facts of historians contradicting themselves. When I read your posts here giving such contempt for the little fellow and such unqualified praise to these contradicting historians, I am left to believe I have walked in on some WWII history feudalism where I am but a serf. Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think I am “all that and a bag of chips”, but I am also not paralyzed with the sense of inferiority that you seem to think I should be by your contempt for my kind.

Please dont give up ! Always good to have some good laugh down here.

 

(Herr Oberst @ Jan 29 2006, 09:48 PM) [post=]</div><div class='quotemain'>Please dont give up ! [/b]


Exxley Interesting statement coming from a Frenchman
[/b]
If there is something interesting historically speaking in the above sentence, please feel free to enlighten us with. I suspect it's just the usual kind of nationalistic ranting from people who has nothing better to say.

 

(Herr Oberst @ Jan 29 2006, 08:48 PM) [post=]</div><div class='quotemain'>Please dont give up ! [/b]


<span style="color:#009900">Quote deleted, as it is taken from a post deleted for content. Angie</span>[/b]Oberst, if you were being funny, well its not really, if you are making a backhanded lash at the French Nation then I suggest you refrain from that. Every Nation has its skeletons and the US is no different. This board is not for that sort of ridicule, I would think

 

Some of you are a bit too serious. This is supposed to be fun. Part of the reason why I enjoy forums is for the freedom to express opinions. I hope I make a few people laugh and sometimes think. Instead of saying touche...I mean seriously, how could I not say that...Exxley practically screamed: I'm the straight man. So I delivered the punch line. Come on folks a little back and forth is healthy.


<span style="color:#009900">Your original post was deleted becaus eit was in breach of board guidelines. Angie</span>

 

(Herr Oberst @ Jan 30 2006, 03:50 AM) [post=45033]Some of you are a bit too serious. This is supposed to be fun. Part of the reason why I enjoy forums is for the freedom to express opinions. I hope I make a few people laugh and sometimes think. Instead of saying touche...I mean seriously, how could I not say that...Exxley practically screamed: I'm the straight man. So I delivered the punch line. Come on folks a little back and forth is healthy.
[/b]

So, tell us then what is supposed to be funny in that sentence ?

 

(jimbotosome @ Jan 29 2006, 06:59 PM) [post=45016]To the victor go the spoils and since you did mention the Germans had “vacated” those parts, then that says a lot of what they thought of his swanning. [/b]

OK, let me correct that. They were never present in fighting strength in the parts of France "liberated" by 3rd Army prior to Metz.

After the Normandy breakout, 15th Army and the remnants of 7th Army moved north to join the newly forming 1st Airborne Army in southern Holland and the Breskens pocket.

By the time 3rd Army reached Metz, new formations were arriving from Germany.


(jimbotosome @ Jan 29 2006, 07:35 PM) [post=45019] No, no, no, no, no, ham, historians are NEVER wrong. How dare you question them and their lifes research! How many book have you written? You should be ashamed of yourself! (How’s that Angie? Sufficient homage?)
[/b]

You probably need to watch your blood pressure.

Homage? You do write nonsense.

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>No, sapper, sorry but most Panzers were not destroyed by Allied armor despite your claim of keeping them off balanced. At Caen, they didn't seem very off balance to me. It was artillery and American and British air that took out the armor and prevented your “lot” from seeing much the vast majority of German assaults and of the German artillery which was only allowed to fire on the Allies during bad weather days for fear of being spotted by air patrols. This is why when you came upon burned out tanks and armor with their frames twisted in two and some flipped upside down, or ripped open like a sardine can. A 75/75mm cannon of a Sherman just does not have the ballistics to do that to such heavy pieces of iron. We have more than established over and over that a Sherman was dog-meat to a Tiger or Panther. It was great at killing unprotected light armor and soldiers but it was no match for a tank to tank battle with virtually anything the Germans had. We have already discussed how sometimes a well placed Panther could sit there and grind down 30 or so Shermans and Cromwells like they were tin cans. The Germans would use Panther turrets like pillboxes and they would put a hurting on Allied Armor. So, spare me the armor bravado, the story is a little over-cooked and tired.[/b]

It's interesting to see this sort of opinion still being widely quoted. Most German tanks in Normandy were not destroyed by Allied aircraft; it was by ground fire from anti-tank artillery or other tanks. Even contemporary accounts show that aircraft had a poor ability to knock out tanks. The majority of British tanks were certainly not knocked out by Panthers or Tigers, or even MkIVs. Again, it was anti-tank artillery and "bazookas" (the actual contemporary phrase for Panzer Fausts or Shreks). Perhaps you are not aware that in 1944/45 the British carried out large numbers of operational studies and one of them was to look at tank losses in Normandy. They even computed how many hits it took to have a complete KO - and in most cases it was more than one, even with a Sherman. This meant in most cases the crew got out and the tank was immobilised. The crew then went to get a fresh tank from the rear echelon; this was a luxury the Germans didn't have. When a Panther, or even a MkIV got immobilised and was abandoned, it was a tank the Germans could not replace.

It is also worth remembering that only selected German units in Normandy had anything better than a MkIV; when you look at the weapons available to 21st Pnzr Div then you see the true state of German armoured forces in 1944; and even in Tiger equipped battalions they were well below strength.

Panther turreted pillboxes, as you describe them, were part of the Liri Valley and Gothic Line defences in Italy, and were not used in NW Europe to my knowledge; unless you have an example of a photo of one? In Italy they proved vulnerable to artillery fire; a good AGRA could wipe them out with one salvo from a Medium Regiment RA.

If you are based in the US try and get via your library a copy of Terry Copp's 'Fields of Fire' which is new look at the Normandy campaign from the point of view of the Canadians (it's published in Canada). While you might not agree with it, hopefully it might open your eyes to wider sources than just General's memoirs, or historians who never use contemporary source material.

 

Fear of a counter attack? did you not know there was a counter attack by 21st Panzer div? Which was stopped in its tracks, of course you didnt. 3rd div had the only armoured attack on them on D-day.

Facts and figures Jimbo, you cant argue with

Estimated German forces on British 2nd army front

June 15th - Panzer divs, 4. Tanks 520. Infantry batt, 43.
25 June - Panzer divs, 5. Tanks 530. inf batt, 49
30th June - PD, 7:5. Tanks 725. Inf batt, 64
5th July - PD, 7:5. tanks 69. Inf batt, 64
10th July - PD, 6. Tanks 610. Inf batt, 65
15th July - PD, 6. Tanks 630. Inf batt, 68
20th July - PD, 5. Tanks 560. Inf batt, 92
25th July - PD, 6. Tanks 645. Inf batt, 92


Estimated Forces on the US army front

15th June - Panzer divs 0, Tanks 70.inf batt, 63
25th June - PD, 1. Tanks 190. Inf batt, 87
30th June - PD, 0:5. Tanks 140. Inf batt, 63
5th July - PD, 0:5. Tanks 215. Inf batt, 63
10th July - PD, 2. Tanks 190. Inf batt, 72
15th July - PD, 2. Tanks 190. Inf batt, 78
20th july - PD, 3. Tanks, 190, infa batt, 82
25th July - PD, 2. tanks 190, inf batt 85

Yet we get called cautious and slow lol oh yea I forget, you had bocage to contend with, funnily enough so did we.


Norman Scarfe Assualt Division- The divs official historian
APPEDIX C page 274

This is aimed at critics of the divs performance in the battle for Caen.

"Justice and truth seem not to have been near the forefront of David Belchem's mind in 1980 when his book "victory in Normandy" appeared. While the late Eric Lummis was at work on an account of the 1st Suffolk's undaunted D-day assualt on Hillman, I was able to show him the correspondance I had had with Carlo D'Este when he was writing " Decision in Normandy, the first serious description of the whole Normandy campaign which revealed a true understanding of the 3rd div's actions on that day. We agreed that none of the neighbouring assualt divisions was confronted by a headquarters bunker so formidably strong and well sited as Hillman, which the Suffolks had overcome by the end of that day. Nor did the other assualt divs meet a panzer attack as threatening as 21st Panzer divs, which Bill Eadies Staffirdshire yeomanry and the other 3 div support units so decisively drove off. Then, when we examined the speed of advance on the 3rd Canadian div and 50 div fronts, we found their performance closely comparable with ours.

So Lord Lovat's sneer at 8 brigades achievement in his complacent account of his own ( with its revealing title, March past 1978,p311) was ill informed and ill judged. The official verdict ( Victory in the west1962 p213) was properly appreciative of the two British and one Canadian seabourne assaults on that stormy sea shore, to have swept away all but a few isolated fragments of Hitler’s Atlantic wall and to have fought their way an average depth of four to six miles on most of a twenty four miles front was surely a notable feat of arms.

Michael Howard has persuasively suggested that 3 div's D-day plan to capture Caen, nine miles inland and with vital river crossings, was in the nature of things
"aspirational". This was demonstrated about an hour after midday when 9 brigade, our reserve brigade, lost its commander, intelligence officer and other staff, soon after coming ashore, all seriously injured, and one killed, by one mortar bomb. At once, the corps commander, Lt Gen Crocker, changed 9 brigades plan, and with it the whole divisions. Instead of heading boldly for Carpiquet airfield alongside 3 Can div, 9 brigade was switched to shield our left flank along the Orne and Caen canal. That was the end of any hope of taking Caen on D-day. It had nothing to do with slow advances that afternoon alleged by Wilmot, Belchem, et al.

Ill informed journalists followed Wilmot’s lead and hinted at our infantry’s slowness on D-day, and at their brigadiers and their commanders lack of driving power, for not being in Caen that night. If this book has done nothing else, it will I hope have nailed that journalism as unpardonable calumny."

Source: L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West: Volume I: The Battle of Normandy (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1962), pages 183 to 213.

"It is impossible to say when the first beach exits were open. People were too busy to keep looking at their watches and some exits, opened fairly quickly, were later blocked by knocked-out vehicles or traffic jams. It had been foreseen that the rate of landing would be governed by the availability of exits and it had been planned to open twenty-eight in the first hour [on the British and Canada beaches]. The 3rd Division and the 50th [on Gold beach] appear to have had their first exits opened not much later but not nearly all that were needed; two hours or more elapsed before the first was opened on the Canadian beaches. The delay in each case had slowed the landings of the reserve brigades and this inevitability had far-reaching effects on the day's progress...."

The 185th Brigade Group had landed nearly up to time and the infantry were assembled in woods half a mile inland by about eleven o'clock. The brigade was to be the spearhead of the division's attack inland; it was to advance with all speed and if possible capture Caen and the ground immediately south of it that day. The advance was to be led by a mobile column of the 2nd King's Shropshire Light Infantry, riding on tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry and supported by the 7th Field Regiment, R.A.; but at noon the infantry's heavy weapons and vehicles were still not clear of the congestion on the shore and the tanks that had succeeded in getting through were being held up by a minefield."

Yes Monty said he would take Caen on D-day, he didnt, so what? Patton said he would drive the British into the sea for another Dunkirk, he didnt, so what? The campaign still ended ahead of schedule that had been agreed with SHAEF and IKE before the invasion took place.

Oh and just to show that the taking of Caen might have been said by Montgomery that everyone bleats on about like sheep. There were plans made if it was not.

This is from the I Corps Operation Order No.1 this dates from April/May 1944

"20. 3 British Division

a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place.

b ) The enemy may develop his counter-attack--

i) Through CAEN
ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN.
iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal
iv) Any combination of the above

In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he suceeds in forestalling us there.

c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established.

i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings.
ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division.

Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business."


I could go on showing you why Caen was not taken on D-day, and how Monty and 2nd army were far from being slow or cautious, how can you be when your taking on all the armour the Germans can throw at you.

 

(Paul Reed @ Jan 30 2006, 05:42 AM) [post=45049]It's interesting to see this sort of opinion still being widely quoted. Most German tanks in Normandy were not destroyed by Allied aircraft; it was by ground fire from anti-tank artillery or other tanks. Even contemporary accounts show that aircraft had a poor ability to knock out tanks. [/b]
The context was Patton's breakout. I can't speak for British ground commanders because I haven't read much by them. There is simply not much available here in the states. But thinking that aircraft had trouble knocking out armor is a startling thing to say. It had trouble finding the armor but never destroying it. I never knew how pervasive this ignorance TAC vs armor went. Thank you great historians!

But your take on anti-tank warfare is not consistent with that of Patton's and Weyland's accounts. XIX TAC was called "Patton's Air Force" for a reason. He is the only Allied general I have seen that has come clean as to the roll of TAC air (Bradley does a little but doesn't put on the dog about it). Rommel told on them, first by telling what destroyed his armies, and as you would expect, he knew better than anyone. He was under no delusions. In Liddel-Hart’s “The Rommel Papers” he made it clear to his son Manfred. Rommel told his boy that once the Allies landed in Normandy which they were sure to do, that the war would be over. Why? He elaborates, that after Germany is defeated there will be a great war between the US and Russia which he said may be right away or may be after a short while. He told him that the US would destroy Russia. When Manfred debated his father saying that “Russia had much better tanks than the Americans” the responded with “Son, we have much better tanks than the Americans”. He explained it was the US’s emphasis on Air power that would decimate the Russian Armies.

If you have this book you can look up this discussion near the back in the section completed by Manfred. Unlike many Allied tank-o-files Rommel was a realist. He knew that it was not armor that ruled the battlefield. It was flying artillery which had more devastating power than the ground artillery and basically unlimited range.

If you know me on this forum and follow my assertions you will know that this is my major bone of contention. The misunderstanding of the role that air supremacy in all phases of warfare played is a tragedy and a disservice to truth. I have offered my theories on where this “gross ignorance” comes from. My strongest belief on it is that it comes from fear of irrelevance of the ground troops, that they might feel slighted if their advantages came from the air, and with the help of historians that primarily interviewed only them, the circle of ignorance is complete.

You mentioned anti-tank guns. Anti-tank guns are primarily a defensive weapon. At least with Patton, he was rarely attacked on a static position. In reading a book on the analysis of US armor doctrine in WWII, it was clear about two things, first, our tanks sucked, and that sucking was “major” not “minor”, and secondly our towed anti-tank guns were fairly useless. It said the only appreciable benefit they saw from anti-tank weapons were the M7 Priests which came along in useful numbers near the start of 1945. Monty’s gang often stayed dug in and was therefore attacked quite a bit so I don’t doubt they had good success with the towed anti-tank guns. In that role they excel. But you simply don’t roll an anti-tank gun into position to target enemy tanks without the tanks objecting to it and this was the common complaint.

They simply could not be deployed in a mobile battle which Patton preferred. Plus with the British forces on a fairly static front the German’s were “dug in” which may have very well helped protect them from the Mossies, Typhoons and Tempests, much more than it should have. With Patton he kept the enemy tanks driving up roads to fall back and this made them vulnerable to TAC air ala the Basra “highway of death” that we see in the photos where equipment is lined in both ditches along a long stretch of road which looks like an assembly line of bent metal and burned out German armor. If you want to see air devastation go look at the photos of the Falaise gap before the Germans wisely surrendered. Patton noted several times how amazed he was that the pilots could pick out and hit a moving vehicle. He instituted a program where a pilot was included in tanks on the battlefield to properly coordinate air strikes called in. If the Battle of the Bulge and its reliance on bad weather to keep from being destroyed before it even started doesn’t make this point on the importance TAC played, then tell me, what possible could? The biggest complaints of the German generals in their fights with the Americans was that they could only travel at night or for no more than an hour in the day, and that they could never assemble for a coordinated attack because of the “Jabos”.

It was so pronounced the role that TAC air played that Patton ordered his press corps to no longer speak of Third Army victories without mention of XIX TAC air.

How did this ignorance propagate? Well, my theory on that is that the typical non-analytical approach of many military historians has led them to discuss war with people other than the air forces, who are often so busy trying to paint their opinion as fact that they forget to lay out logic to reach any interesting or revealing conclusions. The romance of a thundering tank and seeing it shoot up soldiers is too much for most to accept that tanks are more vulnerable to TAC air than the soldiers are to the tanks. That’s just something most people are not emotionally ready for.


But, even though I don't know the accounts of the British and their use of TAC (though I have searched for books on it, they are hard to find), the British certainly depended on it. The single most graphic example was the story of Panzer Lehr on D-Day. Panzer Lehr was not sent to attack the beaches, it was sent to destroy the initial invasion and mop up the beaches, something it should have been able to do with relative ease. The fantastic historians let on to believe that they were lax in leaving to attack but they were sent when the invasion was detected. They were 12 hours away as the tank goes. Because it didn’t happen does not mean it wouldn’t have but this group would have been shooting fish in a barrel. Men with no where to dig in on the beaches and armor no where to hide would have been completely in short order and it would have been back to the drawing board for the Allies. But, enter USAAF IX TAC. On June 7, they paid Panzer Lehr a visit. This 12 hour ride to the front turned into an 80 hour massacre from aircraft (Jugs) alone. By the time they finally reached the Allies they were at 50% of their original strength on June 7 without Allied pilots along the way. It was so bad that the Vire-Beny Bocage road the division members referred to it as a “Jabo Rennstrecke” or “fighter/bomber race course”.

Here is a quote from Max Hastings on 2d SS Panzer Division Das Reich:

. . . questing fighter bombers fell on them ceaselessly. The convoys of the Das Reich were compelled to abandon daylight movement after Saumur and Tours and crawl northwards through the blackout .... [During a change of command] an Allied fighter bomber section smashed into the column, firing rockets and cannon. Within minutes . . . sixteen trucks and half-tracks were in flames .... Again and again, as they inched forward through the closely set Norman countryside, the tankmen were compelled to leap from their vehicles and seek cover beneath the hulls as fighter bombers attacked. Their only respite came at night.

Again, it reiterate, what a disservice done to this history. Why is TAC not the “front page news” on the WWII story? Its always "Oh Monty this, oh Patton that, oh armor something else". Well "hell's bells and jube jells" anyone can do good with an unchallenged air force over them like that that. At least give the TAC boys their props.

 

Rommel's appreciation of airpower, based primarily on his experience in Africa, was based on what the allied medium bombers in particular could do to lines of communication and troops on the move. This applied equally to Normandy and after. See for instance, the trouble Panzer Lehr had on the road to the front in June 1944.

What was never well developed in Europe in WWII was close air support of front line troops. Marking and identification of friendly positions and location of enemy positions, plus ground/air communications, were simply not good enough to allow air support to effectively engage German forces in close contact with allied ground forces. Also, the summer weather of 1944 was particularly bad and visibility was often poor.

In a Market Garden context, these factors were given by the air commanders as reasons for denying air support to XXX Corps.

Regarding tank and anti-tank weapons, the main tank used by both the Americans and British was the M4 Sherman, which was never designed for tank on tank action, because according to US doctrine the job of taking on tanks belonged to the tank destroyers. Thus, in June 1944 only the British Sherman Firefly variant, armed with a 17 pr gun, could effectively engage German tanks at any range - as they did on 6 June against 21st Panzer.

The British (and Canadians) also had a towed version of the 17 pr. In A Soldier's Strory, Bradley commented that he wanted to get some 17 pounders for his army, but production could not keep up with British requirements, so there were none available.

In France in 1940 and in the desert, the Germans used anti-tank guns as the main weapon against tanks. In the desert, this cost the British dear, as tank on tank engagements usually led to the Germans withdrawing onto their own gun lines, which could engage out of range of British tanks.

Incidentally, according to one of Gerry Chester's posts on this board, the British 6 pr could be effectively used against a Tiger, although not the front armour.

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>It was flying artillery which had more devastating power than the ground artillery and basically unlimited range.[/b]

Some interesting points, but again I think you argue from a US model with little awareness of how British units operated in the field. Close air support, as Angie mentions, was not very effective because of the problem of target recognition / friendly recognition. It seems to have been more widely used in Italy; possibly because of more entrenched German positions there in places like the Gothic Line. Again as Angie mentions most air destruction of tanks and AFVs was from medium plus bomber aircraft, or rocket attacks on trains or lines of communications that were almost static and thus vulnerable. This was often away from the battlefield. It did not account for the majority of German tank combat losses in Normandy.

You are right in a sense that anti-tank artillery is defensive, but the Germans throughout the war used it agressively in an offensive role, and there is certainly evidence from British sources that we used battalion level 6-pdrs (which in 1944 were equipped with APDS rounds that could KO a Tiger) and divisional level 17-pounders in this way. We also had self-propelled 17 pounders on M18 Wolverines and Achielles, used by a number of units in Normandy.

That the British army in Normandy was/is often accused of being 'defensive' relates to the role it was asked to play, surely? It was asked to attack and capture ground. Having taken it, it had to beat off counter-attacks, which War Diaries clearly indicate was the costliest part of the infantry battalion's battle; especially if re-supply was interrupted. In carrying out this role it would of course be 'defensive' and this is where this artillery and more importanly AGRA support would be used. Artillery and mortar fire killed most Germans in Normandy; and heavy (and super-heavy) artillery fire accounted for an unknown number of tanks and AFVs. In fact, one of the occasions in which we do know of armour destruction by an AGRA was at Arnhem when 30 Corps artillery firing from Nijmegen supported the flanks of the Cauldron.

Personally I don't believe that a study of any conflict can be made in just following the memoirs of army commanders; they are part of the picture, but as with any source they have bias, perhaps more so given their need to justify what they had done.

I wouldn't claim to hold all the answers, but yours is a common perception of the British army and it's role and performance in NW Euope. Working my way through the contemporary material there seems to be a different picture emerging; the army was changing and re-acting all the time in a way that books I have read on the campaign do not explain or even mention.

And indeed Rommel may have said:

</div><div class='quotemain'>“Son, we have much better tanks than the Americans”[/b]

But even he would have liked to have numbers on the scale of the Allies, and more importantly the ability to replace them when lost.

 

(jimbotosome @ Jan 30 2006, 04:29 PM) [post=45062](Paul Reed @ Jan 30 2006, 05:42 AM) [post=45049]It's interesting to see this sort of opinion still being widely quoted. Most German tanks in Normandy were not destroyed by Allied aircraft; it was by ground fire from anti-tank artillery or other tanks. Even contemporary accounts show that aircraft had a poor ability to knock out tanks. [/b]


But, even though I don't know the accounts of the British and their use of TAC (though I have searched for books on it, they are hard to find), the British certainly depended on it. The single most graphic example was the story of Panzer Lehr on D-Day. Panzer Lehr was not sent to attack the beaches, it was sent to destroy the initial invasion and mop up the beaches, something it should have been able to do with relative ease. The fantastic historians let on to believe that they were lax in leaving to attack but they were sent when the invasion was detected. They were 12 hours away as the tank goes. Because it didn’t happen does not mean it wouldn’t have but this group would have been shooting fish in a barrel. Men with no where to dig in on the beaches and armor no where to hide would have been completely in short order and it would have been back to the drawing board for the Allies. But, enter USAAF IX TAC. On June 7, they paid Panzer Lehr a visit. This 12 hour ride to the front turned into an 80 hour massacre from aircraft (Jugs) alone. By the time they finally reached the Allies they were at 50% of their original strength on June 7 without Allied pilots along the way. It was so bad that the Vire-Beny Bocage road the division members referred to it as a “Jabo Rennstrecke” or “fighter/bomber race course”.
[/b]
Really ? 50 % losses suffered by the Pz-Lehr between in less than 2 days. Lol. Nevermind the fact that the overall tank losses for the division in June were:

24 Pz IV, 23 Pz V, 1 JgPz IV, 2 StuG III.

Since the Pz-Lehr had 99 Pz IV, 89 Pz V, 31 JgPz IV, 10 StuG III on June 1, this hardly looks like a 50 % losses.

 

(angie999 @ Jan 30 2006, 11:22 AM) [post=45064]Rommel's appreciation of airpower, based primarily on his experience in Africa, was based on what the allied medium bombers in particular could do to lines of communication and troops on the move. This applied equally to Normandy and after. See for instance, the trouble Panzer Lehr had on the road to the front in June 1944.

What was never well developed in Europe in WWII was close air support of front line troops. Marking and identification of friendly positions and location of enemy positions, plus ground/air communications, were simply not good enough to allow air support to effectively engage German forces in close contact with allied ground forces. Also, the summer weather of 1944 was particularly bad and visibility was often poor.

In a Market Garden context, these factors were given by the air commanders as reasons for denying air support to XXX Corps.

Regarding tank and anti-tank weapons, the main tank used by both the Americans and British was the M4 Sherman, which was never designed for tank on tank action, because according to US doctrine the job of taking on tanks belonged to the tank destroyers. Thus, in June 1944 only the British Sherman Firefly variant, armed with a 17 pr gun, could effectively engage German tanks at any range - as they did on 6 June against 21st Panzer.

The British (and Canadians) also had a towed version of the 17 pr. In A Soldier's Strory, Bradley commented that he wanted to get some 17 pounders for his army, but production could not keep up with British requirements, so there were none available.

In France in 1940 and in the desert, the Germans used anti-tank guns as the main weapon against tanks. In the desert, this cost the British dear, as tank on tank engagements usually led to the Germans withdrawing onto their own gun lines, which could engage out of range of British tanks.

Incidentally, according to one of Gerry Chester's posts on this board, the British 6 pr could be effectively used against a Tiger, although not the front armour.
[/b]
Hold the phone Ang. I think you are referring to the use of heavies. That is not what is typically meant by TAC air. BTW: I don’t think even in the disasters of the friendly fire incidents that using the heavies was unwarranted. It was simply that Ike could not stomach losses even losses of fewer men coming from the heavies. If the heavies had not pounded COBRA far more than 300 additional men would have been lost. But, I won’t fault Ike for not having the nerve to make that call even though it was the wrong one in my opinion. The heavies in COBRA creamed the Germans. They were a shambles after it. Imagine if they had gotten it every week. They would have surrendered in droves.

But TAC air, as I use it, is Jugs, Mustangs, Typhoons, Tempests and Mosquitoes diving in on tank or artillery positions and dropping an egg right on top of them as well as strafing men, vehicles and light armor until it dies or catches on fire. I have several TAC air books analysis of Quesada and Weyland (IX and XIX TAC commanders respectively) in great detail. One of the few scenes in the movie Patton that was technically correct was the after morning he had the Chaplin write a weather prayer for him and it was clear weather the next morning. The scene opens with clear skies and the roar of squadrons of XIX TAC Jugs flying over the assembling forces going ahead of the armies to find the Germans who had gotten through on the bad weather for their offensive and to make sure Patton never faced them. That tells the whole story there in that one scene. As far as I am concerned, you could stop the movie right there and it would have been complete. It is profound scene and just looks to the untrained eye like a trivial aspect of the movie. One must read a IX or XIX TAC air book before they first talk about the application of tanks in the US armies. It may be that the British didn't get their TAC air going but I know that Churchill has a quote to the effect that "air supremacy unchallenged is a fearsome weapon" or something to that effect. I assume he was not just talking about US TAC air as the Mossies and Typhoons were just as deadly when unchallenged as the Allied air was for mid 1944-45.

I will agree with your statement that the lack of TAC support greatly hurt Market Garden and you can lay a lot of that blame on the lack of radio communications. I, of all people, am the last person to trivialize that. My beef against the Market Garden is not the tactical failures of it. I have stated that several times. My beef with it is it was the wrong idea and the worst time to have it. If everything was a static front and stalemated then something like MG would be a far more reasonable plan. In desperate times it might have been an alternative to consider. But despite your person feelings on the reasons Patton was on the move, it was a fact that he was indeed on the move and banging hard on the door of Germany so the Holland route was completely unnecessary. Monty would have served the cause much greater if he had just focused on getting Antwerp open. That would have saved the hour more than Patton plowing into Germany.

I have been asked more than once why I thought so much of Patton. First of all he was a very soulful man. Very introspective. I don’t say he was openly humble but his dialog with himself reveals something more than the brash general persona he put on when commanding. He was brilliant militarily as he knew all the known intricacies of placing and ordering equipment on the battlefield, how to exploit the lay of the land, etc. It was because he had obsessed on warfare since a child and was possessed by it. In that sense he had not equal. But the thing I appreciated the most about his fighting style in WWII is that he naturally being aggressive “flushed” out the Germans into the open to where better equipment could decimate them. He understood early on what the dominance of air power was and how to use it. He learned that from the Germans in North Africa and polished it in Sicily. I also agree with his philosophy that you lose far less by attacking the enemy on the run than by allowing him to dig and having to dig him out all over again. It is very hard for me to see qualities in a field general than Patton. Keep him away from the news media and you have quite a weapon. In my opinion, Patton discovered the dominance of air power and that was what allowed him to be so aggressive with wimpy armor. I am sorry the guy wasn’t British so you would realize it is not a nationality thing.

The issues of the anti-tank guns I read the US Army retrospective. They claimed they sucked. I think you are being a little mislead by the idea of the anti-tank gun in 1944 versus was needed in 1940. A much larger caliber was needed along with a larger profile to take out armor. The 105s which were the cannons of choice by the US were simply too big to pull into position without getting the truck and weapon destroyed before the driver could get out to unhitch it. In the Ardennes, the analysis book claims that the kill ratio of German tanks to US anti-tank guns was 3:1.

The Germans on the western front were very clear about what terrified them. It was not anti-tank guns or armor, it was Jabos. I have posted many quotes by the big dog leaders pleading for air defense on the condition that they cannot survive without it. TAC should NEVER have been back page news in WWII, but it is.

The Firefly was no better than the Sherman Jumbo. It too had a 76mm long barrel cannon. They were much better against medium German armor but they still were not a true match. But the US abandoned them because they primarily used HE rounds on men and equipment and the 76mm could not fire it. The numbers on these tanks were very small in WWII throughout most of 1944. Of course there was little German armor to speak of after the Battle of the Bulge. Of the Sherman's the M36 tank destroyer variant with its 90mm was the only real match for all German armor at any angle. The US used tanks to support infantry. That was the only successful part of their tank doctrine. But then again, why send a Sherman up against an enemy tank when there are 100s of Thunderbolts patrolling the skies looking for targets of opportunity? Always play your strengths against your enemies weaknesses. Let them complain that their burning tanks were much better than the ones heading to the scene to kill the men that no longer have armor protection.

Now, that’s what I call a tank doctrine.

 

(Paul Reed @ Jan 30 2006, 12:09 PM) [post=45068]And indeed Rommel may have said:

</div><div class='quotemain'>“Son, we have much better tanks than the Americans”[/b]

But even he would have liked to have numbers on the scale of the Allies, and more importantly the ability to replace them when lost.
[/b] Paul, the thing you are overlooking is that if it were not for air "supremacy" Rommel would have had more armor than the Allies, not less. It is simple matter of approximating the number of rounds your tanks are shooting and subtracting that number from the Allied tank inventory. They were called "Tommy Cookers" and "Ronson Lighters" for a reason. God bless the men with the guts to sit in them. Must have been a very queer feeling.

 

(jimbotosome @ Jan 31 2006, 01:20 AM) [post=45094](Paul Reed @ Jan 30 2006, 12:09 PM) [post=45068]And indeed Rommel may have said:

</div><div class='quotemain'>“Son, we have much better tanks than the Americans”[/b]

But even he would have liked to have numbers on the scale of the Allies, and more importantly the ability to replace them when lost.
[/b] Paul, the thing you are overlooking is that if it were not for air "supremacy" Rommel would have had more armor than the Allies, not less. It is simple matter of approximating the number of rounds your tanks are shooting and subtracting that number from the Allied tank inventory. They were called "Tommy Cookers" and "Ronson Lighters" for a reason. God bless the men with the guts to sit in them. Must have been a very queer feeling.
[/b]
And how exactly would Rommel have had more armor than the Allies ? How many German tanks were destroyed directly or indirectly by Allied aircrafts during the Normandy campaign ?

 

(Exxley @ Jan 30 2006, 10:11 PM) [post=45099](jimbotosome @ Jan 31 2006, 01:20 AM) [post=45094](Paul Reed @ Jan 30 2006, 12:09 PM) [post=45068]And indeed Rommel may have said:

</div><div class='quotemain'>“Son, we have much better tanks than the Americans”[/b]

But even he would have liked to have numbers on the scale of the Allies, and more importantly the ability to replace them when lost.
[/b] Paul, the thing you are overlooking is that if it were not for air "supremacy" Rommel would have had more armor than the Allies, not less. It is simple matter of approximating the number of rounds your tanks are shooting and subtracting that number from the Allied tank inventory. They were called "Tommy Cookers" and "Ronson Lighters" for a reason. God bless the men with the guts to sit in them. Must have been a very queer feeling.
[/b]
And how exactly would Rommel have had more armor than the Allies ? How many German tanks were destroyed directly or indirectly by Allied aircrafts during the Normandy campaign ?
[/b] Well, I don't know exactly how to extract reliable numbers. Some places I have seen the P-47 credited with 8000 tanks alone. But the numbers inversion would come not so much from what Rommel didn't have destroyed of his own but what his own would have destroyed of the Allies. Without the TAC air, our forces would not only have faced unchallenged superior tanks but also would have been introduced to German artillery which is something we fortunately saw very little of. From the outset of WWII, whoever won the sky won the war and ground forces (though needed to complete the job) and their head to head comparisons are completely inconsequential to who won the war.

It goes without saying that the effect of artillery is devastating. It can destroy virtually anything in its range. Our boys fortunately saw very little of it because of the air patrols. If the arty fires, the Jabo’s would see them and drop a bomb or fire rockets right on the target as the smoke from the round would give away its exact position. The Germans simply couldn’t risk it. The allied tactical fighter/bombers roamed the skies with a good deal of impunity. The Americans used tankers at first but they kept calling in the wrong type of strike and couldn’t tell the fighter/bombers how to approach and identify so they developed a tactic of having a tactical air pilot take turns riding in the tanks and calling the air strikes. This was tremendously effective. Patton and Weyland developed this technique. These bombers were somewhat immune to the 88s because they could fly in so fast and hit a target (sometimes the 88 itself) that the 88 simply could not react, and their biggest problem in diving was the 20mm because if it was trained on them, it could take them out. The weapon of choice was rockets though. It allowed the most kill power for the sortie. The Jug pilots had a rule to never dive on the same target twice because it was the biggest risk of being taken out. The Germans started chasing the Jugs to get them to jettison their bombs for a fight and would then peal away to escape. The TAC command developed a rule that you cannot take on a German fighter for fear of court marshal unless you can prove you were attacked which the pilots claimed would almost have to be bullet holes in the aircraft. The Jugs were more than capable of taking the attacking fighters out but their primary mission was tactical support after air supremacy was maintained in mid 1944 and interdiction was somewhat superfluous.

Priorities for USAAF according to Field Manual 100-20:
1) Air Supremacy – Get rid of the Luftwaffe
2) Interdiction – Take out supply lines, railroads, bridges, depots, etc.
3) Close Air Support – Take out armor and artillery

This manual also separated the control of the Air Force under its own command. This policy was greatly influenced by Sir Arthur Coningham.

So I find it hard to believe that the British themselves didn’t use some of these techniques. The Allies shared the best of everything. The one major difference that was spelled out in the tactical books and in the influence on British/American air policy was the number of aircraft available. The Brits had some awesome strike aircraft but somewhat limited in numbers which limited the ways they could be used. If there was a significant difference in doctrines, it would probably be influenced by that fact more than any other if not alone. But I have seen many paintings of Tempests and Typhoons diving on armor so I bet you would be surprised at the ratio of kills for even RAF TAC.