Breakout from Tobruk

I've been reading several war diaries of the units that took part in the Tobruk breakout in Nov-Dec 1941 and have been struck by the ferocity of the fighting and also by the way that, at times, the Commonwealth forces manage to co-ordinate infantry, artillery and tanks successfully (even at night!).

It seems a tragedy therefore that 70 Division was sent to the Far East in Jan 1942, having learnt so much about tank-infantry co-operation, to retrain for light infantry operations/Chindit operations. Wouldn't it have been possible (and more sensible) to send a different division back to India?

By the way, it is also good to read the Australian and NZ accounts, which reflect the good British tank and infantry performance - very different from the following summer.

There seems to be a gap in most books here as well, with most Crusader books treating the Tobruk breakout as an Annex to the more glamorous tank battles (which can also be used to beat the British with suggestions of incompetence) and ignore the achievements of those on Ed Duda and Belhamed.

Cheers

Tom

 

I fully agree, and I am glad I got you to collect a lot of the war diaries for me.

Nevertheless, it isn't all rosy even at 32 Army Tank Brigade end. If you look at the break-out plan, you'll note that 1 RTR was essentially wasted on a suicide mission on 21 November (see here: http://rommelsriposte.com/2010/11/30/not-a-good-day-at-the-office-%E2%80%93-1-rtr-and-the-first-day-of-the-tobruk-breakout/ ), and the New Zealanders (Brig. Barrowclough, but not in the official history, rather in private) had some interesting things to say about the willingness of the British tank commanders to engage in the night attack that carried Ed Duda.

Regarding why they were not sent, a few considerations:the only formations that could have been sent were: 4 Indian, 50 Northumbrian, and 70 Division. Also independent Indian Brigades, 29 and 38, I think, and 3 Indian Motor Brigade. Of these, 50 Northumbrian was in Cyprus, or still arriving (not sure). 4 Indian Division, 3 Indian Motor Brigade, and 29 Indian Brigade were at this stage tried and tested formations, with good desert experience. 4 Indian Division and 29 Indian Brigade were fully engaged still in the operation. 38 Indian Brigade had just been formed.

So, 70 Division had nothing to do, was not mobile, and was complete. It must have been the obvious choice.

All the best

Andreas

 

Andreas,

Hmmm, it looks like the mission given to 1 R. Tanks was: "1 R. Tanks will raid the extreme left flank near the BARDIA Rd and will pass round TIGER by the S.W. thus possibly passing through elements of 'A' Sqn [4 R. Tanks]. 1 R. Tanks cross S.L. at Z 24."

Not sure what the thinking was here? Did Willison leave any details? I see from the 32 Army Tk Bde Op Order that it was expected that 1 RTR "will raid enemy H.Q. in square 428420 and any enemy rear positions on route" and move "direct on the objective at 25 m.p.h."

I suppose we should remember that the plan was conceived in light of intelligence that suggested this sector was held by only relatively weak Italian forces.

As for 70 Division being the only available infantry division to send to India - I'm not sure which units were in Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, etc. I guess the decision was made before Rommell's counter-attack as well?

Cheers

Tom

 

*
Hello Andreas, hope all is well with you!

The 50th (Northumbrian) Division left Cyprus for Palestine on 7 November 1941, but only really to reassemble for a journey to Northern Iraq. It was sent to Northern Iraq to fight, if necessary, in the Caucasus with the Russians; but only on the occasion of the Germans seriously threatening Russian and British oil interests in the area.

The 50 Div was replaced in Cyprus by the 5th Indian Division and had to hand over all of its (new) kit to them. In return, 50 Div inherited the 5th Indian Division's dilapidated kit, which was in such a bad state of repair that 50 Div had to travel to Iraq without the 150th Infantry Brigade (which was left behind in Palestine).

The 151st Infantry Brigade, the last 50 Div unit to leave Iraq, started its journey to the Western Desert on 6 February 1942. The 50 Div was assembled in the Gazala lines defences (its then boxes) on approximately 26 February 1942.

I assume that at the time the decision was made to send the 70th Infantry Division to the Far East, there was an expectation that 50 Div may have to fight alongside the Russians in the Caucasus. It was only when the Russians felt comfortable that they had the Germans contained that they told Churchill that they did not need British assistance and 50 Div was sent to the Western Desert.

The world was a 'chess board like' battle ground, with the pieces being moved around as needs and time dictated. Nothing was ideal.

Best,

Steve.

 

Andreas just followed your link to the crusader site thank you for sharing. I shall enjoy reading the contents and get educated too Elsie

 

According to the British Official History in Oct 41 there were 10 infantry divisions, 4 infantry Bde groups, 6 inf bdes, 1 motor Bde and 10 unbrigaded battalions in the Middle East.

I guess the divisions were: 70 Brit, 50 Brit, three Australian divs, two SA divs, the NZ div, and 4 and 5 Indian Divs.

If 50 Div had already been relieved from Cyprus and was in Iraq/Iran then it would be interesting to see exactly how they decided to send the experienced 70 Div and leave the inexperienced 50 Div in the Middle East - although as I typed that I thought maybe that was exactly why!

Cheers

Tom

 

*
I don't understand your meaning, Tom...?

Best,

Steve.

 

Steve,

I'm trying to understand why it was decided to send an infantry division which was experienced in tank - infantry co- operation out to India and replace it with a territorial division that hadn't seen action in the western desert. Or, they could have sent 50 Div back to Cyprus and sent one of the Indian divisions that were available. Fortunately 50 Division did a damn fine job! But I'm not sure that the best use was made of a whole division of regulars.

Regards

Tom

 

Hello Tom,

Due to negative criticism coming from the USA and Australia, I know that Churchill was under and therefore applying, a great deal of pressure for a full British Division (as apposed to Empire/Commonwealth) to be fighting Axis forces and the Western Desert would seem the obvious place to achieve that. But why 50 Div was chosen for the Western Desert instead of the 70 Div, I have no idea. It may have just been a matter of timing... The veterans on this forum would explain it by simply saying 'Army'; in other words, there is no logic...

The answer may lie in the Corps War Diaries or other documents available originating from higher authority. I have not found any applicable reference in my relevant books.

Best,

Steve.

 

You have to remember that when the decision was made, they thought they had Rommel whipped and it was mostly a question of wiping up the pieces that remained of the Axis force. So having a territorial division in the ME to support mopping up and invading Tripolitania against weak opposition wasn't as much of a drawback as having a regular division in Burma was an advantage against the Japanese.

All the best

Andreas

 

The Spectator Archives - Tobruk:


http://archive.spectator.co.uk/search?term=Tobruk&first-month=Jul&first-year=1939&last-month=Dec&last-year=1946


you can of course specify your own search - Dunkirk etc.

 

Steve,

Yes, the answer might just be that there was no particular logic...

Andreas,

Yes, I had wondered about the decision from the post-Crusader euphoria perspective. That has sparked a thought about where the spare shipping came from - but that's another question.

Cheers

Tom

 

Hello Tom,

Some further thoughts...

As the war progressed there was less and less difference between a Regular and TA Battalion, Brigade, or Division; as replacements came from the same source.

When 50 Div left the UK it was around the same time as the 18 Div left, both destined for the Western Desert but with the latter ordered en route to Singapore and straight into captivity. However, some irony, on the journey 50 Div had been issued with tropical gear and the troops thought they were destined for the Far East... but still ended up in the Western Desert.

50 Div won 3 VC's in 14 months in the Western Desert, were an assault Division in Operation Husky (Sicily landings) and Operation Overlord - Gold Beach (Normandy landings) and ended up as the most battle hardened and experienced British Infantry Division in WWII.

70 Div never functioned again in battle as a full Division after Operation Crusader and was removed from the nominal role in 1943.

The fickle finger of fate at work. Figure that...!!!

Best,

Steve.

 

Steve,

All good points, and whatever happened to 50 and 70 Div the formation that had the toughest luck was obviously 18 Div.

Another thing I had forgotten about was the variety of experiences that the Inf Bdes of 70 Div had had before becoming part of 70 Div - seems like they had been everwhere in the Middle East including Somaliland, Iraq, Syria and Crete.

My Tobruk research seems to be boiling down at the moment to trying to find answers to the following questions:

From who did the order to break out come from, what did it say it wanted done, and when was it passed to the Tobruk Garrison?
Did 70 Div brief Army on their plan?
Why was the attack conducted by 32 A Tk Bde with infantry from 70 Div in support and not the other way around?
When the enemy began to press in on the SE corner of the perimeter, did anyone in Tobruk re-consider their planning?
Was intelligence held by Army passed to 70 Div and vice versa?

That should keep me busy for a bit :biggrin:

Cheers

Tom

 

It came from either 8 Army or ME Command. My guess is from 8 Army, since the breakout was to be ordered by it. TobFort issued its own operation instruction on 2 November, so the order would have been received in the days before that.

Yes, the operation order was copied through to 8 Army, & H.H.Q. M.E.

Because doctrine was for infantry tanks to lead such an attack.

The pressure happened in October, the situation had considerably quietened down by early November. In any case, the idea was to find the shortest way to connect with XXX Corps, and thereby to split the Axis forces. In hindsight, that was probably a mistake, and one could argue an attack to the west along the Via Bardia, and taking out Gambut, would have been far more disruptive.

It appears so. 70 Division Intel Summaries contain items they could only have received from outside, and 13 Corps intel summaries contain items related to Tobruk.

All the best

Andreas

 

Andreas,

Thansk for the reply. I'm not sure about this though:

Because doctrine was for infantry tanks to lead such an attack.


The tactical doctrine was for the tanks to leads, yes, but in other attacks the infantry tanks were placed under command of the infantry. For example,

"42 R TANKS OPERATION ORDER NO. 2
17 Nov 41.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy. Main line of defence consists of strongly fortified positions from HALFAYA to LIBYAN OMAR. The OMAR area appears to be strongly defended and minefields are known to exist on its Southern side.
A few AFVs have been reported in this area.

2. Own Tps. 7 Ind Inf Bde Gp with 42 R Tanks (less 1 Sqn) under comd, will seize and consolidate..."



In addition, on 23 Nov 41, 44 RTR came under command the NZ Division and was then assigned to 'under command' first 6 NZ Bde and then 4 NZ Bde.

Judging by typical British tank infantry doctrine, both at the time and later, it was more normal for the infantry tank units to be placed under command of Infantry Brigades. During the Tobruk breadout, it seems that infantry units were placed under command of 32 Army Tank Brigade.

I'll see if I can find anything to suggest why this was.

Cheers

Tom

 

Different operations. Sidi Omar was a take and hold, while Tobruk was a breakout and exploit job. The first stage at Tobruk was under control of the infantry (taking BUTCH), and then the tanks took over.

Furthermore, only one infantry battalion was to participate, so giving the command to commander of the largest formation made sense.

Also to consider, 32 Army Tank Brigade had been in Tobruk for much longer, and presumably knew the terrain better.

All the best

Andreas

 

I just looked it up.

Phase 1: Taking BUTCH - 14 Brigade with D Sqdr. 7 RTR under command
Phase 2: Taking TIGER - 32 Army Tank Brigade with 1 infantry battalion under command
Phase 3: 1 RTR wreaking havoc in Bologna's rear - 32 Army Tank Brigade without any infantry
Phase 4: 14 Infantry Brigade with D Sqdr. 7 RTR under command cleans up area between TIGER and BUTCH
Phase 5: 32 Army Tank Brigade with one infantry battalion under command takes Ed Duda

All the best

Andreas

 

Hi Andreas,

That's interesting, where did those phases come from?

According to WO169/1751 (2 Y&L WD), the 32 Army Tank Brigade Op Order of 5 November 41 says:

6. 14 Inf.Bde are attacking with 32 Army Tank Brigade.
7. The following Units will come under command 32 Army Tank Brigade:-
(a) For capture of TIGER.
One Bty 149 A/Tk Regt.
One Inf Bn. plus additional carriers (14 Inf Bde)
One Coy 1 R.N.F.
(b) For capture of ED DUDA.
1 R.H.A.
57 Lt.A.A. Bty.
One Bty. 149 A/Tk Regt.
One Sec. Fd. Coy. R.E.
One Coy. 1 R.N.F.
One Inf. Bn. (14 Inf Bde)
One Sec. Fd. Amb.
8. 32 Army Tank Briagde and attached troops will:-
(a) break through the enemy lines of investment.
(b) cut the road SOLLUM – DERNA.

BTW have you seen this website:

http://www.sidirezegh.com/Menus/Home.php

Some interesting Then and Now photos.

Cheers

Tom

 

Apologies for the smilies, I can't seem to get rid of them. They should be (b)'s!

Cheers,
Tom