Could Britain have defended against an invasion in September 1940?

Leaving aside the sloops, gunboats and MTBS for a moment - Brian Lavery puts the strength of the Auxiliary Patrol...the armed trawlers and armed yachts...at @....600!

Do you feel like providing a list of the names?

Sorry, only joking!

 

LOL in all seriousness there has to be a list SOMEWHERE...

But in the meantime, looking at Lavery, I can break it down a little bit; the Auxiliary Patrol had 242 large yachts and 450 motor fishing vessels between Portsmouth and the Tyne in July 1940...at THAT date they were unarmed; IIRC they were armed with SOME form of weaponry by the end of August.

Lavery notes that Adm. James at Portsmouth was very skeptical of their use, believing that they could be policed up in a night...but to police up 692 boats means a HUGE amount of time the KM are busy NOT doing something else

Also - he notes that this was just the INSHORE patrol Out beyond that there was a barrier of armed RNPS trawlers.

Checking up on this, I found something else I'd forgotten - the River Emergency Service, armed motorboats operating in the Thames, Medway, Crouch, Colne, Blackwater. Deben, Orwell, and other rivers on the East Coast

It's worth noting what Lavery notes - motorboats, both of the Auxiliary Patrol, the River Patrols, and the Coastal Forces....would have been of shallow enough draft to operate INSIDE the RN's minefields; that's a BIG advantage right in to the shore.

This was in fact among the specific orders they received on the 26th of August - that they should operate inshore destroying enemy landing craft, engage aircraft trying to drop paratroopers close to shore, bombard landing grounds and beaches, and stand ready to transport counterattacking troops across waterways. Lavery references the role definitions of the Auxiliary Patrol to ADM 199/687 and ADM 199/360

 

Up to date accuracy was certainly required however the list I posted was to give those not aware just how large the Royal Navy was when war was declared and how widely the fleets were dispersed.

 

LOL in all seriousness there has to be a list SOMEWHERE...

But in the meantime, looking at Lavery, I can break it down a little bit; the Auxiliary Patrol had 242 large yachts and 450 motor fishing vessels between Portsmouth and the Tyne in July 1940...at THAT date they were unarmed; IIRC they were armed with SOME form of weaponry by the end of August.

Lavery notes that Adm. James at Portsmouth was very skeptical of their use, believing that they could be policed up in a night...but to police up 692 boats means a HUGE amount of time the KM are busy NOT doing something else

Also - he notes that this was just the INSHORE patrol Out beyond that there was a barrier of armed RNPS trawlers.

Checking up on this, I found something else I'd forgotten - the River Emergency Service, armed motorboats operating in the Thames, Medway, Crouch, Colne, Blackwater. Deben, Orwell, and other rivers on the East Coast

It's worth noting what Lavery notes - motorboats, both of the Auxiliary Patrol, the River Patrols, and the Coastal Forces....would have been of shallow enough draft to operate INSIDE the RN's minefields; that's a BIG advantage right in to the shore.

This was in fact among the specific orders they received on the 26th of August - that they should operate inshore destroying enemy landing craft, engage aircraft trying to drop paratroopers close to shore, bombard landing grounds and beaches, and stand ready to transport counterattacking troops across waterways. Lavery references the role definitions of the Auxiliary Patrol to ADM 199/687 and ADM 199/360

I am sure there must be. A few months ago I managed to get hold of a book originally produced by the Tactical & Staff Duties Division (Historical Section) of the Admiralty in 1940, called 'The Evacuation from Dunkirk of the British Expeditionary Force and French Troops.'

This actually lists every vessels (British and Allied) which took part in the evacuation, todether with the name of the commanding officer and the number of men rescued, ranging from HMS Malcolm ( Captain(D) T.E. Halsey - 5851 men, to the launch Sea Roamer (Lt. J. Bald, RNVR) - 2 men.

The degree of detail is quite fantastic, so I am sure that somewhere within the archives similar lists will also exist for the Auxiliary Patrol and the River Emergency Service.

Incidentally, if any out there would like any informaton about a vessel that was (or might have been) at Dunkirk, please let me know & I can look her up.

 

‪1940 British Home Front - More Color Footage‬‏ - YouTube




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...there wasnt even enough shipping assembled at that date and what about escorts?
That is simply not correct. Well, it depends on what you describe as "enough". In my book I have put it down like this:

On July 25, 1940, the German Navy upgraded its transport need to:

155 freighters – 700,000 tons - averaging 4,000 tons
1,722 barges of various sizes
471 tugs – regular tugs and oceangoing fishing vessels
1,161 motor vessels

The barges were categorized into three main classes: canal barges of either 38 or 50 meters in length and a load capacity of 350 and 500 tons respectively, and ocean barges with a length of 47 to 50 meters with a load capacity of 750 tons. These were then split up in sub-categories depending on their particular missions during the landing.

On September 4, 1940, the Kriegsmarine reported in hand:

168 large freighters, total 704,548 tons
1,910 barges
419 tugs and oceangoing fishing vessels
1,500 motor boats (100-220 tons) – 1,200 for barge handling in the final landing stage and 300 for Beach “E.”

As for barges the final need for the S-day landings were reduced to approx. 1.150 barges due to the decreased landing width. What this means is that the S-day barges for a large part were expendable as in all 2.300 barges were modified for the operation.

 

The information I supplied earlier was from the Royal Navy Pink List of 16 September, 1940.

The Pink List was issued every three or four days, and listed the whereabouts (obviously not the position at sea of course) and operational status of every major RN warship.

In effect, it was the Royal Navy's Order of Battle, from which the Admiralty and subordinate commanders made their operational decisions, so it was essential that it be accurate.

Unfortunately, the Pink List of September 16th is very misleading if one does not know how to read it.

 

Some years ago I read that the only fully operational fighting division in the UK after Dunkirk was my old Div. Third British Infantry. They gathered arms from everywhere, with the idea of returning to France to continue the fight. But in the mean time France had capitulated...... That was the gist of the report; make of it what you will.....
Sapper

 

That is simply not correct. Well, it depends on what you describe as "enough". In my book I have put it down like this:

On July 25, 1940, the German Navy upgraded its transport need to:

155 freighters – 700,000 tons - averaging 4,000 tons
1,722 barges of various sizes
471 tugs – regular tugs and oceangoing fishing vessels
1,161 motor vessels

The barges were categorized into three main classes: canal barges of either 38 or 50 meters in length and a load capacity of 350 and 500 tons respectively, and ocean barges with a length of 47 to 50 meters with a load capacity of 750 tons. These were then split up in sub-categories depending on their particular missions during the landing.

On September 4, 1940, the Kriegsmarine reported in hand:

168 large freighters, total 704,548 tons
1,910 barges
419 tugs and oceangoing fishing vessels
1,500 motor boats (100-220 tons) – 1,200 for barge handling in the final landing stage and 300 for Beach “E.”

As for barges the final need for the S-day landings were reduced to approx. 1.150 barges due to the decreased landing width. What this means is that the S-day barges for a large part were expendable as in all 2.300 barges were modified for the operation.

How were they to man these as I have read that the Kreigsmarine itself said it would need to find 20000 men to man these vessels. By stripping training units and paring down the surface fleets manning they could produce 16000 leaving a shortfall of 4000. Baring in mind the effect that stripping crews from other vessels would have on their ability to do the jobs required.

 

Some years ago I read that the only fully operational fighting division in the UK after Dunkirk was my old Div. Third British Infantry. They gathered arms from everywhere, with the idea of returning to France to continue the fight. But in the mean time France had capitulated...... That was the gist of the report; make of it what you will.....
Sapper


The Canadian Army Historical record would tend to agree with you:

There was need for courage. Britain's military position was well-nigh desperate. The last effort to save France had left it even worse than it had been immediately after Dunkirk. The 52nd Division had been extricated, but (like the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade) only with the loss of most of its transport and equipment, which left it temporarily almost useless. The same was true of the 1st Armoured Division. Since the formations of the original B.E.F. were far from recovered from Dunkirk, the Canadian force (save for those units of it that had reached France and lost their transport there) was now, in point of training and equipment combined, the strongest element in a very weak fabric. Its closest competitor was Major-General B. L. Montgomery's 3rd Infantry Division, the most forward of the Dunkirk divisions, which it had been intended should follow the Canadians to France. As, however, this formation's War Diary had recorded that its strength on 6 June was only 4500, it still cannot have been in first-rate condition a fortnight later.
In these circumstances, "Canadian Force" was reconstituted as a self-contained formation on 20 June; and on the 23rd it began to move from Aldershot to a new "position of readiness" in the Oxford area, from which, in its role of mobile reserve directly under G.H.Q. Home Forces, it could strike effectively in any required direction. The force was again organized in brigade and battalion groups constituting mobile


HyperWar: The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary [Chapter 2]

 

I have to disagree:what Britain could deploy if there was an invasion,was irrelevant ;all was depending on what the Germans could land on DDay ,and this would be negligible:a few batallions without heavy weapons and supply (the rest would keep company the fish).And,on the more important Day After,those who would try to cross the Channel,would keep company those from the first day and ...the fish .And,afterwards...one very small gale,and nothing would cross the Channel.
Overlord was planned for 5 june (!),but was delayed because of the weather,and,a few weeks later,one of the two Mulberries was destroyed by a summer(!)storm .It is easy to imagine what would happen in september .

 

I'll have to check in Newbold, but IIRC Monty's 3rd was up to establishment in motor transport indeed...but only because he made a stink directly to Churchill when Churchill was visiting his command, and demanded to be able to hire commercial buses to motorise his troops. Permission was given, and the buses were acquired and drilled with...

But IIRC for other divisions, the restriction on acquiring buses for extra transport and retaining it - due to the charter cost - was still in place; they could ONLY do so much closer to a prospective landing Buses had been hired earlier, and some training/exercising done with them for a short time - but due to the costs incurred they'd been returned to civilian use for the moment.

However - the 3rd was...like ALL other British and Commonwealth divisions...still severely deficient in divisional arty and ant-tank guns Better than most, but still under-establishment.

And I'm SO glad the prospect of the British Army riding into battle in motor coaches was not put to the test....!

 

Be sure of one thing...... After the debacle of Dunkirk, had the enemy managed to get here, they would have cut through the little we had, like a hot knife through butter.

I remember those times very well..... I lived them.. I also recall the nation went to work, and united like never before in its long history. The aircraft factories spread far and wide, worked non stop. one skilled men took over from the other, and the machinery without it ever stopping... home to bed up and back into work.....

This young lad worked those hours, and carried out his Home Guard duties. On top of that, we were out at night helping with the bombing raids on Southampton. Night after Night, with no let up. But we all knew the impending danger, and what we may be called on to do, had the invasion come.
Sapper.

PS. The tale of pikes fromk museums, was not the joke that it is now seen as. We did not have rifles or grenades. We just trained with Molotov cocktails. BUT we were determined that no enemy should set foot on our sacred land. Nor did they... Only as prisoners....

 

Be sure of one thing...... After the debacle of Dunkirk, had the enemy managed to get here, they would have cut through the little we had, like a hot knife through butter.

I remember those times very well..... I lived them.. I also recall the nation went to work, and united like never before in its long history. The aircraft factories spread far and wide, worked non stop. one skilled men took over from the other, and the machinery without it ever stopping... home to bed up and back into work.....

This young lad worked those hours, and carried out his Home Guard duties. On top of that, we were out at night helping with the bombing raids on Southampton. Night after Night, with no let up. But we all knew the impending danger, and what we may be called on to do, had the invasion come.
Sapper.


From what I've read about the factories producing aircraft is that they not only worked 12+ hour days but also firewatched etc at night. People were literally falling asleep standing up.

 

If the air battle over Southern England was a prelude to invasion , then it can be said that Britain did defend herself against invasion.

 

Had Hitler invaded shortly after Dunkirk he might just have made it, but the construction and speed of the defences that were built after Dunkirk was some thing else. I remember pill boxes being built all over the place, holes made in the road and covered with a small wooden cover. These holes would have taken a shorten railway line which would have ripped of a tank track with ease. Barb wire was installed which in places was half a mile deep all along the coast was own with all sorts of mines. All the beaches were of limits due to these mines, and for years after the war they were still being washed up on the beach. A massive amount of material was purchased from the US and our factories were getting under way and turning out stuff hand over fist. The General Public knew this was going to be a fight to the finish and work all the hours they could to turn out the weapons. Young men were being called up for duty by the thousands and women were being allocated there jobs in the factories to keep production. Park railing, garden gates and anything of metal was being torn down and thrown into the furnaces to make these weapons. It really was amazing just how much Britain changed in those few months since Dunkirk and the BoB.

 

Some years ago I read that the only fully operational fighting division in the UK after Dunkirk was my old Div. Third British Infantry. They gathered arms from everywhere, with the idea of returning to France to continue the fight. But in the mean time France had capitulated...... That was the gist of the report; make of it what you will.....
Sapper

You are quite correct. Churchill hoped to establish a 'Reconstituted BEF' after Dunkirk, and on 7 June the 52nd Lowland Division began to arrive in Cherbourg. It was to have been followed by the 3rd Division and the 1st Canadian Division. Sir Alan Brooke had been appointed as Commander-in-Chief, but on 14 June he met with Weygand, who told him that the French army was no longer capable of organised resistance.

Brooke immediately contacted the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, and the landing of further troops was stopped. 1st Canadians had just landed, and were immediately re-embarked at St.Malo, whilst the 52nd was evacuated via Cherbourg, at the same time as was the 92000 troops who had constituted the base organizations of Nantes, Rennes, and Le Mans.

I have never come across any evidence that the 3rd Division went back to France, and I am reasonably sure that they didn't.

 

How were they to man these as I have read that the Kreigsmarine itself said it would need to find 20000 men to man these vessels. By stripping training units and paring down the surface fleets manning they could produce 16000 leaving a shortfall of 4000. Baring in mind the effect that stripping crews from other vessels would have on their ability to do the jobs required.

This is an excellent point. The German Navy of 1938 consisted of 75,000 men, according to 'Janes Fighting Ships', and there was no organization similar to the RNR or RNVR available to permit rapid expansion..

Manpower was found by using personnel from ships under repair, new ships in the later stages of construction, and by laying up some vessels, notably the ancient battleships Schleswig-Holstein & Schliesen.

This produced some 4000 men, and appeals were then made for men with appropriate experience. In this case, 'appropriate experience' apparently included an interest in boating or canoeing.

In addition, some bargees from occupied countries were also 'volunteered.'

I leave you to decide whether an interest in canoeing could be considered sufficient experience to take a vessel of uncertain seaworthiness across the Channel, not once but numerous times over a period of several weeks, at a time of year when there was every possiblity of deteriorating weather and worsening sea states.

I have my own view on the matter!