Could Operation Market-garden Have Succeeded?

No Trouble Jimbo. Dont get upset because of your constant attacks on the British are sometimes replied with a few home truths

 

(sapper @ Jan 22 2006, 06:43 AM) [post=44666]No Trouble Jimbo. Dont get upset because of your constant attacks on the British are sometimes replied with a few home truths
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My constant attacks on the British? Ok, whatever. You know sapper, we have our heroes of WWII here in the US as well and I have met quite a few and heard their stories. I have never once heard them, while reminiscing about the war, taking time to criticize their British comrades who where wounded and died along side them. So I am curious; why do you do it? Whether your shots at these men, who are not here to defend themselves against you, are misrepresentations or not, what "honor" do you possibly have to gain? What if these boys in the prime of their lives had left you brave British soldiers to fight the war alone? Who would you criticize then?

 

Dont mention the 20,000 odd American deserters who were in Paris not long after the Ardennes had kicked off. Any British comparison to that?

Not difficult at all to find many tactical failures from Kasserine all the way through to the "Mythical redoubt"

 

The "redoubt" was more of an intelligence failure, the responsibility for which rests with SHAEF as much as anywhere. As such it was an allied failure.

 

As far as 20,000 US deserters, wow, what a number. Funny that Bradley, Patton and Ike never mentioned these deserters in their memoirs. Did you report them?

If you think that brand new infantry recruits being assaulted by 7 divisions in a surprise offensive, falling back to a defensive position is “desertion” then you are one sick puppy, ham. If so there was an excellent British comparison. By using your “logic” the entire African campaign was a desertion of the entire British VIII Army across Africa, all the way to the “redoubt” in Egypt.

Perhaps a much more profound question would be why were the Yanks still in France for the Ardennes Offensive to take place in Dec? Seems if Patton was only 10 days away from the Siegfried Line in early September and the German front on the verge of collapse, that those same Yanks would have been pretty close to Berlin if not there by late Dec 44. Anybody got any ideas what shut the down the Patton juggernaut and allowed the Germans, who were on the run abandoning their heavy equipment and armor, to regroup and refit? Any of you guys there have an idea? Perhaps a clue as to what caused the rapid destruction of the German army to cease around Sept-Oct 44 time frame and get buried in the constant late Oct-Nov-early Dec torrential rains? I thought you might have some insight. Me, I could only venture a wild guess.

 

Reading you guys messages and bickering between each other makes me realise how important Eisenhower was to the Allied Cause being able to co-ordinate a number of different nations armies and use them to defeat Germany in the west.

jimbo, why is it that you can only reference the memoirs of Generals for your back ups? Cmon now using memoirs that are clearly written to justify their positions and put them in more favourable light is not the most accurate way to argue a case - Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery all had axes to grind with each other and didnt spare the criticism in their memoirs, especially Bradley and Montgomery - Read Von Manstein or Guderians memoirs too and see how many inconsistencies there are. For example, if you were to read Montgomery's version of events and then Bradley's who do you believe? And more importantly why? How do you know who is telling the truth?

I'm not saying that Ham and Jam is right, by the way. But a more neutral source backing up your claim would lend more credence to your assertions. I'm not giving out to you, merely offering a suggestion.

 

It is not disputed by historians that there were a large number of US deserters in Europe from late 1944 into 1945. I think that this is why Eddie Slovik, the only US serviceman shot for desertion in the ETO, was executed. It was to encourage the others.

Paris was a particular magnet for US deserters and some - although a small minority overall - drifted into criminal black market gangs which were operating in the city.

If it really was 20,000, then that is a small percentage of the total US forces in Europe, particularly if you include the rear echelon, including COMZ.

 

(Gotthard Heinrici @ Jan 23 2006, 10:29 AM) [post=44737]Reading you guys messages and bickering between each other makes me realise how important Eisenhower was to the Allied Cause being able to co-ordinate a number of different nations armies and use them to defeat Germany in the west.

jimbo, why is it that you can only reference the memoirs of Generals for your back ups? Cmon now using memoirs that are clearly written to justify their positions and put them in more favourable light is not the most accurate way to argue a case - Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery all had axes to grind with each other and didnt spare the criticism in their memoirs, especially Bradley and Montgomery - Read Von Manstein or Guderians memoirs too and see how many inconsistencies there are. For example, if you were to read Montgomery's version of events and then Bradley's who do you believe? And more importantly why? How do you know who is telling the truth?

I'm not saying that Ham and Jam is right, by the way. But a more neutral source backing up your claim would lend more credence to your assertions. I'm not giving out to you, merely offering a suggestion.
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Bickering is debating petty things. WWII is over and all of its details are petty so by that assertion is any debate here not a bickering contest?

I think a better mediator was Churchill. Ike was so biased toward the British that he often crippled the American forces and in doing so fostered a great deal of resentment of the British amongst the American generals. Ike was afraid to be seen as favoring his own so he went the other extreme. Ike wanted to run for president. The ETO was his campaign trail. I sometimes believe the war was won despite him.

As far as referencing generals who knows more about what was going on and why? Some historian that interviewed sergeants after the war? The generals were the major players. They are the ones who made the big decisions and right or wrong the war was dictated by those decisions. When you look at the writings of a general you see two things clearly. His opinion and his reports/orders. I do not believe that the reports and orders are falsified as they would indicate that the man had no character at all. But one thing that generals do is give you context and the beliefs of the major players at the time. Historians don’t do that since they are simply reporting hearsay. I don’t think Patton’s or Ike’s egos have a thing to do with reality but it can be culled out pretty easy. Quite frankly, the auto-biographies, notes, diaries and letters of the generals are the most accurate sources of information even though they carry a lot of opinion in them too. I would much rather know what happened and what was intended in a certain strategy than to hear some arrogant historian tell me different. I wasn’t there. I have to rely on those that were. I have little choice.

In the distinction of the two when they contradict, they normally contradict in opinion not orders or statement of the situation and context. But if and when they do, I would take the one that made the most logical sense. I think it is easier to see someone covering his mistakes than you let on.

Let me ask you this: Why do you put such trust in historians that were not on the radios, not reading the orders, not at the discussions, not privy to the real situation, not deciding when or why to do something, who also have biases, and whose opinions are often contradictory of other historians and are also merely composites of other historians? That tends to be a circular thought path. If the blind lead the blind…

What is wrong with the application of common sense even if it contradicts the “great” historians? I am in the process of reading “Day of Deceit” in which purports the evidence that the Pearl Harbor attack was foreseen and even devised by the American leadership, that Japan was baited into a war with the US. I am not saying it is unequivocal but the evidence is startling both in quality and quantity and yet the “gods-amongst-the-men” historians have yet to even intimate that such a thing was possible, give evidence for or against it, other than one guy, and the others simply attack him like a pack of wild dogs.

In Oct 2000, congress officially exonerated General Short and Admiral Kimmel of responsibility because of the revealing of the proof of documentation that the attack was foreknown and they were not informed. Now if you had the choice, would you rather hear from the cryptographers/translators of the JN25 code themselves or from some historian that simply thinks that it absurd that a US president and a British Prime Minister to conduct such a plan and buys that the JN25 code was not broken until after Dec 7 when there are archived documents decrypted from it that are dated months before contradicting this very assertion?

That would be telling me that I may very well have been led to believe that Pearl was a fundamental tactical oversight, not even possible of a new cadet in Annapolis, but of Kimmel/Short that was not foreseen, and led to believe this “fact” for all these years and I need to drop to a knee in homage when the mere mention of the word “historian” is uttered like I had come into the presence of the Queen Mother herself? I don’t think so.

I am not anti-historian but I do try to keep them as mortals dealing with the same biases and errors that I myself am exposed to being human.

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>As far as 20,000 US deserters, wow, what a number. Funny that Bradley, Patton and Ike never mentioned these deserters in their memoirs. Did you report them?[/b]

No not me, but try Robin Neillands book on the battle for the Rhine, it mentions it in there, and I wonder why Ike and Bradley would not of mentioned it? hmmmmmmm lets think. 20,000 American deserters around the flesh pots of Paris, no wonder the black market was booming. A whole division's worth of men who were not retreating as part of any corps or formation but men who went AWOL.

Rival gangs of deserters were hijacking trains, stealing truckloads of fuel and having gunfights in the Bois de Boulogne area (sounds like the wild West) By September there were 15,000 US deserters in Paris. So that was before even the Ardennes kicked off.



</div><div class='quotemain'>I think a better mediator was Churchill. Ike was so biased toward the British that he often crippled the American forces and in doing so fostered a great deal of resentment of the British amongst the American generals. Ike was afraid to be seen as favoring his own so he went the other extreme. Ike wanted to run for president. The ETO was his campaign trail. I sometimes believe the war was won despite him. [/b]

What a load of nonsense, what crippled the American forces was that you had such a stupid set up regarding supplies, Ike had no say over what fuel and supplies got to the front line, that was down to COMZ.

[1] The present article was first published, in a similar form, in
Military Review, XXXI, No. 5 (August, 1951), under the title "Logistic
Limitations on Tactical Decisions." A full account of the logistical
story in the European theater may be found in Roland G. Ruppenthal,
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1953), and Volume II (Washington, 1959), specifically
Volume II, Chapter I. See also Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command
(Washington, 1954), in the same series; and Field Marshal Viscount
Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1947);
Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1952); George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1947); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1948); and Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951).


On its operational side, OVERLORD, the plan for the invasion of the European continent, had been predicated on an estimate that the enemy would make successive stands on the major water barriers across France and Belgium. In accord with this assumption, it was expected that he would make a stand at the Seine River, a line that would not be reached until D plus 90. Furthermore, plans had contemplated a fairly steady rate of advance and not the pursuit of a disorganized enemy. While such a forecast of progress admittedly was conjectural, it formed, necessarily, the basis of logistic preparations. In the belief, for example, that the Seine ports would not become available quickly, great emphasis was placed on the development of the Brittany area, including the port of Brest. In addition, at least a month's pause at the Seine was expected to be necessary to develop an administrative base capable of supporting further offensives. Even on these assumptions, the margin of safety on the OVERLORD logistic plan was believed to be nonexistent.

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I, Chs. IV, VII; II,
Ch. I.


The arrival at the Seine marked only the beginning of supply difficulties. Despite the logistic complications which the rapid advance had already foreshadowed, decisions now were made to establish a bridgehead across the Seine; then to encircle Paris; and, finally, to continue the pursuit without pause all along the front. On purely tactical grounds these decisions were logically indicated, for the Allies now enjoyed a definite superiority, and the disintegration of enemy resistance offered opportunities that it would have been folly to ignore. From the point of view of logistics, however, these decisions carried with them a supply task out of all proportion to planned capabilities. With the supply structure already severely strained, these decisions entailed the risk of a complete breakdown.

See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF)
Planning Staff Studies, Post-NEPTUNE, 17 Jun and 17 Aug 44, in SHAEF G-3
SHAEF/18008/Plans 44; Administrative Staff Study 14, The Logistical
Implications of a Rapid Advance by AEF Beyond the Seine, 23 Aug 44, in
SHAEF G-4 381 War Plans General, I, 44, Planning Paper, Logistical
Implications of a Rapid Thrust to Berlin, Sep 44, SHAEF G-4 Logistical
Forecasts, Folder 13.

The continued advance, late in August and at the beginning of September, consequently brought hectic days and sleepless nights to supply officers. All the difficulties which had already begun to appear during the approach to the Seine now were further aggravated. The main problem, as before, was the deficiency in transport. Despite great efforts, rail reconstruction was unable to keep pace with the advance. Air supply repeatedly failed to match its predicted capacity. Motor transport therefore continued to bear the principal burden of the forward movement of supplies, and it was unable to deliver even daily needs, to say nothing of stocking advance supply depots.

The unbearable supply task which the continued advance created can best be appreciated by comparing planned with actual developments. At D plus 90 it had been assumed that no more than twelve United States divisions would have to be supported at the Seine. Not until D plus 120 was it thought feasible to support these divisions in their first offensive action beyond that barrier. In actuality at D plus 90 (4 September) sixteen divisions already were being supported at a distance of 150 miles beyond the Seine, and, within another week, First U.S. Army forces were operating at the German border in the vicinity of Aachen, well over 200 miles beyond Paris. By D plus 98 (12 September) the armies had advanced to a line which forecasts had indicated would not be reached until D plus 350. Between 25 August and 12 September they had advanced from the D plus 90 to the D plus 350 phase line, thus covering 260 phaseline days in 19 days. The record actually was more phenomenal than these figures indicate, because, in the earlier dash to the Seine, the armies had overcome an initial lag of 30 days. The city of Paris also had become an additional supply liability because of its liberation 55 days ahead of schedule.

Contrary to plan, therefore, and as a direct consequence of the August decisions, considerably greater forces were being maintained at much greater distances than contemplated. This was accomplished despite an insufficiency of motor transport (which had been predicted even before D Day), despite the failure to open the Brittany ports, and despite the premature assumption of responsibilities in connection with the civil relief of Paris.

The probability that logistic limitations might straitjacket tactical operations had been realized as early as 24 August, when General Eisenhower expressed anxiety over the Allies' inability to undertake, simultaneously, the various operations which appeared desirable. Flushed with success, however, the Allies had begun to develop ambitions which they had not dared consider a month earlier. The uninterrupted advance in the next two weeks continued to nourish the hope that strong offensives, both north and south of the Ardennes, might be sustained. In the first week of September, General Eisenhower decided that such simultaneous drives to both the Ruhr and the Saar were still within Allied capabilities, and on 10 September he accordingly authorized an advance across the West Wall by both United States armies.
He admitted that the supply organization already was stretched to the breaking point, but he believed the operation was a gamble worth taking in order to profit fully by the disorganized state of the German forces.

The maintenance of the armies was a touch-and-go matter at this time, however, and it was necessary to keep a constant finger on the logistic pulse. Supply capabilities clearly were unequal to the support of sustained operations by both armies against determined opposition, for deliveries were being made at the rate of only 3,300 tons a day to the First Army and 2,500 tons to the Third-about one half of what they required. The dual offensive was supportable only if it could achieve quick success. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Third Army commander, was informed, therefore, that unless he was able to force a crossing of the Moselle with the mass of his forces within the next few days, he was to discontinue the attacks and assume the defensive.

Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 44, Operations Division Executive
Office File 9; see also Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug 44, and
Eisenhower to CCS, 9 Sep, both in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning,
I. Tedder's (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder) Notes on Meeting at
Brussels, 10 Sep 44, OCMH files.


Within the next ten days increasing resistance in both the First and Third Army sectors forced General Eisenhower to make the decision which he had hoped to avoid. A survey of supply capabilities at this time showed that United States port discharge was averaging less than 35,000 tons a day, several thousand tons below requirements. Even this was more than could be cleared from the ports, for the number of truck companies had been greatly reduced as a result of the demands for line-of-communications hauling. The net effect of these basic deficiencies was inescapable: a restriction on the number of divisions that could be supported in active operations and, consequently, a limitation in the scale of combat operations. As early as the middle of August it had become impossible to maintain in combat all the divisions which were available. By early September three had been immobilized and their motor transportation used to form provisional truck companies. Two more divisions arrived in the middle of the month, and it was thought that their motor vehicles might have to be utilized in the same way. Logistic planners estimated that there would be twenty-nine divisions in the 12th Army Group by 1 October, but thought it unlikely, on the basis of the current logistic outlook, that more than twenty could be maintained in combat as far forward as the Rhine at that date. Whipple Ltr, cited n. 6; Memo, Moses for CofS 12th A Gp, Use of
Divisions on Line of Comms, 5 Sep 44, 12th A Gp G-4 Memos 1944, Folder
56, Drawer 11.

In the light of these circumstances, General Eisenhower, in mid-September, considered two possible courses of action: the concentration of all resources behind a single blow on a narrow front directed toward the center of Germany (the proposal favored by Field Marshal Montgomery); or an advance along the entire front with the aim of seizing suitable positions on the German frontier where the Allied forces could regroup, establish maintenance facilities, and mount a broad drive into Germany. [10] The first course, often referred to as a "knife-like thrust" to Berlin, was rejected on both tactical and administrative grounds. Logistic resources likewise were lacking for the full implementation of the second course. The Supreme Commander, nevertheless, decided in favor of the second plan, which provided that the Allies push forward to the Rhine, secure bridgeheads over the river, seize the Ruhr, and concentrate on preparations for the final nonstop drive into Germany. Because of the limited logistic capabilities, however, the timing of the Allies' efforts toward the attainment of immediate objectives now became of utmost importance. The implementation of this plan, consequently, required a succession of attacks, first by the 21 Army Group, then by the First Army, and, finally, by the Third Army, with supply priorities shifting as necessary.


The dilemma in which the Allies found themselves at this time was, as previously noted, a direct outcome of the earlier decisions by which logistic considerations had been subordinated repeatedly to the enticing prospects which beckoned eastward. General Eisenhower himself admitted that he had been willing to defer the capture of ports in favor of the bolder actions which had taken the Allied armies to the German border. The first such deferment had been made on 3 August, when the bulk of the Third Army was turned eastward rather than into Brittany as originally planned. Two weeks later the Supreme Commander had again subordinated logistic considerations when he decided to cross the Seine and continue to drive eastward. Such deferments were no longer permissible.
See Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Sep 44


The developments of the next few weeks produced little cause for altering the conclusions reached in mid-September. At the very end of the month the Communications Zone presented figures on its delivery capabilities which revealed even more clearly the impossibility of supporting large-scale operations east of the Rhine. The 12th Army Group had indicated, on the basis of daily maintenance needs of 650 tons a division, that its requirements would total 19,000 tons a day during the first half of October, assuming the employment of twenty-two divisions, and 23,000 tons a day by 1 November, when the strength of the army group would reach twenty-eight divisions. In addition, however, the army group requested that the Communications Zone deliver 100,000 tons of supplies over and above these daily requirements in order to meet deficiencies in equipment and establish minimum reserves. The Communications Zone's reply was discouraging indeed. It announced that it would be approximately sixty days before any substantial tonnages could be built up in the forward area. September deliveries had averaged only 8,000 to 10,000 tons a day to the forward areas, and for the entire month of October deliveries would not even meet daily maintenance needs. Not until mid-November did the Communications Zone expect its port and transportation situation to improve sufficiently to permit the build-up of reserves, over and above daily needs, in all the army areas. The outlook for the next six to eight weeks was, therefore, a depressing one, for there appeared no escaping the prospect that the forces which the 12th Army Group could maintain actively operational would either have to be reduced in size or continue on the starvation scales that had characterized their support for the past several weeks. [15]

It also was clear that the maintenance of large-scale operations would remain unsatisfactory until the port of Antwerp and adequate rail lines of communications were made available. The operations of the 21 and 12th Army Groups, consequently, were to be dominated throughout the fall of 1944 by the necessity of developing a new administrative base in closer proximity to the front lines.

Tactical operations, to paraphrase an old maxim, had definitely become the art of the logistically feasible.

SHAEF G-3 Appreciation, Factors Affecting Advance into Germany After
Occupation of the Ruhr, 24 Sep 44; Memo by Planning Staff, 24 Sep 44,
SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning; Memos, Moses for Stratton, Supply
Estimate, 25 Sep 44 and 1 Oct 44 SHAEF G-4 Allocation of Tonnages, 1, 8
Oct 44-SHAEF G-4 400 Supplies General 44, IV, Memo, Ravenhill for G-4, 10
Oct 44, SHAEF G-4 Maintenance of British and U.S. Forces 153/2/GDP-1, Box
1, Folder 42, Cable, SHAEF to Bradley, 11 Oct 44, SHAEF AG 381-3 SHAEF to
AGWAR Rpts on OVERLORD.


ROLAND G. RUPPENTHAL, Staff Member, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University. Ph.D. in history, University of Wisconsin. Taught at Akron University. Historical officer and assistant theater historian, European theater, World War II. Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. Historian, OCMH, 1946-53. Author: Utah Beach to Cherbourg (Washington, 1948), AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION; Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I (Washington, 1953) and Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II (Washington, 1959), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.


Now this is how good COMZ was, you would have thought that Ike being CC in Europe would have some say on supply but COMZ was commanded by Lt Gen JCH Lee who was a lay preacher, he was nicknamed Jesus Christ himself (work the initials of his name) He reported directly to Lt Gen Brehon Somerville, and he was Gen Marshall's logistical adviser and head of the supply services in Washington, rather than to Ike. This infuriated Ike's chief of staff, W Beddel Smith, who had no say in matters of supply, rightly regarded Lee as a stuffed shirt and equally rightly, felt that the supply services in the ETO should be responsible to and take orders from the Allied Supreme Commander, but it did not.

Ike could have sacked Lee, push come to shove but this would have caused an immense row in Washington, where Lee had powerful friends and Marshall had encouraged Somerville to act independently. You see what I mean by the war was being run more by politics than good tactical knowhow.

It was Lee who decided what the armies should have. This of course created problems as the armies needs changed according to their situation in the field. When an army is advancing it needs fuel, when they are to attack they need ammunition, when on the defensive they need mines, wire and trench stores. When the weather turns cold the troops need winter clothing (Ardennes a good example of not getting what they needed) None of this washed with Lee, he went by the book and if these things were not in the book then they were not issued at all. If troops were using more supplies than Lee had scaled then no extra supplies were sent. If a units demands exceeded its authorised scale its operations should be modified since obviously the scale could not be changed.

Of course all this bureaucratic nonsense had an effect on the troops but they found ways out by sending foraging parties back to base depots and took what they wanted or bribed the storemen to supply thier needs. Lorries destined for one corps or division were hijacked by men from other units with greater needs.
This practise was quite common in Patton's army and he was fully aware of it happening and described it as 'not war, but magnificent'.

So it goes to show how great COMZ was and how well run it was, it basically came down to being Lee's private army. Lots of dodgy things happened, the black market was thriving in Paris, and where was the US's main supply depot? Lee is rumoured to have sent a plane each week to Morocco and this plane brought back citrus fruits so that Lee and his minions could enjoy freshly squeezed orange juice for their breakfast, and have a slice of lemon in their Gin and tonics, nice touch.

COMZ when encamped in Paris took up 90% of all Paris hotels they had a huge admin staff, Lee's move to Paris did not go down well with Ike who knew what the main lure of the city was. There are many stories, factual that the staff of COMZ were more interested in the Paris nightlife than in supporting the troops in the field. Nothing like PX stores or comforts destined for the fromt line being used to obtain the good things in life in Paris.



So of course it was our fault

 

By the way Angie nice avatar, theres a good book often for sale on ebay called "Not so bloody quiet on the Western front" its about a 53rd lad during the Ardennes and onwards. I got my copy from ebay and the author who the book is based on signed it.

Andy

 

(ham and jam @ Jan 28 2006, 10:10 AM) [post=44972]No not me, but try Robin Neillands book on the battle for the Rhine, it mentions it in there, and I wonder why Ike and Bradley would not of mentioned it? hmmmmmmm lets think. 20,000 American deserters around the flesh pots of Paris, no wonder the black market was booming. A whole division's worth of men who were not retreating as part of any corps or formation but men who went AWOL.

Rival gangs of deserters were hijacking trains, stealing truckloads of fuel and having gunfights in the Bois de Boulogne area (sounds like the wild West) By September there were 15,000 US deserters in Paris. So that was before even the Ardennes kicked off. [/b]
So this Neilland guy’s (I assume another great British Historian?) theory, of which you agree with was that there were 20,000 soldiers who were “AWOL” in order to become a third supply source by hijacking trains and stealing truckloads of fuel just to compensate Monty’s disobedience and failure to open Antwerp so that Patton’s “Thundering Third” could drive to Berlin and end the war fast? I know he was moving too fast for the Red Ball Express and COMZ to keep him supplied, but a third supply line called “Black Market” using 20,000 men under the guise of AWOL soldiers? Wow! That’s quite a “get” for this Neilland fellow.

(ham and jam @ Jan 28 2006, 10:10 AM) [post=44972]What a load of nonsense, what crippled the American forces was that you had such a stupid set up regarding supplies, Ike had no say over what fuel and supplies got to the front line, that was down to COMZ. [/b]
I read a story about the British quartermasters supplying about ½ the capacity of the American equivalent. Patton commented on that too. He said that the British were disorganized and why COMZ and Red Ball were so much more efficient. It was never really that big of a problem because British VIII army was either hopelessly bogged down or “borrowing” supply and divisions for some high-risk, low reward mission, from the Americans. What a shame we could never get supply from western France/Normandy. It would have been so beneficial. I guess the British didn’t have an AWOL/Quartermaster (a.k.a. Black Market) division to open up such a supply line. Did Neillands ever offer a comment on why?

You know ham, regardless of what fabrications you managed to dig up out the manifold sources of British WWII literature, there will always be one thing that clouds relevance of it and that is that if Monty had kept his stinking hands off the war and not interfered with the juggernaut of Patton moving at light speed, the war would have been over earlier. Now I am not calling Monty a double agent of the Nazis, but no other general in the war on either side, who did more to slow the allied advance into German than he. Though, I am sure it was simply incompetence rather than treason, he was a godsend to the Germans how desperately needed time to get out from under Patton’s wheels. Perhaps half of the British/Canadian and American casualties of the war could be directly or indirectly attributed to the disaster in Holland. If you had put Monty and Ike on a plane and shipped them to the Pacific, perhaps the Germans would have had to have surrendered by the end of fall 1944. Who knows? But then again that might have gotten more Marines and Aussies killed and that wouldn't have been fair to them either.

 

Jimbo I am always amazed at your sheer arrogance. Your ideas of the invincibility of the American forces are to say the least Outrageous. You will have to learn, as did your countrymen in Normandy, when it comes to the real fighting, with the British there is no parallel, certainly not from our allies.
While your lot piddled about, we took on the might of the Panzers and decimated them. How? By constant attacks. A thrust here, another somewhere else, always keeping the Panzers off balance, scurrying hither and thither, trying to plug the gaps that we created…never giving them the chance to get together a heavy Panzer punch.
All so the Americans could get on with the job in the East of Normandy. Even then, when they at last got ready, their own bombers came over and clobbered the lot as they prepared for the advance…Typical!
Sapper

 

Found a great site on Market Garden.

http://www.rememberseptember44.com/

Sorry if this site has been posted already, but it's really worth a look.

 

(sapper @ Jan 28 2006, 01:52 PM) [post=44979]Jimbo I am always amazed at your sheer arrogance. Your ideas of the invincibility of the American forces are to say the least Outrageous. You will have to learn, as did your countrymen in Normandy, when it comes to the real fighting, with the British there is no parallel, certainly not from our allies.
While your lot piddled about, we took on the might of the Panzers and decimated them. How? By constant attacks. A thrust here, another somewhere else, always keeping the Panzers off balance, scurrying hither and thither, trying to plug the gaps that we created…never giving them the chance to get together a heavy Panzer punch.
All so the Americans could get on with the job in the East of Normandy. Even then, when they at last got ready, their own bombers came over and clobbered the lot as they prepared for the advance…Typical!
Sapper
[/b]
Your mocking of the American soldiers because they caught by friendly fire is beyond the pail, sapper. That was a very dishonorable thing to say. How would you feel if one of the ones that survived MG uninjured mocked you? images/smilies/default/mad.gif

You also said that your lot took on the might of Panzers and decimated them. Funny the first day “taking of Caen” objective that turned into a 2+ month bog down of Monty didn’t seem to devastate any Panzers at all. So, your attacks on the US soldiers. is dubious to say the least and sounds like some bitter jealousy to me. It does nothing to make me think there was something wrong with the American soldier but on the contrary makes me wonder what you have to hide by your libeling them here. For some reason it seems to make you feel better about yourself and what you did to plaster these men who are not here to refute your testimony.

But, I have never said anything about the British fighting man. The subject here is oriented around leadership and strategic decisions. Blaming soldiers for losing MG would be like blaming the pieces on the chess board for losing a match. It’s you and ham that make it about bad soldiers rather than bad leadership/decision. Your claims that the Americans “piddled” about is shameful. If the Americans piddled about, why did the First and Third Armies keep getting division after division stripped to go back and help Monty come forward. Ike was your buddy. He made sure that the pride of Monty didn’t get short handed in the glory crossing into Germany despite the fact that stalling the American Armies to let him catch up caused quite a bit of anger from Bradley, Patton and Devers. But he was the big boss. Remember, it was only Monty that had the gall to disobey Ike. American generals knew they would get sacked if they did. Insubordination was a Monty thing alone.

No, sapper, sorry but most Panzers were not destroyed by Allied armor despite your claim of keeping them off balanced. At Caen, they didn't seem very off balance to me. It was artillery and American and British air that took out the armor and prevented your “lot” from seeing much the vast majority of German assaults and of the German artillery which was only allowed to fire on the Allies during bad weather days for fear of being spotted by air patrols. This is why when you came upon burned out tanks and armor with their frames twisted in two and some flipped upside down, or ripped open like a sardine can. A 75/75mm cannon of a Sherman just does not have the ballistics to do that to such heavy pieces of iron. We have more than established over and over that a Sherman was dog-meat to a Tiger or Panther. It was great at killing unprotected light armor and soldiers but it was no match for a tank to tank battle with virtually anything the Germans had. We have already discussed how sometimes a well placed Panther could sit there and grind down 30 or so Shermans and Cromwells like they were tin cans. The Germans would use Panther turrets like pillboxes and they would put a hurting on Allied Armor. So, spare me the armor bravado, the story is a little over-cooked and tired.

I don’t think that anyone believes that First and Third Armies being only 10 days away from crossing the Siegfried Line would still have been in France four months later without the assistance of Monty’s Market Garden campaign. If that’s personal to you (did you help plan it?) I can’t help that. It is simply a statement of logic and common sense, not nationalistic pride of a country’s doughboys. This crapola that the armor didn’t shift to try to stop the breakout is crap that they didn’t face it is crap. The breakout would logically become the most critical issue of defending Germany so it would stand to reason that the Panzers would move from the static front to the collapsing one trying to reinforce it. Here is an example of how absurd this “excuse” is:

Hitler: “What army is that breaking out and running east?”
German General: “It’s Patton, he is heading to Berlin”
Hitler: “Oh well, we’ll have to give up Berlin and Germany to the Americans, we just can’t risk moving more armor from in front of Monty and letting him make it to Antwerp”.

Pants! Pants, I say! Come on people, we can do better than that. Let's get back to talking about WWII.

 

This exercise makes the charge of the Light Brigade...As I go out on this limb, all Chindit bloggers please put down those machetes.

Seasoned officers should know better than to send Airborne against Panzers when there is no close air support. I believe they had that intelligence about Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg. Browning probably mmed yes ...Piece of cake. Sten Mk 5s, Lee-Enfield No 4s, Brens and a few 6-pr ant-tank guns were no match against Stu G IIIs, PzKpfw Vs, and 21-cm Wurfgrantes. The Red Devils were excellent troops but they had no significant support. Monty did not learn the lesson from Normandy and Falaise. Air power...Operation Goodwood... allowed the British to breakout. Churchill always seemed to put immense pressure on his Generals to get going before properly prepped...Dervishes.. The Americans experienced a similar situation in The Hurtgen forest that being command arrogance.

 

(Herr Oberst @ Jan 28 2006, 05:10 PM) [post=44985]Quoted post[/post]</div><div class='quotemain'>
This exercise makes the charge of the Light Brigade...As I go out on this limb, all Chindit bloggers please put down those machetes.

Seasoned officers should know better than to send Airborne against Panzers when there is no close air support. I believe they had that intelligence about Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg. Browning probably mmed yes ...Piece of cake. Sten Mk 5s, Lee-Enfield No 4s, Brens and a few 6-pr ant-tank guns were no match against Stu G IIIs, PzKpfw Vs, and 21-cm Wurfgrantes. The Red Devils were excellent troops but they had no significant support. Monty did not learn the lesson from Normandy and Falaise. Air power...Operation Goodwood... allowed the British to breakout. Churchill always seemed to put immense pressure on his Generals to get going before properly prepped...Dervishes.. The Americans experienced a similar situation in The Hurtgen forest that being command arrogance.
[/b]
Agreed, the Huergen Forest thing, I will never understand. What a waste of men for a useless objective. Bradley didn't say why he fed Collins to the wolves. He does remark how bad the butchery was and sums it up in saying his plan to smash through to the Rhine and encircle the Ruhr Pocket was simply a failure. Most of this failure was due to the incessant raining during the period of mid Oct 44 to early Dec 44. But I again assert that the Allies had no business in France in October. The battle should have been in Germany.

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>Jimbo I am always amazed at your sheer arrogance...While your lot piddled about, we took on the might of the Panzers and decimated them. How? By constant attacks. A thrust here, another somewhere else, always keeping the Panzers off balance, scurrying hither and thither, trying to plug the gaps that we created…never giving them the chance to get together a heavy Panzer punch.[/b]



images/smilies/default/wacko.gif Sapper Villers-Bocage Laddie Villers-Bocage How British Armor reacts to Panzers! The Russians were well aware of what a PzKpfw VI-E Kompanie could do to their armor. Look its not a Yank thing. The Germans wacked us at Kasserine. Now I will put my Katana down images/smilies/default/ph34r.gif

 

All these long and involved postings! Sounds like the hysteria of desperation to me. How can the Americans talk about tank warfare ? They never saw any.
Sapper

 

(ham and jam @ Jan 28 2006, 03:25 PM) [post=44973]By the way Angie nice avatar[/b]

Thanks.

I indirectly got the idea from sapper. On another topic, I posted a picture of my dad in wartime uniform and sapper commented that he appeared to be wearing the Welsh division shoulder patch.

 

(jimbotosome @ Jan 28 2006, 05:12 PM) [post=44975]
You know ham, regardless of what fabrications you managed to dig up out the manifold sources of British WWII literature, there will always be one thing that clouds relevance of it and that is that if Monty had kept his stinking hands off the war and not interfered with the juggernaut of Patton moving at light speed, the war would have been over earlier. [/b]

Jimbo, such language is rather unacceptable, so I suggest that you clan up your act and conduct yourself a bit more like a serious student of history.

Why not read the book, which is Neillands, Robert: The Battle for the Rhine 1944 - Arnhem and the Ardennes: the Campaign in Europe, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005. Until you do, you are really not in a position to comment on his research based work.

I know that you have an utter contempt for historians - which makes me wonder how you manage to maintain an interst in the subject - but give it a go. Not just Neillands. Try a few and check what they say back to their original sources. Even you might learn something.

As for Patton, he did a pretty good job of swanning around those parts of France which the Germans had vacated. Classic cavalry tactics.