British Tank Development.

And there's the conceptual conundrum: was it actually designed to be upgunned (what was the status of the longer 75 when the tank was in development?), or was it just luck that they found themselves with a tank in production that could take a bigger gun when they found that things weren't going their way.

 

I honestly don't know the answer to that, but I'm hoping someone does.

All the best

Andreas

 

Just checked Spielberger (IV) and Scheibert (III). Spielberger refers to the foresight in the design but doesn't source it further. Scheibert states the III was designed to take a 5cm gun, but they didn't have one at the time it was designed so they went with a 37mm instead.

All the best

Andreas

 

The Mk III received a gun that fired the same ammunition as the 3.7-cm PAK 36 (standard infantry AT gun), the Mk IV a gun that fired the same ammunition as the LeIG 18 (standard light infantry field gun). In fact, a great deal of thought had been given to standardising ammunition requirements.

The Panzertruppe would have preferred a 5.0-cm gun, as a compromise the turret ring was designed in such a way that it could be retrofitted. Whether this was due to the foresight of the designers or to Guderian's energetic advocacy is not clear from the little literature I have.

 

If in doubt it was Liddell-Hart.

All the best

Andreas

 

I don't think so - but an excellent transition to the actual thread topic ;-)

 

Talk of turret rings inevitably leads me to think about British restrictions in design. As I recall, everything was limited by the maximum width that the British rail (and railway tunnel?) system could support. Churchills had to have the air cleaners removed from the side of the rear hull during transport.

What I can't remember is why the British rejected the idea of sponsons over the tracks in order to extend the width of the turret. Was it to keep the tank from being too tall?

 

It may have been foresight, but of a different kind. One thing that the Germans lacked later on was certain rare materials. For the Allies this allowed us to improve the ammunition of smaller guns to a point where those smaller weapons were still useful. For example a 2-pounder, with Littlejohn was theoretically able to knock out a Tiger from the side. Yet the Germans lacked these materials so had to go bigger to achieve the performance.
Now material shortages effected both sides, for example the British knew about HESH from 1940, but only used it in two rounds in the entire war. That's likely because of production of plastic was so limited that it couldn't be put into wider usage, and what little use it did get the rounds were leavened with conventional explosive. IIRC Germany was quite the colossus of the chemical industry so may well have been able to adapt to producing it, but they didn't know it existed.

Foresight, or cost saving?

 

Special Warwell wagons had to be constructed for rail transport of Shermans because of their height which exceeded the loading gauge of certainly all LMS and Cheshire Lines . Grant ‘iron cathedrals’ must have been bridge removers. However l suspect few of these arrived in Britain in comparison.

 

Germany developed numerous Wolfram/Tungsten-dependent guns in WW2, much later than the 30s. Some of these, like the sPzB41 saw widespread service in e.g. the desert. So this was clearly not the case.


Captured sPzB41 in the desert, 6 Mar 42, IWM E9090 http://media.iwm.org.uk/iwm/mediaLib//46/media-46665/large.jpg

2.8 cm sPzB 41 - Wikipedia

It also makes little sense as an explanation when you consider that by early/mid 1930s standards there was little need for any special materials in ammunition to defeat typical armour encountered. The problem did not come up until the French campaign, and my understanding is that the Germans did not even produce Tungsten-cored ammunition for the 37mm and 50mm guns until 1940 and the 2cm KwK until 1941.

Lexikon der Wehrmacht - Panzer 3

Lexikon der Wehrmacht - Panzer 2

If you have information confirming that Scheibert's or Itdan's explanations are wrong, you are welcome to provide it. Fact of the matter is that the tank was designed and built with a turret ring that could accommodate a larger gun, and that this was done purposefully.

All the best

Andreas

 

You've managed to find a small production anti-tank weapon that used the principle. However, you fail to have actually read your own source:

If you use the Wiki numbers then total Tungsten used for all the ammunition produced, was about 1 tonne. The fact it was discontinued due to a shortage of tungsten tells you all you need to know. Germany was so hard up for the material they had to cancel production of an ammunition type that had cost just one ton over three years.

Further:
German Uranium Cored APCR WWII Ammo

So Wikipedia and Albert Speer both agree that Germany lacked certain materials in sufficient quality for the ammo needed. It's almost certain further digging will find more details, but at current I lack the time.
Thus my original comment about Germany lacking the rare materials needed for fancy ammunition types, and thus had to scale up to achieve the same performance stands scrutiny.

 

There is an interesting article here about tungsten in WW2. Chapter 3 covers Germany. The interesting comment is that “A critical shortage of tungsten never occurred”. They merely reorganised their stocks and acquisitions to maximise the benefits of what they had. So the priorities in its use were machine tools to produce war materials not use in war materials themselves like anti tank ammo.
https://www.researchgate.net/public...War_China_Japan_Germany_the_Allies_and_Iberia

The Allies also exerted diplomatic and economic pressure on Portugal and Spain in early 1944 to cut supplies.
Wolfram Crisis - Wikipedia

 

No, it doesn't, because you haven't demonstrated that it was any part of their decision-making process.

 

We are talking about tank development in the 1930s here, and you try to use evidence from 1943 to contribute to the discussion.

So with all due respect let me note that I do not seriously consider for one second that I am the one who fails to read here.

All the best

Andreas

 

Yes. How is that relevant to decisions taken in German tank design in 1934?

All the best

Andreas

 

very simple answer:
Saving scarce resources and production capacities

If you know the ratio of (massive) rearmament to industrial capacity to economic output in Germany from 1935 onwards, this is hardly surprising.

 

The guys at Krupp and Rheinmetall already understood their craft pretty well: sub-calibre tungsten hypervelocity ammunition (pinch-head grenade) was quickly recognised as an extremely effective concept.
But as it happens: then come upset bureaucrats from the financial, armament and economic offices.....
That is why the concept was tearfully buried.

Instead, in the long run, the 8.8 anti-aircraft gun was redesigned for installation in tanks, because it could deliver an ordinary lump of metal to the target with remarkable terminal ballistic effect.
(And it suited both the German penchant for overengineering AND the Nazi penchant for gigantomania).

But somehow we are getting away from the actual topic again......