Could Britain have defended against an invasion in September 1940?

My father and Father-in-law were supposedly trained men by this time, carrying out coastal defence etc. Historical records say that they received a total of 22 Bren's, with limited ammunition, in september 1940, 12 of which were almost immediately taken away to be given to another battalion. So I think that they had good reason to worry about being able to put up a reasonable resistance. 7th September code-word "Cromwell"___ presaging immediate invasion, was received.

Much of this is confirmed by the 18th's diaries however allocations of ammunition seemed higher.

 

In relation to Sea Lion I think the war Game carried out in the early 70's pretty much spelled out what would have happened. It took the Allies at least 2 years of dedicated planning, husbanding of resources and many man hours of training to attempt the crossing in 1944. And even with Air and naval superiority it was still a difficult and hard campaign to breakout of the Normandy area.

Without the Luftwaffe having Air Supremacy it is difficult to imagine how they were going to carry out a proper seaborne invasion. Think of the shipping that the Allies used in 1944, the many different versions of Landing Craft that were developed specifically for this task and the Germans were going to use mainly Barges, Barges that were designed for inland waterways. The Kriegsmarine could not match the Royal Navy ship for ship and even with Air Superiority there would be no guarantee that the Luftwaffe could stop the Navy from attacking the invasion fleet.

Even if the Luftwaffe managed to drive the RAF from Southern England, could they manage to harass air bases in Wales and Scotland properly? I know they had bases in Norway but did the Luftwaffe's planes have the capability to strike at the RAF's bases in the North of England?

There's far too many "ifs and Buts" about this operation to ever say that it would be a success. My own view is that it would go the way of the wargame and that is a failure for Operation Sealion.

 

Having a bit of trouble loading images so I will do them one by one.

 

And another!

 

And Another!

 

Andy
That of course would depend on how much Hitler would want to risk his capital ships. Everyone knows he wrapped them in cotton wool after the loss of Bismarck.

Germany's capital ships in September 1940 were almost non existant in terms of operational vessels.
Hipper was ( I am pretty sure) the only capital ship which was operational - and the direct / support fire which was so much a part of D-Day would have been denied to the Germans they simply didn't have sufficent ships to protect and support a landing , in fact they didn't have enough to do either task.
The barges converted to take troops and equipment over wopuld have been utterly vunerable both to the weather and to the Royal Navy.
As Gott says disaster , from the German side it was a high risk venture and the Channel was a major challange for them within the timespan which presented and the window of opportunity which was fast closing.

 

As others have said German shipping (or lack of) was the key. Many river barges were hastily fitted with aircraft engines but this made them very unstable and any sort of sea would have capsized them. If one thinks about the sunken Sherman DD's at Omaha and how crucial was their loss then imagine if the same proportion of Panzers failed to arrive for Sealion. The Sandhurst 'War Game' did prove that the German airborne divisions would have had the most success however the one thing that such games do not take into account is the troops spirit (both attackers and defenders). In this respect I believe that it is valuable to draw a comparison with Crete where the paratroops were largely shot out of the skies and fought on heroically in very small numbers. This caused problems on Crete in some areas but the same would not have occurred on Britisih soil. And it was the same men (in reality and the war game) who faced each other Germans v Kiwis (with plenty of support from London div). So I believe that deciding not to go was probably the smartest thing Hitler did.

 

Surely, the psychological aspect needs to be factored in? Since May 1940, the Germans had overrun Western Europe and Britain practically stood alone. With obvious invasion preparations underway, no doubt the Germans were expecting a capitulation.

Had the Luftwaffe tactics of attacking the airfields not been disrupted, then the RAF might not have been able to use the South East of England bases, and a possible paratroop drop on the Isle of Wight might have given them British territory and a base for Luftwaffe bombers and fighters to continue a blitzkreig on troops artillery and transport hubs, let alone further heavy bombing of London and other major cities.

Had the Germans got a foothold then I feel that the state of mind in the country would have been panic, much as it was with the Continental population.

The troops had been rescued, but without all their accoutrements and may not have had the "spirit" that they later developed.

The key lies in actually getting boots onto English soil. Had that happened, morale might have collapsed and the Country sued for peace.

As pointed out, look how tough our invasions of Sicily, Italy and Normandy were, with vastly more material and manpower. had the Germans got ashore in some numbers as an organised force, then fighting might well have come to an end at that point.

 

Look at what happened to the German paras on Crete when faced by civilias armed with little but knives, pitchforks etc - a bloodbath - same likely to happen in SE England - many of the Home Guard were used to hand to hand fighting from the Great War

 

I would agree with some of what you say Kev , but without reinforcements being able to get ashore the paratroops would have been in trouble and the Germans didn't have the hardware to get ashore in good order , they would not have been able to exclude the RN from the equation , it could have been a "Crete" for them.
The Luftwaffe would not have been able to bomb cities and support the invasion - they lacked the resources for this and in dividing their efforts would have achieved neither.

 

Had the Luftwaffe tactics of attacking the airfields not been disrupted, then the RAF might not have been able to use the South East of England bases, and a possible paratroop drop on the Isle of Wight might have given them British territory and a base for Luftwaffe bombers and fighters to continue a blitzkreig on troops artillery and transport hubs, let alone further heavy bombing of London and other major cities

...but without reinforcements being able to get ashore the paratroops would have been in trouble


There were MAJOR isues affecting the use of the FJ by September 1940.

They were still busy recruiting and training replacements for the great losses they had experienced in parachute troops in Norway and Holland.

There was a widespread shortage of parachute silk in Europe!

There was a shortage of gliders; Belgium and Holland had written off nearly all the Luftwaffe had.

The numbers of available JU52 transports for the Fj and Airlanding Divisions had plummeted. At the start of September it had risen back up to just barely over 300; some 3/5s of the Ju52 transport fleet had been writen off in Norway and the Low Countries, and Junkers' production rate seems A/ to have been quite low anyway, and B/ the factory spent a considerable part of the summer rebuilding wrecks and damaged aircraft from Holland.

There was also a GREAT reluctance on the part of OKW to write the FJ into anything more than perioheral operations at first; in the first version of the Sealion plans there was only combat engineer-level attacks against the shore batteries on either side of Dover; Student lobbied hard for a greater role....and this inceased to the same small ops plus JUST two airfield landings to put troops into holding the Royal Military Canal.

Many german officers and planners regarded Norway and Holland as phyrric victories; operationally successful - but VERY high in manpower and aircraft losses. Something as small as boggy ground on airfield aprons meant that when damaged aircraft blocked the runway...those attempting to land on open ground on either side similarly were damaged/written off. In Holland as the airfields blocked, the LW was reduced to trying to land its Ju52s on major roads and out on the beach at Zandvoort.

ONCE they got possession of their objectives in Holland...the NEXT problem was that the rest of the Wehrmacht had to fight their way TO THEM to relieve them....rather than being able to aim for their OWN objectives!!!! So the MOST the planners were willing to offer Student was two SMALL airfield landings VERY close to the coast...so if anything went wrong, the FJ could be relieved far more easily than in Holland. And the corrollary of THAT of course was that small landings meant that the FJ could only be given a relatively minor tactical objective.

 

These munitions etc were received from the US just after Dunkirk in July 1940"

- 785,000 .30 cal. Lee-Enfield rifles,
- 130 million rounds .30 ammo.
- 87,000 machine guns (various types)
- 6 million rounds .30 cal. machine gun ammo.
- 900 75mm field guns
- 1,075,000 75mm shells
- 308 3" Stokes mortars
- 97,680 Stokes mortar shells
- 25,000 BAR's
- 21,000 revolvers
- 1,000,000 revolver cartridges
.


Was this all purchased from the US under "Cash & Carry"?

 

785,000 .30 cal. Lee-Enfield rifles. I never knew they made .3 calibre Lee Enfields. I came across some Mk 2 No 4s with US PROPERTY stamped just behind the bridge charger guide they were .303. I fired a Canadian Ross .303. Now looking back on my old notes I see that the M1917 I fired is referred to as the .30 Enfield. Great stuff.

 

[FONT=&quot]A few people have asked what Royal Navy resources were available to combat a invasion attempt in September, 1940.
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Here is the situation as of 16 September:[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Plymouth : 1 Battleship, 2 Cruisers, 16 Destroyers.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
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[FONT=&quot]The Humber : 3 Cruisers.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Sheerness/Harwich : 2 Cruisers, 24 Destroyers.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Portsmouth : 1 Cruiser, 16 Destroyers.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]( Obviously, this is just the number of ships of destroyer size or above. There were literally several hundred smaller vessels – minesweepers, sloops, armed trawlers, gunboats and MTBs etc ).[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]The Home Fleet itself ( 2 Battleships, 1 Battlecruiser, 3 Cruisers & 17 Destroyers at Rosyth, and 1 Battlecruiser, 1 Carrier, 4 Cruisers and 7 Destroyers at Scapa Flow ) would not have come south unless German heavy ships appeared in the southern part of the North Sea. We know now that the heaviest ship available to the Germans in September 1940 was Hipper, a heavy cruiser, but at the time the Admiralty were unsure of the operational status of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and even Bismarck.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]There were also a further 8 French & 3 Polish Destroyers at Plymouth and Portsmouth.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Enough to do the job, I believe![/FONT]

 

785,000 .30 cal. Lee-Enfield rifles. I never knew they made .3 calibre Lee Enfields. I came across some Mk 2 No 4s with US PROPERTY stamped just behind the bridge charger guide they were .303. I fired a Canadian Ross .303. Now looking back on my old notes I see that the M1917 I fired is referred to as the .30 Enfield. Great stuff.

This shipment, I believe was the result of this action by Canada!

Did you ever wonder why Canada did not declare war on Germany until the 10th of September? Because Canada used their neutral status in this interim period to purchase $20,000,000 of arms from the still neutral United States!

 

This was posted in another thread for Sealion!

Naval:


From Redcoat


This was the total RN strength in 1939. All would not have been available in September 1940 due to other duties.


15 Battleships & battlecruisers
7 Aircraft carriers.
66 Cruisers
184 Destroyers of all types
60 Submarines, mainly modern with nine building.
45 escort and patrol vessels
The first 56 'Flower' class corvettes on order to add to the converted 'V' and 'W's' and 'Hunts'

 

There were literally several hundred smaller vessels – minesweepers, sloops, armed trawlers, gunboats and MTBs etc


Leaving aside the sloops, gunboats and MTBS for a moment - Brian Lavery puts the strength of the Auxiliary Patrol...the armed trawlers and armed yachts...at @....600!

 

Royal Navy Ship Dispositions September 1st 1939. This provides the overall number and not what was available in September 1940 but it makes interesting reading nonetheless.

Royal Navy Ship Dispositions - 1 September 1939

 

Royal Navy Ship Dispositions September 1st 1939. This provides the overall number and not what was available in September 1940 but it makes interesting reading nonetheless.

Royal Navy Ship Dispositions - 1 September 1939


The information I supplied earlier was from the Royal Navy Pink List of 16 September, 1940.

The Pink List was issued every three or four days, and listed the whereabouts (obviously not the position at sea of course) and operational status of every major RN warship.

In effect, it was the Royal Navy's Order of Battle, from which the Admiralty and subordinate commanders made their operational decisions, so it was essential that it be accurate.

There was a similar, but much larger, list for smaller RN vessels.