Could Operation Market-garden Have Succeeded?

Needless to say, the Dutch knew of it's importance as did the Germans.... so why didn't we?

Put it down to arrogance, in the same way they failed to pick up on the tanks in the photo

 

Ignore this post.

 

The new book by Robin Neillands on the Arnhem/Rhine battles makes some interesting points. He has little time for the 'gun-to-the-head' story. He also puts much of the blame for the failure of Market Garden onto Gavin for not capturing Nijmegen Bridge at the start. His view is that the Americans have subsequently tried to offload responsibility onto the British, and most particularly Guards Armoured, for a job that they should have done in the first place, as a top priority. I hope I haven't misrepresented his argument, and he does praise the fighting qualities of the Americans but criticizes their planning and leadership. Rather turning the tables on the normal 'idiotic British' school of eg the film 'A Bridge Too Far'.

 

(Mark Hone @ Oct 19 2005, 06:26 AM) [post=40216]The new book by Robin Neillands on the Arnhem/Rhine battles makes some interesting points. [/b]

I think the most important thing in this new book, which I would strongly recommend, irrespective of where you stand on the issues, is what Neillands argues in the lack of a clear strategy once Eisenhower took over the role of ground force commander.

Specifically relating to Market-Garden, he points out that not only did 82nd Airborne not capture the Nijmegen bridges, they delayed taking Nijmegen town. Their priority was to take the Groesbeek heights to protect their flank in the event of a German counter-attack from the Reichwald, which did develop, but not for several days. He also points out that Groesbeek had been chosen by Browning as the location of his corps headquarters - when there was no role or purpose in the corps HQ being there in the first place - and I wonder how much pressure this put on Gavin, newly promoted to divisional commander and the most junior in rank, to divert an extra regiment there, which could easily have taken Nijmegen and the bridges on 17 September or early on 18 September.

Neillands, Robin: The Battle for the Rhine 1944, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 2005 (£20 UK price)

 

I know I am in danger or repitition here, but there are times in battle when it best to throw caution to the winds and go for the objective "hell for leather" No matter the odds! no matter the casualties! Go for it...

That was Arnhem....Everyone knew that the chances were slim...but at that time having chased the enemy across France, Belgium, and Holland, there was that one chance. I have heard many times about the single thrust up through the narrow roads Holland...That is blatantly incorrect. I know this for sure being I took part in the eastern thrust North. Via Lille St Hubert. Weert, Euvelwegen. up through to Mook ETC. Nijmegen.

It failed. but in the process we took a great deal of Holland, central and Eastern Holland.
Fortune favours the brave.

sapper

 

(sapper @ Oct 19 2005, 11:56 AM) [post=40223]I know I am in danger or repitition here, but there are times in battle when it best to throw caution to the winds and go for the objective "hell for leather" No matter the odds! no matter the casualties! Go for it...

That was Arnhem....Everyone knew that the chances were slim...but at that time having chased the enemy across France, Belgium, and Holland, there was that one chance. I have heard many times about the single thrust up through the narrow roads Holland...That is blatantly incorrect. I know this for sure being I took part in the eastern thrust North. Via Lille St Hubert. Weert, Euvelwegen. up through to Mook ETC. Nijmegen.

It failed. but in the process we took a great deal of Holland, central and Eastern Holland.
Fortune favours the brave.

sapper
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I agree totally Sapper. But the question still has to be asked why, when there was obviously time to prepare the operation in some detail, why some really fundimental things were not even considered or advice ignored.

No denial that the men on the ground did their very best in the circumstances, but if your agument that it is sometimes worth taking a risk when the prize is high enough is taken as correct, then it also stands that if the prize is really that high then the planning as to be bold and take into account all possible eventualities to give the men on the ground the best possible chance of getting that big pirze.

You may say that the intelligence recieved of the number and types of German forces was ignored because the risk was concidered worth taking. But then much advice from the Dutch was ignored, even though it would have made the chances of getting and holding the bridge better. The decision to land 8 miles away from the bridge in order to save aircraft, the idea that the southern bank of the Rhein was too soft for gliders (in winter maybe, but not in September), the choice to split the insersion into three lifts over three days....... all examples that show inconsistencies in the 'go for it at any cost' idea.

If these inconsistencies point to anything other than the Division having planned to ignore all risk in order to get the bridge at any cost, the only other conclusion has to be that there was a failure in the planning to some extent.

And I would hope that everyone would agree that the troops on the ground that are expected to take those risks deserved the very best planning and commitment from the planners and leaders at all levels right to the top.

 

Lovely aint it? WE chase the enemy half way across europe, full tilt ..full bore..go for it, never mind the intellgence. Why stop with your trousers half down? Go for the full monty mate.. When you talk about planning,the war was at a highly fluid state. it was a real scramble. given the same chance today, would you take that outside chance? or would you sit on your hands waiting for something to happen???

If that would be your attitude? its a damn good job you were never in my Company..believe me! Colonel Tiger Urquehart RE would have had your guts for garters. And then some.......
Sapper

 

Once again I agree with you to a point. But the operation WAS planned in great detail, and on the whole Market Garden achieved most of what it set out to do. No argument there. I'm in no way saying that it went badly, it could just have gone better. But to deny that mistakes were made at the planning stage is to deny that with a little more care during the recce and planning there could have been more success.

If the prize was so big, it was an oppertunity wasted by not planning it better. As a serving Engineer I know that the old saying 'time spent on recce is never wasted' is true and the same goes for planning. You may disagree, and I respect that, but there is a time for rushing in to get the bridge in, or the job done, but if you rush in with a flawed plan, in most cases you might as well not waste the resources.

You quote the saying 'Luck favours the brave'. I could paraphrase it by saying 'Luck favours the brave with the best plan'.

View attachment 1144

 

(Mark Hone @ Oct 19 2005, 01:26 AM) [post=40216]The new book by Robin Neillands on the Arnhem/Rhine battles makes some interesting points. He has little time for the 'gun-to-the-head' story. He also puts much of the blame for the failure of Market Garden onto Gavin for not capturing Nijmegen Bridge at the start. His view is that the Americans have subsequently tried to offload responsibility onto the British, and most particularly Guards Armoured, for a job that they should have done in the first place, as a top priority. I hope I haven't misrepresented his argument, and he does praise the fighting qualities of the Americans but criticizes their planning and leadership. Rather turning the tables on the normal 'idiotic British' school of eg the film 'A Bridge Too Far'.
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That's strange that he would take that attitude. Sounds like an attempt at blame shift.

Following the 82nd's action in Holland, Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey, British Second Army Commander, paid this tribute to Gen. Gavin:

"I'm proud to meet the Commanding General of the greatest division in the world today."

Doesn't sound like Dempsey agrees with Mr Neillands on Gavin. Do you think Mr Neilands knows something fundamental about the campaign that Dempsey didn't? It is amazing how suddenly brilliant book writers become when the people that saw what happened are gone and sixty years clicks off the calender.

 

(jimbotosome @ Oct 20 2005, 02:40 AM) [post=40281]
That's strange that he would take that attitude. Sounds like an attempt at blame shift.

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On the contrary, he argues that historians, particularly American historians, unfairly shifted the blame onto the Grenadier Guards - and in particular Major Carrington (who, incidentally, is still alive and well) for not advancing, unsupported by infantry, with a few tanks, at night, on a single road with deep ditches on either side, into a prepared German position after Nijmegen.

He is pointing out that in fact XXX Corps had to spend a lot of time and effort, together with 82nd Airborne, not just taking the Nijmegen bridges, but also the town. The purpose of dropping 82nd Airborne should have been to take the town and bridges and give XXX Corps a clear run.

He is in no way critical of the fighting qualities of 82nd Airborne. He is critical of the plan under which two of their regiments established positions on the Groesbeek Heights instead of taking the town.

Please just consider whether he has a point without jumping into the usual chauvanism in which US forces are beyond criticism.

Why don't you read the book?

 

This viewpoint has been prevalent for years that the Guards were the ones who caused Market Garden to fail and Hollywoods interpretation of the operation (A Bridge too Far) didnt help even though it is a great war film!!

 

(angie999 @ Oct 20 2005, 09:58 AM) [post=40287]Major Carrington (who, incidentally, is still alive and well) [/b]

Is that Lord Carrington, subsequently Defence & Foreign Secretary & Secretary General of NATO? He was definitely in the Grenadier Guards & I'm sure that he was in the Guards Armoured Division.

If it is then there's a coincidence. Another British major involved in Market Garden, Brian Urquhart subsequently became a senior UN diplomat. in 1944, he was an intelligence officer at 1st British Airborne Corps HQ & became concerned by vague reports of battered panzer formations refitting in the Netherlands. His worries were ignored & he was told that he needed a rest & was sent on leave. A character based on him was included in the film A Bridge too Far but his name was changed as it was thought that movie goers would find it too confusing to have two characters called Urquhart, even though the 1st Airborne Division commander was played by Sean Connery & the intelligence officer by somebody else.

 

(angie999 @ Oct 20 2005, 04:58 AM) [post=40287]Please just consider whether he has a point without jumping into the usual chauvanism in which US forces are beyond criticism.
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I don't hold the US forces above reproach. In fact I blame Ike more than Monty for taking the risk.

I also don't agree that action for the sake of action is always good. Fortune might favor the brave, but it also punishes the impetuous.

I don’t think the failures were tactical, nor necessarily strategic. To me that’s really what Monty was responsible for. I think they were administrative. Monty is too close to the plan. It’s his baby. He is far more likely to have blind ambition than Ike who is tasked as someone that is responsible to be the objective regulator. Ike should have recognized that intelligence was being ignored or insufficient since the zeal for success can be blinding.

Tactical mistakes whether they be made by Monty or by Gavin, are very understandable because they are in the heat of the moment and the fog of war. I don’t hold Monty beyond criticism either. The claim that the operation was 90% successful was a bunch of hoo-hah. He should have never had said that. That’s making excuses. There is no such thing as a success in taking an objective if you can’t hold it. Without the holding, the taking is pointless.

My criticism for Market Garden is not that it was a poorly planned mission nor that intelligence ignored, nor even someone didn’t do something like Gavin didn’t, nor the wrong crystals in the radio. These were all mistakes none of which were soley responsible for the failure. Criticizing those things is retrospective arrogance. All of the 82nd objectives were taken ahead of schedule. Nit picking small details to say this was incompetent or that is incompetent is not revealing in the least. How they accomplished their objectives is strictly academic.

But my criticism, which I don’t believe is retrospective, and is twofold. First, the mission didn’t have even a small chance to succeed and this should have clear prospectively. The speed and precision at which you take an objective are pointless to the fact there is no way in Hades you can hold it. Not having the intelligence to know with “good probability” you can hold it, is NOT simply “taking a risk” but rather throwing “caution to the wind” and not properly counting the costs and their ripple effects of taking this risk. Wishful thinking does not alter reality. So, If time is “of the essence”, so much that you are willing to take large risks to minimize it by Plan B, then you should also assume that time taken for Plan B is equally critical to Plan A which you have to return to if Plan B fails. So, sacrificing a month for an improbable mission, to avoid was is say a four-month mission, now makes that four month mission effectively “more” than a five month mission since there were not the resources to do them both simultaneously and the enemy now had time to reinforce and change the speed at which you can now usurp him from the same position. I have stated that I believe that Market Garden caused the surprise at the Ardennes both by giving the Germans the weather critical to catch them in that perfect position as well as forcing Patton to surrender the Metz he took so easily and allowing the Germans to regroup in France, and that two supply lines were not open for an additional month. It is not a matter of linear time but is exponential because it allows the fleeing enemy to dig in, regroup and reinforce which he needs so badly to do and did at both the Metz and Antwerp.

The second part of the criticism is the arrogance of the assumption that your enemy is an idiot. You certainly have the prerogative to make that assumption, but you do not have the prerogative to make it and act on it without large cost. To me it is like the Germans not taking sufficient winter clothing into Russia, so confident they wouldn’t need it. Market Garden was not an operation that occurred as a result of recon probes finding a weak spot in the enemy’s defense, a region “undefended” and calculating that you have an advantage and then planning the operation. To lose it then would be a failure in calculation and again something you can certainly understand happening. But if you are planning to assume your enemy is stupid, you must do a “crap-load” of recon to verify that you have a good foundation for thinking he has the military IQ of a donut. Wishful thinking, hyper-optimism, whatever you want to call it, it not a luxury that you can afford just because you have driven your enemy across France.

That’s why I believe nit-picking the tactical details or even blame shifting is pointless. Even if all tactical operations were successful, they still could not have resisted the counterassault of those SS Panzer divisions. To believe that they could is naïve. Had SHAEF and Monty had known those divisions were in Holland, surely you believe they would not have attempted the operation because even complete tactical success would not have caused a successful mission because you have not accounted for that level of resistance and should have from common sense if not from the dubiousness of "sketchy” intel.

I think by debating responsibilty on details of tactical execution is an inference that the operation could have worked as planned with 100% perfect execution. It simply could not have.

 

Major Carrington is indeed Lord Carrington. The idea that he was the 'officer with a gun to his head' is discused in the Holts' Battlefield Guide to 'Market Garden'. He describes it 'what an extraordinary story'. Apparently he very nearly bumped into Moffatt T. Burriss, the supposed wielder of the gun, at the 50th anniversary commemoration in 1994. I looked at a lot of the first-hand accounts of the capture of the Nijmegen Bridges for my 2003 battlefields tour and , as usual, they are very contradictory. The same people have even given rather different versions to different historians.
Incidentally, the Brian Urquhart reconnaissance photos story has apparently been called into question by 'After The Battle' publications in their exhaustive (and very expensive) book on 'Market Garden'. Perhaps a millionaire who possesses it might enlighten us on their research.
Guards Armoured contained several subsequently famous people including Willie Whitelaw, Robert Runcie and the late, great Brian 'Johnners' Johnstone.

 

The 82nd took all their objectives ahead of schedule???

What history books are some you reading? Nijmegen was not taken ahead of schedule, if Gavin had given more men to that task on D-day the bridge could have easily of been taken before it was reinforced that evening then most of these MG topics would not be about. Browning and Gavin are at fault, Gavin thought the main threat was hrough the Grooesbeek heights, he had intel reports that the Germans had something like 1000 tanks ready to pounce, sorry but the Germans didnt have anything like 1000 tanks on the whole of the Western front. Strange really because where did Browning have his HQ? answers ona post card please. Surely if he thought this threat was real then he wouldnt have put his HQ where he did. Besides, any real threat from the heights did not come until the 4th day.


US official history says that in July 45 Gavin claimed that possesion of the heights was the key to success or failure at Nijmegen. If they were held by the Germans taking Nijmegen and the bridges would be worthless as the heights dominated all the terrain around it. But US offical history says, 'Whether the prospects of difficulty in holding the high ground in the 82nd AB's sector justified delay in renewing the attack on Nijmegen bridge.... must be a matter of conjecture'.

Surely the whole idea of MG was took take the bridges? without the bridges what was the point? The 101st took theirs or what was possible and then thought about beating back the Germans.

Gavin also claims in his memoirs that the only way to take a bridge is at both ends, so why didnt he? the 504th did it that way at Grave.

Lord Carrington Grenadier Guards : " There was no significant opposistion until we got to Nijmegen. There may have been the odd skirmish on the way but nothing slowed us down until we got to Nijmegen and found ourselves in the middle of a battle. That brought the coloumn to a halt and i remember meeting Chester Wilmot, the war correspondent, who helped drink my last bottle of liberated champagne."

Guards armoured came to halt as they approached Nijmegen, and 20,000 vehicles began to pile up behind them along the single narrow highway.

Captain Thorne, Guards 1st motor battalion: " We were in scout cars and the first person I can recall seeing is general Boy Browning, striding across the field to meet us, looking immaculate as always. Then Gen Gavin appeared and detailed a couple of platoons of US paras to accompany us as we went for the post office where those demolition mechanisms for the bridges were suppoosed to be kept. There was a battle going on, alot of mortaring, plenty of opposisiton in the town and buildings on fire. We came to one street where all the buildings were on fire, intense heat, and I had a shot at some Germans outlined beyong the fire and hit a couple of them.

When the Guards arrived at Nijmegen, the 82nd were not making any headway, the Guards had to deploy and help them take it, and their prime task of getting to Arnhem had to give way to the matter at hand.

Guards tanks and artillery assisted the 505th in another attack on the South end of the bridge, all day on the 19th the Guards were intergrated with the Americans in the street fighting and had several tanks knocked out.

Gavin met Horrocks and informed him that he was going to send the 2nd/505th against the South side of the bridge and " as quickly as possible" send another force in boats across the Waal to take the North side. The snag as we all know is that the 82nd had no boats and had to get them from the British.

In his memoirs Gavin says that in a US army corp, boats would be included with Engineers and so on, he suggests that the British were not so organised. Horrocks said to Gavin that they did have boats and that they were well back down the coloumn. Guards armour history states that it was expected that the enemy might blow one or two bridges and for that reason atleast 9000 Sappers with 500 vehicles had been included with bridging equipment. Its highley unlikely that Horrocks new little of these units, Gavin perhaps being frugal with the truth again.

At 19.10 on D+3 the 82nd and Guards armoured took the bridge. One of the first tanks across was driven by Sgt Robinson and this is his account

" The Nijmegen bridge wasnt taken, which was our objective. We reached the far end of the bridge and immediatley there was a road block. So the troop Sgt covered me through and then I got to the other side and covered the rest of the troop through. We were still being engaged, there was a gun infront of the church 3 or 4 hundred yards in front of us. We knocked him out. We got down the road to the railway bridge, we cruised around there very steady. We were being engaged all the time. Just as I got round the corner and turned right I saw these helmets duck in a ditch and run, and gave them a burst of machine gun fire. I suddenly realised they were Americans. They had already thrown a gammon grenade at me so dust was flying everywhere. They jumped out of the ditch, and kissed the tank, they kissed the guns because they had lost alot of men. They had had a bad crossing.

My orders were to collect the American Colonel who was in a house a little way back, and the first thing he said to me was ' I have to surrender'. Well I said, im sorry, my orders are to hold this bridge. Ive only got two tanks but if you would like to give me ground support for a little while until we get some more orders then we can do it. The Colonel said he couldnt, so I said he had better come back to my wireless set and talk to Horrocks because before I started the job I had freedom of the air. Everybody was off the air except myself because they wanted a running commentary about what was going on. So he came over and had a pow wow with Horrocks. The Colonel said 'Oh very well' and I told him where I wanted the men, but of course it wasnt ten minutes before they were on their way again.

Lord Carrington joined us about two or three hours after because he had been sitting on the North end of the road bridge protecting that."

Carrinton says: " When I got across the bridge there was no sign of Robinson, there were still Germans in the superstructure of the bridge. I halted my tank on the North end and radioed back that the bridge was open. I sat there for a while until more tanks started to cross, I then set off to find Robinson who was about 1 mile up the road and talking to some American Paras who were very pleased to see us."

Andrew Gibson of the Welsh Guards

"My own complaint is the ACCEPTANCE of the thesis (by other historians) that the Guards armoured division should have gone on to Arnhem on the night they captured the Nijmegen bridge. The division 'off balance' and still heavily involved in fighting back on the South side in the town, could not have done so. There was nothing to go on with, the main job now was to defend the bridge against the 'expected' counter attack. Any element which had gone on would have found it very hard to get over Arnhem bridge, which was not and NEVER was held by Johnny Frosts gallant force, (to hold a bridge you have to of captured both ends)
if it had of got over it would have been met my superior German numbers in that part of Arnhem.

We have always been fed the story about fired up American paratroopers railing at the British tankers for not going straight on but Peter Robinson's memoir tells a very different tale.

It is time for this accusation, which does not stand up to detailed examination, to be finally refuted."

The first 4 tanks to cross the bridge were soon joined by Carrington, who says that he met soon after an American officer who was very pleased to see us. Later on the officer went on to accuse the Guards of being 'yellow bellied cowards' and that he felt 'betrayed' when these 5 tanks did not immediately set out down the road to Arnhem to relieve their 'airborne brothers'. He says that he was told that there were German anti tank guns and armour up ahead to which he replied, again allegedly, that his men would mount tanks, come with the Guards and clear the guns out of the way.

Lord Carrington " My recollection of this meeting is different. I certainly met an American officer but he was perfectly affable and agreeable. As I said, the airborne were all very glad to see us and to get some support, NO ONE suggested we should press on to Arnhem. This whole allegation is bizzare, just to begin with I was Captain and second in command, of my squadron so I was in no posistion either to take orders from another Captain or depart from my own orders which were to take my tanks across the bridge, join up with the US airborne and form a bridgehead. This story is simply lunacy and this alleged exchange DID NOT TAKE PLACE.

Gavin in his memoirs says, " The tanks of the guards engaged 2 88's dug in on the Northern shore, destroyed them and continued across the bridge. The first people to greet them were the paratroopers of the 504th. So enthusiastic were they that one of them actually kissed the leading British tank" Sort of ties in with what Robinson says, and so in my view makes his story to be correct.

A captain of his majesty's guards does not take it upon himself to rush off into enemy territory, especially when his orders are to help the Americans forma bridgehead and defend it against counter attacks.

Gavins meeting with Tucker the next day is strange also, in his memoirs he says that Tucker was livid at the British for not going on, Tucker apparently asks Gavin
"what are they doing, why in the hell dont they get to Arnhem?" Gavin says " I did not have answer for him"

Whats strange is that Gavin the commander should have known that the Guards had been helping him for the last two days, only in those hours at the time of this meeting with Tucker, the Coldstream guards were helping to break up an attack at Groesbeek, the Irish guards had gone back down the road to Eindhoven to deal with another enemy attack , yet Gavin claims he 'did not know' what they were doing.

Only 5 tanks were north of the bridge and helping Tuckers men, why he didnt know this? its a bit baffling.

The Guards were not able to advance up the road in strength because they were scatterd all over Nijmegen and the South bank of the Waal an area of some 25 square miles helping the 82nd carry out tasks that Gavin did not carry out on D-day.

Tucker complains about the '12hours' delay, but why doesnt Gavin give a GOOD explanation for why there was a 36 hour delay in the taking of the bridge? All the credit goes to him and all the blame goes to the British.

The US offical history says, "The guards armoured Coldstream guards group were still needed as a reserve for the airborne division. This left just two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day D plus 4, because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings. Once on the north bank much of the British armour and infantry had to be used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the 504th had forged. North of Nijmegen the enemy had tanks and guns and infantry of two SS PZ divisions in countryside ideal for defense."

But hey im sure Carrington and his 5 tanks could have saved the day for the airborne at arnhem bridge.

The official US history also says "At the village of Ressen, less than 3 miles North of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by 11 tanks, another infantry batt, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm AA guns and other survivors of the previos fighting at Nijmegen.

 

Hi Andy.
Later, after Market Garden, came operation Aintree. A murderous battle if ever there was one. But sadly not one where the Americans exactly covered theirselves in Glory. Indeed, quite the opposite. Here there can be no argument as to who did what, or where, is it plain for all to see. Only two groups were involved the USA 7th and the British Third.
I have the story but hesitate to post it. Why? Well it will come as a hard knock to the American ego..
Sapper

 

Brian I dont mind mentioning it, we always seem to be the punching bag. You mean where the US 7th armoured were sent in to take Overloon and got shot up so badly that they were then sent elsewhere? Then the British 3rd division and 6th Guards armoured had to do the job the "lucky 7th" could not manage.

Andy

 

OK Andy. Just to please you mate.....

After Market Garden came operation Aintree.

The names of Overloon and Venraij will not be forgotten in a hurry by any one who fought there, this was a murderous and vicious battle fought out amongst the Sandy tracks, mud, and pine woods that surround these places.

In the beginning, the American 7th Armoured Division had announced their intention to "sweep" down through Overloon and Venraij and then take the strategic town of Venlo. Oh dear! Oh dear! After being thrown back suffering 452 casualties, dead, wounded and missing, coupled with the loss of tanks and other vehicles that the Germans had inflicted on them, they decided that the casualty rate was far too high, retired to the South, tails between their legs, never to be seen again.

All the while Third British Infantry had been watching this performance with more than a little misgiving. Their apprehension was soon to be justified. The Division was given the job where the Americans had failed. We slid into the forward positions in a rain storm, the roads covered in mud as we slowly slithered into position.

The weather matched my foreboding, code named Aintree, this was to be a bitterly fought battle with every element of modern warfare. Fierce artillery duels. Heavy mortar fire, nebelwerfer and machine gun fire, no quarter given, or expected. But from our point of view the whole area had been sown with mines like the legend of the Devils Teeth, when sown, they multiplied a thousand fold.

Overloon was flattened. Mine lifting had to be carried out under the most demanding conditions, we had to clear a path through for both the infantry and tanks. Eighth Brigade led off as usual, with 185 Brigade also involved, we cut paths through the mine fields, but it was a particularly horrible and dirty bit of war with heavy mortar fire, and I hated every minute of it!

After taking Overloon we had to reorganize and prepare for the next phase of the battle, to capture Venraij. Immediately we came up against the Molen Beek, this was as difficult problem to solve as anything we had come up against previously, it was a stream that ran between Overloon and Venraij, it had been mined everywhere, on the banks, in the mud, even under the stream itself.

All the approaches had been heavily mined, not only with anti-tank mines but also with anti-personal mines, some in deep mud making it even more trying, to top it off, he had the whole area covered with artillery fire and mortar fire, completely covered! Our job was to force a crossing under the most dangerous and severe conditions, to get the tanks and infantry across and while under fire. We got the infantry across the Beek first, but the tanks caused a great deal of difficulty, some of them immediately got bogged down on the other side, making it even more difficult to get others across.

We knew that the infantry men needed tank support, they would have been in some trouble without tanks, in the circumstances the R.E Field Companies gave everything they had. Years later talking to a Dutchman, he told me that the Dutch people called it the Engineers Molen Beek tragedy.

After the war they built a museum to commemorate the freedom from German rule by the Third British Infantry Division. Later it became the National war museum at Overloon, But it was originally dedicated after the war, to the Third British Infantry Division.

The Cost.
Slowly the Germans had to give ground before our infantry, this was an old fashioned infantry battle where the Enemy had to be winkled out of the woods, buildings and prepared positions. Between the 12th and the 18th of October Third British Infantry Divisions casualties were three times that of the Americans.

But, by the 18th Overloon and Venraij lay safely in our hands. "Brutal and Murderous" are the words that spring to mind when trying to describe the battle, I remember all those brave men who fought and died there with great admiration. Hero's all. It seems to me that some battles are of such severity that a special medal should be struck and awarded to those who took part. The taking of Overloon and Venraij in my opinion, would be the foremost for an award.

According to the Dutch war museum that was originally dedicated to the Third Div: the cost to those engaged in this battle was 2500 British dead, and a total of 3500 casualties leading up to the battles and after, (Me being one of them) that is the information given me by the Overloon war museum. The Dutch people tend the graves with great care and every year on the anniversary of the freeing of Overloon and Venraij the school children gather and lay flowers on every individual British and American grave.
Sapper

 

After getting to know Brian, the last few years, reading his book and his posts I just had to visit these areas that Brian has just talked about above. Heading down the road where Brian's war came to an end was quite strange, what with wondering what it must have been like all those years ago, and also not be able to find any of Brian's knees But we did find this great memorial to the Norfolks and 3rd division

 

(sapper @ Jan 16 2006, 10:06 AM) [post=44429]Hi Andy.
Later, after Market Garden, came operation Aintree. A murderous battle if ever there was one. But sadly not one where the Americans exactly covered theirselves in Glory. Indeed, quite the opposite. Here there can be no argument as to who did what, or where, is it plain for all to see. Only two groups were involved the USA 7th and the British Third.
I have the story but hesitate to post it. Why? Well it will come as a hard knock to the American ego..
Sapper
[/b]
No, by all means, post it here sapper. I realize how difficult it is to dredge up American tactical failures in WWII to make you feel better about your own. Don’t be discouraged though, be my guest even if you have to settle for anecdotes of American failures that are conspicuous by the fact they always seemed to happen under British command. By all means, sapper, denigrate away! Sometimes you just have to take them where you can get them.